a gallant army, but not one as yet. In the next place, supposing they were all as thoroughly disciplined as our Foot Guards or crack regiments, they could not be of the least service to Great Britain in the event of an invasion, for this plain reason, that they, and double their number, would, in such an event, be required to keep Ireland quiet. We have supposed, in the preceding calculations, the whole regulars, above 21,000 effective men, withdrawn from Ireland to join in the defence of the centre of the empire; could the whole police, or any part of them, be also brought

over, leaving the whole of Ireland to the tender mercies of Ribandmen and Repealers? The thing is quite ridiculous, after the experience we have had of Irish Catholicism; and therefore nothing more need be said on that head.

Nothing is more certain than that, in the event of a serious descent being made by the French on Great Britain, not only would all the regular troops now in Ireland, or nearly all, but the whole police, be required to keep down rebellion. Hear the Nation, of June 4, 1852, on this sub ject, in an article on the Electric Telegraph:

"It would be a fatal message, truly, for Ireland," says the Nation, "if we interpreted the first despatch of this new agent of intercourse (the Electric Telegraph) as a decree of perpetual subjection to our country. Suppose we look across the Straits of Dover. Is there not a scientific ligature binding England to France? And will any man pretend that by this concealed agency war between the two historic enemies is rendered im

possible for evermore? Why, England was in a panic of fear two short months ago; and even now she speculates and takes precautions against the designs of the successor of Napoleon. She trusts rather to her legions than to her telegraphs, and enrols a militia in anticipation of a message of war, which would be uttered as from the throats of cannon, not ingeniously symbolised by scientific mechanism. There are two termini to a telegraph; and it would be strange if we could not take possession of that on our own shores if this country were in arms, and an invading army in England. A telegraph will threaten as well as compliment-will bear tidings of war as well as messages of peace. And if a war in

Europe gave Ireland an opportunity to revenge the hourly insults and tyrannies of England-if the convulsion which the prognostications of English statesmen teach us to expect bursts upon us-if, as we said last week, we be thrown upon our own resources, and have to choose our part in the struggle-this new fetter would be torn to pieces in an hour, or be the agent to announce to England that the subject she has scourged for centuries had abjured her authority and defied her will.”

And, again, touching The Times' renewed "ferocity," the Nation (June recent criticism on Young Ireland's 4) again explains its meaning in these

terms:

"In the present state of this country, with public opinion in a trance, and the population marching to the hustings instead of the arsenal, it would be utter insanity to threaten England. We canspeculate on events as freely and as justnot give her blow for blow; but we can ly as our ancient enemy, The Times. And behind the clouds which portend trouble and danger to England, shall we not be permitted to proclaim that the sun still shines in whose light our country shall renew her liberty and strength? We do proclaim that England's danger is 1reland's opportunity. And we welcome that danger; and trust that, when it comes, Ireland will turn it to her advantage. The fall of the tyrant is the emancipation

of the slave."

Then, as to the yeomanry and dock battalions, the same observation applies. We are the last persons in the world who would throw a shadow of doubt on the loyalty of these men, or feel the slightest distrust in their courage, or even, in a certain degree, But every efficiency in the field.

man acquainted with the rudiments even, of the military art, and none more than the most estimable and really efficient of those admirable corps, knows well that the business of a soldier, like every other trade or profession, is not learned either in a week or a month; and that many a corps which has gone through permanent duty of ten days, and can pass muster on an inspection, and make a good figure on parade, would be sadly thrown out if required to move, in double-quick time, under a heavy cannonade or biting fire of Minié rifles, and would rapidly sink

or melt away under the ills of dripping bivouacs, night marches, and scanty rations. Admirable and serviceable as auxiliaries to regulars, they could never be placed in line with them, or relied on as a substantial addition to our effective force in the field. Add to this that the dockyard battalions would all, in the event of an invasion, be required to defend their own works, in addition to the regular forces assigned for that purpose; and with them they would be few enough. And as to the yeomanry, it must be recollected that they are, for the most part, composed of persons in rural life and scattered over an immense tract of country, and therefore they could not be immediately collected at a single point in the south of England to oppose a sudden landing and rapid march upon London, of a formidable concentrated French army. Many days, probably weeks, must elapse before the yeomanry-how active, loyal, and courageous soever-could by possibility assemble, and reach the south of England, from Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, and the north, even supposing those great deposits of mercantile and manufacturing wealth could with safety be left unprotected, when every sabre and bayonet in the regular army was already drawn off to meet the invader near the metropolis. And in those few days or weeks, the greatest danger would be incurred, and the empire might be lost.

