should not naturally be expected, or if there was no special notice of the particular danger.1

§ 943. Injuries from negligent conduct.

Not only must there be precautions to prevent injury by intentional acts, but also by negligent acts of other passengers or any other persons, so far as they can be reasonably anticipated. And the carrier is bound to use

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due diligence to prevent damage from such negligent acts if he sees that they are likely to cause harm, as for instance to stop a car negligently started by an unauthorized person or to remove valises negligently left in an aisle, or to protect passengers against other passengers who are fighting and causing danger of injury to other passengers. If, however, the negligence of the fellow passenger or third party was not reasonably to be anticipated, as where it consisted of throwing open violently a car door, carrying bombs in a parcel of the usual appearance or setting fire to a fellow passenger, there is no liability. If the carrier had no right to control the negligent persons, it is, of course, not responsible for their conduct. The act of an intoxicated person in tripping a passenger while being removed has been held one for which the carrier was not responsible, there being no evidence of negligence in permitting the intoxicated person to board the car, and mere contact with a person who is being removed because of intoxication has been held to afford no cause of action.9

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§ 944. Liability for injuries by outsiders.

In defining the liability of a carrier of passengers for injuries to them by third parties the modern law makes

1 North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Cook, 145 Ill. 551, 33 N. E. 958 (1893).

2 Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Buckmaster, 74 Ill. App. 575 (1897).

Holly v. Atlanta Street R. R. Co., 61 Ga. 215, 34 Am. Rep. 97 (1878).

4 Graeff v. Philadelphia & R. R. R. Co., 161 Pa. St. 230, 28 Atl. 1107, 23 L. R. A. 606, 41 Am. St. Rep. 885 (1894).

East Indian Ry. Co. v. Kalidas

Mukerjee, App. Cas. 396, 70 Law
J. P. C. 63, 84 Law T. 210 (1901).

6 Sullivan v. Jefferson Ave. Ry. Co., 135 Mo. 1, 34 S. W. 566, 32 L. R. A. 167 (1895).

Murphy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 L. R. Irish, 301 (1897).

8 Cobb v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 179 Mass. 212, 60 N. E. 476 (1901).

Spade v. L. & Boston Ry. Co., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N. E. 747, 43 L. R. A. 832, 70 Am. St. Rep. 298 (1899).

this same distinction. The common carrier, it is granted, must use the utmost care in protecting passengers and their attendants, not only from the violence and rudeness of its own officers and agents but also of intruders and outside parties.1 There are many well considered cases which support this view, but none of them fail to impose the qualification that the wrong or injury done the passenger by such strangers must have been of such a character, and perpetrated under such circumstances, as that it might reasonably have been anticipated, or naturally expected to occur.2

1 Colorado.-Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 4 Colo. App. 102, 35 Pac. 196 (1893).

Georgia. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Boyle, 115 Ga. 836, 42 S. E. 242, 59 L. R. A. 104 (1902).

Illinois. Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Pillsbury, 123 Ill. 9, 14 N. E. 23, 5 Am. St. Rep. 483 (1887).

Kentucky.-Tate v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 309, 81 S. W. 256 (1904).

Louisiana.-Clerc v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R. R. & S. S. Co., 107 La. 370, 31 So. 886, 90 Am. St. Rep. 319 (1902).

V.

Massachusetts.-Ormandroyd Fitchburg & L. St. R. R. Co., 193 Mass. 130, 78 N. E. 739, 118 Am. St. Rep. 457 (1906).

Missouri.-O'Gara v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 724, 103 S. W. 54, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 840 (1907). Nebraska.-Bevard V. Lincoln Traction Co., 74 Neb. 802, 105 N. W. 635, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 318 (1905).

North Carolina.-Seawell v. Carolina Central R. R. Co., 133 N. C. 515, 45 S. E. 850 (1903).

Rhode Island.-Bosworth v. Union R. R. Co., 26 R. I. 309, 55 Atl. 490 (1904).

Vermont.-Dufur v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 75 Vt. 165, 53 Atl. 1068 (1902).

Virginia.-Connell v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 93 Va. 44, 24 S. E. 467, 57 Am. Rep. 786 (1896). England.-Cobb v. Gt. Western R. R. Co., A. C. 419 (1894).

2 Alabama.-Batton v. So. & No. Ala. R. R. Co., 77 Ala. 591, 54 Am. Rep. 80 (1884).

Georgia. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Boyle, 115 Ga. 836, 42 S. E. 242, 59 L. R. A. 104 (1902).

Illinois. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Laloge, 113 Ky. 896, 69 S. W. 795, 62 L. R. A. 405 (1902).

