THOMAS, Agent for the United States.

It appears from the papers in this case that the claimant was, in the month of November, 1846, a resident merchant of Matamoras, Mexico. War existed between the United States and that country at the time the transaction took place of which the complaint is made, and the United States army was in possession of Matamoras.

The American schooner "Star," Captain Merrill, master, arrived at the mouth of the Rio Grande November 6, 1846. On his arrival there, it is alleged that the captain made application to G. S. Cook, the deputy collector at Brazos Santiago, for a permit to discharge the cargo of his vessel at Burita or Matamoras. Both these places. were without the revenue district of Mr. Cook, and his permit, even if honestly obtained, could give no right to land the goods at either Burita or Matamoras, because he had no authority in either place. Besides, both were under military government, and an officer of the army at each place was acting as collector of the port.

Under the authority of this permit, it is stated that the cargo of the "Star" was transferred to a steamboat and landed at Matamoras, and the goods placed in the warehouse of the claimant. A few days thereafter they were seized, on the ground that they had been introduced by a fraudulent evasion of the custom-house regulations of the place.

It is not pretended that any duty had been paid on these goods, and the right to sell them without such payment was asserted by the claimant, because the civil authority of the United States had not yet been extended over that possession. The commanding officer refused to allow him this privilege, and he now claims, in consequence of the proceedings of the military commander, twelve thousand pounds sterling damages, from the government of the United States.

In the first place, I must object to the jurisdiction of the commission in this case. The convention under which it is organized gives jurisdiction of the claims of " British subjects" upon the government of the United States. The claimant was domiciled in the enemy's country when the transaction took place of which he complains, and by a well settled principle of international law, he is to be regarded as a Mexican, and not a British subject; and whatever claim he may have had against the United States was disposed of by the treaty of

peace. This is not the tribunal before which to make his complaint, as I have fully shown in the argument I had the honor to submit to the commissioners, in the case of the Messrs. Laurent, and to which I would now beg to refer them.

Upon the simple statement of this case, it seems to me the commissioners must reject the claim entirely. A merchant, living in the enemy's country, ventures to ship goods to a military port, recently fallen into the hands of a victorious army, and he finds that the revenue laws of the conqueror's country have not yet been proclaimed there by the Executive, and he hence claims the right to disregard the regulations which the military commandant has established, and to say that because the revenue laws have not been extended over this place by the civil authority, that he will exercise the right to sell his goods in that market without the payment of duties. I can see nothing in this pretension likely to deserve the attention of the commissioner, unless it be its effrontery.

The civil authority at Matamoras was merged in the military. The commander of the place was supreme. He dictated all the laws for its government, and it cannot be disputed that he had, by the laws of war, the right to impose any law or regulation which he deemed proper for the landing of goods, or to prescribe the conditions on which they might be sold within his command. It is not unusual for the conqueror to regard the laws found existing as in force till it may become expedient to change them. There was, previous to the taking of the place by the army, a law of Mexico requiring the payment of duties, and the claimant should have expected to become subject to this law, if no other had been established. The commander, however, chose not to enforce this law, but to adopt that which was prescribed for the admission and sale of the same kind of goods in the United States, which he had clearly a right to do. It is, however, impossible, in any view of the case, that this cargo could be rightfully entered and sold in that port without the payment of duty. When Matamoras was taken by the army, there was no cessation of law or government. When the authority of Mexico terminated, that of the United States commenced; and there was consequently no interregnum during which the claimant could come in unaffected by law.

It is alleged, however, that the claimant had a permit to land the goods. In my statement of the case, I have already shown that the per

mit was wholly illegal and gave no protection or authority whatever. Besides, there is much reason to believe that, valueless as it was, from being granted by a custom-house officer possessing no jurisdiction over the district of Matamoras, there was fraud in procuring it. The deputy collector made a written statement, it is said, that the captain of the schooner "Star" made oath before him that the duties had been paid, and the said deputy collector exhibited what purported to be a copy of this oath, subscribed by the captain of the Star, to Lieutenant Chase, quartermaster of the army and collector of the port. These circumstances go to show that the permit, so much relied upon, was fraudulently obtained.

