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look to the trustees for the annuity still persists in personally annoying the other party by attempting to live together, the trustees are placed in a very embarrassing position, as they are no longer entitled to pay the annuity; and, if it is not paid, the husband is as liable for the debts incurred by the wife for her necessaries as if no deed had ever been executed. The only value, therefore, of a deed of voluntary separation is to show that the separation is voluntary, and to define the conditions upon which the separation is agreed upon, which conditions, however, can be broken at any time; and there is no legal means of enforcing them, as there is no legal consideration to make the stipulated payment binding.

175. Protection Orders.-Previously to 1870, a protection order was of extreme value, but since 1870 it is almost worthless, as, from that time, every wife is entitled to everything such an order can confer. It can only be obtained when the husband has deserted the wife for a considerable period (a year or more), so that it is out of the question where the husband persists in living with the wife; and, in defiance of such an order, the husband is at liberty to return, live with, and molest his wife to any extent short of assault with intent to do her bodily harm. Such an order, though obtainable, is now a delusion to be avoided, rather than an advantage to seek.

176. Separation Orders.-The insufficiency of protection orders with reference to personal considerations, as described in the last paragraph, having become notorious, the law in this respect was qualified by an Act of 1878, which gives any judge of a criminal court, or stipendiary magistrate, or magistrates in petty sessions, before whom a husband is convicted, of such an assault as the judge or other party entitled to adjudicate shall consider aggravated, power to make a separation order, which has the same force as a decree of judicial separation pronounced by the Divorce Court. The effect is to restrain the husband or wife from inter

fering with, trespassing upon, annoying, molesting, or intruding upon the other. It is a very complete legal remedy of personal grievances, but it cannot be resorted to unless the prescribed aggravated assault is committed. Minor assaults and cruelties will not suffice for the purpose, so that the only possible resort in such a case is the Divorce Court, under the head of Judicial Separation or Divorce.

the grievances of a wife fall short of 177. Judicial Separation. - If aggravated assault, but are of such a personal character that she earnestly desires to avoid living with her husband, the only effectual means of attaining her object, short of divorce, is judicial separation, which can only be obtained by proceedings in the Divorce Court, under circumstances recognized by the law as sufficient grounds, which must be cruelty or desertion by the husband.

178. Conjugal Cruelty.-No mat ter how grossly immoral, or insulting, or abusive, or violent, or disgusting a husband's conduct may be, it will not amount to the legal definition of cruelty so long as it does not include the infliction or direct threat of physical assault of an injurious character; for cruelty, to be effectually pleaded by a wife against her husband, must be wilful ill-treatment, and bodily injury resulting therefrom, or of marked injury to health resulting therefrom; or threats of such an unqualified character as to cause reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, and actual terror of conse quences. Evidence falling short of this will fail.

and objection of the wife. Indifference, and especially acquiescence, concerning the desertion of the husband will deprive the wife of any right of redress; and an expression of satisfaction that he is gone, if proved, will put the wife completely out of court. Desertion by a husband, of however aggravated a character, will not entitle a wife to judicial separation, unless the desertion continues without interruption for two years. Two years less one day is insufficient; two years and one day will

suffice.

180. Offer to Return.-If a husband who has deserted his wife offers within two years to return, and the wife refuses, that absolves him, and bars all redress. It is understood that such an offer has often been made for the express purpose of evading proceedings. Such an offer after the expiration of the two years is ineffectual for such purpose. The wife may then refuse to receive him with perfect impunity.

181. Reasonable Excuse.-A husband who has deserted his wife for two years may effectually plead good cause or reasonable excuse. If he can prove gross misconduct of the wife, he may plead that that drove him from home, and the plea will effectually bar the wife from redress.

182. Dilatoriness.-If a wife, after being in a position to prove legal cruelty or desertion, allows an unreasonable time to elapse before seeking redress, she is liable to be defeated on that ground. Delay beyond a few days is dangerous.

183. Petition and Affidavit.Proceedings in the Divorce Court are commenced by a petition, and an affidavit affirming the facts stated in the petition, and claiming custody of children (if any), and such arrangements with regard to maintenance and property as the circumstances may suggest. 184. Subsequent Proceedings. Upon a petition being filed, the Court issues a citation to the respondent, who must, within eight days

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afterwards, lodge the proper notice of intention to appear in defence. There are many possibilities of delay, but if the allegations are strictly true and sufficient, the petitioner, with ordinary attention and assiduity, may rely upon a decree, which takes effect forthwith.

tion.-A decree of judicial separation 185. Effect of Judicial Separareleases the parties from all obligations

relative to each other, and relative to

the world (and releases the wife from all disabilities), incurred by the marriage, except one. It is precisely the same as divorce, only that neither of the parties can marry so long as they are both alive.

186. Separated Husbands.-A husband judicially separated from his wife is liable during both their lives to abide by the decree as regards property claim upon her person. He has no or allowance to his wife. He has no right in her separate property. He cannot effectually interfere in her separate business, engagements, or earnings. He cannot enter his wife's premises or home without her consent without incurring the penalties of trespass, just as would be incurred by a stranger. He is expressly bound to abstain from annoying her in any way. He is not liable for her maintenance, only so far as the decree specifically directs. He is not liable for any of her debts.

