and the regular and graduated scale of preferment in force in England is unknown here. Seniors do not hesitate to accept junior business, and we see juniors usurping the places of their leaders. Nothing is settled, nothing is certain. Success depends upon many collateral circumstances, and may be co-existent with them. It is more easy and more sudden than in the older country,but at the same time it is less secured and more transient. Popularity has more to do with it than merit, and popular friendship is as fleeting as popular judgment is fallible. The successful lawyer walks as if on stils. It is true that he is suddenly elevated, that his stature is more than that of ordinary men, but there is an uneasy feeling of insecurity pervading the sense of his elevation, and a direful consciousness that, even as the exaltment was rapid, so also may the abasement be sudden. This must always be the case in new and unsettled communities, where the slow but certain advancement of the old world is impos sible. Having thus briefly sketched out the surround ings of Australian lawyers, we may, at some future time, refer more nearly to them as a representative class. Australian Jurist.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CONVICTIONS FOR MURDER

FORT WAYNE, IND., Jun. 25, 1871,

Editor Albany Law Journal:

I notice in the last number of your journal some suggestions from the governor to the legislature of the state of New York, as to a change in the law fig the punishment in cases of a conviction for murder in the first degree, recommending that it be made discretionary with the jury to affix the death penalty, or make the punishment imprisonment for life. This has been the law in this state since 1852. An experience of several years as prosecuting attorney for a circuit comprising ten counties, warrant me in speaking advisedly as to the wisdom and good results of the law. I can recall to mind several cases, where parties indicted for murder in the first degree, were convicted and sentenced to the state prison for life, who, in case the jury had had no discretion in the matter, would likely have been acquitted. I have generally found that the case must be one of a very exaggerated character, and the evidence clear, positive and conclusive, to get a jury of twelve reputable, unprejudiced and unbiased citizens, to return a verdict authorizing the depriving a human being of his life.

The provision of the statute of this state, to which▾ have referred, is as follows:

"Any person convicted of treason, or murder in the first degree, may, instead of being sentenced to death, in the discretion of the jury, be imprisoned in the state prison during life." J. H. S.

BOOK NOTICES.

The Legal Remembrancer, containing concise statements of the law, as it now is, on subjects of general importance, particularly adapted to the state of New York. Edited by Austin Abbott. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1871. 12mo., pp. 288.

As a "labor-saving machine," this book will be found of great value. Its professed object is, “to present concise and accurate statements of the most important rules of law, as now understood and applied, on subjects upon which the profession are most frequently consulted, or often in need of immediate means of refreshing the memory." Every lawyer is supposed to be familiar with the general principles of law, and with the practical application of those principles to the ordinary affairs of life.

But there are a thousand matters of detail, or technics, so to speak, that, to acquire and hold in the mind, ready for use, would require the memory of a Magliabechi, and "the days of the planet Jupiter." Hence the value of a book like the one before us, in which is accu

99

rately and concisely set down the law on many of those matters likely to escape the recollection when most needed. The difficulty has been, with most of these handy-books, that they were not accurate; and we have examined this with the especial view of testing it in that regard. We have compared the statements under many of the subjects with the very latest statutes and decisions, and have invariably found them correct. Very possibly there are errors in the book; but we have not found them. There are some subjects included that could have been conveniently spared, and others that we regret to see omitted; but, on the whole, the work is well done, and will prove a very desirable memoria technica to the practi tioner.

1st Monday, oyer and terminer and circuit (part 1), New York; Sutherland.

1st Monday, circuit (par 2), New York; Brady. 1st Monday, special term (chambers), New York; Barnard.

1st Monday, special tem (motions), Kings; Gilbert. 1st Monday, circuit d oyer and terminer, Sullivan. 1st Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Fonda; Bockes.

1st Monday circus and oyer and terminer, Onondaga. 1st Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Monroe; J. C. Smith.

2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Rensselaer; Hogeboom.

2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Rome; Foster.

2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Ontario; Dwight.

2d Tuesday, special term, Oswego.

3d Monday, special term (issues), Kings; Gilbert. 3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Greene; Ingalls.

3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Chenango; Murray.

3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Belmont; Daniels.

3d Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Canton; James.

4th Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Malone; James.

