MISSOURI. A married woman may contract as if sole.44 MONTANA. A married woman may contract as if sole.45 NEBRASKA. A married woman may contract for her services or may carry on business as if sole. She can bind herself by covenant of warranty when selling her separate estate, but not on covenants in deeds of her husband's land in which she joins. 46 NEVADA. A married woman may contract in her own name and on obtaining an order of the court may become a sole trader.47 NEW HAMPSHIRE. A married woman may contract as if sole except that she cannot bind herself by either contract or conveyance as a surety for her husband, or as assuming his obligations. 48 49 NEW JERSEY. A married woman may contract as if sole except that she cannot become an accommodation surety." NEW MEXICO. A married woman has full power to contract.50 NEW YORK. A married woman may contract as if sole and may carry on trade in her own name. Husband and wife may contract with one another except in regard to relieving the husband from liability to support her on contracts affecting the marriage relation.51 NORTH CAROLINA. Until 1911 a married woman could contract as if sole only if she was a free trader, and this she could not become without the consent of her husband. If she was not a free trader her power to contract in such a way as to bind her property was limited to contracts for her necessary personal expenses, the payment of antenuptial debts or to support her family, unless her husband consented in writing. 52 By a statute of 1911, she can now contract "so as to affect her real and personal property " as if unmarried. 53 44 Rev. Stat. (1909), Sec. 8304. "Rev. Laws (1912), §§ 2173, 2190. First Nat. Bank v. Rutter (N. J. L.), 106 Atl. 371. 50 Stat. (1915), § 2750. 51 Domestic Relations Law, § 51. 52 Pell's Revisal (1908), §§ 2094, 2112, and notes pp. 1153 et seq. 53 Gregory's Supplement (1913), § 2094. NORTH DAKOTA. A married woman may contract as if sole, and husband and wife may contract with one another.54 OHIO. A married woman may contract as if sole, and husband and wife may contract with one another. 55 OKLAHOMA. A married woman may contract as if sole and husband and wife may contract with one another.56 OREGON. A married woman may contract as if sole. 57 PENNSYLVANIA. A married woman may contract as if sole except that she cannot become an accommodation surety." RHODE ISLAND. A married woman may contract as if sole. 59 SOUTH CAROLINA. A married woman may contract as if sole.60 SOUTH DAKOTA. A married woman may contract as if sole, and husband and wife may contract with one another.61 TENNESSEE. The rules of the common law as to married women still prevail with slight exceptions. A married woman's separate estate is bound for the necessaries purchased by her for herself or her minor children. If her husband is adjudged insane or deserts her she then acquires the same capacity as if sole.62 TEXAS. A married woman has capacity to contract for necessaries or in regard to her separate estate. Beyond this her capacity is limited as at common law.63 Her contracts will not bind community property unless they were incurred for necessaries during marriage. A married woman cannot become a partner but may become surety for her husband by pledge or mortgage.64 UTAH. A married woman may contract as if sole.65 VERMONT. A married woman may contract as if sole with any one but her husband, so far as concerns her separate property except that she can only become surety for her husband by way of mortgage of her property." 54 Civ. Code, § 4411. 55 Page v. Adams Gen. Code (1912), §§ 7999, 8000. 56 Rev. Laws (1910), § 3353. 58 3 Purd. Dig. (13th ed.), p. 2451. 66 62 Shannon's Annot. Code (1917), § 4241 and notes, § 4244. 63 Lemons v. Biddy (Tex. Civ. App.), 149 S. W. 1065. 64 McEachin's Civ. Stat. (1913), Arts. 4624, 4627 and notes. 65 Comp. Laws (1907), § 1199. 66 Pub. Stat. (1906), Secs. 3037, 3039; Seaver v. Lang (Vt.), 104 Atl. 877. VIRGINIA. A married woman may contract as if sole.67 WASHINGTON. A married woman may contract sole.68 as if WEST VIRGINIA. The rules of the common law still generally prevail. A married woman may deposit money in her own name and give a good receipt on withdrawing it. The husband is liable for antenuptial contracts of his wife to the extent of property acquired from his wife. Her earnings are her own, and if living apart from her husband she may carry on business in her own name." 69 WISCONSIN. A married woman is not given general power to contract, but she may carry on business in her own name if deserted by her husband, or if he fails to support her.70 WYOMING. A married woman may contract as if sole.71 $270. Agency of wife for husband. Even at common law in early times it was recognized that the wife might be the agent of the husband and, as such, bind him by contracts and purchases. She herself incurred no liability even as a warrantor of her authority,72 but under modern statutes, giving a married woman power to contract, this would doubtless be otherwise. Whether a married woman is in any case agent for her husband, except in regard to contracts for necessaries, is a question of fact to be determined by the same rules which govern the law of agency in general. So far as express authority is concerned, there is no occasion for discussion. As to implied authority, however, the relation of husband and wife necessarily differentiates the situation from that of ordinary cases of implied authority in the law of agency; though the differences are of fact rather than of legal principle. Where a husband and wife are living together and the wife is in the habit of buying goods and pledging her husband's credit for them and he has been in the habit of paying the price of such goods, it may fairly be inferred that he authorizes the continued purchase of goods of that 67 Code, § 2286a. * Remington's Codes (1915), § 5927. See Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 Pac. 328. 