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the transportation. But the excuse for liability for delay is not, as in the case of liability for loss, confined to public enemies. If the delay is caused by mob violence which cannot be overcome, or even by reasonable fear of such violence, it is not negligent to cease operations. And the delay is consequently excusable.1

§ 912. Interruption by strike.

The case of strikes presents a difficult situation, as has been seen. In so far as the operations of the company are prevented by the violent action of the strikers after leaving the service, or the violence of sympathizers, with which the public authorities have not been able to cope, delays are excusable until peaceful conditions are restored.3 Where, however, there is delay or damage caused by the employés quitting work, the mere fact that the company has not sufficient means to perform the services at its disposal, is on general principles, no excuse,

1 Arkansas.-Railway Co. v. Neville, 60 Ark. 375, 30 S. W. 425, 28 L. R. A. 80, 46 Am. St. Rep. 208 (1895).

Georgia.-Haas v. Kansas City, F. S. & G. R. R. Co., 81 Ga. 792, 7 S. E. 629 (1888).

New York.-Little v. Fargo, 43 Hun, 233 (1887).

Pennsylvania.-Lang v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 342, 26 Atl. 370, 20 L. R. A. 360, 35 Am. St. Rep. 846 (1893).

See generally, § 667, supra. 2 See these cases especially: Georgia.-Haas v. Kansas City, F. S. & G. R. R. Co., 81 Ga. 972, 7 S. E. 629 (1888).

Kentucky.-Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Bell, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 393 (1891).

New York.-Grismer v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 102 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. 828, 55 Am. Rep. 837 (1886).

Texas.-Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Levi (Tex. Ct. of App.), 14 S. W. 1062 (1889).

See generally, § 669, supra.
3 See further:

Illinois.-Indianapolis & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Juntgen, 10 Ill. App. 295 (1881).

Indiana.-Lake Shore, M. S. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 89 Ind. 457 (1883). Mississippi.-Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Spencer, 72 Miss. 491, 97 So. 168 (1894).

Montana.-State ex rel. v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 14 Mont. 381, 36 Pac. 458 (1894).

Georgia.-Central R. R. & B.

and delays from this cause are, therefore, not excused.1 The existence of a strike upon a connecting railroad, however, may be an excuse for forwarding goods by another line than that originally contemplated; 2 but such deviation should not be resorted to without consulting the owner if this is practicable.3

§ 913. Interference of patron.

Where the default to which the patron objects is due to his own interference, he can hardly be heard to complain of it. A striking illustration of this principle was where the party was responsible for a fire set in the carrier's tunnel rendering the tracks impassable. But the shipper is equally precluded from recovery if the loss was due to his delay in loading the car. And he cannot complain if performance is not continued where he has failed to make prepayment. So if his instructions in regard to icing cause the delay, he can have no complaint. This

Co. v. Georgia Fruit, etc., Exch., 91
Ga. 389, 17 S. E. 904 (1893).

Missouri.-Read v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. R. Co., 60 Mo. 199 (1875).

Illinois.-Pittsburg, F. W. & C. R. R. Co. v. Hazen, 84 Ill. 36, 25 Am. Rep. 422 (1876).

New York.-Blackstock v. New York & E. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48, 75 Am. Dec. 372 (1859).

See generally, § 668, supra. 1 See further:

Georgia. Southern Ry. Co. v. Atlanta Sand & S. Co., 68 S. E. 807 (1910).

Indiana.-Bartlett v. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 94 Ind. 281 (1883).

North Carolina.-Murphey Hardware Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 150

N. C. 703, 64 S. E. 873, 22 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 200 (1909).

Texas.-International & Gt. No.
Ry. Co. v. Tisdale, 74 Tex. 8, 11
S. W. 900, 4 L. R. A. 545 (1889).

2 Steiger v. Erie Ry. Co., 5 Hun, 345 (1875).

Railroad v. Odil, 96 Tenn. 61, 33 S. W. 611 (1895).

4 Railroad Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 Ohio St. 489, 32 N. E. 476, 34 Am. St. Ry. 579 (1892).

'Stoner v. Chicago Gt. W. Ry. Co., 109 Iowa, 551, 80 N. W. 569 (1899).

Louisville & C. Packet Co. v. Bottorff, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1324, 77 S. W. 920 (1904).

7 Texas Central R. R. Co. v. Dorsey (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. 575 (1902).

was particularly plain in a recent case where the shipper had the shipment stopped in transit to get time to negotiate for special rates.1 And probably the plainest case of all is where the delay is due to the shipper's failure to address the parcel properly.2

§ 914. Press of business.

It sometimes happens that there is a mass of business which cannot be handled within reasonable time. This matter has been already elaborately discussed.3 A wholly unexpected press of business is held an excuse for refusing to undertake further service, provided that the company has exercised due diligence in providing adequate facilities.1 Following these cases, the law for this situation will consequently be that where sufficient equipment has been provided to meet expected business, and by reason of unexpected demand prompt service cannot be given, there is an excuse for such unavoidable delay. This, however, is limited to cases where, when the business was accepted, it was not known that there was impending this extraordinary pressure of business. For the management is not excused for the delay in forwarding business which it had accepted with knowledge of its inability to do so."

