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corps; but is generally designated as the love of novelty, fondness of change, &c. This is a property, that shews itself with the very beginning of its subject, and most likely will accompany him to the end, if his sense and apprehension should last so long. For these two things, novelty and change, depend entirely on the relations of experience; which changing continually afford to every object and situation at first sight, and for a short time such attributes, being in truth mere accidents of the mind. We cannot call the appetite for such accidents Fickleness, because this property is not more appetitive than aversive: and Inconstancy is about the same. Moreover, Changeableness does not mean the appetite for change merely, but an inconstancy in purpose, and sentiment as well; and yet it is the nearest term for this common appetitive property that now occurs; which may account for its present adoption, if the term be not altogether as appropriate as one could wish.

-7, It appears then, that several of the properties above named are of a divided character: but the property now to be mentioned is so much so, that one hardly knows where to place, or how to name, or how to regard it. A name, however, the property must have; and a name is accordingly here assigned it, being, it is true, only an old name with a new acceptation, to suit the nature of the subject, v. g., Promise: and what it stands for is an essential appetitive property nearly opposite to those between which it is placed, v. g. curiosity and expectation, as an object for both.

This essential property, whether virtual or effective, not being equally flagrant in every subject, may not have so obvious a part as some others: but this feature or circumstance is not peculiar to promise. There are few properties that do not blaze forth more or less in different subjects according to circumstances, and according to their proportion or share in the constitution. It cannot be doubted, that, with some men, promising is as common as

falsehood and upon the whole there can be no mistake in mentioning it as an inherent if not predominating essential in the constitution of the Kingdom.

Of kinds and degrees of promise we have several depending on its circumstances or accompaniments. Sometimes promise is mute and unintentional: most men's children have this mute property before they begin to promise loudly. And of this loud or at least ostensible promising there are also different modes; such as vowing and swearing for the highest or most intense; affirming and protesting for the next; intimating, encouraging, insinuating, &c., for others of the mildest and most familiar sort.

Characteristics, too, it has, both good and evil; as punctuality, sincerity, loyalty, honour, truth, on the one hand; flattery, deception, falsehood, treason, baseness, treachery, on the other. And

Forms enough it has, too, of various import; as engagements and contracts; duty, obligation, allegiance; treaty and alliance, e. g. ; of which this is not a place to speak particularly. Neither would it here be pertinent, to insist much on

The accidents of promise; as making, keeping, breaking, &c. So much, indeed, as this may be said for it that promise is sometimes better broken than kept, yet must always be at the ordering and disposal of its object from the time it goes forth. As long as promise keeps at home or has not been accepted, it will be as free as intention, being for the time accountable only to its subject or depositary; but no longer. So it appears from our Saviour's parable of the man and his two sons (Matt. xxi. 28), that, not only just and reasonable, but foolish and rash promises are in the power of their object, or the person to whom they are made: if disagreeable to that person, they may be released, and are then better broken ⠀ than kept, or at least, not so bad, being less hurtful or grating to the innocent; as in the parable" Whether of ; them twain did the will of his Father?" (Ib. 31.) By the

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will of his Father the refusal of one son was discharged and void as if it had never been made, not having been accepted; while, by the same will and acceptance, the assent of the other was stamped with falsehood. And the example of the first "of them twain" will apply to every case of threatening, which is a sort of promise, to do something disagreeable to its object, as well as to every case of refusal, which is also a sort of promise not to do what its object requires. So likewise all promises made expressly before God, for all are implicitly, will be naturally voidable, when made against his will, or in favour of what he forbids.

But, even where a promise is better broken than kept, it will not be honoured in the breach: for a breach of promise can never be honourable under any circumstances; nor pardonable either until it has been duly repented. The maxim of the Preacher, "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin” (Eccl. v. 6), was intended chiefly for religious rows: but in their common affairs also people should mind how they promise; and not suffer this essential property, however forward it may be in them, to triumph over others of more consequence; as the characteristics, gravity, truth, honour, and sincerity.