187. Separated Wives.-A wife, judicially separated from her husband, is, in like manner as the husband, bound by the decree, whether it was procured at her instance or not. She has no claim upon him for maintenance only so far as the decree may specifically direct. She has no claim upon his person or protection. She is expressly bound to abstain from trespassing upon his home, and from annoying him in any way.

188. Divorce.-The only ground upon which a divorce can be obtained is the adultery of one of the parties; but there is a wide and essential dif ference between the claim of a husband to a divorce from his wife, and the

203. Housekeeping. However much the tendency may have grown, or is likely to grow, which rather resents the idea of every wife being a housekeeper, it is impossible for the generality of wives to evade the duty without considerable suffering. Persons of great wealth and exalted station may, if they choose, generally evade the duties of home-life, limiting themselves entirely to its pleasures and enjoyments; but it will not do for the generality to do so. A household where the wife takes no part in the management will mostly be inefficiently conducted, with great extravagance of expenditure. Those who have most money, indeed, have most need of reflection upon this matter. They who have little or nothing to lose may disregard it, but the rich who would keep rich cannot afford to deal lightly with their riches. Many of the best families of England have been consolidated by an appreciation of that in olden times. 204. Sir Walter Raleigh's Discomfiture. The pleasantry and brilliancy of Sir Walter Raleigh made him a generally welcome guest. During a summer visit at the country seat of a peer, he had his chamber window open one fine morning while he was dressing, and, consequently, became aware that the lady of the peer was vigorously superintending the conduct of domestic affairs. Amongst other evidences, he heard her inquire in a decisive voice, "Are the pigs fed?" Raleigh held such considerations in considerable contempt; so, on meeting her ladyship

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205. Servants.-To the generality of wives upon whom devolve the responsibilities of conducting a home of any pretensions, the word servants comprises nearly everything within the field of view; for whether a house has good or bad servants decides many things, if not all.

206. Great Houses.-It is a fact beyond all question that the command of all the best servants is in the hands of the occupiers of great houses, in the like of which many servants are proud to dwell, where the payment of high wages secures superior services, and where the emulation of many stimulates time when servants were better in great everyone. Probably there never was a houses than they are now.

207. Modest Establishments.It is in domestic establishments of modest pretensions that the difficulty of servants is, perhaps, the severest. Too sensible of the proprieties to be willing to put up with decidedly inferior girls, and not quite equal to commanding the services of the best, housekeepers in such modest circumstances are, probably, in the greatest difficulty in this respect.

208. Services of Relations.The law regards works and services rendered by near relations to each other as gratuitous acts of kindness, and does not presume that they are to be paid for, unless there be an express contract between the parties. This very distinctly applies to sisters, nieces, and others who may reside for a time with any person, and incidentally render service which, under different circumstances, must be paid for. But if a contract be made for service by a relation, or any payment be once made for such service, the obligation to continue payment as long as the service is accepted is implied.

209. Hiring. Every hiring of a domestic servant is presumed to be for a year, unless clearly expressed to the contrary, subject to several peculiarities appertaining to domestic service, as hereafter described.

the contract; it can only be appealed to as collateral proof that the contract was made.

213. Proposed Writing.-If A view to hiring and service for any and B enter into a conversation with a period, however short, and they fully agree about terms, and verbally engage to serve and accept service, and then, at the same interview, one of them says he will write a letter to confirm the engagement, or the other requests such a letter, or they both agree that a memorandum shall be prepared and mutually signed, a reservation is thereby implied; and if the letter is never written, or the memorandum is never signed, neither of the parties is bound unless the service is duly entered upon, and accepted or assented to; for a proposal to commit a verbal engagement to writing, if the proposal is made at the same interview, is fatal to the validity of the conversation as a bindcontract.

So.

The payment or refraining from payment in itself makes no difference. The real value of the process is that it implies and may be quoted as evidence that a verbal hiring had previously taken place; but the omission of the payment will make no difference to the force of the hiring contract, which is just as good, if proved, as if the money had been paid and accepted.

212. Contracts for a Year.-An express binding contract of hiring and service for not more than a year may be entirely completed by conversation, provided nothing is said about writing; for writing cannot change the nature of

214. Subsequent Proposals of Writing.-If the contract is verbally completed, and the parties separate with that understanding, an after writing of or proposal to write the particulars of the hiring will not void the verbal contract, unless both parties consent to waive it.

215. Interrupted Conversations.-Should a contract of hiring and service be verbally agreed upon, and the interview between the parties be merely interrupted, and one of the parties should go away, the party who goes away is bound, but the other may afterwards refuse to be bound until the contract is committed to writing, or confirmed by tender and acceptance of the service.

216. Exceeding One Year.-A contract of hiring and service for more than a year must be in writing. The consequence is, that if a servant is engaged without writing on the 31st of December, to serve for the whole of the ensuing year commencing on the Ist of January, though the service is only for