official consent—a court, believing them to act solely from pure motives, and an exclusive devotedness to the interests of their country, being thus deceived, may at some instant become the instrument of injuring its best interests, and inflicting the severest wound on its character.

But Mr. Grymes has alleged that the interests of the United States have not suffered-that at all events the money could not be demanded until the determination of the appeal. In my mind this is no apology for him. The sacred purity of our courts of justice, the boast and pride of our country, is deeply stained, if, for a moment, it can be believed, that their officers can be turned, by the means of money, into pliant tools of every designing, speeulating merchant.

Mr. Grymes says he was anxious to have the Franchise bonded, because she was at a considerable expense, having reason to believe the sentiments of the judge were favourable to a delivery of the proceeds of the cargo to the claimants, on their giving security to refund in case of a reversal of the decree. If Mr Grymes, under that impression, had assented to an arrangement of that sort, no censure could be attached. But his fault was, to receive money from Shepherd, for the purpose of extending a credit to him, and to attempt to make this court the means of his acquiring unlawful gain.

This transaction is attempted to be defended, on the ground of its publicity. It is said it took place in the streets. My only surprise is, that all who heard the conversation were not astonished and confounded; and the only apology I can conceive for them is, that they could not believe that the parties were serious.

It appears, indeed, that at some unlucky moment, Mr. Shep herd did disclose his bargain with Mr. Grymes; but there is not the slightest evidence to show that Mr. Grymes ever imparted to any one of his most intimate friends, to Mr. Moreau, or to any body else, that he had received a single shilling from Shepherd. I must also observe, that even Mr. Shepherd seems to have repented of his disclosure. When he was before me on Tuesday, although particularly questioned as to this transaction, and of the conversation that passed between him and Desforgues, he only said, that he had told Mr. Desforgues, that he had paid

bank interest for the amount of his note-he did not say that he had agreed to pay, or had paid, to Mr. Grymes any sum of money, until Mr. Grymes acknowledged it himself.

Mr. Grymes has appealed to his correct conduct in many instances in this court, to show that it is not probable that he could have been actuated by improper motives in this affair. It is true that Mr Grymes has, on many occasions, in the performance of his official duties, displayed a zeal for publick interests that did him much honour-it gives me great pleasure that I can declare that I consider his exertions those of a faithful officer. It appears that in several instances he has been kind, indulgent and accommodating, without any expectation of reward, and, in the instance of Mr. Kenner, refused money when offered-I wish the transaction of the day he saw Shepherd, could be blotted out of the history of his life, it is one that I cannot approve, but on the contrary must unequivocally condemn. Mr. Grymes may consider these observations as somewhat harsh: I lament the occasion that has produced them. They are the sentiments of one who is moved at this moment by no passion or ill will; who having been for some years engaged in administering justice, knows full well the value of unsullied reputation, how all-important the character of purity and incorruptibility is to the ministers of the law, and that a contrary impression on the mind of the community must be productive of contempt of laws, abhorrence to our officers, and finally end in the destruction of our admirable institutions. It is with much pain I pronounce the result of the inquiry, which is, that Mr Grymes, has incurred the censure of this court, and he is censured accordingly.

I do hereby certify the above to be a true copy from the original now on file in the clerk's office of the District Court. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court, at the city of New Orleans, this 12th day of July, in the year of our Lord, 1810, and in the 35th year of American independence.

THOMAS S. KENNEDY, clerk.

THE ADVERSARIA.

THE frequent quarrels that arise among them (the Germans) when intoxicated, terminate not so often in abusive language, as in blood and slaughter. In their feasts, they generally deliberate on the reconcilement of enemies, on family alliances, on the appointment of chiefs, and finally on peace and war; conceiving, that at no time the soul is more opened to sincerity, or warmed to heroism. These people, naturally void of artifice or disguise, disclose the most secret emotions of their hearts in the freedom of festivity. The minds of all being thus displayed without reserve, the subjects of their deliberation are again canvassed the next day; and each time has its advantage. They consult when unable to dissemble; they determine when not liable to mistake. TACIT. de Mor. Germ. c. 22.