1 Herring v. Chesapeake & W. R. R. Co., 101 Va. 778, 45 S. E. 322 (1903).

2 McGowan v. Wilmington & W. R. R. Co., 95 N. C. 417 (1886).

See generally, §§ 663 et seq. and §§ 798 et seq.

'See generally, §§ 800 et seq.

See particularly:

Illinois.-Cobb C. & Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 88 Ill. 394 (1878).

Kentucky.-Newport News & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Reed, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 1020 (1889).

Missouri.-Dawson v. Chicago

& A. R. R. Co., 79 Mo. 296 (1883).

New York.-Wilbert V. New York & E. Ry. Co., 12 N. Y. 245 (1855).

Texas.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 60, 93 S. W. 1024 (1906). Wisconsin.-Peet v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 20 Wis. 594, 91 Am. Dec. 446 (1866).

See generally, §§ 665, 666.

United States.-Helliwell v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 10 Biss. 170, 7 Fed. 68 (1881).

Indeed, there are cases so extreme as to hold that a carrier is bound to know when he accepts property for shipment that he has, or can obtain, facilities for its transportation within a reasonable time.1 At all events, pressure of business resulting from lack of proper means of transportation cannot be an excuse for delay. Where this unexpected press of business will excuse the railroad for failure to move promptly all freight it has taken, it should usually normally move the freight on hand in the order of its receipt. But in extraordinary circumstances, it may postpone a later shipment for an earlier.1

Illinois.-Gt. Western Ry. Co. v. Burns, 60 Ill. 284 (1871). Missouri.-Tucker v. Pacific R. R. Co., 50 Mo. 385 (1872).

North Carolina.-Branch v. Wilmington & W. R. R. Co., 77 N. C. 347 (1877).

Utah.-Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 24 Utah, 83, 91 Am. St. Rep. 778, 66 Pac. 768 (1901).

Tennessee. Southern Ry. Co. v. Deakins, 107 Tenn. 522, 64 S. W. 477 (1901).

Wisconsin.-Maclaren v. Detroit & M. R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 138 (1868). 1 United States.-Thomas v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 63 Fed. 200 (1894).

Teras.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Anderson (Tex. Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 691 (1893); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McAulay (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 475 (1894); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hodge (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 829 (1895); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hume, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 653, 24 S. W. 915.

But see:

Massachusetts.-Thayer v. Burchard, 99 Mass. 508 (1868).

Missouri.-Ballentine v. North Missouri Ry. Co., 40 Mo. 491, 93 Am. Dec. 315 (1867).

* See particularly:

United States.-Ormsby v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 2 McCrary, 48, 4 Fed. 706.

Mississippi.-Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Blum Co., 80 Miss. 180, 40 So. 748, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 432 (1906).

Wisconsin.-Ayres V. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W. 432 (1888).

Texas.-International & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Lecus (Tex. Civ. App.), 23 S. W. 323 (1893).

3 See particularly, Marshall v. New York Central R. R. Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 502 (1886), and Southern Ry. Co. v. Atlanta Sand & S. Co., 68 S. E. 807 (1910).

See generally, §§ 837-842, supra. 'See particularly, Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6 (1875), and Briddon v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 28 L. J. Ex. 51 (1858). See generally, §§ 850–857, supra.

Topic D. Liability Consequent upon Default

§ 915. Delay must be negligent.

The rule is universal as to all public services that in order to make out a case of liability for delay in performing, some blameworthiness' must be shown, either the rare case of intention or the common case of negligence. What constitutes negligence is, of course, a question of due care under the circumstances. This may be tested generally by determining what is the time in which the service is usually completed. But the mere fact that there has been delay in performance beyond what would be the reasonable time under ordinary circumstances for completing performance, does not make out a conclusive case of liability, for there may be valid excuses for such delay as has just been seen. Unusual delay, to be sure, makes out a prima facie case; and where fault would be denied it must be shown that performance could not have been completed in less time by reason of unforeseen obstacles. Sometimes the neglect of the carrier speaks for itself. If a train is delayed by one of its force being drunk, the railroad can obviously have no excuse. And so if a locomotive is so negligently handled that certain

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Texas. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Hynes, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 20, 21 S. W. 622 (1893).

Virginia. Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 99 Va. 394, 39 S. E. 144 (1901).

2

England.-Taylor v. Gt. No. Ry. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 385 (1866). Kentucky.—Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Brinley, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 9, 29 S. W. 305 (1895).

South Carolina.-Nettles v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 7 Rich. L. 190, 62 Am. Dec. 509 (1854).

Weed v. Panama R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 362, 72 Am. Dec. 474 (1858).

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