-8, Expectation, anxiety, suspense, &c., are also properly members of both the spiritual and intellectual association; being, however, strictly appetitive, and therefore, like the foregoing, rather more spiritual.

-9, There are still other properties of this class, and nearly allied to the last mentioned expectation; such as, Ardour, zeal, enthusiasm, and others very estimable on proper occasions, though it has been usual to apprehend one of them, enthusiasm, only in an unfavourable sense. But such properties do not any of them here seem to require a particular notice, as they only differ by a degree from others that have been noticed sufficiently. And the forenamed properties altogether are, perhaps, about the most remarkable of the essential appetitive sort: while

4, Others deserve also to be mentioned on account of their weight in the opposite scale of Aversion: such are, 1, Courage; 2, Anger; 3, Surprise; 4, Secrecy; 5, Avoiding, Resistance; 6, Doubt, Hesitation, &c.; 7, Diffidence, Distrust, Suspicion, &c.; to which the same general remark will apply as to the last mentioned opposite appetitive class, v. g. respecting the same property being attended with different names, notions and effects continually in different spheres and in different subjects or combinations, and in relation to different objects, though always itself essentially the same. Thus our disrelish of many material things, as of food, for example, is aversion: so is the grating of discordant sounds; so is the disagreement of other simple effects or feelings with their objects: and the dislike to certain actions and characters is no more; as the Psalmist's particular dislike, e. g. expressed in that apostrophe to the Supreme Being, "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee: and am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee?" (Ps. cxxxix. 21.) Neither was this holy feeling of the Psalmist and of many who have felt like he, any peculiar kind of aversion; though there seems a prodigious distance between the natural and spiritual casts of this property; as, e. g. between the loathing of unwholesome food, and a hellish abhorrence of all that is good or amiable in the several parts of thinking and doing.

It may not be a matter of great consequence, to ascertain the very exact position of every constituent in the spiritual body, association, or department-or not so much so, as it is considered in the departments or kingdoms of nature; if it were, one should be at a loss sometimes how to proceed. But still there are constant vestiges or criterions generally to be observed sufficient for the purpose; as e. g. with respect to

-1, That much talked of and often overrated property, animal Courage, which would deserve indeed to be set lower than the undermost of its class, if it were no more than what

the world generally takes it for, being on that construction not more a human property than a brutish, if it be so much. And what makes its classification doubtful is, that the property or principle of courage, however paradoxical it may appear, is (unlike fear) to seek what it avoids, as a worthy antagonist, or the hand of an assailant. But still we must be aware, that courage in any subject is not to be reputed invariably good for its object any more than fear, its antithesis; but often more formidable, which seems conclusive evidence, that neither of these properties can exist naturally without a very sensible tinge of aversion.

To judge from the derivation of the word, one would suppose, that courage was the most essential property of manhood; or rather, its very essence. Indeed, it is often called Heart and Spirit by the vulgar: as if a man's better, superior, or governing element consisted entirely in brute courage. Its degrees or simple modes (being an active property) are assurance or confidence, boldness, daring, defiance, &c.; its more complex modes, rashness, presumption, obstinacy, impudence-bearing of course the same relation to their antitheses, shyness or diffidence, weakness and timidity, desperation, cowardice, &c., as the general property of courage bears to that of fear, v. .g. of seeking in some measure, as well as avoiding their respective objects. And if it were worth while to distinguish this general property of courage with fear, its forementioned antithesis still farther, the same might be done to a very great extent by means of various criterions; as of object, time, place, occasion, &c., producing a variety of sorts equally striking in themselves and incompatible with each other as e. g. are produced by object, courage towards God or man, courage towards one sex or the other, and also towards equals or inferiors of either sex. It being generally found, that they who are bold towards God, can be timid enough towards their fellow-creatures; and also, that the most presuming coxcombs, in regard to women, are the greatest cowards in regard to men. So one man

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