Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. ernment, based upon the Government's own liability to the claimant. And obviously it does not include an application for the entry and delivery of non-dutiable merchandise, as to which no claim is asserted against the Government, to which the Government makes no claim, and which is merely in the temporary possession of an agent of the Government for delivery to the person who may be entitled to its possession. This is not the assertion of a "claim upon or against " the Government, within the meaning of the statute; and the delivery of the possession is not the "approval" of such a claim. Neither is the wrongful obtainir g of possession of such non-dutiable merchandise a "defrauding " of the Government within the meaning of the statute. It is contended by the United States that, by analogy to the decisions in Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479, and Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182, 188, and other cases involving the construction of § 37 of the Penal Code relating to conspiracies to defraud the United States, the word "defrauding" in the present statute should be construed as being used not merely in its primary sense of cheating the Government out of property or money, but also in the secondary sense of interfering with or obstructing one of its lawful governmental functions by deceitful and fraudulent means. The language of the two statutes is, however, so essentially different as to destroy the weight of the supposed analogy. Section 37, by its specific terms, extends broadly to every conspiracy "to defraud the United States in any manner and for any purpose," with no words of limitation whatsoever, and no limitation that can be implied from the context. Section 35, on the other hand, has no words extending the meaning of the word defrauding" beyond its usual and primary sense. On the contrary it is used in connection with the words cheating or swindling," indicating that it is to be construed in the manner in which those words are ordinarily used, as relating to the fraudulent causing of pecuniary or property loss. And this meaning is emphasized by other provisions of the section in which the word "defraud" is used in reference to the obtaining of money or other property from the Government by false claims, vouchers and the like; and by the context of the entire section, which deals with the wrongful obtaining of money and other property of the Government, with no reference to the impairment or obstruction of its governmental functions. We hence conclude that the indictment did not show, within the meaning of § 35 of the Penal Code, either the purpose of obtaining the approval of a "claim upon or against" the United States and the Treasury Department, or the purpose and intent of "defrauding" them. The demurrer was rightly sustained; and the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. CHAMBERLAIN MACHINE WORKS v. UNITED STATES. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS, No. 123. Argued January 12, 13, 1926.-Decided March 1, 1926. A petition relying upon fraud and coercion to overcome a release of the claim sued on, must state distinctly the particular acts, specifying by whom and in what manner they were perpetrated, so that the court may see that, if proven, they would warrant the setting aside of the settlement. 59 Ct. Cls. 972, affirmed. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing a petition on demurrer. Mr. Raymond M. Hudson, with whom Mr. Burton E. Sweet was on the brief, for appellant. Opinion of the Court. 270 U.S. Assistant to the Attorney General Donovan, with whom Solicitor General Mitchell was on the brief, for the United States. MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court. The Chamberlain Machine Works filed its petition in the Court of Claims to recover compensation for the partial performance of a war contract for the machining of steel shells, which had been cancelled by the United States before completion, pursuant to the terms of the contract. The petition was dismissed on demurrer, without opinion. 59 Ct. Cls. 972. The appeal was allowed in June, 1924. The petition and an exhibit thereto disclosed that the claim was originally prosecuted in the War Department, under the Dent Act, in various proceedings before the Ordinance Section of the Claims Board, the Board of Contract Adjustment,' and the Appeal Section of the Claims Board; and that the Secretary of War made an award to the petitioner of $41,300.05, "in full adjustment, payment, and discharge" of the contract, which was accepted by the petitioner, in writing, in "full satisfaction of any and all claims or demands" which it had or might have pertaining to, growing out of, or incident to the contract. The petition sought to recover on the original contract, despite the settlement made more than three years before. It alleged, broadly, that this settlement was iniquitous and unjust, and not the voluntary act of the petitioner, but was secured by "fraud" of the officers of the War Department in the handling of the claim, by "continued brow-beating," and by "coercion" through which they "literally forced" the petitioner to take the sum offered. 28 Dec. War Dept. 298. 16 Dec. War Dept. 242. " The general allegations of "fraud" and "coercion were mere conclusions of the pleader; and were not admitted by the demurrer. Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, 127. To show a cause of action it was necessary that the petition state distinctly the particular acts of fraud and coercion relied on, specifying by whom and in what manner they were perpetrated, with such definiteness and reasonable certainty that the court might see that, if proved, they would warrant the setting aside of the settlement. See Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 818, 829; PerkinsCampbell Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 213, 218; Cairo Railroad v. United States, 267 U. S. 350, 352. The petition contained no such specific allegations; and since its vague and general averments did not overcome the effect of the release, the demurrer was properly sustained. See St. Louis Railroad v. United States, 267 U. S. 346, 350. The judgment of the Court of Claims is Affirmed. FLEISCHMANN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES TO THE USE OF FORSBERG ET AL. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. No. 50. Argued October 15, 1925.-Decided March 1, 1926. 1. A bill of exceptions is not valid as to any matter that was not excepted to at the trial, and can not incorporate into the record nunc pro tunc, as of the time when an exception should have been taken, one which in fact was not then taken. P. 356. 2. In a law case tried by the District Court without a jury, (Rev. Stats. §§ 649, 700,) where there are no special findings of fact, and no exceptions to rulings of law taken during the tria' and preserved by bill of exceptions, questions relating to matters of fact or conclusions of law embodied in the general finding are not reviewable. P. 355. Statement of the Case. 270 U.S. 3. But preliminary rulings on the pleadings made by the District Court under its general authority, before the issues are submitted under the statutory stipulation, are reviewable as in ordinary cases, independently of the statute. P. 357. 4. Under the Materialmen's Act, if suit on a contractor's bond be not brought by the United States "within six months from the completion and final settlement" of the contract, suit by any person who supplied labor or materials, etc., may be brought in the name of the United States, "within one year after the performance and final settlement of the contract," but not later. Held that allegations in the use plaintiff's declaration and in intervening petitions, that the contract was "completed and final settlement had" on a date specified, more than six months, but within a year, before institution of the suit, were not mere conclusions of law but allegations of fact. P. 358. 5. Amendments, in such a suit, which do not set up a new cause of action, but merely supplement the defective statement of previously existing rights, relate back, and may be filed after expiration of the year following final settlement. So held where the amendments brought in a supplementary contract amending, but not otherwise affecting, the original construction contract. P. 359. 6. The strict letter of an Act must yield to its evident spirit and purpose, when this is necessary to effectuate the intent; and unjust or absurd consequences are to be avoided if possible. P. 359. 7. The Materialmen's Act provides that where suit is instituted by a creditor or creditors, only one action shall be brought, which must be within one year from "performance and final settlement" of the contract, and any creditor may file his claim and be made a party within one year from the completion of the "work" under the contract, and not later. Held, in view of the remedial purpose of the Act and the liberal construction called for, that intervening claimants, like original plaintiffs, have one year from final settlement. P. 360. 3. Amendments held germane to causes of action originally alleged. P. 362. 9. A judgment of the District Court may validly be entered at a term following that in which the case was heard and taken under advisement. P. 363. 298 Fed. 330, affirmed. ERROR to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed a judgment of the District Court (298 |