Strong as the preceding statement is as to the urgency of the case, and the absolute necessity of adding to our national defences, if we would save the empire from subjugation, and ourselves from pillage, confiscation, and ruin, it becomes incomparably stronger when the state of our colonial possessions is considered. All of them, even more than Great Britain and Ireland, are on the peace establishment. If a war broke out, and the centre of the empire was threatened, every one of them, so far from being able to furnish any succour to the endangered metropolis, would be urgent in their demands for reinforcements to defend themselves. We speak not only of pacific colonies, as to which, whatever our own opi

nion may be, we are well aware there may be a difference of views among many able and patriotic men. We speak of the great military posts we hold in many parts of the globe, and without the possession of which all attempts to maintain our maritime superiority, or prevent ourselves from being blockaded in our own harbours, and our independence and industry, even at home, utterly destroyed. Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, the Bahama Isles, the Cape, Martinique, Aden, Ceylon, Hong-Kong, and a vast many others, are not so much colonies, in the proper sense of the word, as maritime fortresses, without possession of which our fleets would be unable to circumnavigate the globe, our means of sending out supplies and reinforcements to India would be cut off; and that magnificent possession would soon be lost, and with it all our other colonial possessions in the world. If we lose them, how is our revenue to be maintained, or our industry nourished?-for, rely upon it, every one of them would, as soon as emancipated, imitate the example of the French, Prussians, and Americans, and lay an import duty of 30 per cent on our manufactures. What would then come of our export trade to our colonies, now amounting to £19,000,000 annually? And yet how are they to be preserved against the wide-spread internal discontent which prevails in our colonial establishments, or the open hostility of the foreign powers, who would hasten to secure each a fragment of so mighty a dominion, if we have not the means from home of augmenting their present miserably insufficient garrisons?

If a disaster of a fatal description does befall the empire, no one can say that it has come upon us when not duly warned both by words and deeds of our dangers. Our greatest commanders by sea and land, and the persons best acquainted with the subject, concur in recommending it. The Duke of Wellington, Lord Hardinge, Sir John Burgoyne, Sir Charles Napier, Lord Palmerston, the late Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, Lord Derby, differing as far as the Poles are asunder on so many other subjects, are unanimous on this. But

great and deserving of the utmost respect and consideration as the opinions of these very eminent men are, there are considerations still more vital to be taken into view in estimating the weight due to their opinions. FACTS-RECENT UNDENIABLE FACTS-NOW SPEAK IN A VOICE OF

THUNDER. The economical policy, the laissez-aller system, has been tried both in Asia and Africa, and what has been the result? Why, that we have been on the very verge of losing our dominions in both in consequence. Lord William Bentinck, it is well known, in conformity alike with the instructions and uniform pacific policy of the Directors and his own disposition, adopted the pacific system to a considerable extent: he reduced the Anglo-Indian army from 260,000 to 180,000 men; and both he and his successors carefully abstained, by any warlike preparations, concentration of troops on the frontier, or accumulation of magazines, from giving umbrage or grounds for jealousy to the native powers. What ensued? Why, that which every man acquainted with history predicted, and every man unacquainted with it denied-that we were brought to the very verge of ruin in consequence. Our disbanded sepoys enlisted with the Sikhs, and augmented their already formidable force. The power which had the resources of a population of 80,000,000 at its command, was all but overpowered by one which had only the resources of 6,000,000; and nothing but the indomitable firmness and heroic courage of Lord Hardinge, Lord Gough, and their devoted followers, who emulated the three hundred Spartans at Thermopylæ, prevented the Indian empire from being lost, from the previous adoption of the pacific system, on the field of Ferozeshah!

Turn to Africa, and see what a lesson the practical application of the pacific system has taught us in its southern extremity. Lord Glenelg, it is well known, adopted that policy in its full extent: he thought he would conciliate savages by retiring before them. He trusted, with the simplicity of ignorance, to the missionaries causing the Caffre to change

his nature. were emancipated in 1834: we thought that gratitude for freedom in them would compensate the alienation of the Boors for the confiscation of their property, for a compensation not a fifth part of its value. Trusting to the effect of these decisive measures of conciliation and concession, and listening to the suggestions of the peace party, we withdrew our frontier, permitted the settlement of the Caffres on our dominions, disarmed the Boors, and intrusted the defence of a country as large as England, and a frontier 1000 miles in length, to less than 3000 British soldiers. What has been the result? Why, that we have been dragged into a long, bloody, and inglorious war. The Caffres have proved as hostile and rapacious as ever, the Boors sullen and apathetic, the Hottentots rebellious and ungrateful. After sixteen months of painful and most harassing hostility, the war is still unfinished; several serious discomfitures have been sustained; the enemy is still in possession of the rocky fastnesses in our own territory, though assailed by ten thousand of the best troops in the British dominions; and the most powerful empire, so far as wealth and resources go, on the face of the earth, is openly defied and insulted by a horde of naked savages.

