The requirement of the Carmack amendment that a carrier receiving property for transportation in interstate commerce shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor does not require other receipts for baggage than baggage checks. Such checks are in

in their character and not inconsistent with any statute or their duties to the public, to protect themselves against liability, as insurers, for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value, except upon additional compensation, proportioned to the risk. And in order that such regulations may be practically effective and the carrier advised of the full extent of its responsibility, and, consequently, of the degree of precaution necessary upon its part, it may rightfully require, as a condition precedent to any contract for the transportation of baggage, information from the passenger as to its value; and if the value thus disclosed exceeds that which the passenger may reasonably demand to be transported as baggage without extra compensation the carrier, at its option, can make such additional charge as the risk fairly justifies.' Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 27, 25 L. Ed. 531.

"We are therefore of the opinion that the requirement published concerning the amount of the liability of the defendant based upon additional payment where baggage was declared to exceed $100 in value was determinative of the rate to be charged and did affect the service to be rendered to the passenger, as it fixed the price to be paid for the service rendered in the particular case, and was, therefore, a regulation within the meaning of the statute. * * * But the effect of the regulations, filed as required, giving notice of rates based upon value when the baggage to be transported was of a higher value than $100, and the delivery and acceptance of the baggage without declaration of value or notice to the carrier of such higher value, charges the carrier with liability to the extent of $100 only."

17 In Boston and Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. Ed. 868, 34 Sup. Ct. 526, supra, as to this, the court said:-"We do not think the requirement of the Carmack amendment, that a railway company receiving property for transportation in interstate commerce shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, required other receipts than baggage checks, which it is shown were issued when the baggage was received in this case. When the amendment was passed Congress well knew that baggage was not carried upon bills of lading, and that carriers had been accustomed to issue checks upon receipt of baggage. We do not think it was intended to require a departure from this practise when the matter was placed under regulation by schedules filed and subject to change for unreasonableness upon application to the Commission. Such checks are receipts, and there is no special requirement in the statute as to their form. It is doutless in the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to make requirements as to the checks or receipts to be given for baggage if that subject needs regulation. Act of June 18, 1910, secs. I and 15 (36 Stat. 539)."

fact receipts and the statute contains no special requirement as to the form of such receipts as it nominates.

Liability of Carrier to Suit in Foreign District.—The provisions of the Carmack amendment, while intended to facilitate the remedy of the shipper by making the initial carrier responsible for the entire carriage, were not intended to make foreign corporations through connecting carriers liable to suit in a district where they were not carrying on business in the sense which the courts have held necessary to confer jurisdiction. The business necessary to give a court jurisdiction must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with process. Each case is subject to the facts therein within the comprehension of this rule. And a carrier corporation which establishes an office in a foreign district and maintains agents there who attend to claims presented against the road for settlement is carrying on business within the meaning of the rule and is amenable to process and suit in that district.18

18 St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 57 L. Ed. 486, 33 Sup. Ct. 245. The defendant in error filed suit against the railroad in New York County to recover damages for loss sustained by him arising from the alleged negligence of the carrier in failing to properly ice and re-ice poultry shipped from Waco, Texas, to New York City. Upon the door of an office in New York City appeared the name of the railroad corporation together with the names of certain officials and their designation. Claims were presented to these officials at this office by correspondence and replies thereto were received showing that attention was being paid to the claims. The railroad denied jurisdiction of the New York court in the case. The Supreme Court said:-"In this class of cases where it is undertaken to hold a corporation personally liable in a foreign jurisdiction, two questions ordinarily arise: the first, Was the corporation within the jurisdiction in which it is sued? the second, Was process duly served upon an authorized agent of the corporation? As to the latter question there is little difficulty in this case. The cause of action having accrued in New York by the failure to keep the contract for the safe delivery of the goods there, the service could be properly made under the New York statute, in the absence of other designated officials, upon the resident director. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 49 L. Ed. 810, 25 Sup. Ct. 483. The other question as to the presence of the corporation within the jurisdiction of the court in which it was sued raises more difficulty. A long line of decisions in this court has established that in order to render a corporation amenable to service of process in a foreign jurisdiction it must

appear that the corporation is transacting business in that district to such an extent as to subject it to the jurisdiction and laws thereof. The Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 27 L. Ed. 222, 1 Sup. Ct. 354; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 39 L. Ed. 517, 15 Sup. Ct. 559; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406, 47 L. Ed. 1113, 23 Sup. Ct. 728; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428, 47 L. Ed. 1122, 23 Sup. Ct. 754; Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. 841, 27 Sup. Ct. 513; Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 51 L. Ed. 916, 27 Sup. Ct. 594; Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437, 54 L. Ed. 272, 30 Sup. Ct. 125; Harndon-Carter Co. v. Norris, Son & Co., 224 U. S. 496, 56 L. Ed. 857, 32 Sup. Ct. 550.