69 Code (1913), Secs. 3676, 3678, 3682. character.73 This implication may, however, be avoided if it appears that the husband warned the seller not to give credit, or if the husband and wife separate.74 As to necessaries for the wife or family, an obligation is imposed by law upon the husband similar to that which the law imposes upon infants and insane persons in regard to necessaries furnished to them.75 There is some confusion in the early cases between this obligation of the husband to pay for necessaries purchased on his credit by his wife, and his obligation to pay for goods which he had either impliedly or apparently authorized her to buy. The distinction is important because while an implied or apparent authority may be revoked by express prohibition, an obligation imposed by law, sometimes called an 'agency by necessity," cannot be. This agency by necessity is limited to cases where the husband is not fulfilling the obligation imposed upon him by law to furnish support to his wife according to his station in life, owing to his fault and not that of his wife; but within this limit the husband is bound even though the necessaries are furnished against his will.76 Similarly he is liable for her funeral expenses to one who in the husband's absence or because of his refusal to act reason 73 Wallis v. Biddick, 22 W. R. 76; Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460; Debenham v. Mellon, 6 A. C. 24; Dolan v. Brooks, 168 Mass. 350, 353, 47 N. E. 408; Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N. W. 77, 28 Am. St. Rep. 362; Feiner v. Boynton, 73 N. J. L. 136, 62 Atl. 420; Gilman v. Andrus, 28 Vt. 241, 67 Am. Dec. 713. 74 Etherington v. Parrot, 1 Salk. 118. See also Jolly v. Rees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628; Debenham v. Mellon, 6 A. C. 24; McKee v. Cunningham, 2 Cal. App. 684, 84 Pac. 260; Hibler v. Thomas, 99 Ill. App. 355; Olson Co. v. Youngquist, 76 Minn. 26, 78 N. W. 870; Hass v. Brady, 49 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 235, 96 N. Y. Suppl. 449; Segelbaum v. Ensminger, 117 Pa. St. 248, 10 Atl. 759, 2 Am. St. Rep. 662. And as to goods of a character not needed for herself or for ordinary fam ily use no inference of authority can be made, as where goods were bought by the wife to establish her sons in business. Richburg v. Sherwood (Tex. Civ. App.), 105 S. W. 524. 75 Therefore, where support is furnished to a husband and wife jointly under circumstances entitling the person furnishing the support to payment, the liability is solely that of the husband, though by statute the wife is competent to contract. Lavoie v. Dube, 229, Mass. 87, 118 N. E. 179. 76 Nissen v. Bendixsen, 69 Cal. 521, 11 Pac. 29; Rea v. Durkee, 25 Ill. 503; Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424; Dorrance v. Dorrance, 257 Mo. 317, 165 S. W. 783; Tebbets v. Hapgood, 34 N. H. 420; Ott v. Hentall, 70 N. H. 231, 47 Atl. 80, 51 L. R. A. 226; Clothier v. Sigle, 73 N. J. L.419, 63 Atl. 865. ably incurs the expense." If the parties are living apart the plaintiff in order to recover, on the theory of agency by necessity, must show that the separation is due to the husband's fault.78 If the wife is sufficiently provided for by her husband she has no agency by necessity to bind him even for articles of a sort which would ordinarily be classified as necessaries.79 Whether a wife has power to pledge her husband's credit in this way, if she has property of her own from which she could derive an adequate support, is a point which has been somewhat questioned. Two early English cases 80 denied her that right. In the later of these cases Lord Ellenborough instructing the jury said: "The only credit given to the husband is an implied one, which arises from his situation and the inadequacy of the funds of the wife. . . If [she was adequately provided for] the circumstance repels all idea of implied credit." This seems still to represent the law of England, and has some support in the United States. But in a recent New Hampshire case,83 the court in a careful opinion held that the wife's right was not limited by her possession of means sufficient to supply her reasonable wants. On principle, this decision seems sound. Certainly, if the husband is bound to support his wife when she is living with him in spite of the fact that she has means of her own, she ought to be allowed to pledge his credit if he fails to perform that obligation. The early English decisions went on the mistaken idea of an agency implied in fact instead of a right 81 "See Woodward, Quasi-Cont., § 205. Hatton v. Cunningham, 162 N. Y. S; 1008. 78 Brinckerhoff v. Briggs, 92 Ill. App. 537; Sturbridge v. Franklin, 160 Mass. 149, 35 N. E. 669; Clothier v. Sigle, 73 N. J. L. 419, 63 Atl. 865; Sturvetant v. Starin, 19 Wis. 268. Compare Baker v. Oughton, 130 Iowa, 35, 106 N. W. 272. "Reid v. Teakle, 13 C. B. 627; Hoey v. Hechtman, 2 Cal. App. 120, 83 Pac. 85 (statutory); Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 252, 50 N. W. 77, 28 Am. St. Rep. 362; Oatman v. Watrous, 105 N. Y. S. 174. Compare 82 Wenz v. McCann. 107 N. Y. App. Div. 557, 95 N. Y. S. 462. 80 War v. Huntly, 1 Salk. 118; Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 86. 81 Dixon v. Hurrell, 8 C. & P. 717. 82 Litson v. Brown, 26 Ind. 489; Hunt v. Hayes, 64 Vt. 89, 23 Atl. 920, 15 L. R. A. 661, 33 Am. St. Rep. 917. In both these cases it should be noticed that the wife's means were derived fro.n her husband. In the Vermont case as an allowance expressly for her sup port, and apparently sufficient for that purpose. 83 Ott v. Hentall, 70 N. H. 231, 47 Atl. 80. See also Eiler v. Crull, 99 |