This case was fully and carefully investigated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and Uhde, the claimant, was heard before him by counsel, and the result was that the Secretary decided the duties must be paid, and in case that was not done, the goods should be sold at auction, and the duties and expenses being deducted the balance should be turned over to the claimant. This order was carried into effect in a manner the least exceptionable to the claimant. The goods were transported to Galveston and there sold under a decree of the district court, and the sum of $8,715 36 was left at the disposal of the claimant. It appears, therefore, that he had a hearing before the Secretary of the Treasury, and the further privilege of a trial by the district court, which in the United States is the court of admiralty jurisdiction, and the proper tribunal to determine a question of this kind; and that court ordered the goods to be sold and the duty and expenses paid. The trial took place at Galveston, in Texas, the nearest place that could have been selected and the most convenient to the claimant. It is difficult to conceive how the United States could have acted with greater fairness or with more regard for his just rights. The commissioners ought to give due consideration to the fact that this case has been decided by the proper executive officer charged with the administration of this particular branch of the government, and that the decision has been confirmed by the judgment of a competent court. Universal law and international comity demand that these proceedings should be everywhere respected, and, most of all, by a joint commission, sitting under the authority of England and the United States.

Dr. PHILLIMORE, for the claimants:

It cannot be disputed that prima facie Mr. Uhde is entitled under the terms of the convention-namely, "subjects of her Britannic Majesty'-to have his claim entertained by the commissioners.

I agree, however, that a treaty or convention is to be construed, and particular expressions in it interpreted, agreeably to the rules of international law.

I do not know upon what principle of law, or what authority among jurists, a restrictive interpretation could be affixed upon these words of the convention, unless, indeed, (as I understand the American counsel to argue,) they happened to have received such restrictive interpretation from a uniform current of decisions of acknowledged international authority.

I do not see that the authority of any jurist is referred to by Mr. Thomas, and the cases which he cites* are far from satisfying me that the commissioners could legally adopt any such exceptional construction of the terms as is contended for. They are taken from the prize courts, from the privy council, from the common law, and from the equity courts.

A misunderstanding of the cases in the prize courts appears to me to be at the root of Mr. Thomas's argument.

It is quite true that flagrante bello merchants residing in the enemy's country are considered, with reference to the belligerent right of maritime prize, as subjects of that country, without reference to the country of their origin or allegiance, and without much reference to the length of their residence.

Their domicil, for this particular purpose, is said to be sufficient to found the right of the maritime captor; but it would be stretching the principle of those decisions to an extent which was never intended to say that they were not British subjects in the sense of this convention; for instance, and the example alone is sufficient to answer the whole question, is there any jurist who would say that an injury offered to a British merchant residing at Mexico would not, all other means of redress being exhausted, justify the issue of reprisals on the part of Great Britain?

*This is designed as an answer to Mr. Thomas's argument in Laurents' case, page 136.

The case of McConnell vs. Hector, decided in 1802, (3 Bos. and Puller, p. 314,) that persons who had incorporated themselves with the commerce of the enemy, flagrante bello, may not sue in this country.

The case of Albretch vs. Susman (2d Vesey and Beames, p. 326) decided that the quasi diplomatic character of consuls made no difference as to the law on this point.

The Countess of Conway's case, (2d Knapp's Privy Council Reports, p. 367,) when examined, appears to be adverse to Mr. Thomas's argument, for Mr. Baron Parke decided, in that case, that the party must show "that she was a British subject in some sense," and that "one of these two things must be shown, either that the countess was a natural-born British subject, or that having been born abroad she was domiciled in England, and in that character entitled to the protection of a British subject at the time of the confiscation." Now, Mr. Uhde is a natural-born subject of Great Britain, and his native character, by a particular regulation of the Mexican State, is most carefully preserved.

I am of opinion that the principles of international law do not warrant the restrictive interpretation sought to be put upon the plain words of the convention, and that Mr. Uhde is not disentitled to have his claim entertained by the commissioners.

DOCTORS' COMMONS, October 14, 1854.

ROBERT PHILLIMORE.