Each member of the great society of nations being entirely independent of every other, and living in what has been called a

of importance to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The government of France and those of other European States were long since officially apprised by this government, that the United States could not see, without concern, that island transferred by Spain to any other European State. President Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive that the sort of protectorate introduced by the order in question might, in contingencies not difficult to be imagined, lead to results equally objectionable."

To this, it was answered, on 27th October, 1851: "M. de Sartiges had endeavored to establish, in a distinct manner, the two following points: - First, that the instructions issued by the government of the (French) Republic were spontaneous and isolated; secondly, that those instructions were exclusive, for an exclusive case, and applicable only to the class, and not to the nationality of any pirate or adventurer that should attempt to land, in arms, on the shores of a friendly power. He had added that the existing laws in regard to the right of search-laws about which the susceptibilities of the French government are as forcibly roused as those of the government of the United States were neither directly nor indirectly affected by the order to repel violence by force, since the instructions which have been issued to the commanding officer of the French station were only intended to apply to a case of piracy, the article of the maritime code in force concerning pirates." It was further said, "Those general considerations do not prevent [M. de Sartiges] from acknowledging that the interest which a country feels for another is naturally increased by reason of proximity; and his government, which understands the complicated nature as well as the importance of the relations existing between the United States and Cuba, has seriously considered the declaration formerly made by the government of the United States, and which has been renewed on this occasion, that that government could not see, with indifference, the island of Cuba pass from the hands of Spain into those of another European State.' The French government is likewise of opinion that, in case it should comport with the interests of Spain, at some future day, to part with Cuba, the possession of that island, or the protectorship of the same, ought not to fall upon any of the great maritime powers of the world." This correspondence was closed with a note of Mr. Webster, dated November 18, 1851, in which he says: "Inasmuch as M. de Sartiges now avers that the French government had only in view the execution of the provision of its maritime code against pirates, further discussion of the subject would seem to be for the present unnecessary." Cong. Doc. 32 Cong. 1 Sess. Senate, Ex. Doc. 1, p. 74–82.

เ

But, on 23d April, 1852, separate notes, though of the same tenor, inclosing copies of a despatch from their respective ministers of foreign affairs, (M. de Turgot and the Earl of Malmesbury,) and of the draft of a tripartite convention were addressed by the Ministers of France and England to the Secretary of State. The only substantive article of the convention was: "The high contracting parties hereby severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba; and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempt to that effect on the part of any power or individuals

state of nature in respect to others, acknowledging no common sovereign, arbiter, or judge; the law which prevails between

whatever." The accompanying communications contained disclaimers, by England and France, of any such intention by either of those powers, and referring to the previous course of the United States, it is assumed, that "all three parties appear to be fully agreed to repudiate, each for itself, all thought of appropriating Cuba, and that it would therefore seem as if all that remained to be done were to give practical effect to the views entertained in common by the three powers." This it was proposed to do, either by the above convention or by the interchange of formal notes to the same effect.

In acknowledging these notes, on 29th April, 1852, Mr. Webster says, "It has been stated, and often repeated to the government of Spain by this government, under various administrations, not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a voluntary cession of the island to any European power, she might rely on the countenance and friendship of the United States to assist her in the defence and preservation of that island. At the same time, it has always been declared to Spain that the government of the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to any European power. . The present Executive of the United States entirely approves of this past policy of the government, and fully concurs in the general sentiments expressed by M. de Turgot, and understood to be identical with those entertained by the government of Great Britain." He deemed it his duty, at the same time, to remind the ministers, and through them their governments, that "the policy of the government of the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements with other States, and to keep itself free from international obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the United States themselves." He assured each of them that the President would take his communication into consideration, and give it his best reflections.

The French and English ministers, on 8th of July, 1852, again refer to the proposed convention. In their respective notes, which, like the former papers, only differ in being written by each in his own language, they place the right of intervention of their governments, as well on their general commercial interests as on the special interests, which their subjects, and the government of France, on their own account, have in the question as creditors of Spain. "There is," they say, "at the present time, an evident tendency in the maritime commerce of the world to avail itself of the shorter passages from one ocean to another offered by the different routes existing or in contemplation across the isthmus of Central America. The island of Cuba, of considerable importance in itself, is so placed, geographically, that the nation which may possess it, if the naval forces of that nation should be considerable, might either protect or obstruct the commercial routes from one ocean to the other. Now, if the maritime powers are, on the one hand, out of respect to the rights of Spain and from a sense of their international duty, bound to dismiss all intention of obtaining possession of Cuba, so, on the other hand, are they obliged, out of consideration for the interests of their own subjects or citizens, and the protec

nations being deficient in those external sanctions by which the laws of civil society are enforced among individuals; and the

tion of the commerce of other nations, who are entitled to the use of the great highways of commerce on equal terms, to proclaim and assure, as far as in them lies, the present and future neutrality of the island of Cuba." They also state, "that British and French subjects, as well as the French government, are, on different accounts, creditors of Spain for large sums of money. The expense of keeping up an armed force in the island of Cuba of 25,000 men is heavy, and obstructs the government of Spain in the efforts which they make to fulfil their pecuniary engagements. By putting an end to the state of apprehension, which is the cause of those armaments, we should increase to Spain the means of meeting those engagements." The confining to European governments an exclusion from the future sovereignty of Cuba is thus animadverted on: "The word 'European' in juxtaposition with the word 'power,' might justify, on the part of the British and French governments, some doubt as to the signification of the declaration of the United States; and it might be thought that the United States, while, by their declaration, they exclude other nations from profiting by the chances of future possible events, have not debarred themselves by that declaration from availing themselves of such events." The convention is, in conclusion, declared to have but two objects in view, "the one a mutual renunciation of the future possession of Cuba; the other an engagement to cause this renunciation to be respected."

