Morris' Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. the supply and price of the Blossburg and Barclay regions is illegal, and the contract therefore void. A second question is, whether the bill drawn in this case by the general sales agent on the Barclay Coal Company, in favor of the Morris Coal Company, to equalize prices upon a settlement under the contract, is such an independent cause of action as will support the suit. When a bill, note or bond is but an instrument to execute an illegal contract, it is tainted by the illegality and cannot be recovered. The illegal consideration enters directly into the instrument, and is followed up because the law will not permit itself to be violated by mere indirection. This is the principle mentioned in the cases of Steers v. Lashley, 6 Term Rep. 61; Swan v. Scott, 11 S. & R. 164; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434; Fisher v. Bridges, 3 E. & B. 642; Lestapies v. Ingraham, 5 Penn. St. 82. In the last case, GIBSON, C. J., says: "The solemnity of the security would not preclude an inquiry into the consideration of it, had it been illegal;" and in Swan v. Scott, DUNCAN, J., said of a bond, the consideration of which grew out of an illegal transaction, "there the illegal consideration is the sole. basis of the bond, and there can be no recovery." In the present case, the bill itself refers directly to the equalization account, and was given in immediate execution of the contract. This being the case, it is distinguishable from Fackney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 2069; Petrie v. Hannay, 3 Term. Rep. 418; Farmer v. Russell, 1 Bos. & Pul. 295; Lestapies v. Ingraham, supra; Thomas v. Brady, 10 Penn. St. 164, cases where the action was not upon the illegal contract, or upon an instrument in execution of it, but was founded upon a new consideration. The distinction is well stated by Judge WASHINGTON, in Toler v. Armstrong, 3 Wash. C. C. 297, affirmed in the supreme court of the United States, 11 Wheat. 258. The present case is free of difficulty, the money represented by the bill arising directly upon the contract, to be paid by one party to another party to the contract, in execution of its terms. The bill itself is therefore tainted by the illegality, and no recovery can be had upon it. The judgment is therefore affirmed. United States tax lien-proceeds of property sold on execution. The fixtures and furniture of the tenant of a distillery, upon which the United States had a lien, were sold under an execution issued on a judgment obtained against him by a creditor in a State court. Held, that the property was not sold subject to the lien, but that the lien was to be first discharged. The lien of the United States on the proceeds is superior to that of the judg ment creditor or of the landlord for rent. APPEAL from a decree of the district court of Philadelphia. It appears that a writ of fieri facias was issued at the suit of James Blake & Co. against Winston F. Rogers, and the funds arising from the sale of the property (fixtures, etc., of a distillery) were brought into court for distribution. An auditor was appointed to distribute the fund, which amounted to $1,332.17. The claimants were the United States revenue collector, J. Dyre Dungan, the landlord of the premises which were occupied by the defendant, and the plaintiffs in the execution. The claim of the United States was $1,613; and the auditor awarded the whole proceeds of the sale to the collector. The report was confirmed. Thereupon, Dungan and Blake appealed. P. Archer and L. C. Cassidy, for Dungan; G. Junkin, for Blake. The sheriff sold subject to the fixed lien of the government. Reed's Appeal, 13 Penn. St. 476; Vandyke v. Bennett, 1 Tr. & H. 724; Metzer v. Menor, 8 Watts, 296; Vandever v. Baker, 13 Penn. St. 121; Mann's Appeal, 50 id. 375. The right of the government could not operate over the lien of a prior contract the lease. N. H. Sharpless (with whom was J. Cooke Longstreth), for appellee, referred to the acts of congress cited in the auditor's report. Taylor v. Carryl, 24 Penn. St. 259; S. C., 20 How. 583; Hagan v Lucus, 10 Pet. 400. The landlord has no lien for rent on goods sold under execution; he has merely priority of payment from the proceeds. VOL. VIII.-22 Dungan's Appeal. Blake's Appeal. READ, J. By the report of the auditor, it appears that the property sold were the fixtures of the distillery of Winston F. Rogers, the defendant in the Blake judgment, consisting of tubs, boilers, tools, stills, etc., with some office furniture of inconsiderable value, all on and belonging to the distillery premises. The defendant became indebted to the United States for taxes on his distilled spirits, manufactured in this distillery, and for his deficient returns, and for a capacity-tax on his distillery. Rogers was actually indebted to the United States, in the sum of $1,613, for unpaid taxes alone on his distilled spirits, which, being greater than the amount for distribution, makes it unnecessary to consider the remaining portions of the claim of the government. By the act of congress of 20th July, 1868, "imposing taxes on distilled spirits and tobacco, and for other purposes" (15 Stat. at Large, 125), it is enacted "that there shall be levied and col· lected on all distilled spirits, on which the tax prescribed by law has not been paid, a tax of fifty cents on each and every proof gallon, to be paid by the distiller, owner or person having possession thereof before removal from distillery warehouse; and the tax on such spirits shall be collected on the whole number of gauge or wine gallons, when below proof, and shall be increased in proportion for