The deliberating on business, and the holding of councils of state during entertainment, was the practice of the Celtick and Gothick nations. And, it is remarkable that the word mallum or mallus, which, during the middle ages, denoted the national assembly, as well as the County Court is a derivative from mael, which signifies convivium.

From this union of festivity and business, there resulted evils which gave occasion to regulations which cannot be read without wonder. It was a law of the Longobards, “Ut nullus ebrius suam causam in mallum possit conquirere, nec testimonium dicere; nec comes placitum habeat nisi jejunus." LL. Longobard. lib. 2. tit. 52. 1. xi.—No drunken man shall be at liberty to plead his own cause, nor to give evidence in a court of justice; nor shall the magistrate give judgment unless fasting.

We read in Capit Kar. et Lud. "Rectum et honestum videtur ut judices jejuni causas audiant et decernant."-It seems fair and honest that judges should be fasting when they hear and determine causes. Lib. 1. l. 62. ap. Lindenbrog. And the following law was made in a synod held at Winchester, ann. 1308. "Item, quia in personis ebriis legitimus dici non debet consensus, inhi bemus, ne in tabernis per quæcunque verba, aut nisi jejuna saliva.

vir, aut mulier de contrahendo matrimonio sibi invicem fidem dare præsumant. 2. Wilkins, Concil. p. 295.-Because persons when drunk, are incapable of giving a legal consent, we forbid, that a man and woman attempt to pledge themselves in a contract of matrimony, when in a tavern by any form of words, unless with a fasting spittle.

This rudeness, of which we see the source in Tacitus, seems to have continued very long in England. "Non exolevit hacte nus mos antiquis," &c. says SIB HENRY SPELMAN, in Gloss. p. 385. The ancient custom has not yet ceased in the courts which are called assizes for the sheriffs of the county to expend a large sum of money twice a year in feasting the judges and gentry of the country.

From this propensity of the older Britons, has proceeded the restriction upon jurors, to refrain from meat and drink, and to be even held in custody, until they had agreed upon their verdiet

LAW ANECDOTE.

In the year 1792, Timothy Oates, publick crier of the court in Wiltshire, presented the following petition:

"To the honourable judges of the court in and for the county of Wilts: the petition of Timothy Oates, publick crier of said court, humbly sheweth :-

That your petitioner is this day eighty-four years of age, and was a crier in this court before either of your honours were born. That, small as his perquisites are, his wants are still smaller. He, alas! can cry no longer: but he may possibly live a little longer: and during that small period he implores to cry by proxy. His son Jonathan has a sonorous echoing voice, capable of rousing a sleeping juror or witness in the remotest nook of the courthouse. Your petitioner begs that Jonathan may be accepted as his substitute; so that of your petitioner it may be said when he is dead and gone, that although he cried almost all the days of his life, yet he never shed a tear."

The bench granted, nem con

THE

AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

RHODE ISLAND.

Case of the AURORA.

ON the 4th of February 1813, a novel and highly interesting question was argued before the District Court of the United States, holden by his honour Judge HOWELL, in the case of a libel against the ship Aurora, of Newburyport, prize to the privateer Governour Tompkins, of New York, found sailing under a British license. The principal documents produced on the part of libellants were-a consular copy of a letter from Admiral Sawyer, commanding on the Halifax station, referring to a previous correspondence between the admiral and Andrew Allen, jr. British consul at Boston, on the subject of supplies from America, reciting the necessity and policy of maintaining a constant supply of provisions from America to the British West India Islands, with assurances to the consul, that his majesty's vessels of war would be directed to permit to pass and fully to protect all American vessels so laden and bound, and which should have on board the pass or license of the consul, with a copy of the admiral's letter authenticated by the consul; also, a pass signed by the consul at Boston, with such authenticated copy annexed; No. XVI.

A