Similarly tariff sheets must set forth specifically all charges for refrigerating, precooling or preicing shipments of fruits, veg

tation of baggage liability is covered by that Act. (Here follows a lengthy quotation of the provisions of section six of the Act.) It is to be observed that the schedules are required to state, among other things, in naming certain charges 'all other charges which the Commission may require, all privileges or facilities granted or allowed and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, effect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee.' The question then is did the limitation as to liability for baggage based upon the reqirement to declare its value when more than $100 was to be recovered come within that provision. It seems to us that the ordinary signification of the terms used in the Act would cover such requirements as are here made for the amount of recovery for baggage lost by the carrier. It is a regulation which fixes and determines the amount to be charged for the carriage in view of the responsibility assumed, and it also affects the value of the service rendered to the passenger. Such requirements are spoken of, in decisions dealing with them, as regulations; as, a common carrier 'may prescribe regulations to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the risks he may have to encounter.' York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107, 112, 18 L. Ed. 170.

"Turning to the Act itself we think the conclusion that this limitation is a regulation required to be filed by the Act is strengthened by section 22 which provides: 'But before any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this Act, shall issue any such joint interchangeable mileage tickets with special privileges as aforesaid, it shall file with the Interstate Commerce Commission copies of the joint tariffs of rates, fares, or charges on which such joint interchangeable mileage tickets are to be based, together with specifications of the amount of free baggage permitted to be carried under such tickets, in the same manner as common carriers are required to do with regard to other joint rates by section six of this Act. This section would indicate that Congress thought that section 6 of the Act had to do with specifications of the amount of baggage which would be carried free and that such regulations should be filed under the requirement of section 6 to which it referred. This conclusion is further strengthened by the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission * * * by its tariff circular No. 15-A, entitled 'Regulations Governing the Construction and Filing of Freight Tariffs and Classification and Passenger Fare Schedules,' effective April 15, 1908, and in force at the time of the loss here in question. * * *

"This requirement is a practical interpretation of the law by the administrative body having its enforcement in charge, and is entitled to weight in construing the Act. *

"We are therefore of the opinion that the requirement published concerning the amount of the liability of the defendant based upon additional

etables, etc.1 The proper rate for such service, as well as the forms of the schedules and the approval of the tariffs are all rate-making matters which by the Act are committed to the Interstate Commerce Commission and are treated at length under Section 15.

Under section 6, not only must the filed and published rates indicate separately and specifically all charges made to shippers and consignees for services rendered by the carriers but the schedules must also set forth all allowances made to shippers and

payment where baggage was declared to exceed $100 in value was determinative of the rate to be charged and did affect the service to be rendered to the passenger, as it fixed the price to be paid for the service rendered in the particular case, and was, therefore, a regulation within the meaning of the statute. By requiring the baggage regulations, including the excess valuation rate, to be filed and become part of the tariff schedules, the rule of the common law that the carrier becomes an insurer of the safety of baggage against accidents not the act of God or the public enemy or the fault of the passenger (the rule established in this country, 3 Hutchinson on Carriers, sec 1241) was not changed. The effect of such filing is to permit the carrier by such regulations to obtain commensurate compensation for the responsibility assumed for the safety of the passenger's baggage, and to require the passenger whose knowledge of the character and value of his baggage is peculiarly his own to declare its value and pay for the excess amount. There is no question of the reasonableness or propriety of making such regulations, which would be binding upon the passenger if brought to his knowledge in such wise as to make an agreement or what is tantamount thereto."

19 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, (PreIcing Case), 232 U. S. 199, 58 L. Ed. 568, 34 Sup. Ct. 291. This case dealt with the pre-cooling and pre-icing of shipments of California fruit to the eastern market. The court said: "What is a proper rate on fruit in precooling shipments, or a fair charge for hauling necessary ice or rendering other transportation services are all rate-making matters committed to the Commission. It may determine what shall be the difference in rate between carload and less than carload lots. It may decide whether the difference in revenue, due to a difference in method of loading, warrants a difference in the rate on carload shipments of the same article. It may prescribe the form in which schedules shall be prepared and arranged (sec. 6) and may approve tariffs stating that the single rate includes both the line haul and accessorial services absorbed in the rate. Conversely, it may prescribe a tariff fixing a through rate which includes not only the haul of the fruit, but the haul of the ice necessary to keep the fruit in condition. All these are matters committed to the decision of the administrative body, which, in each instance, is required to fix reasonable rates and establish reasonable practises. The courts have not been vested with any such power."

consignees for any services rendered or facilities extended by them in aid of transportation of whatever nature or description they may be.20 Such services performed by the shipper or consignee might include, for example, the furnishing of private cars, the use of private tracks, or some element more intimately associated with the physical act of transportation such as switching, hauling, lightering or other work, included in the haul-rate, but actually performed by the shipper.

