or take away any of its incidents. Nor does it in any wise work a denial of due process of law."

9917

Limitation of Court Actions.—Where a shipper has not filed a complaint for unreasonable charges with the Interstate Commerce Commission or intervened in such a complaint, but has a claim for excessive charges growing out of shipments at rates on which the Commission has ruled, he must bring his action for damages in the courts within two years of the date on which the cause of action arose or be debarred.18

*

17 In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., decided February 23, 1915, the Supreme Court said:-"It is also urged * * that the provision in section 16 that in actions like this, 'the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,' is repugnant to the Constitution in that it infringes upon the right of trial by jury and operates as a denial of due process of law. This provision only established a rebuttal presumption. It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury. At most therefore it is merely a rule of evidence. It does not abridge the right of trial by jury or take away any of its incidents. Nor does it in any wise work a denial of due process of law. In principle it is not unlike the statutes in many of the states whereby tax deeds are made prima facie evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings upon which their validity depends. Such statutes have been generally sustained."

18 Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., decided March 15, 1915. The Supreme Court said: "The inquiry as to the reasonableness of the advance was general in its nature. The finding thereon was general in its operation and inured to the benefit of every person that had been obliged to pay the unjust rate....... The plaintiff and every other shipper similarly situated was entitled by appropriate proceedings before the Commission or the courts to obtain the benefit of that general finding and order....... But while every person who had paid the rate could take advantage of the finding that the advance was unreasonable, he was obliged to assert his claim within the time fixed by law. When the overcharge was collected a cause of action at once arose and the shipper at once had the right to file a complaint or to intervene in proceedings instituted by others. If he failed to take either of those steps and there was a finding of unreasonableness in the proceedings begun by others, he could, if in time, present his claim, and await the result of the litigation over the validity of any order made at the instance of those parties. If it was ultimately sustained by the court as valid he would then be in position to obtain reparation from the Commission-or a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction, on a claim that had been seasonably presented. But neither proceedings begun by other shippers, nor findings of unreasonableness and orders issued thereon by the Commission, would save the rights of those who disregarded the requirements of the Hepburn amendment."

SECTION 16a. REHEARINGS BY THE COMMISSION.

Commis si on may grant hearings.

re

for rehearing

shall not oper

ate as a stay of

proceedings, un

less so ordered by Commission.

SEC. 16a. (Added June 29, 1906.) That after a decision, order, or requirement has been made by the Commission in any proceeding any party thereto may at any time make application for rehearing of the same, or any matter determined therein, and it shall be lawful for the Commission in its discretion to grant such a rehearing if sufficient reason thereApplication for be made to appear. Applications for rehearing shall be governed by such general rules as the Commission may establish. No such application shall excuse any carrier from complying with or obeying any decision, order, or requirement of the Commission, or operate in any manner to stay or postpone the enforcement thereof, without the special order of the Commission. In case a rehearing is granted the proceedings thereupon shall conform as nearly as may be to the proceedings in an original hearing, except as the Commission may otherwise direct; and if, in its judgment, after such rehearing and the consideration of all facts, including those arising since the former hearing, it shall appear that the original decision, order, or requirement is in any respect unjust or unwarranted, the Commission may reverse, change, or modify the same accordingly. Commission Any decision, order, or requirement made after reverse, such rehearing, reversing, changing, or modifying ify order. the original determination shall be subject to the same provisions as an original order.

may, on rehear

ing,

change, or mod

This section was incorporated in the Act to Regulate Commerce on June 29, 1906, and although adopted on the recommendation of the Commission it seems superfluous in view of the very extensive powers granted by other sections of the Act. No cases involving the construction of this section have been adjudicated by the Supreme Court.

SECTION 17. PRACTISE AND PROCEDURE.

may determine own pro

cedure.

SEC. 17. (As amended March 2, 1889.) That the Commis si on Commission may conduct its proceedings in such its manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice. A majority of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but no commissioner shall participate in any hearing or proceeding in which he has any pecuniary interest. Said Commission may, from time to time, make or amend such general rules or orders as may be requisite for the order and regulation of proceedings before it, including forms of notices and the service thereof, which shall conform, as nearly as may be, to those in use in the courts of the United States. Any party may appear before said Commission and be heard, in person or by attorney. Every vote and son or by atofficial act of the Commission shall be entered of record, and its proceedings shall be public upon the request of either party interested. Said Commission shall have an official seal, which shall be judicially noticed. Either of the members of the Commission may administer oaths and affirmations and sign subpœnas.

Parties may appear in per

torney.

Official seal.

The rules of practise and forms of procedure are simple and have been liberally construed by the Commission. For the rules of practise adopted by the Commission, see Appendix, page 533For forms of procedure, see Appendix, page 543. They have not been the subject of litigation before the Supreme Court.

SECTION 18. SALARIES OF COMMISSIONERS AND EXPENSES OF COMMISSION.

Commissioners.

Secret ry

salary.

Salaries of SEC. 18. (As amended March 2, 1889.) [See section 24, increasing salaries of commissioners.] That each commissioner shall receive an annual salary of seven thousand five hundred dollars, payable in the same manner as the judges of the courts of the United States. The Commission shall aphow appointed; point a secretary, who shall receive an annual salary of three thousand five hundred dollars, payable in like manner. The Commission shall have authority to employ and fix the compensation of such other employees as it may find necessary to the Offices and proper performance of its duties. Until otherwise provided by law, the Commission may hire suitable offices for its use, and shall have authority to proWitnesses' cure all necessary office supplies. Witnesses summoned before the Commission shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States.

Employees.

supplies.

fees.

Expenses of the Commis

paid.

All of the expenses of the Commission, including sion how all necessary expenses for transportation incurred by the commissioners, or by their employees under their orders, in making any investigation, or upon official business in any other places than in the city of Washington, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the chairman of the Commission.

By section 24, added June 29, 1906, the salaries of the members of the Commission were increased to ten thousand dollars and by the sundry civil Act of March 4, 1907, the salary of the secretary of the Commission was increased to five thousand dollars.

The Act to Regulate Commerce, amended as indicated above, provides that "all of the expenses of the Commission * shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the chairman of the Commission"; and

the appropriation Act of the same date provides "that hereafter expenses of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be audited by the proper accounting officers of the treasury." The Supreme Court has held that it is not necessary to submit to the comptroller of the treasury actual copies of telegrams relating to the business of the Commission accompanying vouchers therefor if in the opinion of the Commission such messages are so far confidential that the requirement for their production is unreasonable and against public interest.1

I United States v. Moseley, 187 U. S. 322, 47 L. Ed. 198, 23 Sup. Ct. 90. The accounts for money expended by the secretary of the Commission for telegrams sent pursuant to the directions of the Commission were disallowed by the auditor of the treasury because the secretary had not complied with the requirement of the comptroller to furnish the original telegrams or, if confidential, in lieu thereof a certificate to that effect signed by the chairman of the Commission. The secretary, however offered to submit the books of the Commission to the comptroller and auditors of the treasury. The court said:-"It is to be remembered that the petitioner is but the secretary of the Commission. He does not direct its functions, its expenditures, or control its records. He could only submit the requirement of the comptroller to the Commission and its response to the comptroller. Its response was 'that so much of the comptroller's communication as required copies of telegrams relating to the business of the Commission to accompany telegraph vouchers for which credit is asked be disregarded by the secretary and disbursing agent, the Commission holding that such messages are so far confidential as to justify refusal to disclose their contents, and that the requirement for their production is unreasonable and against public interest.' This was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the comptroller."