"In the court below it was adjudged that the so-called Carmack amendment, under the circumstances here detailed, had had the effect of making the corporation liable to suit in New York and, because of the agency within New York of the connecting carrier, effected by that statute, must be held to be there present and subject to service of process. In view of the recent consideration of the Carmack amendment in this court it is unnecessary to now enter upon any extended discussion of it. The object of the statute was to require the initial carrier receiving freight for transportation in interstate commerce to obligate itself to carry to the point of destination, using the lines of connecting carriers as its agencies, thus securing for the benefit of the shipper unity of transportation and responsibility. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 203, 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 Sup. Ct. 164. The provisions of the amendment had the effect of facilitating the remedy of the shipper by making the initial carrier responsible for the entire carriage, but the amendment was not intended, as we view it, to make foreign corporations through connecting carriers liable to suit in a district where they were not carrying on business in the sense which has heretofore been held necessary to confer jurisdiction.

"We reach the conclusion that this case is to be decided upon the principles which have heretofore prevailed in determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the district in such sense as to subject it to suit therein. This court has decided each case of this character upon the facts brought before it and has laid down no all-embracing rule by which it may be determined what constitutes the doing of business by a foreign corporation in such manner as to subject it to a given jurisdiction. In a general way it may be said that the business must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with process. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, supra, 407; Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., supra, 532. Applying the general principles which we regard as settled by this court, Was this company doing business in the state of New York in that sense?

"The testimony discloses that the two roads together constitute a continuous line from St. Louis, through the states of Illinois, Missouri, Tenessee, Arkansas and Louisiana into Texas, and are together known as the

'Cotton Belt Route.' This combination has an office in the city of New York, upon the door of which, as upon the stationery and literature of the companies, the symbol, 'Cotton Belt Route,' is found in use. Underneath appears the general description, 'St. Louis Southwestern Lines,' and there is also named a general eastern freight agent and traveling freight agent of the lines. With this joint freight agent at the office in New York the matter of the plaintiff's claim was taken up and considered, and correspondence concerning it was had through his office, and a settlement of the claim attempted. It was only after such negotiations for a settlement had failed that this action was brought. Here, then was an authorized agent attending to this and presumably other matters of a kindred character, undertaking to act for and represent the company, negotiating for it and in its behalf declining to adjust the claim made against it. In this situation we think this was the transaction of business in behalf of the company by its authorized agent in such manner as to bring it within the district of New York, in which it was sued, and to make it subject to the service of process there. See in this connection, Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Meyer, supra, 415; Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 255, 53 L. Ed. 782, 29 Sup. Ct. 445. In our opinion the court did not err in holding the corporation subject to process and duly served in this case."

SECTION 21. ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE INTER

STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Annual re

Congress.

to

SEC. 21. (As amended March 2, 1889.) That ports of the the Commission shall, on or before the first day of Commission December in each year, make a report, which shall be transmitted to Congress, and copies of which shall be distributed as are the other reports transmitted to Congress. This report shall contain such information and data collected by the Commission as may be considered of value in the determination of questions connected with the regulation of commerce, together with such recommendations as to additional legislation relating thereto as the Commission may deem necessary; and the names and compensation of the persons employed by said Commission.

No cases involving the construction of this section have been decided by the Supreme Court. Annual reports have been submitted to Congress, twenty-eight in number, including that for the year 1914, since the creation of the Commission. These reports contain a statement of the work of the Commission during the preceding year; a summary of the various hearings and decisions of the Commission; a statement and digest of the decisions of the various courts in cases involving the construction of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended; a statement of appropriations and expenditures and of persons employed by the Commission; together with recommendations for further legislation to increase the efficacy of the Act.