The whole of the slaves

Are not these examples pregnant with instruction and prophetic of warning to Great Britain, considering how much more exposed to danger she is than either our Indian empire or African possessions. It is not the Sikhs, with a population of six millions-it is not the Caffres, with twenty or thirty thousand fighting men, that here threaten us: an enemy, a gigantic enemy, a foe of four centuries' standing, is at our gates. There is close to our shores a nation of thirtyfive millions of people, the leading portion of whom, it cannot be denied, are animated with a feeling of jealousy of England, as an old rival and formidable power, however kind and hospitable they may be to us as individuals. The two countries have in every part of the world interests, commercial and political, which are constantly clashing, and the conflict of which may at any time of a sudden give rise to dis

cussions of the most serious and embarassing nature. Of the reality of this danger it is impossible to entertain a doubt, when it is recollected that three times during the last twenty years-viz., once on the Eastern question and the affair of Acre; once on the Otaheite question and Queen Pomare; and once on the Hungarian refugees and Don Pacifico's claims-we were on the very verge of a serious war with France, and on the last occasion with France and Russia united. On the second occasion, Lord Palmerston has told us in the House of Commons, not only that we were on the verge of a war with France, but Louis Philippe's generals had offered, in six days, to put him in possession of London, and a squadron and the troops were ready at Cherbourg for that purpose. There can be no

security for an independent and powerful nation holding out such prizes to the victor, but in such means of defence at home as enables it to set an enemy at defiance.

The military stores of all kinds in France are immense, and not only all placed in citadels of approved strength and wholly beyond the reach of a coup-de-main, but they are so connected by a net-work of railways, constructed for the most part by the friendly aid of English capital, as to be capable of immediate transport to each other, or to the sea-coast for embarkation. In this respect England presents a painful contrast to its more far-seeing and sagacious rival. By far the greater part of our military stores are placed at Woolwich, a position admirably adapted for embarkation, and tolerably defended by the batteries of Sheerness and Tilbury on the sea side, but entirely open on the land, and liable to instant capture by a corps of 20,000 men, which might suddenly effect a landing on the coast of Kent, and assail it in rear. The remainder, or reserve stores, are for the most part at Weedon, a position farther in the interior, and on that account less liable to attack, and admirably chosen for railway communication with all parts of the country; but, like Woolwich, it is wholly undefended by fortifications, and would at once fall into the hands of any enemy who for a week together obtained the command

of the field in the neighbourhood of London. This glaring piece of imprudence and frightful defect in our national defences has been frequently pointed out by our historians; and all our leaders, both civil, military, and naval, are well aware of and deeply lament it. But such is the apathy of the public mind, and the weakness of every Government since the masses were let into the direction by the Reform Bill, that no administration has yet had the courage to propose the fortification of these vital national depots, nor, in truth, have they had the means, if they had hazarded the measure of carrying it through the House of Commons. So vast is its importance, however, so pressing the necessity of instantly adopting some efficient measure on the subject, that it is no exaggeration to say that the national existence is dependent on its success; and that if Lord Derby's administration fails in bringing forward and obtaining the support of the Commons to some measure calculated to give us security, in this respect, our days are numbered, and the handwriting on the wall has already pronounced our doom.

If a war was to break out between France and England, as it has so often been on the very verge of doing of late years, it is by no means improbable that the former country, although upon the whole inferior as a naval power, and greatly inferior in the long run in nautical resources and experience, might, in consequence of her superior means of naval preparation, for a short time obtain the command in the Channel. Napoleon, it is well known, had matured a deep laid plan for this purpose, which failed, not in consequence of our having any naval force at home to dispute it, but solely because Admiral Calder accidentally fell in with and rudely handled the combined fleet on its return from the West Indies, and Villeneuve, after he had joined the Ferrol squadron, instead of steering with his thirty-three ships of the line for Brest, where Gantheaume awaited him with twenty-one, steered to Cadiz, in August 1805, where he was ere long blockaded, and at length totally defeated by Nelson at Trafalgar. This extraordinary accident, or infa