2 original movement (which movement is ultimately completed), will not deprive the transportation of the character of interstate commerce.1 And so if the goods are first billed to a point in the State of shipment, and at that point are rebilled to their ultimate destination in another State, without breaking of bulk, the whole constitutes a single carriage. The continuity of the carriage of freight over a line formed by two or more roads is not broken in fact merely by the declaration on the part of one or more of said carriers that as to the transportation over its road it is local and not a through carrier. Neither is the continuity of the shipment broken by a sale of the goods in transitu. If, however, the goods are consigned to a dealer and he, selling them before arrival, rebills to the purchaser without breaking bulk, the two carriages are distinct. The transit is a single unit, continuing from the time of the original shipment to the ultimate end of the carriage; and where the beginning and end are in different States, the entire transit from beginning to end is interstate. It does not cease to be interstate when the goods finally enter the State of destination; it continues an interstate shipment even within that State, until delivery. Therefore any attempt by the State to make orders in regard to the switching of such shipments to the consignee is a regulation of interstate commerce." 4 3 1 Cutting v. Florida Ry. & Nav. Co., 46 Fed. 641 (1891). 2 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Avery (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 704 (1895); Houston, D. & N. Co. v. Insurance Co., 89 Tex. 1, 32 S. W. 889, 30 L. R. A. 713, 59 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1895); Mexican Nat. R. R. Co. v. Savage (Tex. Civ. App.), 41 S. W. 663 (1897); State v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 542 (1898). 3 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fort Grain Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 72 S. W. 419 (1903). 4 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 97 Tex. 274, 78 S. W. 495 (1904), aff'd in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 51 L. ed. 540, 27 Sup. Ct. 360 (1907). ⚫ State V. Southern Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. W. 252 (1899). McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., § 1416. Carriage wholly within the State. Even though passengers or goods are being carried between two States, a carrier transporting them may nevertheless not be engaged in interstate commerce. Though a carrier receives goods directed to a point outside the State, he is not an interstate carrier if he is only to carry within the State, and there deliver to an entirely independent succeeding carrier, with whom he has no common arrangement. So if the carrier receives within the State of destination goods brought from without the State by an entirely independent carrier, the receiving carrier is not engaged in interstate commerce.2 This is commonly the case where the intrastate carrier does not issue a through bill of lading, or receive freight upon through bills issued by an interstate carrier.3 So where goods are shipped in one State, directed to a consignee in another, but carried only to the State line, and there received by the consignees, the shipment is not interstate.1 A mere switching company which transfers goods from one carrier to another within the State, entirely without reference to their final destination, is not engaged in interstate commerce, whatever the destination of the goods. This is true whether the switching is before or after loading." And so the cab service of a railroad company at its New York terminus is wholly subject to local regulation." 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. ed. 1142, 26 2 Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Whitehead, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595, 26 S. W. 172 (1894). 3 Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Bellaire, Z. & C. Ry. Co., 77 Fed. 942 (1897). 4 United States v. Chicago, K. & S. R. R. Co., 81 Fed. 783 (1897). 5 Kentucky & J. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 37 Fed. 567, 2 L. R. A. 289 (1889). 6 Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Larrabee Flour Mills, 211 U. S. 612, 53 L. ed. 352, 29 Sup. Ct. 696 (1909). 7 New York ex rel. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 48 L. ed. 325, 24 Sup. Ct. 202 (1904). This is like the case where goods which had been consigned to one point within a State were afterwards sold and forwarded to another point.1 2 § 1417. State legislation burdening interstate commerce. If certain cases only are examined it would seem that State statutes which restrict the conduct of interstate transportation in any substantial degree are unconstitutional, the absence of congressional regulation on the subject being held equivalent to a declaration that the matter should be left undisturbed. Thus a State statute forbidding the separation of travelers has been held void as applied to interstate transportation. But it follows that as the matter is to be left without legislative interference a carrier may make proper regulations separating white passengers from black, which may apply to interstate commerce.3 A State statute directed against all discrimination in freight rates has been held unconstitutional, so far as its application to interstate shipments is concerned.4 And of course a State statute cannot penalize the failure to deliver an interstate message promptly in another State. There have been doubts as to the extent to which a State can regulate the stopping of interstate trains. It was at first said that the State could order this. But it is now well established that this cannot be done, if the company provides an adequate 1 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 51 L. ed. 540, 27 Sup. Ct. 360 (1907). 2 Hail v. Decuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547 (1878). 'Chiles v. Chesapeake & O. R. R. Co., 218 U. S. 71, 30 Sup. Ct. 667 (1910). 4 Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed. 244 (1886). local service.1 It may be that a State can provide redress for failure to respond to a request for service even when the service refused is interstate. But it is a question whether this is not going too far.3 § 1418. Scope for State police power. It will have been noticed that the problem is how far the conduct of interstate commerce should be left subject to the same law throughout the Union without disturbance by local law, and how far the police power of the State may be exercised by general legislation applying to the conduct of interstate commerce as well as to all things done within its borders. If the regulation is regarded as of vital importance to the State, the Federal courts may permit it to apply to interstate business, at least in the absence of congressional action. Thus a State may prohibit a railway from receiving even for interstate shipment hides not duly inspected to prevent fraudulent shipment of branded skins, because of the peculiar necessity for such policy in those regions. And a State may by general law prohibit running of freight trains interstate as well as intrastate on Sunday, this statute governing the conduct of all within the jurisdiction." To safeguard its citizens a State may require that all locomotive engineers operating trains within its borders shall be examined and licensed. And a State may es 1 See the latest cases on this point: Atlantic C. L. R. R. Co. v. Wharton et al., 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. ed. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 121 (1907); Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 218 U. S. 135, 30 Sup. Ct. 633 (1910). 2 Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 40 L. ed. 1105, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 934 (1895). 3 Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. 6 4 2 tablish quarantine against the introduction of diseases through interstate commerce.1 But it may not unreasonably forbid the importation of all cattle whether diseased or not. It is, however, established beyond question by many decisions that a State may not forbid, or even hamper the bringing in, of intoxicating liquors, the sale of which is forbidden within its borders in the belief that their consumption constitutes a danger to society.3 The difference between diseased cattle and intoxicating liquor, one perceives, is, at best, a difference in degree. Perhaps the State may go further than this exercise of the police power strictly in regulating service, but it cannot go far without being told that it is hampering interstate commerce. Thus a State may regulate the heating of cars, those upon interstate trains as well as others. But it may not require that cars shall be furnished for interstate shipments. And so a State may require an interstate carrier to settle claims promptly. But a State may not increase the liabilities of an initial carrier engaged in interstate commerce." 5 § 1419. Effect of action by Congress. Whatever doubts there may be as to the extent to 1 Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 32 L. ed. 695 (1889). 2 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527 (1877). 3 Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700 (1881); Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 42 L. ed. 1100, 18 Sup. Ct. 674 (1898); Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 51 L. ed. 987, 27 Sup. Ct. 606 (1907); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 53 L. ed. 972, 29 Sup. Ct. 633 (1910). 'New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. ed. 853, 17 Sup. Ct. 418 (1897). 5 Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 50 L. ed. 772, 26 Sup. Ct. 491 (1906). Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, 30 Sup. Ct. 378 (1910). 7 Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 196 U. S. 194, 49 L. ed. 444, 25 Sup. Ct. 218 (1905). |