statute of frauds; but where the labor and skill of a workman are of the essence of the contract, the statute does not apply, although they are to be expended in the production of goods and chattels, and from the workman's own raw materials. Pitkin v. Noyes.

2. The same doctrine will apply to an agreement to raise three acres of potatoes and deliver them to the other party, at a fixed price per bushel, the inquiry being whether it was of the essence of the agreement that the contractor should himself raise the potatoes. Ib.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. If a debtor promise to pay a part of his debt, under an agreement with his creditor that it shall be in full satisfaction of the whole claim, such promise will not be sufficient to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations upon the balance of the debt. Batchelder v. Batchelder.

2. An unaccepted offer to pay part of a debt, the payment to be in full settlement of the whole claim, does not take a case out of the statute of limitations, even to the extent of the amount offered to be paid. Ib.

WATER-COURSES.

1. When the channel of a river has been gradually changing for years, by wearing away the bank on the defendant's side and by adding and forming accretions upon the opposite shore owned by plaintiff, by slow and imperceptible degrees, the channel, as so changed, must be regarded as the rightful and accustomed channel for the time being as between the different parties. Gerrish v. Clough.

2. Such accretions become the property of the land owner upon that side of the river, and are as much entitled to protection as his original inclosure. Ib.

3. In such case, the defendant may protect his banks from further encroachment, by rubbling or other means, provided it do not cause a change in the (then) accustomed channel of the river, to the material and appreciable injury of other riparian owners; but he has no right to build a dam, breakwater, or other obstruction in the stream which will raise the water upon the plaintiff's land or wash the same away. Ib.

4. The questions in regard to the right of a reasonable use of the stream, or in regard to ordinary care and prudence, in erecting such dam or obstruction, do not arise in such case. Ib.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RECEIPT AND A RELEASE UNDER SEAL.

A passenger who was injured in a railway accident accepted a sum of money by way of compensation, and signed a receipt which was expressed to be in discharge of his claim in full upon the railway company for all loss sustained and expenses incurred by the accident. After signing this receipt he became worse and applied for further compensation, which the railway company refused to give him; and he commenced an action at law against them, in which he claimed heavy damages. The company pleaded the common plea of payment and receipt of the sum of money in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, upon which the plaintiff, instead of replying to the plea, filed his bill, alleging that he had not replied because he was advised that the plea was a full and complete answer at law to his cause of action, and praying that the defendants might be enjoined from relying on the plea at the trial of the action, and from setting up the receipt as a satisfaction of the damages claimed, except to the extent of the sum already paid. The judgment of Vice-Chancellor Malins, who granted the injunction, is not reported, but the judgment of the lords justices, who reversed the decree of the vice-chancellor, and dismissed the bill with costs, is fully reported. Lee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., 19 W. R. 729.

It is, or was, a common but reprehensible practice with railway companies, after an accident has occurred, to get the sufferers to sign a receipt, accepting a sum of money down for the injuries they have sustained, before they well know the extent of those injuries. See the remarks of the Lord Justice Mellish (19 W. R. 732) on this practice. In cases

of this description a bill will lie to restrain the railway company from relying on the plea that the plaintiff in the action received the sum in accord and satisfaction (Stewart v. Great Western Railway Campany, 13 W. R. 907), by reason of the fraud involved.

The bill in Lee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, sup., was probably filled on the authority of Stewart v. Great Western Railway Company, sup.; but in Stewart v. Great Western Railway Company fraud was alleged on the part of the company's agents, and that the company intended to rely on the receipt thus obtained as a defense to the action. This allegation gave the court jurisdiction, and enabled the lord chancellor to overrule the demurrer, although the bill did not go on to pray compensation. In Lee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company no case of fraud was made by the bill or proved at the hearing, and the bill was dismissed on the ground that, in the absence of fraud, the plaintiff could not want the aid of a court of equity. In fact, the plaintiff did not want the aid of the court to set aside the receipt. This is apparent when we consider what the true nature of a receipt is, as distinguished from a release under seal. A release under seal extinguishes the debt (Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 295), or rather acts as an estoppel, and can only be set aside on bill filled, or under the equitable jurisdiction of a court of law. But a receipt, according to Abbott, J. C., in Skaife v. Jackson, 3 B. & C. 421, is nothing more than a primary acknowledgment that the money has been paid or, as Littledale, J., said in the same case, it is not an estoppel, and amounts to nothing more than a parol declaration of payment. In Graves v. Key, 1 B. & Ald. 313, 318, where the holder of a bill had written on it a receipt in general terms, and the question was whether the receipt was conclusive evidence that the bill had been satisfied, the following reasons were prepared by the court for delivery: "A receipt is an admission only, and the general rule is that an admission, although evidence against the person who made it, and those claiming under him, is not conclusive evidence, except as to the person who may have been induced by it to alter his condition. Straton v. Rastal, 2 T. R. 366; Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford, 3 East, 147; Herne v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 586. A receipt, therefore, may be contradicted or explained, and there is no case, to our knowledge, in which a receipt upon a negotiable instrument has been considered to be an exception to the general rule."

Lord Ellenborough's dictum in Almer v. George, 1 Camp. 392, that a receipt in full, where the person who gave it was under no misapprehension and can complain of no fraud or imposition, operates as an estoppel and is binding on him, means, according to Pollock, C. B., in Bowes v. Foster, 6 W. R. 257; 2 H. & N. 784, where the receipt in full is given as for a real receipt and discharge. Almer v. George, moreover, is distinctly overruled by Graves v. Key, sup., and is not law. As Martin, B., explained in Bowes v. Foster, the fact of a release may be pleaded; but a receipt cannot be pleaded in answer to an action, it is only evidence on a plea of payment; and where the defendant is obliged to prove payment, a document not under seal is no bar as against the fact that no payment was made. Thus, the effect of a receipt is destroyed on proof that it was obtained by fraud; (Farrer v. Hutchinson, 9 A. & E. 641), or that it forms part of a transaction which was merely colorable (Bowes v. Foster, sup.), and a receipt indorsed for the purchase-money, although signed by the seller, is of no avail in equity if the money be not actually paid (Coppin v. Coppin, sup.; see Griffin v. Clowes, 20 Beav. 61), though the receipt in the body of the deed, being under seal, amounts to an estoppel, and is binding on the parties at law. Rountree v. Jacob, 2 Taunt. 141.

The question between the plaintiff and the defendant company in Lee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, sup., was, whether the receipt covered future and consequential injuries or not. The receipt was in terms a discharge of the plaintiff's claim in full upon the company, but the plaintiff alleged that he signed it on the express condition that he should not thereby exclude himself from further compensation if his injuries eventually turned out to be more serious than was then anticipated. A receipt,