any greater strength than the strength of proof spirit as defined in this act; and any fractional part of a gallon, in excess of the number of gallons in a cask or package, shall be taxed as a gallon. Every proprietor or possessor of a still, distillery or distilling apparatus, and every person in any manner interested in the use of any such still, distillery or distilling apparatus, shall be jointly and severally liable for the taxes imposed by law on the distilled spirits produced therefrom, and the tax shall be a first lien on the spirits distilled, the distillery used for distilling the same, the stills, vessels, fixtures and tools therein, and on the lots or tracts of lands whereon the said distillery is situated, together with any building thereon, from the time said spirits are distilled until the said tax shall be paid." The argument of the appellants is, that the sheriff could not sell the property, except subject to the lien of the government for the unpaid tax. In plain language, he could not give a title to the property sold by him as an officer of the law. If, therefore, he sold the articles levied upon in twenty-five different lots to twenty-five different persons for twenty-five different prices, would each lot be subject to the whole fixed lien, or how much of it? Dungan's Appeal. Blake's Appeal. The case of The Royal Saxon is an answer to this argument. In Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, the supreme court of the United States held that, where property is levied upon, it is not liable to be taken by an officer acting under another jurisdiction. Speaking of a seizure by a sheriff under process from a State court, and a subsequent seizure of the same property by the marshal, under process against the same defendant, it is said: "The marshal or the sheriff, as the case may be, acquires a special property in the goods, and may maintain an action for them. But if the same goods may be taken in execution by the marshal and the sheriff, does this special property vest in the one or the other, or both of them? No such case can exist; property once levied upon remains in the custody of the law, and is not liable to be taken by another execution in the hands of a different officer, and especially by an officer acting under another jurisdiction." The sheriff having sold the property, under an execution from a State court, the distribution will be made by that tribunal, and, in so doing, it will recognize the unpaid tax on the distilled spirits as the first lien, and direct its payment accordingly. This has been done. by the court below in the present case, following the precedent in the appeal of The United States v. Black et al., from the decree of the court of common pleas of Cumberland county, the opinion in which case was filed at Pittsburg on the 19th October, 1869. This, of course, reaches the claim of the landlord, the unpaid tax being made a first lien on the distilled spirits, the distillery used for distilling the same, the stills, vessels, fixtures and tools therein, from the time said spirits are distilled until the said tax shall be paid, which secures its first payment out of the proceeds of such sale. "The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions, except such as rest in the discretion. of the authority which exercises it. It reaches to every trade or occupation; to every object of industry, use or enjoyment; to every species of possession, and it imposes a burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may be followed by seizure and sale or confiscation of property." Cooley on Constitutional Limitation, 479. The laws of the United States are supreme on all subjects to which the legislative power of congress extends. Decree affirmed, and appeals dismissed at the costs of the appellants. Fulmer v. Seitz. FULMER, plaintiff in error, v. SEITZ. (68 Penn. St. 237.) Promissory note-effect of alteration on liability of sureties. A promissory note, not bearing interest, was signed by the principal maker and by the sureties, and delivered to the payee. Two months afterward, the payee, without fraudulent intent, and the sureties not being present, but by consent of the principal maker, added the words "Int. payable semiannually." In an action on the note by the payee, held, that the alteration avoided it as to the sureties, and that, after going to trial, the payee could not be permitted to strike out the added words, and recover on the note in its original form. (See note, p. 175.) The ACTION on a promissory note by Henry Fulmer against George Seitz, Henry A. Sage, John A. Seitz and George H. Bender. note was as follows: "$4,000. EASTON, February 11, 1868. "One year after date, we, or either of us, promise to pay, to the order of Henry Fulmer, four thousand dollars, without defalcation for value received. Int. payable semi-annually. "GEORGE SEITZ, "JOHN A. SEitz, The principal maker was George Seitz, the other signers were sureties. When the note was delivered, the words in italics, "Int. payable semi-annually," were not in the note. The opinion states the other facts sufficiently. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brought a writ of error to this court. 0. H. Meyers and E. J. Fox, for plaintiff in error. An alteration, leaving the effect of the instrument as it was before, is not material. Miller v. Gilleland, 19. Penn. 122. "Int. payable semi-annually," does not necessarily imply interest payable from the date of the note. 2 Phillip's Ev. 429; Edwards on Bills, 708, 712, 713; Byles on Bills, 227; Addison on Contracts, 1154; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 14; Potter v. Gardner, 5 Pet. 718; Doman v. Dibden, |