4th Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Sandy Hill. Last Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Chemung; Murray.

Last Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Tioga; Boardman.

Last Monday, special term, Monroe; E. D. Smith.
Last Tuesday, special term, Albany."

USAGE. Usage has effected more than legislation. By far the greatest portions of the written or statute laws of England consist of the declaration, the re-assertion, the repetition, or the re-enactment, of some older law or laws, either customary or written, with additions or modifications. The new building has been raised on the old ground work; the institutions of one age have always been modeled and formed from those of the preceding, and their lineal descent has never been interrupted or disturbed.-Sir Francis Palgrave.

CORRECTION. In our abstract of the case of Westfall v. Gere and others (ante, p. 14), the opinion of Mr. Justice Talcott is referred to in such a way as to, perhaps, leave the impression that it was a concurring opinion, whereas it was, in fact, the reverse. The opinion of a majority of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, and was correctly presented in the abstract. From that opinion Mr. Justice Talcott dissented.

PRECEDENTS. - The law of England would be a strange science, indeed, if it were decided upon precedents only. Precedents serve to illustrate principles, and to give them a final certainty. But the law of England, which is exclusive of positive law enacted by statute, depends upon principles; and these principles run through all the cases, according as the particular circumstances of each have been found to fall within the one or other of them. Quicquid agunt homines is the business of courts, and as the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind. Ld. Mansfield, 1 Cowp. 39.

LORD MANSFIELD. The character and qualities of this great man were singularly adapted to the work he felt himself called on to achieve, that of communicating form and symmetry to the then rude and shapeless mass of our commercial law. Sprung from a noble family, he had enjoyed an education suited to his birth. He was versed in not only the laws and history of his own country, but in those celebrated writings which constitute the noblest monuments of ancient greatness. To these he could recur as guides in doubt, and models of arrangement; from these he had learned to regard law as a science, to be expanded by the development of principles, not merely amplified by the accumulation of precedents.

NEW YORK STATUTES AT LARGE.
СНАР. 10.

AN ACT to authorize the extension of the time for the collection of taxes in the several towns and cities in this State.

PASSED January 26, 1871; three-fifths being present. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assemby, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. If any collector of taxes in any town or city in this State shall, within fifteen days after the passage of this act, pay over all moneys collected by him, and shall renew his bond, as is herein provided, the time for the collection of taxes, and for making return thereof by him, shall be, as is herein provided, extended to a day not later than the twentieth day of March, eighteen hundred and seventy-one. Such bond shall be renewed, with such sureties as, in any town, shall be approved by the supervisor thereof; or in case of his inability to act, by the town clerk thereof, and, in any city, shall be approved by such officer or board therein, as is authorized by law to approve of collectors' bonds. The penalty expressed in such bond in every case shall be double the amount of the taxes in that case remaining uncollected. The bond shall be approved in writing, and filed, as required by law, and have all the effect of a collector's bond. A copy of the bond and the approval thereof shall, within fifteen days after the passage of this act, if it is the bond of a collector of taxes in any town, be delivered to the county treasurer of the county in which is located said town; and if it is the bond of a collector of taxes in any city, it shall be delivered to the officer or board in said city authorized to receive taxes from said collector. The time, not later than the said twentieth day of March, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, to which the collection of said taxes, and the making returns thereof, may be extended, shall in any town be fixed and limited in writing, and indorsed on the warrant of the collector by the supervisor of the town, or, in case of his inability to act, by the town clerk thereof, and in any city by the common council thereof.

2. It shall be the duty of the secretary of state, at once after its passage, to cause this act to be printed upon slips of paper, and to deliver to each county treasurer, and to the mayor of each city, a sufficient number thereof, to supply one to each collector of taxes in said county and city; and it shall be the duty of said county treasurer, and of said mayor, to deliver one thereof to each collector of taxes in his city or county respectively.

23. This act shall not extend to the cities of New York, Albany, Brooklyn, Troy, Buffalo, Rochester, and Binghamton, or to any other city of this state wherein taxes are collected under special laws.

4. This act shall take effect immediately.

CHAP. 11.

AN ACT providing for additional compensation to deputies, clerks, and assistants, in the various departments of the state government.