Minnesota. Fewings v. Mendenhall, 88 Minn. 336, 93 N. W. 127, 60 L. R. A. 601, 97 Am. St. Rep. 519 (1903).

Missouri.-Woas v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 664, 96 S. W. 1017, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 231 (1906).

New York.-Weeks v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 50, 28 Am. Rep. 104 (1878).

§ 945. Injuries resulting from overcrowding.

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Injury to passengers resulting from overcrowding at stations is another danger from which the carrier is bound to protect its patrons. Such liability may arise even when the carrier does nothing more than permit the crowd to gather and neglect to control it. Particularly where the carrier controls the admission of passengers to the conveyances he is bound to exercise reasonable care so to regulate the movements of those whom they are undertaking to transport as to preserve the safety of all. But when the facilities used by the traction company are not wholly within its control, the utmost that can be required of the company is to provide against the expected crush by having sufficient guards. In the management of

Pennsylvania.-Pittsburg, F. W.

& C. R. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512, 91 Am. Dec. 224 (1866). Teras. Segal v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 35 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 80 S. W. 233 (1904).

England.-Pounder v. North Eastern Railway Co., 1 Q. B. 385 (1892).

A carrier owes to passengers, and others lawfully using its station platform the duty to protect them from dangerous habits of the servants of an express company in negligently moving trucks about the platform without warning. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Shaw (Ark.), 125 S. W. 654 (1910).

But see McGrath v. Eastern Ry. Co., 74 Minn. 363, 77 N. W. 136 (1898), where it was held that the railroad was not responsible for the hitting of a passenger upon a platform by a package of papers thrown from a train by a news agent.

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1 Kansas.-Topeka C. Ry. Co. v. Higgs, 38 Kan. 375, 16 Pac. 667, 5 Am. St. Rep. 754 (1888).

Nebraska.-Pray v. Omaha St. Ry. Co., 44 Neb. 167, 62 N. W. 447, 48 Am. St. Rep. 717 (1895).

New Jersey.-Hansen v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 64 N. J. L. 686, 46 Atl. 718 (1900).

New York.-McGearty v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 15 App. Div. 2, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1897).

2 Viemeister v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. S. 162, 91 App. Div. 510 (1904); Grogan v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 97 App. Div. 413, 89 N. Y. S. 1027 (1904).

3 Dawson v. New York & Brooklyn Bridge, 31 App. Div. 537, 52 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1898).

And see Dittmar v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 91 App. Div. 378, 86 N. Y. Supp. 878 (1904).

4 Kuhlen v. Boston & N. Street Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 341, 79 N. E. 815, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729 (1907).

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crowded vehicles due care must be used. But it cannot be said to be negligence merely to take passengers on board when all the seats are taken.2 But if so many are taken on board that one of the passengers is subsequently crowded off, the carrier is liable. And the carrier is likewise liable if the jostling of the crowd causes injury to passengers.1

§ 946. Proper extent of the duty.

The proprietors of the service are, however, only liable to those who are in a position to claim its special protection. Thus a railroad owes a duty to protect travelers who come to its premises a reasonable time before the departure of its trains 5 or to passengers who remain upon its premises a reasonable time after their arrival. The same duty is owed to persons coming to make an inquiry 7

See also Wagner v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 95 App. Div. 219, 88 N. Y. Supp. 791 (1904).

1 Merrill v. Eastern R. R. Co., 139 Mass. 238, 1 N. E. 548, 139 Mass. 252, 29 N. E. 666 (1885).

2 Jacobs v. West End St. Ry. Co., 178 Mass. 116, 59 N. E. 639 (1901).

3 Reem v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 77 Minn. 503, 80 N. W. 638, 778 (1899).

Buck v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 15 Daly, 48, 2 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1888). The carrier is not liable, however, for anything not the natural and probable result of the overcrowding, such as one passenger, because of vexation at being crowded, throwing another passenger off of the car. Synder V. Colorado Springs & C. C. Dist. Ry. Co., 36 Colo. 288, 85 Pac. 686, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 781, 118 Am. St. Rep. 110 (1906).

If a passenger appears well able to take care of himself and in no danger, it is not negligence in the conductor not to go to the passenger's assistance. Jarmy v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 55 Minn. 271, 56 N. W. 813 (1893).

5 See St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 631, 35 S. W. 741 (1896), and Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Bowlin (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. 918 (1895).

6 Georgia.-Brunswick & W. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 101 Ga. 684, 28 S. E. 1000 (1897).

Illinois. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tracey, 109 Ill. App. 563 (1903).

Indiana.-Glenn v. Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co., 165 Ind. 659, 75 N. E. 282, 112 Am. St. Rep. 255, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872 (1905).

Texas.-Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Batchler, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 116, 73 S. W. 981 (1904).

'See particularly, Daniel v.