20 See Chicago and Alton Railway Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 563, 53 L. Ed. 653, 29 Sup. Ct. 689, where it was contended that an amount paid to the shipper by the carrier was for the use of tracks owned by the shipper but it was contended on the other hand that it was in the nature of a rebate and illegal under the Elkins Act. Without opinion and by a divided court the Supreme Court sustained the opinion of the lower court holding the carrier guilty of the offense charged. In deciding this case the Circuit Court of Appeals (156 Fed. 558) had said "to secure equality among shippers, the law commands, not only that the rates shall be equal, but that they shall be fixed and certain-subject to no addition or diminution against, or in favor of, anyone-so fixed and certain that any shipper can with his head and pencil figure out from the tariff sheets just what the rate is, both for himself and for his competitors." The District Court (148 Fed. 646) had said:-"The word 'rate,' as used in the interstate commerce law, means the net cost to the shipper of the transportation of his property; that is to say, the net amount the carrier receives from the shipper and retains. In determining this net amount in a given case, all money transactions of every kind or character having a bearing on, or relation to, that particular instance of transportation whereby the cost to the shipper is directly or indirectly enhanced or reduced must be taken into consideration. * * * The object of the statutes relating to interstate commerce is to secure the transportation of persons and property by common carriers for reasonable compensation. No rate can possibly be reasonable that is higher than anybody else has to pay. Recognizing this obvious truth, the law requires the carrier to adhere to the published rate as an absolute standard of uniformity. The requirement of publication is imposed in order that the man having freight to ship may ascertain by an inspection of the schedules exactly what will be the cost to him of the transportation of his property; and not only so, but the law gives him another and a very valuable right, namely, the right to know, by an inspection of the same schedule, exactly what will be the cost to his competitor of the transportation of his competitor's property."

Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 230 U. S. 247, 57 L. Ed. 1472, 33 Sup. Ct. 916, supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 56 L. Ed. 83, 32 Sup. Ct. 22; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Updike Grain Co., 222 U. S. 215, 56 L. Ed. 171, 32 Sup. Ct. 39; United States v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 231 U. S. 274, 58 L. Ed. 218, 34 Sup. Ct. 75.

Thus the primary purpose of the provision requiring the filing, publishing and posting of rates is to secure their uniformity and certainty and to enable shippers to determine by an inspection thereof the cost to themselves and to their competitors for the transportation of their property-in short to establish a published absolute standard of uniformity which shall be adhered to.

Through Rates.-By the amendment of June 29, 1906 (the Hepburn Act) the railroads were required to make the same publication, posting and filing of joint as of separate rates. These, of nature, applied to shipments over through routes of connecting carriers as compared with a shipment only over the line of a single carrier. A through route or shipment is most commonly evidenced by a through bill of lading though it is formed by any arrangement, direct or indirect, between carriers with connecting lines.21 By an amendment of the same date power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission in its discretion and for good cause shown to allow changes in tariffs upon less than the thirty days notice specified in the Act and to modify, either in particular instances or by general order the requirements as to the posting and filing of tariffs of rates and charges.

21 Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. 700.

SECTION 7. CONTINUOUS CARRIAGE. SEC. 7. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to enter into any combination, contract, or agreement, expressed or implied, to prevent, by change of time schedule, carriage in different cars, or by other means or devices, the carriage of freights from being continuous from the place of shipment to the place of destination; and no break of bulk, stoppage, or interruption made by such common carrier shall prevent the carriage of freights from being and being treated as one continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of destination, unless such break, stoppage, or interruption was made in good faith for some necessary purpose, and without any intent to avoid or unnecessarily interrupt such continuous carriage or to evade any of the provisions of this Act.

Continuous carriage of

freights from

place of ship

ment to place

of destination.

This section prohibiting any combination to prevent the continuity of traffic from the place of shipment to the place of destination must be considered in connection with the provision of section 3 governing the interchange of traffic which the courts have declared leaves the carriers free to make their own arrangements for through traffic. The Supreme Court has declared that the provisions of section 7 are aimed solely at the acts of railroad companies which may prevent continuity of transportation for any purpose. It is restrictive of the powers of railroads making it unlawful for such interstate carriers by any means or devices to prevent the carriage of freight from being continuous from the place of shipment to the place of destination. Consequently there could be no violation of this law where a state court might, by proper process under state attachment laws, seize and hold the cars of an interstate carrier, in spite of the possible embarassment to interstate commerce resulting therefrom.1

I Davis v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co., 217 U. S. 157, 54 L. Ed. 708, 30 Sup. Ct. 463. This case arose from the