PASSED January 26, 1871; three-fifths being present. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The treasurer shall pay, upon the warrant of the comptroller, from the general fund, additional compensation for the calendar year, commencing January first, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, to the deputies, assistants, clerks, and messengers permanently employed in the office of the secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, clerk of the court of appeals, attorneygeneral, department of public instruction, state engineer and surveyor, insurance department, to the librarians and their assistants and janitors in the state library, the private secretary of the governor, and clerks and messengers of the executive departments, to the secretary and assistant secretary of the regents of the university, to the curator of the state cabinet of natural history, and to the superintendent of the capitol and state hall, and the state geological hall, at the following rates of advance on the salaries received by them, or a proportionate amount for a less term of service: On all salaries of fifteen hundred dollars and under, an increase of thirty-five per cent; on all salaries over fifteen hundred and less than two thousand dollars, an increase of twenty-five per cent; on all salaries of two thousand dollars, an increase of fifteen per cent. The sum of thirty thousand dollars, or as much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated from the general fund to pay the advances provided for by this section.

§ 2. The increased compensation herein before given to the deputy and clerks in the railroad department, in the office of the engineer and surveyor, and to the deputy and clerks in the insurance department, shall be repaid by the several railroad and insurance companies, pursuant to chapter five hundred and twenty-six of the laws of eighteen hundred and fifty-five, and chapter three hundred and sixty-six of the laws of eighteen hundred and fifty-nine.

23. The treasurer shall pay from the canal fund, upon the warrant of the auditor of the canal department, additional compensation to the deputy and each of the clerks of the canal department, and to each of the clerks of the canal commissioners and canal appraisers, and to the clerk of the contracting board, for the calendar year commencing January first eighteen hundred and seventyone, at the following rates of advance on salaries received by them: on all salaries of fifteen hundred dollars and under, an increase of thirty-five per cent; on all salaries over fifteen hundred and less than two thousand dollars, an increase of twenty-five per cent, or a prorportionate amount for a less term of service. The sum of five thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated from the canal fund, not otherwise appropriated, to pay the advance provided for in this section.

§ 4. The treasurer shall pay, on the warrant of the Comptroller, out of any fund appropriated for military purposes, for the calendar year, commencing January first, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, additional compensation to the assistants, clerks, messengers and janitors permanently employed in the office of the adjutant-general, inspector-general, quartermaster-general, paymaster-general, surgeon-general and commissarygeneral, at the rates of advance on the salaries received by them (or apportionate amount for less term of service) as provided for the assistants, clerks and messengers named in the first section of this act.

§ 5. This act shall take effect immediately.

TO SUBSCRIBERS. The volumes of the LAW JOURNAL are strongly and uniformly bound at this office for $1.50 full sheep, and $1 half sheep.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, FEBRUARY 11, 1871.

THE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW, ESPECIALLY AS SUGGESTED BY MR. FIELD'S ADDRESS TO THE CALIFORNIA BAR.

After years of service, Mr. Field has become identified with the theory of reducing the law to the form of legislative codes. With us, he has been its principle exponent. The mention of the topic recalls his name. Happier in his experience than most radical reformers, he has lived to find his labors recognized at home and abroad.

Hence it was that the representatives of the California bar turned to him. They must have turned to him with large expectations- not indeed for his mere opinion or advice; every lawyer, there, as here, knew that in his opinion the law should be embalmed in codes; that his advice would be to try the experiment of codification. But certain questions, easily apprehended, were implied in that application, not merely as to the principle on which a code of laws should be prepared, or whether it could absorb all the laws of the state, and combine the rules necessary for present and future administration, but especially, What are the proofs of safety, economy and utility, whether derived from philosophic principles, or from experience? If after a trial in any country, such a code of laws has proved a failure, to what may that failure

be ascribed?

Our brethren of California have been brooding, as in prayer and with tears, over this problem. They ask for aid, light. It is as the cry of those of old"Come over and help us." With such men, thus engrossed, mere words go for very little; "glittering generalities," for nothing. You can no more appease those craving bad with comfits and weak fluids, than satisfy such minds with any thing less than a demonstration drawn from principles of jurisprudence, and from the teachings of history.

