tract relates to specific property, there can be no question about lack of definiteness in the contract itself so far as concerns the property to which the bargain relates; the question is wholly whether the memorandum sufficiently describes this property. This question has risen more frequently in regard to sales of real estate than in regard to sales of personal property; still there are a few decisions in regard to goods. It will be seen from the decisions cited below that the American courts have required greater particularity in descriptions of real estate than in descriptions of goods. In the cases relating to real estate it may be that too great stress is laid upon a description that will identify beyond possibility of doubt the subject-matter of the sale. "John Smith" in a memorandum does not identify, beyond a peradventure, a party so designated, but it is a suffiFed. Rep. 200, where billets "4 x 5 or 5 x 5" was held sufficient description. 3 New England Wool Co. v. Standard Worsted Co., 165 Mass. 328, 43 N. E. 112. In this case the property described was "about 2,000 to 2,500 lbs. F. C." The property in regard to which the parties were bargaining was in fact, 2,443 lbs. of "F. C." wool. The court held the description sufficient because when it was shown "who and where the parties were at the time of making the contract, and what property the plaintiff had on hand of the kind described, it is clear without more that the memorandum referred to the 2,443 lbs. of wool on hand." No doubt the court is right in saying that it was possible to translate the memorandum when the surrounding circumstances and the time and place of the bargain was shown but that would also be true of a memorandum which read: "I have sold you the goods you looked at, at the usual price," but it may be doubted whether this memorandum would be sufficient. In Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Broomfield, 180 Mass. 283, 62 N. E. 367, the words, "all your iron which you may desire to sell," were held a sufficient description of iron on the premises of the plaintiff's mill. In Brewer v. Horst-Lachmund Co., 127 Cal. 643, 60 Pac. 418, 50 L. R. A. 240, the subject-matter of the sale was a certain lot of hops. Samples had been given from these hops and, in accordance with a custom in the trade, samples were designated by a number-in this case, "13." The reference to the goods in a telegram as "13" was held a sufficient description of them. A more extreme case is Macdonald v. Longbottom, 1 E. & E. 977, where evidence was admitted to show that the words, "your wool," referred to certain particular wool which the plaintiff had under his control at the time of the contract. In Shardlow v. Cotterell, 20 Ch. D. 90 (C. A.), Lush, L. J., said (at p. 97): "Suppose a horsedealer having a great number of horses offers one of them for sale; the horse is trotted out and approved of, but the parties differ about the price. Suppose the next day the seller writes and says, 'I will let you have that horse for £50,' and the buyer writes to accept the offer, would not parol evidence be admissible to show what horse was meant?" cient description of a person of that name intended. It may perhaps be questioned whether "Estate on Congress Street, owned by Sarah A. Hill," is not a sufficient description of the estate the parties were bargaining about, although the description may be applicable to another piece of property also. The 4 This descripion was held insufficient in Doherty v. Hill, 144 Mass. 465, 11 N. E. 581. See decisions stated in Wood on the Statute of Frauds, § 353. In Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413, it was held, following Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, that in a memorandum of sale, dated at Boston, the words "a house on Church street" sufficiently described the property. Wells, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The most specific and precise description of the property intended requires some parol proof to complete its identification. A more general description requires more. When all the circumstances of possession, ownership, situation of the parties, and of their relation to each other and to the property, as they were when the negotiations and the writing was made, are disclosed, if the meaning and application of the writing, read in the light of those circumstances, are certain and plain, the parties will be bound by it as a sufficient written contract or memorandum of their agreement. Mead v. Parker was followed by Slater v. Smith, 117 Mass. 96." In Hines v. Copeland, 23 Cal. App. 36, 136 Pac. 728, the description "49 acres" was held insufficient where the seller owned 6 lots, aggregating 120 acres. To similar effect is Roberts v. Bennett, 166 Ky. 588, 179 S. W. 605, L. R. A. 1916 C. 1098; Meramec &c. Material Co. v. Kreis, 261 Mo. 160, 168 S. W. 1148; Hannon v. Scanlon, 158 Wis. 357, 148 N. W. 1082. In Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, 18 Atl. 979, 7 L. R. A. 87, "his place in Stratford containing about fifteen acres" was held sufficient, but in Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 4 109, 26 Atl. 715, "a tract of land with all the buildings thereon, adjoining the New Haven and Derby R. R., in the town of Orange, and containing some twenty acres more or less" was said to be insufficient, though apparently the seller owned no other property anwering the description. In Hall v. Cotton, 167 Ky. 464, 180 S. W. 779, L. R. A. 1916 C. 1124, "their farm of 531/18 acres" without a statement of the place where the farm was situated or of the previous owner or any other means of identifictaion was held insufficient. In Fortesque v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910, "his land" was held "too vague and indefinite to admit parol evidence to locate the land." In Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S. E. 