Special Report of William E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney-general, Being a ... - United States. Department of Justice, William Elijah Fuller, United States. Spanish Treaty Claims Commission

by Spanish and insurgent forces during the recent insurrection in Cuba, which broke out in February, 1895.

Article VII of the treaty of Paris is as follows:

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

In order to carry out these provisions Congress passed the act entitled "An act to carry into effect the stipulations of article seven of the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded on the tenth day of December, 1898," and which act was approved March 2, 1901.

Pursuant to the first paragraph of this act the President nominated Hon. William E. Chandler, of New Hampshire, and formerly Senator from that State; Gerrit J. Diekema, of Michigan; James P. Wood, of Ohio; William L. Maury, of the District of Columbia, and William L. Chambers, of Alabama, as members of the Commission, designating Senator Chandler as president of the Commission. He also nominated William E. Fuller, of Iowa, as Assistant Attorney-General, to make defense for the United States in all proceedings before the Commission. These nominations were all confirmed by the Senate March 9, 1901, and the persons named entered upon the discharge of their duties.

The Attorney-General gave notice March 27, 1901, that the first meeting of the Commission would be held April 8, 1901, and that all claims must be filed within six months from the date of that meeting, with the proviso, found in the organic act, that for good reasons shown the Commission might allow a further period of six months, the effect of which was to allow one year for filing claims.

At this first meeting of the Commission William E. Spear, of Massachusetts, was chosen secretary and a set of rules were adopted.

It soon became apparent that the Commission did not possess all the powers necessary to enable it to carry on the work for which it was created, especially in the matter of procuring evidence, punishing for contempt, etc., and accordingly Congress passed the act entitled "An act to amend the act approved March 2, 1901," etc., being what is generally spoken of as the organic act. This amendatory act was approved June 30, 1902.

CLAIMS FILED.

Four hundred and ninety-five claims were filed within the first period of six months, the total amount of these claims being $61,087,829.04. Forty-seven claims, in the aggregate amount of

$1,584, 248.74, were filed during the second period of six months, thus making in all 542 claims filed, and the total amount of these claims is $62,672,077.78.

Of these claims 152 in number, and aggregating $2,825,000 (one claim not specifying any amount, but asking an amount "in the discretion of the Commission"), were for damages which resulted, it was claimed, from the wrongful act of Spain in blowing up the battleship Mine in the Habana Harbor, February 15, 1898.

THE "MAINE" CLAIMS.

The question whether these claims, known as the "Maine cases," came within the terms of the treaty and the jurisdiction of the Commission was the first one of serious importance with which the Commission was called upon to deal, and it was both serious and important. Certainly if Spain had understood that by making this treaty she was agreeing that a local tribunal created by the sole act of the United States, but exercising international powers and jurisdiction, might sit in judgment upon a question so deeply affecting her honor, she never would have signed. But were these claims individual claims against Spain which the United States assumed by the treaty, and which must therefore be tried by the Commission, regardless of all inherent questions, or were they a gross claim primarily in favor of the United States as a nation, and which she expressly waived by the treaty? Whether the individuals who suffered had a direct claim, legal, moral, or equitable, against the United States did not enter seriously into consideration, as Congress has not seen proper to commit any such question to the Commission, whose jurisdiction was limited, plainly, to such claims as were primarily against Spain, the settlement of which the United States had assumed.

The question came up on a demurrer to the claims, interposed by the Government, and which therefore brought sharply before the Commission the legal questions involved. The demurrer was based on four propositions, viz:

1. That the Commission had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; 2. That the facts stated were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action;

3. That no liability ever existed on the part of Spain, and therefore none arose against the United States by the provisions of the treaty of Paris; and

4. That the claims were not within the terms of the treaty.

The demurrers were argued at length, both orally and in print, the oral arguments occupying several days, and were participated in by several leading lawyers of the Washington and New York bars for the claimants, and for the Government by the Assistant Attorney

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General and his assistant attorneys, and he was also ably seconded by Mr. Charles W. Russell, from the Attorney-General's office. The oral arguments were made in December, 1901, and the opinion of the Commission by President Chandler was handed down March 6, 1902, sustaining the contention of the Government.

The demurrers were sustained on the ground that if there was any legal wrong done in the blowing up of the Maine it was against the United States; the injury primarily was national and not individual, the individual soldiers and sailors aboard the vessel at the time having no primary or original rights as against Spain. Therefore, when the United States by the terms of the treaty released Spain from all national claims she released her from all liability on account of the blowing up of the Maine, and that no liability then or ever existed in behalf of those who suffered by that disaster, as against Spain, consequently none now existed against the United States by virtue of the treaty and the organic act.

