Senator MALONE. She did it principally on synthetics.

General FELLERS. She did. So I think the idea that we have to occupy the world-we have troops in company strength or greater in 49 countries or areas of the world-I do not think it is necessary for our survival. I think there are many substitutes that we would be just as good in finding as the German. The German had very little uatural oil or gasoline.

Senator MALONE. What do you think we should do with those foot armies in those 49 different nations?

General FELLERS. I think we should bring them home, sir.

Senator MALONE. Do you think that would spoil the psychology we built up that we are sending our troops over there to encourage them to train their foot armies? You do not think that would have a bad effect?

General FELLERS. I believe if we controlled the air and the sea, and make the provisions in peacetime to do it that that is the greatest contribution that we can make to our friends anywhere in the world. Senator MALONE. Bring our foot soldiers home and tell them if we are able to protect them under any condition that airpower is the answer, and we cannot maintain both.

General FELLERS. If the natives in any area of the world that we might be willing to help defend are unable to furnish ground troops, we will have to let them go.

Senator MALONE. If the war started while they are there, what would happen?

General FELLERS. It is our policy to intervene. The State Department has a bulletin published in 1952, which says that there are no more sidelines for war, that the only way the United States can stay out of war is to prevent war from happening, and war anywhere in the world is our business. So our policy is to participate in any war

that starts.

Senator MALONE. Then your testimony is that the way we are proceeding is not the way to stay out of war.

General FELLERS. No, sir, nor is it a way to win a war if it comes. Our effort is diffused, very badly diffused.

Senator MALONE. General, I hold in my hand a map marked "American Airbases." Would you explain this map for the benefit of the committee and you may submit it as an exhibit if you care to.

General FELLERS. Yes, sir. This is a polar projection map, which you have handed me, and it is showing that Europe is not between the United States and Russia as is generally supposed from looking at a mercator map, which is not very accurate, especially as you move toward the north or south pole. This map shows that the Russian bases in the Arctic are literally on top of Canada, and the United States. It shows that it is closer from Red bases opposite Alaska to our industrial area in Detroit than it is from bases in Central Europe. In other words, Russia does not have to capture Europe to get airbases from which to strike the United States. Russia already has suitable bases in the Arctic.

Senator MALONE. Are you telling the committee that if we are attacked by Russia, it is not likely to be through Europe?

General FELLERS. The nearest and best route, and the one most likely to be ungaurded is the route over the polar cap, and of course that is where the bombing attacks will come from.

Senator MALONE. Not through Asia or Europe?

General FELLERS. No, sir, Russia does not have to have bases in Europe. The bases opposite from Alaska which they already have and are operating today are just as close to Detroit as the westernmost portion of France. The idea has been sold to the American people through slogans like "We Can't Stand Alone" and "If Europe Falls, We are Next," and "We Must Have Allies", which are not essentially sound. I believe in allies, and all we can get, but we have no ally that can contribute to airpower except Great Britain. Therefore, allies are only good for cannon fodder, and no matter how many we have, we will never get as many men in Europe as Russia can throw against us.

Senator MALONE. In other words, you are telling us that the slogans in national defense are comparable to the slogans on domestic economy, like dollars shortage and reciprocal trade.

General FELLERS. Yes, sir, I think they are misleading.

Senator MALONE. And "Trade, Not Aid." We have sort of run our country on slogans for about 20 years, have we not?

General FELLERS. Yes, sir, there is another slogan that has a fallacy in it, and that is every dollar spent in Europe is defending us. The only way Russia can strike us is with bombers and submarines over the polar cap and by sea. We can be hit by the Red submarine and bomber, regardless of the outcome of a war in Europe-favorable or unfavorable.

Senator MALONE. We could lose our own country and win the one in Europe.

General FELLERS. We cannot win in Europe, but if we did, it would not affect Russia's ability to strike us.

Senator MALONE. It would not affect America even if we won in Europe.

General FELLERS. A dollar spent in Europe's defense does not necessarily help defend us.

Senator MALONE. This map will be filed as exhibit No. 1.

(The map referred to was marked "Fellers' Exhibit No. 1" and filed with the committee.)

Senator MALONE. Suppose we had enough troops over there, and Russia allowed us to service them and did not take Europe, and came in and took the United States.

General FELLERS. That might happen, and Europe would be delighted to be neutral. If we are attacked by air I cannot believe that the European powers are going to attack Russia on the ground.

Senator MALONE. Then we could get away from all of this by just moving to Europe. That is more or less facetious, because they could take Europe the next morning.

General FELLERS. No, sir. I would like to comment on that. Europe is not the enemy of Russia today. We are the only country able and willing to challenge Russia. If she can get rid of us and knock our industry out by submarine and air, she can do anything she wants in Europe later. So this idea that Europe is in danger, and we are not in danger is very wrong.

Senator MALONE. You think really we are the ones in danger?

General FELLERS. We are the ones they are after. Russia did not build these 1,000 TU-4 bombers that can fly 5,000 miles to strike Eu

rope, because Europe can be struck with twin engine jet IL-28's, of which the Reds have plenty in Central Europe.

