"The President hopes that Her Majesty's Government will view the propriety of the suspension in the same light in which he proposes it, as wholly in the interest and solely with a view to an early and friendly settlement of the questions between the two governments.

"He hopes that when the question shall again be considered it may comport with the views of Her Majesty's Government to embrace within the scope of the negotiation some agreement by the two governments, defining their respective rights and duties as neutrals in case the other government becomes unfortunately involved in war with a third power.

"The absence of some agreement or definition on this subject was among the causes leading to the rejection of the recent convention, under which, had it been adopted by the two countries, none of the grave questions which have arisen would have been passed upon by a tribunal whose decision either party (much less other nations) would regard as authority, so as to prevent repetition or retaliation. It might, indeed, well have occurred in the event of the selection by lot of the arbitrator or umpire in different cases, involving, however, precisely the same principles, that different awards, resting upon antagonistic principles, might have been made.

"If, however, the two leading maritime commercial nations of the world establish a rule to govern themselves, each with respect to the other, they may reasonably hope that their conclusion will be accepted by the other powers, and will become for the future recognized as a part of the public law of the civilized world."

While rejecting the claims convention, the Senate adopted a resolution advising and consenting to the conclusion of a treaty of naturalization on the basis of the protocol signed by Mr. Johnson and Lord Stanley. Mr. Motley was furnished with full powers to conclude such a treaty. On the convention for the arbitration of the San Juan water boundary, the Senate did not come to a vote. Mr. Motley was instructed to communicate this fact to the British Government.

with Lord Clarendon.

Mr. Motley had his first interview with Lord Motley's Interview Clarendon on the 10th of June, and, although it did not affect the international result of the negotiations, it illustrates the complications to which they were exposed and forms an integral part of their history. Mr. Motley, after communicating the purport of his instructions. in regard to the naturalization question and the San Juan boundary, proceeded to the subject of the rejected claims convention. In so doing he declared that he was fully sensible of the "gravity of the occasion" and of the "contingencies" that

would depend upon the negotiations concerning such "burning questions as those comprehended under the simple title of a convention for the settlement of all outstanding claims." The rejected convention would, he said, have "covered up a griev ance which most certainly would have continued to rankle and to fester beneath the surface," and those wounds "must be. probed before. they could be healed." Mr. Motley also expressed the conviction that the "aleatory process" provided for the selection of an umpire was an unworthy method for disposing of questions hinging on great principles of law and "involving the welfare of nations and the contingencies of war and peace."

In regard to the recognition of belligerency, Mr. Motley said that the President recognized the right of a sovereign power "to issue proclamations of neutrality" under proper conditions, but that "such measures must always be taken with a full view of the grave responsibilities assumed;" that "the famous proclamation of neutrality of May 13, 1861," was not considered by the United States as justifiable, but that the President desired it to be used only as showing animus and "as being the fountain head of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both individually and collectively, by the hands of Englishmen;" that other nations had issued proclamations contemporaneously, or nearly so, with that of Great Britain, but that from Great Britain alone had come "a long series of deeds, injurious to the United States, as the fruits of the proclamation.”

In conclusion, Mr. Motley said that he meant to do his best to bring about better relations, but that he did not disguise from himself that "the path was surrounded by perils." It was, he observed, sometimes thought puerile or unbecoming in political or international affairs to deal with the emotions, the passions, or sentiments; but enlightened statesmen, like those of Eng land, would never forget that "grave and disastrous misun derstandings and cruel wars resulted as often in history from passionately excited emotions and injured feelings as from cabinet deliberations or political combinations." There was, he declared, "much excitement of feeling and intensity of opinion" in the United States in regard to the questions at issue, and he deemed it his duty calmly but earnestly to call attention "to this grave aspect of affairs." He "confessed to a despondent feeling sometimes as to the possibility of the two nations ever

understanding each other," or of "their looking into each other's hearts."!

At the beginning of this interview Lord Clarendon referred to Mr. Sumner's speech on the rejected claims convention, and it is not improbable that his lordship assumed, as the conference progressed, that the views expressed in that speech had been adopted as the basis of Mr. Motley's instructions. The tone of these instructions was, however, wholly conciliatory. In preparing them Mr. Fish had kept three objects in viewfirst, to show that the rejection of the claims convention was not an act of unfriendliness; second, to suggest a suspension of discussion till the prevailing irritation should subside; and third, to make it clear that the government of the United States did not base its claims against Great Britain on the latter's concession of belligerent rights to the Confederate States. Of these three points the last was the most important, as well as the most troublesome. It was the most important not only because it vitally affected the course of future negotiations, but also because it involved a sovereign right which it was the interest of all nations to preserve, and for the exercise of which the Government of the United States now foresaw a possible occasion in the insurrection prevailing in Cuba. It was the most troublesome, because it brought the administration into conflict with those who considered the concession of belligerency as a ground of claim.

