railroads under such legislation have only been compelled to make connections with other roads lying at a distance or to build connecting tracks with strict regard to the situation of the various railroads and the interests and communities to be served. Where the advantage to the public is great and the cost to the roads is not prohibitive or does not amount to the confiscation of property the track connection will be upheld though one or both of the roads may thereby be deprived of the revenue which it would otherwise have received for the longer haul. The Supreme Court has held that the states do not possess the power to direct

sidered (Chicago &c. R. R. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 174, 44 L. Ed. 417, 20 Sup. Ct. 336), the weight to be given that fact depends somewhat on the character of the facilities sought. If the order involves the use of property needed in the discharge of those duties which the carrier is bound to perform, then, upon proof of the necessity, the order will be granted, even though 'the furnishing of such necessary facilities may occasion an incidental pecuniary loss.' But even then the matter of expense is 'an important criterion to be taken into view in determining the reasonableness of the order.' Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. North Carolina Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. 585; Missouri Pacific Rwy. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. Ed 472, 30 Sup Ct. 330. Where, however, the proceeding is brought to compel a carrier to furnish a facility not included within its absolute duties, the question of expense is of more controlling importance. In determining the reasonableness of such an order the court must consider all the facts,-the places and persons interested, the volume of business to be affected, the saving in time and expense to the shipper, as against the cost and loss to the carrier. On a consideration of such and similar facts the question of public necessity and the reaonableness of the order must be determined. This was done in Wisconsin R. R. v. Jacobson, in which for the first time, it was decided that a state Commission might compel two competing interstate roads to connect their tracks."

In Wisconsin, Minnesota and Pacific Railroad v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, at p. 301, 45 L. Ed. 1194, 21 Sup. Ct. 124, the court said:-"In so deciding we do not at all mean to hold that under no circumstances could a judgment enforcing track connections between two railroad corporations be a violation of the constitutional rights of one or the other, or possibly of both such corporations. It would depend upon the facts surrounding the cases in regard to which the judgment was given. The reasonableness of the judgment with reference to the facts concerning each case must be a material, if not a controlling, factor upon the question of its validity. A statute, or a regulation provided for therein, is frequently valid, or the reverse, according as the fact may be, whether it is a reasonable or an unreasonable exercise of legislative power over the subject matter involved. And in many cases questions of degree are the controlling ones by which to determine the validity, or the reverse, of legislative action."

carriers engaged in interstate commerce to deliver all cars containing such commerce beyond their right of way and to a private siding, on the ground that such an order imposes a burden upon interstate commerce so direct and so onerous as to leave no question that it is an unconstitutional regulation.110 Such an order

110 McNeill v. Southern Railway Company, 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed. 1142, 26 Sup. Ct. 722. This case was decided May 28, 1906, before the adoption of this amendment to the Act to Regulate Commerce. The North Carolina Corporation Commission ordered the railroad company to deliver certain of its cars, containing shipments destined to the consignee, beyond its right of way and on the siding extending across the land of private persons to the establishment of the consignee, upon payment of the freight charges. The court said:-"Not being called upon to do so, we do not pass upon all the general regulations formulated by the Commission on the subject stated, but are clearly of opinion that the court below rightly held that the particular application of those regulations with which we are here concerned was a direct burden upon interstate commerce and void. Viewing the order which is under consideration in this case as an assertion by the Corporation Commission of its general power to direct carriers engaged in interstate commerce to deliver all cars containing such commerce beyond their right of way and to a private siding, the order manifestly imposed a burden so direct and so onerous as to leave no room for question that it was a regulation of interstate commerce. * ** The direct burden and resulting regulation of interstate commerce operated by an alleged assertion of state authority similar in character to the one here involved was passed upon by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. (118 Fed. Rep. 113). The court in that case was called upon to determine whether certain laws of Kentucky imposed a direct burden upon interstate commerce and were a regulation of such commerce, upon the assumption that those laws compelled a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce trasportation to deliver cars of live stock moving in the channels of interstate commerce at a particular place beyond its own line different from the general place of delivery established by the railway company. In pointing out that if the legislation in question was entitled to the construction claimed for it, it would amount to a state regulation of interstate commerce, it was aptly and tersely said (p. 120): 'It is thoroughly well settled that a state may not regulate interstate commerce, using the terms in the sense of intercourse and the interchange of traffic between the states. In the case at bar we think the relief sought pertains to the transportation and delivery of interstate freight. It is not the means of making a physical connection with other railroads that is aimed at, but it is sought to compel the cars and freight received from one state to be delivered to another at a particular place and in a particular way. If the Kentucky constitution could be given any such construction, it would follow it could regulate interstate commerce.

comprehending only intrastate commerce would doubtless be sustained.

By its very nature this paragraph demands and has received a strict construction both by the Interstate Commerce Commission and by the Supreme Court. In its terms it is limited to a "lateral, branch line." This designation refers to what the applicant road is at the time of making the application for the connection and not to what it may become after such a connection has been secured. This is not a roving power conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission enabling it to order a switch connection wherever it may arbitrarily determine. It is limited to a somewhat narrow class of lines which are by their nature dependent upon and incident to the main line with which the connection is desired. They may be embraced in the generic term "feeders"— roads such as may be built from mines, or forests or manufacturing plants to bring coal and ore, or lumber, or manufactured products to the main line for through shipment. It does not suffice that as a result of such a switch connection some shippers might be accommodated if the road which applies is not at the time of such application a branch of the trunk line carrier with which the union is desired. A road built independent of the trunk line, operated without regard to it, and parallel to it and thus in a measure in competition with it, manifestly would not constitute a "lateral, branch line." It is safe to define a "lateral, branch

This it cannot do.' *** And because we confine our decision to the issue which necessarily arises we do not intimate any opinion upon the question pressed at bar as to whether an order which was solely applicable to purely state business, directing a carrier to deliver property upon a private track beyond the line of the railway company, would be repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution."