Mr. Everett, having become Secretary of State, announces, on 1st December, 1852, in answer to the preceding notes, that the President declines the invitation of France and England for the United States to become a party to the proposed convention. He expressly disclaims, that our objection to Cuba falling into the possession of any other European government than Spain, arises from our being dissatisfied with any natural increase of territory and power, on the part of France or England. "The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States; at the same time, he considers the condition of Cuba as mainly an American question. The proposed convention proceeds on a different principle. It assumes that the United States have no other or greater interest in the question than France and England; whereas it is necessary only to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote are the relations of Europe and how intimate those of the United States with this island." After assigning, as one of the reasons for refusing to become a party to the convention, its certain rejection, by the Senate, he expresses a doubt "whether the Constitution of the United States would allow the treaty-making power to impose a permanent disability on the American government, for all coming time, and prevent it from doing what has been so often done in times past. In 1803, the United States purchased Louisiana of France; and in 1819, they purchased Florida of Spain. It is not within the competence of the treaty-making power, in 1852, effectually to bind. the government in all its branches; and, for all coming time, not to make a similar purchase of Cuba. . . Among the oldest traditions of the Federal Government is an aversion to political alliances with European Powers. . . The alliance of 1778 with France, at the time of incalculable benefit to the United States, in

performance of the duties of international law being compelled by moral sanctions only, by fear on the part of nations of provok

less than twenty years came near involving us in the wars of the French revolution, and laid the foundation of heavy claims upon Congress, not extinguished to the present day. It is a significant coincidence, that the particular provision of the alliance which occasioned those evils, was that under which France called upon us to aid her in defending her West India possessions against England.

.

"But the President has a graver objection to entering into the proposed convention. He has no wish to disguise the feeling that the compact, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal in substance. France and England, by entering into it, would disable themselves from obtaining possession of an island remote from their seats of government, belonging to another European power, whose natural right to possess it must always be as good as their own a distant island in another hemisphere, and one which by no ordinary or peaceful course could ever belong to either of them. . . The United States, on the other hand, would, by the proposed convention, disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which drains half the North American continent, and with its tributaries forms the largest system of internal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the door-way of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume." "Even now the President cannot doubt that both France and England would prefer any change in the condition of Cuba to that which is most to be apprehended, viz., an internal convulsion which should renew the horrors and the fate of San Domingo." Mr. Everett thus intimates a final objection to the convention: "M. de Turgot and Lord Malmesbury put forward, as the reason for entering into such a compact, the attacks which have lately been made on the island of Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, with the avowed design of taking possession of that island.' The President is convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty, instead of putting a stop to these lawless proceedings, would give a new and powerful impulse to them. It would strike a death blow to the conservative policy hitherto pursued in this country towards Cuba. No administration of this government, however strong in public confidence in other respects, could stand a day under the odium of having stipulated with the great powers of Europe, that in no future time, under no change of circumstances, by no amicable arrangement with Spain, by no act of lawful war, (should that calamity unfortunately occur,) by no consent of the inhabitants of the island, should they, like the possessions of Spain on the American continent, succeed in rendering themselves independent; in fine, by no overruling necessity of self-preservation should the United States ever make the acquisition of Cuba." Cong. Doc. 32 Cong. 2 Sess. Senate, Ex. Doc. No. 13.]

the Refor

ing general hostility, and incurring its probable evils in case they should violate this law; an apprehension of the possible consequences of the undue aggrandizement of any one nation upon the independence and the safety of others, has induced the States of modern Europe to observe, with systematic vigilance, every material disturbance in the equilibrium of their respective forces. This preventive policy has been the pretext of the most bloody and destructive wars waged in modern times, some of which have certainly originated in well-founded apprehensions of peril to the independence of weaker States, but the greater part have been founded upon insufficient reasons, disguising the real motives by which princes and cabinets have been influenced. Wherever the spirit of encroachment has really threatened the general security, it has commonly broken out in such overt acts as not only plainly indicated the ambitious purpose, but also furnished substantive grounds in themselves sufficient to justify a resort to arms by other nations. Such were the Wars of grounds of the confederacies created, and the wars mation. undertaken to check the aggrandizement of Spain and the house of Austria, under Charles V. and his successors; an object finally accomplished by the treaty of Westphalia, which so long constituted the written public law of Europe. The long and violent struggle between the religious parties engendered by the Reformation in Germany, spread throughout Europe, and became closely connected with political interests and ambition. The great Catholic and Protestant powers mutually protected the adherents of their own faith in the bosom of rival States. The repeated interference of Austria and Spain in favor of the Catholic faction in France, Germany, and England, and of the Protestant powers to protect their persecuted brethren in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, gave a peculiar coloring to the political transactions of the age. This was still more heightened by the conduct of Catholic France under the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu, in sustaining, by a singular refinement of policy, the Protestant princes and people of Germany against the house of Austria, whilst she was persecuting with unrelenting severity her own subjects of the reformed faith. The balance of power adjusted by the peace of Westphalia was once more disturbed by the ambition of Louis XIV., which compelled the Protestant States of Europe to unite with the house of Aus