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Opinion of the Court.

to enjoin the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company from constructing wholly within that State projected trackage, sometimes called the Hale-Cement Line. The bill alleges that the line is, within the meaning of the above provision, an extension of the defendant's railroad; that the prescribed certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission has not been secured; and that operation of the line will result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff, because it will divert to the Santa Fe traffic which would otherwise be enjoyed by the Texas & Pacific. By answer the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the court, insisted that the line is merely an industrial track, and asserted that the plaintiff is barred by laches. After a full hearing, the District Court entered a final decree enjoining the construction or operation of the line unless and until the prescribed certificate should have been obtained. 298 Fed. 488. The case was first brought to this Court by the Santa Fe on constitutional grounds by direct appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code. Because no substantial constitutional question was presented, this Court transferred it to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 266 U. S. 588. There the decree of the District Court was reversed. 4 Fed. (2d) 904. The second appeal to this Court was then taken by the Texas & Pacific under § 241 of the Judicial Code; and the case was docketed here on May 5, 1925. The three objections to granting relief which had been set up in the answer were renewed here.

First. The Santa Fe contends that the decree of the District Court was properly reversed, because the Texas & Pacific had not secured a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the projected line constitutes an extension. It is admitted that where projected tracks would confessedly constitute an extension and no certificate has been obtained, a court may enjoin construction. although such prior determination by the Commission

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was not made or sought. The claim is that where the defendant asserts that the proposed tracks do not constitute an extension, the court must, under the doctrine of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U. S. 138, and Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477, 483, either dismiss the bill because it is without jurisdiction, or postpone action because it is without power to proceed, unless and until a determination by the Commission of the controverted question shall have been made. It is argued that the issue whether tracks constitute an extension presents an administrative question; that the Commission has power to decide it, because Congress, by conferring authority to determine whether an extension is compatible with the public interest, has by implication conferred authority to determine also the subordinate question whether a proposed track constitutes an extension; that if the Commission finds the track to be an extension, it may under its general powers make an order requiring the carrier to cease and desist from construction and operation unless and until the prescribed certificate is obtained; and that, as the Commission has such primary jurisdiction, its aid must have been invoked before a court can grant relief.

To this argument the provisions of the Act afford a conclusive answer. Paragraph 18 prohibits construction of an extension without obtaining the certificate. Paragraphs 19 and 20 provide that a carrier desiring to construct one may apply for the certificate and prescribe the method of proceeding. Whenever such an application is made, the Commission may pass incidentally upon the question whether what is called an extension is in fact such; for, if it proves to be only an industrial track, the Commission must decline, on that ground, to issue a cer

2 See Application of Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 71 I. C. C. 784, 792; Operation of lines by Coal River & Eastern Ry. Co. 94 I. C. C.,389, 393.

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tificate. A carrier desiring to construct new tracks does not, by making application to the Commission, necessarily admit that they constitute an extension. It may secure a determination of the question, without waiving any right, by asserting in the application that in its opinion a certificate is not required because the construction involves only an industrial track. But a party in interest who is opposed to the construction is not authorized by the Act to initiate before the Commission any proceeding concerning the project. If application for a certificate has been made, he may appear there in opposition. If no such application has been made, paragraph 20 affords him the only remedy. That remedy is both affirmative and complete.

The function of the court upon an application for an injunction under paragraph 20 is a very different one from that exercised by the Commission when, having taken jurisdiction under paragraphs 19 and 20, it grants or refuses a certificate. The function confided in the Commission is comparable to that involved in a determination of the propriety or application of a rate, rule or practice. It is the exercise of administrative judgment. Where the matter is of that character, no justiciable question arises ordinarily until the Commission has acted. Compare Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 295. The function of the Court upon the application for an injunction is to construe a statutory provision and apply the provision as construed to the facts. The prohibition of paragraph 18 is absolute. If the proposed track is an extension and no certificate has been obtained, the party in interest opposing construction is entitled as of right to an injunction. The is

See Abandonment of line of Missouri Pacific R. R., 76 I. C. C. 635.

* See Construction of line by Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R., 94 I. C. C. 541.

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sue presented to the court by a denial that the proposed trackage is an extension does not differ in its nature from that raised when the denial is directed to the allegation that the defendant is an interstate carrier. Compare Smyth v. Asphalt Belt Ry. Co., 267 U. S. 326, 328-9. If the facts are agreed, the question is one of law. If they are not agreed, the court must find them. In the case at bar, the District Court, having jurisdiction generally of the parties and of the subject matter, was called upon to determine whether an allegation in the bill, essential to the cause of action, was established. This, the court clearly had power to do. Moreover, even if the question presented were, as contended, properly one of jurisdiction, the objection urged could not prevail. Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist.

Second. The facts on which the Santa Fe contends that the proposed line is merely an industrial track are undisputed. Dallas is a large interior city. The Texas & Pacific extends through it and beyond in a general westerly direction; the Santa Fe in a general southwesterly direction. Both lines have been operated for many years. Along the Texas & Pacific, commencing at a point 21⁄2 miles west of the city and extending westward about 211⁄2 miles farther, lies territory known as the Industrial District. To its development the facilities and services furnished by the Texas & Pacific have been essential. In it are cement works, oil refineries and metal works. The traffic moves in carload lots. All the industries are either located on its right of way or connect with it by spurs. To serve the plants that carrier has long switches and assembling tracks. No other railroad has any direct connection with any of these industries. Their traffic from or destined to the Santa Fe or other lines is interchanged by the Texas & Pacific at points on its line distant from these industries from 12 to 30 miles. Thus, the Texas

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& Pacific receives either the whole or a part of the revenue on all the traffic of the district-the richest freight-producing territory in all Texas.

The Santa Fe has no branch line running near to, or in the direction of, any part of the Industrial District. Hale is a station on its road. The proposed line is to begin at Hale, where storage and assembling yards are to be located, and is to end in the Industrial District, near the Texas & Pacific right of way. The air-line distance from Hale to the proposed terminus is only 34 miles; but the length of line is 71⁄2 miles, besides spurs, sidings and other subsidiary tracks. The greater length is necessitated in part by topographical conditions. These are such that the cost of construction is estimated at $510,000. There is to be one under crossing, where the new line intersects an interurban line, another where it intersects a highway. There are to be two small trestles and numerous fills and cuts. In some respects the character of the construction is that commonly used for industrial tracks. No intention appeared to ballast the track save in stretches where the material was bad. Second hand 75-pound rails, lighter than those commonly used by the Santa Fe, are to be laid. But these are heavier than those used on some of its branches. The ruling grade of the Hale-Cement Line is that prevailing on the Santa Fe branch line running out of Dallas to Paris and Cleburne with which it is to connect. The right of way averages 100 feet; and it is to be fenced on both sides for its full length.

No industry is now located along the proposed line between Hale and the Industrial District. The territory adjacent to that part of the line does not now produce any freight tonnage. The Hale-Cement Line was projected by the Santa Fe in order to reach on its own rails the six plants within the district which lie south of the Texas & Pacific Railroad. These furnish 80 per cent. of the traffic of the District. If enabled thus to tap it direct, the Santa

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