III United States v. Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co., et al., 226 U. S. 14, 57 L. Ed. 104, 33 Sup. Ct. 5. The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad and the Norfolk and Western Railway are trunk lines of steam railroads running east and west across the state of Ohio. After almost touching each other at Norwood, a short distance from Cincinnati, these two railroads draw apart, one in a notherly and the other in a southerly direction, but come together again at Hillsboro some fifty-three miles further east. The Cincinnati and Columbus traction line, an interurban electric railway with a state charter runs between Norwood and Hillsboro through the middle of a diamond enclosed by the steam roads. For a number of miles the interurban line is very close and almost parallel to the tracks of one or the other of the steam roads and for a considerable part of the distance the towns on the electric line

line of railroad" as a railroad by nature tributary to the trunk line and dependent upon it for an outlet to the markets of the country. Subject to the facts of the specific case a feeder might be a lateral branch road of one trunk line at one end and of another trunk line at the other end. And again subject to the peculiar circumstances of each case, a road having a connection with. the trunk lines of two roads and enjoying joint routes and through rates with them would not, as a general proposition be considered a lateral, branch line of railroad of still a third road. It was certainly not the intention of Congress to grant carte

are but from five to ten miles from the nearest station on one of the steam roads. The traction company applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for switch connections with these roads. The question turned upon the point whether the traction line was a “lateral, branch line of railroad," within the terms of the section under discussion. The Supreme Court said, with reference thereto :-"The words 'lateral branch line' do not refer to what the applicant may become or be made by order of the Commission but to what it already is when it applies. The power of the Commission does not extend to ordering a connection wherever it sees fit, but is limited to a certain and somewhat narrow class of lines. The most obvious examples of such lines are those that are dependent upon and incident to the main line-feeders, such as may be built from mines or forests to bring coal, ore or lumber to the main line for shipment. We agree with the Commerce Court that the traction company is not within this class. It is an independent venture, in its general course parallel to, more or less competing with, the steam roads and working on a different plan. Presumably and so far as appears it was built and would have been run without regard to the existence of the steam roads. The cases cited on behalf of the appellants as to the power of railroad companies to construct branch roads under their charter do not apply. There the determination of the company fixes the character of the branch; it builds the branch from the beginning as incident to the purposes of the company. But here, as we have said, this determination of the Commission that the applicants shall be a branch is not enough; the applicant must be a branch before it applies. This is the absolute and reasonable condition. That some shippers would be accommodated by a switch connection is not enough."

In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, Lackawana and Western Railroad Co., 216 U. S. 531, 54 L. Ed. 605, 30 Sup. Ct. 415, the court said: "There certainly is force in the contention that the words of the statute mean a railroad naturally tributary to the line of the common carrier ordered to make the connection, and dependent upon it for an outlet to the markets of the country, which, according to the bill, the Rahway road is not. There is force in the argument that a road already having connection with the roads of two carriers subject to the Act and having joint routes and through rates with them cannot be regarded as a

blanche to every road that might so wish to make a descent upon a trunk line. It was primarily the intention to provide for the needs of shippers seeking an outlet for their goods either by a private road or by the branch of a trunk line.

This section as originally adopted by Congress by the Act of June 29, 1906, was declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad (decided March 7, 1910), to give only to shippers the right to demand switching connections with lateral, branch railroads.112 The right belonged exclusively to shippers lateral, branch line of railroad of another road situated like the appellee. On the other hand, it would be going far to lay down the universal proposition that a feeder might not be a lateral, branch road of one line at one end and of another at the other. We leave this doubtful question on one side because we agree with the circuit judges in the considerations upon which they decided the case. The statute creates a new right not existing outside of it. Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 296, 45 L. Ed. 1194, 21 Sup. Ct. 124. It is plain from the provisions of the Act, the history of the amendments and justice, that the object was not to give a roving commission to every road that might see fit to make a descent upon a main line, but primarily, at least, to provide for shippers seeking an outlet either by a private road or a branch.." The Rahway road, seeking the connection with the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western, is about ten miles long, having one terminus on the Lehigh Valley railroad and also a terminus on the Central Railroad of New Jersey. One of the branches of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western road passes through Summit, New Jersey, where the Rahway Valley railroad sought to force it to make a switch connection. The Supreme Court decided the case upon the terms of this section of the Act to Regulate Commerce before it was amended, on the ground that the Act gave this right only on complaint of the shipper and not on the complaint of a branch railroad company.

112 216 U. S. 531, 54 L. Ed. 605, 30 Sup. Ct. 415. The court here said: "The remedy given by the section creating the right is given only on complaint by the shipper. We are of opinion that the remedy is exclusive, on familiar principles, and that the general powers given by other sections cannot be taken to authorize a complaint to the Commission by a branch railroad company under section 1. If they were applicable to a branch road they would have been equally applicable to shippers, and there was no more reason to mention complaints by shippers than by others. The argument that shippers were mentioned to insure their rights in case of a refusal to connect with a lateral line is excluded by the form of the statute, which obviously is providing the only remedy that Congress has in mind. It may or may not be true that the distinction is not very effective, but it stands in the law and must be accepted as the limit of the Commission's power."