This view was concurred in by four of the Commissioners, Mr. Commissioner Maury filing a separate and able concurring opinion. Mr. Commissioner Chambers filed a dissenting opinion, in which he took the broad ground that there was a wrong done to the individual soldiers and sailors which belonged to them as a primary right; that they did not, on entering the military and naval service of the United States, surrender their individual rights to claim damages for such an injury as was charged in the petitions.

The questions involved in these Maine cases are exceedingly important, both to the Government and to the men who enlist in its Army and Navy, and were argued before the Commission with great care and ability. Since the decision the subject has been repeatedly brought before Congress on bills for relief, but no final determination has been reached favorable to the claimants.

I have therefore deemed it appropriate to set out in full the opinion of the Commission and also the concurring opinion of Mr. Commissioner Maury, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Commissioner Chambers, and they will be found at the conclusion of this report as Appendixes A, B, and C.

The claimants being unable to amend their petitions so as to overcome the objections thus interposed and sustained, the Maine claims were all dismissed, and being without other remedy they thereupon asked that their cases be certified to the Supreme Court for review under the provisions of section 13 of the organic act, which reads as follows:

SEC. 13. When the Commission is in doubt as to any question of law arising upon the facts in any case before them, they may state the facts and the question of law so arising, and certify the same to the Supreme Court of the United States for its decision, and said court shall have jurisdiction to consider and decide the same.

This application was denied by the Commission in a brief opinion by Mr. Commissioner Maury, handed down May 13, 1902, as follows:

In answer to the application of counsel that the question of law involved in the above cases should be certified by the Commission to the Supreme Court of the United States under section 13 of the act of March 2, 1901, establishing the Commission, the Commission announces that, having already reached and announced a decisive conclusion in each of the above cases before receiving the application mentioned, it is of opinion that no occasion exists for the action suggested in any of the above cases.

Thus the Commission in effect laid down the not unreasonable proposition that when they had reached a satisfactory conclusion upon any case or question, they could not be expected to certify that they were in doubt as to whether they had concluded rightly or not. No case and no question has been certified under this section, which was couched in unfortunate language if really designed to give a right of review.

APPARENT ANOMALOUS POSITION OF UNITED STATES.

Article VII of the treaty of Paris brought about a rather anomalous condition. Up to that time the United States was in the apparent (but not real) attitude of prosecuting these claims against Spain, but, in fact in only one instance, that of Ruiz, No. 112, had a claim been presented in the way of a demand for settlement; in fact, Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, repudiated such idea. Doctor Taylor, our minister to Spain, wrote Mr. Olney that the Duke of Tetuan denied obligation to pay any of these claims, to which the Secretary replied December 29, 1896, and with some asperity that

As Spain has not been called upon to pay or to acknowledge obligation to pay any of these claims, the general denial of obligation to pay them or to inquire into the facts upon which they are based, made by the Duke of Tetuan, is, at this stage, premature and inadmissible.

He further states that at a later time the claims would be taken up and considered and presented on their merits, but that, so far, what was done was for the purpose of keeping Spain properly advised of what was being claimed against her by individuals claiming to be citizens of the Untied States.

Of course the United States was claimant, and Spain would be expected to pay all such damages as could properly be charged against her for injuries done to property of American citizens, and the claimants were insistent upon the largest possible amount the facts would justify, Spain resisting. Now the United States takes Spain's place and insists that the claims must be (1) the property of true American citizens, (2) honest and just, (3) lawful under principles of international law, and (4) for a reasonable amount. She could have asked no more of Spain, she expects to do nothing less. Therefore, as already said, the anomaly is apparent, but not real.

QUID PRO QUO THEORY OF CLAIMANTS.

But ever since the claims were filed several of the attorneys for claimants have asserted that under the facts and the treaty the United States has received quid pro quo (in the cessions and concessions made by Spain in the treaty) for these claims, and she must pay them--at least as to every claim of which the treaty Commissioners had knowledege while negotiating the treaty, the only question being one of amount, if indeed that question also was not concluded where the amount had been stated. This contention the Government resisted as entirely unsound and unwarranted, and as the allegations which the claimants must make in their petitions and establish by their proofs depended almost entirely on this question, it was important that it should be settled soon, and once for all, by the Commission.

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