Senator MALONE. I have in mind a book entitled, "Sink 'em All," written by Vice. Adm. Charles A Lockwood, and on page 378 he says:

With an initial force of only 57 submarines at the outbreak of the last war, Germany nearly succeeded in isolating England before we came to her aid, and imperiled not only our supply lines to European Allies but, by inflicting upon us serious losses in tankers, gravely interfered with our flow of oil from Texas, Mexico, Aruba, South America, and the Middle East.

What untold havoc could Russia wreak upon us with a starting force of 1,000 modern submarines--or even with her present force, variously reported to be between 250 and 350 boats.

How many did you say you believe they have?

General FELLERS. The published estimate is 350. It is essentially the same figure.

Senator MALONE. This was published in 1951. Continuing to read from Lockwood's book:

That could be the general situation confronting us at the outbreak of a new world war; a situation in which we could ill afford to move a ship, a gun, a soldier or a ton of freight to the aid of our Allies of the North Atlantic Pact or to start an offensive until we had cleared the seas of the deadly menace of enemy submarines.

Now, let us consider the special situation which might confront us at that same time-a repeat Pearl Harbor attack delivered by submarines using atomic weapons-an attack which might lay waste many of our coastal cities and installations, and deal an almost fatal blow to our ability to make war, or even to defend ourselves.

Such an attack would present no great problem to a first-class submarine force and we must not forget that our most probable enemy is being tutored and guided by submarine experts and scientists from the same nation which has contributed most of the modern improvements to the elementary submarines built by our own American inventors, Holland and Lake.

I have a letter from Vice Adm. C. A. Lockwood, United States Navy, retired, dated November 17, 1953, attaching a brief that I will not read at this time. I will simply make it a part of the record at this point in your testimony, since it covers the same points. (The letter and statement are as follows:)

DEAR SENATOR MALONE: At the request of Mr. Jerome S. Adlerman, counsel for your committee, I am submitting by enclosure herein a hasty study of the problem of protecting sealanes which must be used by shipping of the United States and her allies, in the event of a third world war, for the purpose of supplying strategic and critical materials to our war industries.

You realize, I know, that volumes could be written on this subject and that extensive chart study is essential to arriving at correct conclusions. However, I am glad to give you my observations and opinions based on the following service in World War II:

February 1941 to March 1942, Naval attaché, London.

April 1942 to February 1943, Commander, submarines Southwest Pacific, Perth, Australia.

February 1943 to December 1945, Commander submarines Pacific, Pearl Harbor and Guam.

My statement has not been submitted to the Navy Department; however, since your committee is empowered to subpena witnesses, I believe clearance is

unnecessary.

As you know, studies of this character are made by the Navy Department and the War College and I suggest you avail yourself of their much more careful and comprehensive estimates of the situation.

Sincerely,

C. A. LOCKWOOD,
Vice Admiral, USN (Retired).

DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES SEA LANES IN THE EVENT OF A THIRD WORLD WAR

In the event that the Communist nations, led by Russia, initiate world war III, it is my belief that in spite of existing and contemplated European Defense Forces, Europe and Asia will be quickly overrun.

England, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Greece, and possibly Spain will hold out. The enemy will probably plan to subdue these countries later, and will not subject them to heavy land offensives until Communist primary objectives have been secured.

In Asia, the Middle East, French Indo China, Hongkong, and Malaya will be our allies, as will Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, but India will remain neutral-probably favorable toward Russia. It is to be hoped that Britain will be able to retain its naval base at Trincomalee, Ceylon.

Russia's primary objectives in Europe will be the channel ports and later the Scandanavian ports from which to operate her submarine fleet, estimated in Jane's 1951 at 360 to 370 vessels.

In Asia Communist primary objectives will be the ports of Penang, Saigon, Hongkong, and Singapore for use as submarine bases. Penang was an important base and exchange point for German and Japanese submarines in World War II.

None of these objectives should be too difficult to attain.

Thus, at the outset of war, effective sea communication with Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean will be denied us by Communist submarines, air and land forces. They also will attempt to deny us vital supplies of oil from the Middle East and manganese from India by political means, by invasion or by submarine and air attacks.

What position Egypt will take is anybody's guess but whichever way she goes, use of the Suez Canal will be rendered hazardous, as in World War II, by enemy bombing and mine laying.

Communication with and supply to England will be more difficult than in World War II due to the larger number of submarines available to the enemy. For the same reason, convoys supplying our own bases in Spain and North Africa, assuming that these bases have not been overrun by native troops, will require heavy antisubmarine and antiaircraft protection.

Following the pattern of World War II, after the enemy has obtained Bay of Biscay submarine bases, our sealanes through the Caribbean and along the Atlantic coast will come under attack. Our antisubmarine forces at the time we entered World War II were pitifully inadequate and/or required for convoys elsewhere, hence Allied losses in merchant shipping in those areas were heavy. Since strategic supplies from South America, the Panama Canal, and the Gulf of Mexico make the Caribbean-South Atlantic coast route one of our most, if not the most vital sealane, its protection by ships, submarines and aircraft must be provided before the outbreak of war. Many suitable bases are availableCharleston, Bermuda, Key West, Guantanamo, to name only a few.