568, "his land where he now lives" was held sufficient if susceptible of identification by extrinsic evidence. In Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C. 472, 17 S. E. 539, 22 L. R. A. 379, the description was also "his land," but since the earlier cases and since the cause of action arose in this case, the Legislature had enacted that parol testimony might be introduced to identify the land. The description was held insufficient, a majority of the court holding that the act could not operate retroactively. In Nims v. Gillis, 19 Ga. App. 53, 90 S. E. 1035, "his land according to my tax returns" was held insufficient as the tax books did not describe the taxed lands in such a way as to fix their boundaries. In Jones v. Tye, 93 Ky. 390, 20 S. W. 388, "land adjoining the McKebly land" was held insufficient, the seller having two parcels answering that description. In Holmes English cases seem to require less definiteness of description Even in the United States, "Descrip than the American.5 v. Evans, 48 Miss. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 372, "a piece of property on the corner of Main and Pearl streets, city of Natchez, county of Adams, State of Mississippi," was held insufficient, because there was no reference in the memorandum itself to anything extrinsic that would define which corner was intended. The court said, however: "Extraneous evidence so referred to, and any other evidence in connection with it, which may serve to identify and fix the limits of the land intended is admissible and proper. There would appear to be no limit in that direction except what is to be found in the general reference of the contract. For example, if a contract purports to embrace all the land owned by the vendor in a certain county, it would be admissible to prove any and all the land owned by him in that county." In Mellon v. Davison, 123 Pa. St. 298, 16 Atl. 431, "a lot of ground fronting about 190 feet on the P. R. R. in the 21st ward, Pittsburgh, Pa.," was held insufficient, though the seller owned but one piece of land in the ward named. See also Rineer v. Collins, 156 Pa. St. 342, 27 Atl. 28. In Thompson v. New South Coal Co., 135 Ala. 630, 34 So. 31, 62 L. R. A. 551, 93 Am. St. Rep. 49, "coal lands," was held an insufficient description. See also Ryan v. United States, 136 U. S. 68, 34 L. Ed. 447; Roberts v. Bennett, 166 Ky. 588, 179 S. W. 605, L. R. A. 1916 C. 1098; Daniels v. Rogers, 108 N. Y. App. Div. 338, 96 N. Y. S. 642; Penshorn v. Kunkel (Tex. Civ. App.), 90 S. W. 719. On the other hand-in Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S. W. 373, the court held a description sufficient which described the land in question merely as the lands which the buyer bad previously sold to the seller. Cf. Howard v. Innes, 253 Pa. 593, 98 Atl. 761. In Henderson v. Perkins, 94 Ky. 307, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 782, 21 S. W. 1035, "my home place and storehouse" was held sufficient. See also Bates v. Harris, 144 Ky. 400; Matherley v. Wright, 171 Ky. 264, 188 S. W. 385; Harvey v. Bross, 216 Mass. 57, 104 N. E. 350; Anderson v. Hall, 273 Mo. 309, 188 S. W. 79; Beaton v. Fussell (Tex. Civ. App.), 166 S. W. 458; Spaulding v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 169 S. W. 627. In Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Meriv. 53, the description "Mr. Ogilvie's house" was thought to be sufficient. In Bleakley v. Smith, 11 Sim. 150, "The property in Cable St." was held to be sufficient. In Shardlow v. Cotterell, 20 Ch. D. 90, (C. A.), there was an auction sale, and the memorandum was contained in the following receipt signed by the auctioneer: "Received of Mr. A. Shardlow the sum of £21 as deposit on property purchased at £420 at Sun Inn, Pinxton, on the above date. Mr. George Cotterell, Pinxton, owner." Jessel, M. R., said: "I consider that any two specific terms are enough to point out sufficiently what is sold. For instance, 'the estate of A. B. in the county of C.' or 'the estate of A. B. which he bought of C. D.,' or 'the estate of A. B. which was devised to him by C. D.,' would be sufficiently specific. If so, why should not 'the property which A. B. bought of C. D. on the 29th of March, 1880,' be sufficient? Would anybody doubt that in a will 'the property which I bought of C. D. on the 29th of March 1880,' would be a sufficient decsription? If it is so in a will why not in a contract? I am at a loss to understand the reasoning on which the learned Judge in the Court below proceeded. Let us look at the words in the present case. 'Property purchased at £420 at the Sun Inn, Pinxton, on the tions of real property, omitting the town, county, or state where the property is situated, have been held sufficient where the deed or writing provides other means of identification." The particularity of description essential in a memorandum must ultimately resolve itself into one of degree. This has been so well expressed by an English writer that his remarks are quoted below." above date' (that is the 29th of March, 1880), 'Mr. George Cotterell, Pinxton, owner.' There are here not two, but three specific terms, that on a given day it was sold at a given place, and that it belonged to Mr. George Cotterell. It appears to me that this is an amply sufficient description. True there may be a dispute about what the property was, but so there always may be. It is admitted that the word 'house' would have been sufficient, but that term would no more have excluded a dispute than the word 'property.' I am of the opinion, therefore, that the receipt alone contains enough to determine what the thing sold was." Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Ore. 40, 46, 102 Pac. 178, citing: Crotty v. Effler, 60 W. Va. 258, 54 S. E. 345; Hawkins v. Hudson, 45 Ala. 482; Webb v. Mullins, 78 Ala. 111; Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller, 157 Ill. 225, 41 N. E. 753; Lloyd v. Bunce, 41 Iowa, 660; Mee v. Benedict, 98 Mich. 260, 57 N. W. 175, 22 L. R. A. 641, 39 Am. St. Rep. 543; Norfleet v. Russell, 64 Mo. 176; McCullough v. Olds, 108 Cal. 529, 41 Pac. 420; Tewskbury v. Howard, 138 Ind. 103, 37 N. E. 355; Robeson v. Hornbaker, 3 N. J. Eq. 60; Quinn v. Champagne, 38 Minn. 322, 37 N. W. 451. In Crotty v. Effler, 60 W. Va. 258, 54 S. E. 345, it is said (at p. 263): "Although the state, county, and district may be omitted from the description, it is essential that the land agreed to be sold be so described as to be capable of being distinguished from other lands. It is not necessary that the contract should contain such a description as, without the aid of extrinsic testimony, to ascertain precisely what was agreed to be sold." 7 F. Vaughan Hawkins, Esq., on the Principles of Legal Interpretation with Reference Especially to the Interpretation of Wills, 2 Judicial Soc. Papers, 298 (pp. 326 et seq.): "The other limit of interpretation of which I have spoken is the result of the necessity of there being a sufficient written expression; the meaning of the words cannot be added to or corrected beyond a certain point, or the words cease to be capable of bearing the interpretation to be put upon them; and though the intent may be known, there is no expression in which it can clothe itself. It cannot be too often repeated that legal interpretation is not a mere ascertaining of the intent; it acts only by putting a meaning consistent with the intent, upon the words. And the answer to the question, What is a sufficient written expression? will vary largely with different classes of writings, and under different systems of jurisprudence. In this respect it is manifest that private documents must be interpreted more strictly than public. A deed or will made by a private person is made with the knowledge of the command of the law, which requires the writer to express himself fully and completely, and gives validity to the instrument only on the condition of reasonable compliance with the demand which it has imposed. On the other hand a document, such as a treaty, which as to its form is almost § 579. Intent to make a memorandum is not requisite. As the purpose of the statute is to require a formality of proof in order to make a contract enforceable, not to impose a wholly independent of everything but the will of the contracting parties, leaves the amount of the expression much less determinate; and, although an intention must fail of effect which has no corresponding expression of any kind in the document, yet the interpreter must resort very much to the inferred will of the parties themselves for a criterion of sufficiency of expression, which thus becomes almost wholly merged in the geenral inquiry after the probably intention, meaning as I do, by intention, wherever it occurs in this paper, not a mere inchoate act of the mind, that which a person intended to do, but took no step toward doing, but something which as a mental act was complete, and which the writer endeavored to express by the words he made use of, although those words in fact express his meaning more or less imperfectly. In the interpretation of writings where the latitude allowed to the interpreter is considerable, and particularly where direct evidence of intention not contained in the writing is admitted, the question of what is a sufficient written expression becomes evidently of great practical importance. If a perfectly definite intent can be collected by the aid only of collateral evidence of it, coupled with the meaning of the words, it is probable that the latter element, that of the meaning of the words, bears a sufficiently great proportion to the former, to assure the interpreter that the words will bear the meaning and express it sufficiently. But this security does not exist where parol declarations of intention, for example, are admissible. The undoubted fact that no general definition of what is in such cases a sufficient expression can be fixed upon beforehand is made use of by Sir James Wigram as a constant argument against admitting evidence of intention generally. 'Once admit,' says he (p. 128), 'that the person or thing intended by the testator need not be adequately described in the will, and it is impossible to stop short of the conclusion that a mere mark will in every case supply the place of a proper description.' Surely there is no impossibility such as here contended. It is reasonable to say that if a testator, for instance, describes a person by his surname and Christain name, that is a sufficient description to satisfy the letter of the law, though it may in fact be insufficient completely to identify the person intended. If, on the other hand, a testator should say, 'I give so and so to my son,' when he has nine sons, it would probably be right to decide that such a description was not a sufficient one, since it was one which the writer must have known or ought to have known, would prove ambiguous, and to allow of an addition to which by parol testimony would be to offer a great temptation to perjury. It is evident that a line must be drawn somewhere, and when necessary it will doubtless be drawn in practice; but as yet the boundary of testamentary interpretation on this side is somewhat imperfect, and there is no rule forbidding the introduction of parol testimony of intention to fill up even such a manifestly inadequate description as that I have last supposed. Many questions on the sufficiency of expression arise upon the interpretation of informal writings, as, for instance, contracts; what part of a contract required by law to be in writing need be expressed in the writing; how far usages and customs of trade may be imported, and the like. In fact all the most dif |