To answer these and the like questions exhaustively would require a volume; to have answered them, in a condensed form, so suggestively as to point to the best means of investigation, and so faithfully that those setting out on their journey in the dim twilight, might know something of the difficulties in their way, would, perhaps, have been quite possible within the compass of Mr. Field's article.

The members of the California bar must have had access to much that has been written in favor of the code theory; some fair and reasonable argument; much declamation, assertion, invective, dictated by a narrow and partisan spirit. In common with the friends of that theory in this country and in England, they must have wished that some earnest advocates had been silenced, some teachers taught, some books consigned to utter oblivion; must have wished to see

the subject treated in a proper spirit, and with a degree of modesty and integrity not common to mere theorists. It is but too obvious that this grave cause has suffered from the folly and perversity of its advocates, somewhat as movements in regard to education, science, reform, government, have suffered while in the transition state. The pioneers in such movements are, generally, aggressive men, men with great self-consciousness and little veneration, working, for the time, with stormy zeal. They state their side of the argument, and put down the other side of it, vehemently. They imitate Jeremy Bentham, at least in this what they love or hate they love or hate without measure, even without just cause. Such unprofitable friends and unwise counselors, in England, have been active in this matter for more than a quarter of a century - their views, to be met with in treatises and essays on the law, and on reform, in controversial pamphlets and articles in periodicals; in form and in intent working for the codification of the law; in effect working against it. Thus the project has been retarded. In England, perhaps, Mr. Humphreys deserves to be remembered as one of the most tolerable of such writers - a man of much learning and culture, yet given to such freaks of extravagance that his statement of what he had seen and studied in countries where codes existed could not be accepted; that, to secure the influence of a great name, he could refer to Lord Bacon as in favor of codes, to the surprise of students.

Our California friends may have suffered much vexation of spirit over such discussions. They well knew that between that class of writers and Mr. Field, there lies a great gulf, which not even the inordinate love of an innovation great enough to shock the judicial world could fully bridge over. They knew that a profound and practical lawyer has a great advantage over the mere theorist or abstract reasoner; knew that the doctrine of repression, "the police of nature," has a sanitary influence, and that, as Ignatius Loyola could cool his passions by standing in water amidst the ice, so a feverish tendency to flights of fancy, and to assumption and extravagance, might be toned down by daily immersion in professional and practical affairs.

Mr. Field's correspondents may well have ranked him with the few great writers and jurists in England who have become converts to the theory of codification. His devotion to the subject, his long and intimate acquaintance with it, qualified him to utter the full and final argument. Surely, one standing in the attitude of a teacher and reformer, the counselor of states, will not fail, if he writes at all, to do justice to his favorite theory.

It would seem, therefore, now that he has written, that if the argument be inconclusive, if views and illustrations put forth in support of that argument are questionable, and if the economy, stability, and uniformity of the law, proposed to be secured by codification, as stated, may not be thus secured, the difficulty must be, in the very nature of the subject, radical, if not beyond control.

We propose to notice some specific and material parts of that address, without regard to territorial limitations, believing that what is just and reasonable,

if applied to one state, is just and reasonable if applied to another state; believing, also, that errors in public and prominent discussions, affecting public interests, should not pass unreproved. We shall, therefore, proceed freely with our specifications, the immediate purpose being to prove, that, however useful a code, wisely prepared, might be, the particular

benefits stated in that address would not be secured by such an innovation. Beyond what may seem proper to that end, we shall leave the general argument, for and against codification, undisturbed. We shall indeed have occasion to indicate, but in no unfriendly spirit, the effect which a code might reasonably be expected to have upon the literature of the law, the labors of the courts, and of the profession; but finally hope to suggest some aspects in which the code might be conducive to a systematic adjustment and use of principles, to improved methods of study,

and to a safe and convenient administration of the law. We use, throughout, the term unwritten, as including all law save that known as statutory law. Having premised this much we proceed, as we have said, freely, with our specifications.

The writer closes that address by exhorting our brethren of California in this wise: proceed "with all practicable dispatch," and "enact codes of the whole body of your law."