Shipping from the Congo region, South Africa, and the Atlantic ports of South America will not at first require escort but when enemy submarine bases are secure in the Biscay area, these ships must be assembled in convoys-probably at Para, Brazil, and escorted through the Caribbean and up the south Atlantic coast. Provision of adequate antisubmarine forces equipped with the latest in sonic, supersonic and radar gear should make this route secure.

In World War II one of our most vital sealanes passed south of Australia across the Indian Ocean and up to the ports of India, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Petroleum from Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia will be even more important in world war III than it was in World War II and I am informed that about one shipload (5,000 tons) of manganese per day will be required from India.

Protection of this shipping will be a tremendous job. During World War II, surface forces under my command at Perth (Fremantle) consisted of two Australian, two Dutch and one United States cruisers, plus two Australian and two Dutch destroyers. These ships were totally inadequate for escorting the volume of shipping which flowed past our door and most merchant ships had to proceed unescorted.

Fortunately, losses from Japanese submarines and surface raiders were not large but in world war III, with larger numbers of enemy submarines available and with the threat of air attack from southern Asia and the East Indies, it will be a different story. Large numbers of surface escorts and escort carriers will be essential and bases will be required in Australia, Ceylon, the Persian Gulf

and in the East Indies, if the Indies are in Allied hands. Our bases in the Philippines can assist in antisubmarine work against submarines passing through the South China Sea and in bombing enemy bases in Southeast Asia but they are too far from the Indian Ocean to assist in convoy protection.

Trade with the East Indies will depend upon who holds them and the enemy submarine and air opposition. Darwin in North Australia and Davao in Mindanao would be our best bases from which to cover such trade routes.

The sealanes from Australia to the west coast of the United States will not require much protection. Japanese submarines did sink a few ships east and even south of Australia but they operated from bases in Java or from New Britain and New Ireland and I do not believe the Communists can overrun the two places last named.

Our shipping lanes from the west coast to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands will require antisubmarine escorts, since Russian submarines based at Petropavlosk, Kamchatka, have only about a 2,100 mile run to reach the Gulf of Alaska. The Reds will probably take Kiska, Attu and Shemya early in the war which will put their submarines only about 2,500 miles from San Francisco. In World War II a few Japanese submarines, based in the Aleutians, operated as far south as Santa Barbara. Enemy aircraft based in the Aleutians will add to the threat against our Alaskan sealanes.

Protection of the remaining sealanes considered herein-those to the British Isles and those penetrating into the Mediterranean, obviously will require operations more intensive than those required at the outset of World War II due to the larger number of enemy submarines available.

One of Russia's major objectives will be to isolate England and knock her out of the war. The Germans nearly succeeded in throttling her supply lines in World War I and World War II. Whether the Russians can achieve this objective will depend upon the number and efficiency of her submarines and longer range planes, and upon the effectiveness of our countermeasures.

As you know, our antisubmarine vessels, escort carriers and patrol planes were able eventually to whip the German submarine menace but our losses were terrific about 25 million tons in World War II.

No Allied submarines were used in the Battle of the Atlantic except for a few British along the European coast. Thus Allied forces were free to attack every submarine encountered. However, it is anticipated that in world war III, recognition signals between submarines and other types of craft will have been perfected, thus permitting the use of killer submarines in protection of our convoys. In addition our midgets-just now introduced to the United States Navy-will be invaluable in destroying enemy submarine bases by the use of atomic mines.

As to the Mediterranean, assuming that Italy, France, and Yugoslavia are in enemy hands, the probability of total loss of slow or medium speed merchant convoys will be too great to risk. Britain did manage supply and reinforcement trips to Malta in World War II but each such trip was practically a major operation and accompanied by considerable losses.

We also managed to punch through with invasion forces but we should not attempt such operations in world war III until our antisubmarine and antiair forces have attained great strength.

In estimating the above situation as to the protection of Allied sealanes, I have assumed that the efficiency of Russian submarines is at least as great as that of the Germans. It is reported and undoubtedy is true that many German submarine experts have willingly joined the Russians or have been drafted by them. With German instructors the efficiency of Russian submarines should improve, but actually we may be overestimating the effectiveness of these craft. British officers who served with or in Russian submarines at Murmansk and in the Black Sea have told me that their equipment was not modern and their state of training and attack technique was of the vintage of 1914.

We know that they have German types XXI and XXVI. These are snorkel equipped and have high underwater speed. They did not get into World War II, which was lucky for us. The best defense against these vessels will be our atompowered submarines of the Nautilus and Seawolf type. We must have many more of these.

I was also asked to give my opinion as to our ability to defend the Western Hemisphere.

I believe that our ability to defend the Western Hemisphere depends entirely upon our ability to retain command of the sea and the air above it. No invasion