It is not to be supposed that Mr. Motley willfully departed from his instructions. He has declared-and his declaration should be decisive-that he sincerely endeavored to carry them out. But it is evident that Mr. Motley treated the questions at issue as an historian, rather than as a diplomatist. Instead of refraining from discussion, he precipitated it, suggesting "the contingencies of war and peace," and confessing to a "despondent feeling" as to the "possibility of the two nations ever understanding each other." In describing the Queen's proclamation of May 13, 1861, as the "fountain head of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both individually and collectively," he stated the position of Mr. Sumner instead of that of Mr. Fish on the recognition of belligerency; nor does he appear to have been conscious of the radical difference between the views expressed by these statesmen on that subject.

1S. Ex. Doc. 11, 41 Cong. 3 sess. 5-10.

When President Grant became acquainted Withdrawal of Nego- with the character of Mr. Motley's interview

tiations from London.

he requested Mr. Fish to recall him. Mr. Fish, however, advised the course, which was taken, of attracting Mr. Motley's attention to his departure from his instructions and directing him to inform the minister for foreign affairs that the negotiations on the subject of the Alabama claims, whenever they should be renewed, would be conducted in the United States. Even before the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon convention, but when it was seen that it was doomed to defeat, Mr. Fish expressed to the President the opinion that a pause must be taken in the discussion with Great Britain, and that when the excitement and agitation which would follow the rejection of the convention had subsided the United States should insist that any new negotiations should be held in Washington. Mr. Motley's interview with Lord Clarendon confirmed the wisdom, if it did not reveal the necessity, of carrying out Mr. Fish's plan. A year later Mr. Motley was recalled.

Unofficial Negotia

tions.

Meanwhile unofficial negotiations were in progress. In the summer of 1869 Sir John Rose, who was then a member of the ministry in Canada, and also a commissioner on the part of Great Britain to settle the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company and of the Puget Sound Company against the United States, came to Washington professedly to make some commercial arrangements between the United States and Canada, but really to sound our government as to the possibility of settling the Alabama claims." Indeed, Sir John seems to have acted as a confidential intermediary of the British foreign office not only to sound the government, but also to ascertain the state of public feeling and to gather the opinions of leading members of different political parties in the United States on that subject. In an interview with Mr. Fish in the summer of 1869, Sir John Rose suggested the Duke of Argyle and Mr. Forster as special envoys to the United States to treat on the pending differences. Mr. Fish, however, though he had himself suggested the idea of sending a special envoy to the United

3

Mr. Fish to Dr. Lieber, May 30, 1871, Memorial Proceedings of the New York Legislature, 1894, 45.

2 Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, 44.

3 Speech of Earl Granville, London Times, June 13, 1871.

States,1 1 said the time had not arrived; that the British people were too much irritated by the rejection of the treaty and by Mr. Sumner's speech," and that the American people "were too much carried away with the idea of paying off the cost of the war with the amount of damages that Mr. Sumner's speech had made out against Great Britain." Mr. Fish said "that when the excitement subsided the appointment as special envoy of some man of high rank, authorized to express some kind word of regret, would pave the way for a settlement; and he outlined to Sir John the exact scheme for settlement which was adopted a year and a half later."

Annual Message of 1870.

3

On the 25th of September 1869 Mr. Fish addressed to Mr. Motley an extended instruction, in which he fully set forth the injuries which the United States felt they had sustained. This instruction Mr. Motley was told that he was at liberty to read to Lord Clarendon, but in a separate and confidential instruction of the same day he was informed that he was to consider this permission as a command. This step was followed by others. The British minister at Washington, Mr. Thornton, under the instructions of his government, conferred with Mr. Fish at the Department of State, and efforts were made to find a common ground of negotiation. This end, however, was not easily attained. More than a year passed, and the two governments were apparently still far apart in their views. In his annual message to Congress of December 5, 1870, President Grant referred, with an expression of regret, to the fact that no conclusion had been reached. The cabinet of London, he said, so far as its views had been expressed, did not appear to be willing to concede that Her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence, or did or permitted any act during the war by which the United States had a just cause of complaint. "Our firm and unalterable convictions," said President Grant, "are directly the reverse;" and he then made a recommendation

1 Mr. Fish, in a letter to Dr. Lieber, May 30, 1871, said: "The sending a special mission-some person of high official rank-was suggested by me in May 1869, and was the subject of close confidential conversation and correspondence with influential persons in England as early as the 1st of June 1869. The correspondence was continued in this mode until the fruit ripened."

2 Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, 45-46.

3 For. Rel. 1873, part 3, p. 336.

MSS. Dept. of State.