Why with all practicable dispatch? Would reasonable dispatch be too tame? All proper diligence too tardy? Why use the word dispatch? It is out of place has an ugly look in that relation. An exhortation to undue haste, dispatch, would be bad enough

to be trusted, it is not material what adversaries contributed to that end.

rer

Even in the department of letters devoted to epitaphs, where some exuberance of statement might be excused, the record, economical of details, seldom discloses whether one disorder, or many, going hand in hand, precipitated the demise. But readers of discourses on legal topics are wont to be most exacting. It is not only vital that the thing should be true, but that it be to the purpose. When, therefore, they are told that hostility to codification goes hand in hand with hostility to the union of law and equity, they may answer, in the spirit of a common demurwell, what of that? They may, also, indulge the notion, that those thus going hand in hand, on one ground of hostility, may have been possessed of other independent and controlling grounds of opposition to a code; might have been thus possessed if the union of law and equity had long been an accomplished fact. In the state of New York, we are indebted for the union of law and equity in the same tribunals to our state constitution of 1846. That union has been cordially accepted in this state; so cordially, indeed, that our courts allow legal and equitable claims to be united in the same action, and it would have been thus accepted if the codification of the law had never been heard of.

Reference is made to several codes, to the end that the number of sections might appear. The information would have been more useful if the exterior form were the standard of inherent merit; if the size of the body indicated the worth of the soul. It must be confessed, however, that, with slight modifications,

-only a few lives in peril - but is worse than madness as applied to such legislation.

The other branch of the exhortation-"enact codes of the whole body of your law" - urges what is impossible; what has never been achieved in any free or commercial country; has not even been proposed in New York.

66

Mr. Field states and answers some objections to codes, and is relieved by the conviction that criticism comes from those who are opposed to all codification! From whom so naturally as from those could objections come? Is the criticism less legitimate and worthy of consideration because it flows from such a source? It would, no doubt, be pleasant to the devotee of any special doctrine, if the only hostility met with arose from those holding the same faith; if the most formidable adversary- the lion in the path - would " aggravate his voice," like Bottom, and roar as gently as any sucking dove." But it is not correct if applied to New York, where some doubt as to codes confessedly exists; may not be correct in reference to any country, to say that hostility to codes "goes hand in hand with hostility to the union of law and equity;" or to imply that where that union is accepted, opposition to the code may be given up. However the statements may be applied, it is extravagant, adventurous, illogical - too much after the manner of Mr. Humphreys. There may, indeed, be some foundation for the declaration, if made strictly, and with large qualifications, as to the professional opinion prevailing in England. But, as the spirit of codification has died out there, if echoes of lamentations are

The stop-watch critic, immortalized by Lawrence Sterne, thus magnified his office. But, unhappily. while the sections of the codes are thus given, the vital thing, the experience in countries where codes have existed, is prudently overlooked. The French codes have, it seems, 5098 sections, but how as to the extent, nature and necessity of their other laws?

The reader's attention is diverted-again reminding us of Mr. Humphreys - by a vigorous dash at the question whether a code of one volume of rules is not more tolerable than a digest of several volumes of rules and decisions. As if it were settled that the people must submit to the one or the other - could not well do without both!

In some schools the adroit putting of such an alternative would be called begging the question. And, surely, no such begging could well be carried to a greater extent than in the confident assumption that a code is indispensable, as the only proper and adequate remedy, in view of the extent and of the uncertain and chaotic condition of the unwritten law. If there be that chaos and uncertainty now, might not greater chaos and uncertainty exist after the adoption and use of the code? That will sufficiently appear. But we put by the imputation decisively; the law, with us, is in a sound and healthy ondition, well defined, and to be understood, the only uncertainty being that which necessarily and unavoidably attaches, and ever will attach, to the judicial duty of applying rules and principles to the determination of novel, peculiar, and complicated cases.

But the futility of all attempts to get rid of the

unwritten law, and to substitute a code, is found in the confession, that, if we have a code, we must also have unwritten law, no one can tell how much or how little; two systems, the one new, the other old.

Mr. Field says that "the civil code proposed for New York does not profess to contain all the law." Why not? Upon principle, and owing to inherent and stubborn hindrances every lawyer knows, and has all along known, the reason. That has often been shown by argument, but we now prefer a conviction upon a deliberate, well advised, and voluntary confession, that there may be an end of mere argument,

We are told that "if there be an existing rule of law omitted from the code, and not inconsistent with it, that rule will continue to exist in the same form in which it now exists;" that cases "which are not foreseen can not be provided for, except by directing the courts to decide according to the analogy of existing rules, when there is such an analogy; and when there is not, then, to decide according to the dictates of natural justice."

