But constructive activity such as that entruste to the Assembly would be greatly impaired if con ditions of insecurity prevailed. Hence th Dumbarton Oaks proposals place great emphasi on the powers and procedures to be employed fo the maintenance of peace and security. Thes powers would be vested in the Security Council This Council would be a small body of 11 mem bers which would be in continuous session, aler and ready for any emergency. Of the 11 mem bers, the United States, Great Britain, the Sovie Union, China, and eventually France would have permanent seats. It is clear that the economic strength and military potential of these countries place them in a position of special responsibility in any matter relating to peace and security. Realistic recognition is given this fact in according them permanent seats on the Security Council. The other six members of the Council would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. And I would like to point out here that whatever voting procedure may be agreed to, deci sions in the Security Council would certainly re quire the assent of one or more of these members.

As I have said before, one of the purposes of the Organization would be to facilitate the peaceful adjustment and settlement of disputes. This function would devolve on the Security Council, which would act in accordance with a series of procedures outlined in the proposals. Nations directly involved in any disputes would bear the initial responsibility and obligation for adjusting or settling such disputes peacefully by means of their own choice. Such means might include direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or adjudication by the court of international justice. However, the Council would be empowered to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether or not international peace was endangered. If the parties to a dispute failed to settle their differences by such means, they would be obligated to refer it to the Security Council.

The Security Council would then determine whether the dispute was likely to endanger peace, and if so, recommend procedures or methods of adjustment.

There is thus a dual responsibility in these proposed measures. On the one hand, the parties to the dispute must observe their obligations to find peaceful solutions, and on the other hand, the Security Council must be ever alert to determine when a dispute may constitute a threat to the peace.

But if all these procedures should fail, and the Council should find that the peace was threatened, it would be empowered to take any measures necessary for the maintenance of peace.

The provisions for enforcement action by the Security Council are sufficiently elastic for effective action, whenever such action is required. Although wide discretion is given the Council in the determination of the existence of a threat to or breach of the peace, its action must be taken in accordance with the principles of the charter. Initially such action might consist of measures not involving the use of armed force, such as the severance of diplomatic and economic relations and the interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, radio, and other means of communication. If necessary, however, the Council could take action by air, naval, and land forces to restore peace.

Let me here recapitulate in somewhat greater detail the several successive steps that under the Dumbarton Oaks plan are open to the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, because these steps are of fundamental importance in the proposed structure:

1. The Security Council can investigate any dispute or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.

2. It can call upon the parties to a dispute to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, or by any other peaceful means of their own choice, or it can recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

Up to this point, it will be seen that the succes sive steps open to the Council are of a judicial nature. Only if these several steps have failed to settle the dispute in accordance with the pur poses and principles of the Organization and only if the dispute is found to constitute a continuing threat to the peace is the Council empowered to proceed to further steps of a political nature.

3. If the means already described fail and if the Security Council determines that, as a result, there exists a threat to the peace, it can decide whether it should take action.

4. If the Council decides in the affirmative, it can then determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

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5. The Council can take diplomatic, economic, or other measures short of the use of armed force, these measures envisaging possible complete or partial interruption of communications and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

6. Finally, but only in the last analysis if all previous steps have been found inadequate is the Council empowered to take such action by air, naval, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Clearly, under the proposed plan, every possible effort is to be made to settle international disputes without recourse to the use of force, but force is to be available if only thus can international peace and security be maintained or restored.

Now, for this last purpose, and under special agreements concluded in keeping with their constitutional processes, the member states of the United Nations would be obligated to supply, in case of need, specified contingents of armed forces and other facilities to be used for the maintenance of peace. These special agreements for the supply of forces would be concluded among member states and would be subject to approval by the Security Council.

It is obvious that in the use of armed forces by the Security Council it would require the most highly qualified expert assistance for this pur

pose. For this reason, the proposals provide for the creation of a Military Staff Committee which would consist of the Chiefs of Staffs of the per-. manent members of the Council or of their representatives and of other members of the Organization in special circumstances. This Committee would serve the Security Council not only in military enforcement measures but also in advising the Council upon a general system for the effective regulation of armaments.

This, in brief, is the pattern proposed for the maintenance of peace. There is, however, one further aspect which I wish to emphasize. I refer to the solemn obligations which must be assumed by all members of the Organization. First, they must pledge themselves to resort to none but peaceful means in the settlement of any disputes which may arise among them. As a fundamental corollary to this obligation, they must also pledge themselves to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization. In the event of a breach of the peace, all members must obligate themselves to assist the Organization in any action taken by it to maintain or restore peace. I trust that you will agree with me that these obligations go considerably farther than those assumed by the parties to the Kellogg pact and by the members of the League of Nations. These obligations, together with the extensive power of the Security Council to decide upon measures to be taken in the event of a breach of the peace, therefore would mark a great step forward in our ceaseless efforts to find means of preventing war.

In discussing the role of the General Assembly, I passed lightly over the provisions of the proposals concerning the solution of economic, social, and humanitarian problems. These provisions, in my opinion, merit your attention. As I have said before, the General Assembly would have responsibility for the formulation of broad policies in these fields in the form of recommendations. An Economic and Social Council, under the authority

of the General Assembly, would assist that body in developing international cooperative activity inc the economic and social fields. This Council r would consist of 18 member states elected by the t General Assembly for a term of 3 years. Unlike the Security Council, no provision is made for permanent members. It may be anticipated, how-I ever, that in selecting the members of the Economic and Social Council the General Assembly would take into consideration their ability to contribute to its work.

In considering the functions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, I invite your attention to the extensive develop ment of a number of specialized economic and social agencies. Some of these, such as the International Labor Office, were established at the close! of the last war. Others developed during the inter-war period. However, within the past 18 months 4 new organizations have been projected as a result of the international conferences held at Hot Springs, Bretton Woods, and Chicago. These newly projected bodies include the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Still other organizations may be established to deal with specialized economic, social, and cultural questions, as for example the proposed United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction. I should add to the above list the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, popularly referred to as UNRRA, which is in a special position because of its temporary nature.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contemplate that specialized agencies, such as those just described, would be brought into relationship with the general organization so that their policies and activities might be coordinated and related in the over-all picture. This coordination is considered necessary to prevent overlapping and confusion.