All this, notwithstanding that advocates of the code have declaimed, from first to last, against the unwritten law, a strong aversion stimulating the argument! All this, despite the objection, so often and offensively urged, that the unwritten law, as administered in courts, is uncertain, therefore unreliable; the assumption, that what may be natural justice in the opinion of one judge may not be natural justice in the opinion of another judge!

It follows, however, that with or without the code, unwritten law is to be administered; that the dictates of natural justice are still to be appealed to in courts of justice."

This confession, we are desirous of emphasizing in view of two arguments, conclusions, or prophetic assurances, whatever they may be called - we are not strong in definitions-indicating blessings to be enjoyed under the code; the one, a popular benefit; the other, a judicial and professional relief.

We are told that the code is expedient, as "it would reduce the laws of the land to an accessible and intelligible form, and thus bring them within the reach of the people, who are to regulate their own conduct by them, and who should be able, in great measure, to judge for themselves of their legal rights and duties."

What would any sensible man say to that proposition, if it came from a less respectable source? not from a candidate at the charter election, but, for instance, from a man like Mr. Humphreys?

As the statement confronts us, and, as the author was never known to perpetrate a jest, even in the mildest form, he must be regarded as having been quite in earnest in holding out that inducement to the people.

Let it be assumed, then, that the legal millenium is indeed here-a code of our laws adopted and made accessible to the people! What proportion of them would accept the exhortation to "judge for them

selves of their legal rights and duties?" Some might accept it, as persons credulous to the verge of insanity still exist. Here and there a layman of an inquiring turn of mind might feel his pride touched by that exhortation; might think, with Mr. Field, that the code, in a single volume, easily accessible, may be easily understood. So he bows himself to the study. He soon becomes conscious, however, that some preparatory training, as to the history and nature of the law, that of which the code is, and that of which it is not declarative, as to the use of terms and the interpretation of statutes, would have been desirable. He finds the code a severe, concise, logical statement of rules and principles-in the relations and dependencies of the parts, the occult meanings, as opaque as metals which have been subjected to the action of fervent heat and heavy trip-hammers. Most other books he has taken up have been accessible in tone and in spirit, light gleaming from every page; have sweetly invited him to the conference; held him as with magnetic force and kindling sympathies. But the code, in wide contrast, seems cold, austere, incommunicable, desolate as the barren heath. Like the sick man he turns and turns, and finds no relief. After many trials, changing his mind at every reading of favorite passages, he gives up in despair and takes to his neglected newspapers. On going over the back num bers he finds that, while he has been thus held in bondage, as in the worship of strange gods, the courts in each judicial district of the state have been earnestly at work in construing provisions of the code, and searching for analogies, without entire unanimity and success.

But, while some such adventurous persons might thus suffer, the masses of the people would be proof against the delusion. Most of them are too sensible to be beguiled by advice so flattering to their pride, and believe, with the wise man, that the cobbler should stick to his last. The business man puts down temptation at sight, as he pays his bills. He has heard, too often, promises of reading made easy, of French and dancing taught in five lessons, and of self-raising and baking flour, to believe in the magical transformation needful to enable "every man to become his own lawyer."

The suggestion that, by modification, reduction, or codification, the law could be made simple for popular use, has been often made; as often rebuked by the inevitable course of events. Witness the boast of some who aided in preparing the Code Napoleon, that it would be understood by the citizen; the suggestion of a like benefit in connection with our revised statutes of 1830;† and the announcement that our code of procedure of 1848 contained nothing which any person of ordinary education and intelligence would not comprehend.‡

"Send it up, as a collateral issue, to that jury," said Curran, "and I'll be bound they 'll find it Greek!"

On dit An eminent lawyer at Albany drew his own will, with the revised statutes before him, and so misapprehended the provisions as to wills and trusts, that, when the courts came to consider these provisions, the will was found to be in direct conflict with them, and void.

When the New York code of procedure was adopted In 1848, some rule as to the mode of pleading was necessary. It was provided that the facts should be stated in a complaint in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what was intended.