མ

right, to all his fubjects, rich and poor, without having regard to any perfon; and that ye take not by yourself, or by other, privily nor apertly, gift, nor reward, of gold, nor filver, nor of any other thing, which may turn to your profit (unless it be meat or drink, and that of small value) of any man, that shall have any plea, or process, hanging 'before you, as long as the fame process fhall be fo hanging, nor after for the fame caufe; and that ye take no fee, as long as ye fhall be justices, nor robes of any man, great or fmall, but of the king ' himself, and that ye give advice or counsel to no man, great nor fmall, in no cafe where the king is party. And in cafe that any, of what estate or condition they be, come before you in your sessions, with force and arms, or otherwise against the peace, or against the form of the ftatute law thereof made, to difturb the execution of the common law, or to menace the people, that they may not pursue the law, that ye fhall cause their bodies to be arrested and put in prifon; and in cafe they be fuch, that ye cannot arreft them, that ye certify the king of their names, and of their mifprifion haftily, fo that he may thereof ordain a convenable remedy; and that ye, by yourself, nor by other, privily nor apertly, maintain any plea, or quarrel, hanging in thei king's court, or elsewhere in the country; and that ye deny to no man common right by the king's letters, nor none other means, nor for none other caufe; and in cafe any letters come to you contrary to the law, that ye do nothing by fuch letters, but certify the king thereof, and proceed 'to execute the law, notwithstanding the fame letters; and that ye fhall do and procure the profit of the king, and of his crown, with all things, where ye may reafonably do the fame. And in cafe ye be from henceforth found in default in any of the points aforefaid, ye fhall be at the king's will, of body, lands and goods, thereof to be

.

• done,

'done, as fhall please him. As God you help and ' all faints.'

One might imagine the lives, liberties, and properties of the fubject, were fafe, when the king and his judges were thus bound to do equal and impartial juftice: but the judges were to continue no longer in their office, than durante bene placito, during the king's pleasure. This dependence of the judges upon the king has in many instances. weakened the effect of their oath, and endangered the fecurity of the fubject. We find the judges, when afked by king Charles the first, Whether he could not annul acts of parliament • that were prejudicial to him?' replied, that the king was above the laws,' and in the fame reign, they gave it as their opinion in writing that the 'king might by law levy fhip-money on his fub'jects by his writs' and in 1686, two years before the revolution, they were not afhamed to declare, that the king had a power to dispense with the laws.'

It

At the revolution, the nation faw the neceffity of making the judges independent, for the honour of the crown, as the fecurity of the people. was not in view to abridge the prerogative of its power to appoint, but to reftrain it from difplacing the judges at will. By the act of the 12th of king William the third, it is enacted, that the judges 'commiffions be made during their good beha'viour, quamdiu fe bene gefferint. Towards the clofe of the reign of that excellent prince, the late king, whose memory is embalmed with the tears ' of Englishmen,' was added the judges falary, which they now enjoy, in order to render them as independent of the crown as poffible. It is a glorious reflection, to us who fee a patriot king on the throne, and fuch upright judges on the bench; to think that a Jefferies cannot be fcreened from justice, and R 3

that

that a PRATT need not fear to give a juft interpretation of the laws.

I

On the Liberty of the Prefs.

EVER thought that the more any man endeavoured to exert himself for the liberty of the fubject, the more he ferved his prince, and the more he fhewed his duty to him. The happiness of a king can never be more great, than when his fubjects enjoy a compleat content; and the fubjects can never be contented when their liberties are any ways injured, attacked, or undermined. Whatever man advises his prince to take any one ftep which borders upon contracting the established privileges of the people, is a double traitor both to his fovereign, and his fellow fubjects, and affuredly ought to be discarded by the one, and abominated by the other.

Among the privileges of this country, the chiefeft are, the liberty of the prefs, and the privilege of being tried by our peers; and when ever thefe two are loft (which may God and all good men forbid) the name of a Briton will be defpifed as that of the most abject wretch breathing. The best things prove the worst when once corrupted, and the greater the tafte of liberty hath been, the more heavy will the lofs of it be felt. I would not be understood to infinuate we are in any danger of fuch a lofs; no, quite the contrary: but it can never be unfeasonable to warn my countrymen not to give way to the most diftant attempts against such invaluable bleffings.

Any encroachment on the liberties of the prefs, if rightly confidered, can never add to the real intereft of either king or minifter; by its freedom only, the prince may learn when the people are oppreffed, when any ftatefman (borrowing his

fovereign's

fovereign's name to fcreen his misdeeds) does any act of injuftice; and when any thing conducive to the people's further happiness can be affected. That is the only way by which a fubject's complaints can arrive to the royal ear, and by which truth can come to the knowledge of a king. In most countries, the monarch is furrounded with a number of men, whofe private interefts are to banifh truth, and hinder any accefs to the royal prefence, to those who may inform him of the thoughts of his people, or the oppreffions of his delegates. Confequently, when that liberty is abridged, and nothing dare be printed but what hath received the fanction of a statefman imprimatur, the fubject may be daringly oppreffed, and they may be fure no licence will be granted for publishing a detail of their wrongs; the minister will then boldly tell his master, that every thing goes on right, that the people are happy and contented, and the deceived monarch all the while lays under the imputation of having ordered whatever a minifter has dared to do; and knows not that the multitude fuffer, 'till an open defection proclaims what has been done.

As it is not the intereft of the king, no more is it that of the good minifter to reftrain the prefs. No minifter, however good, however great, however enlightened and capable, can be fuppofed to know the actions of all those who act in the feveral departments of the state at home, in the fleets and armies, the government of diftant provinces, or in embaffies abroad: the accounts fent home by the parties themselves, will moft certainly be in their own favour, and without the prefs, no one will dare difcover any mifmanagement; fince, if inferior perfons, if their names are known, they may fall a victim to the power of those accufed; but by means of the prefs and public papers, a man may give fuch intelligence as a good minifter will be glad to R 4 receive,

receive, and thereby, knowing the minds of the people, may act for the univerfal good.

On the other hand, fince knowledge and experience are not confined to rank and fortune, a fimple individual who hath not means of access to the great, may start a thought, which, if feconded by the power and wifdom of an able and honeft ftatef man, may be productive of general good. Thus by means of the liberty of the prefs, the intelligence, the hints, and wife projects of a minifter, may be greatly extended; truth will come unstopped to the fight of the king, and thence follow justice and benefit to the people.

But if thefe great advantages arise from the liberty of the prefs, whence then can it be fuppofed any one would ever wish to fee it fuppreffed? I answer, folely through fear, and none but bad men can ever entertain that fear, none but bad men can dread an open difquifition of their conduct, fince it is the good man's intereft to be fully known, and the more his character is made public, the more glory accrues to himself, and the more emolument to his fellow fubjects.

Since I have faid thus much on the liberty of the prefs, left any one should mifconftrue my meaning, it will be fomewhat neceffary that I fhould declare what I mean by a liberty of the prefs.

I mean then, a full and uncontroverted liberty to print, (without feeking any permiffion) whatever a man ought juftly to have liberty to say. This confequently will exclude all treafon, all flanders which may be prejudicial to any honeft man's life, character or fortune, all obfcenity which may be corruptive of morals, and all impiety which may tend to fubvert religion. All thefe exclufions are already made by our laws, and as no man can say thofe things with impunity, fo no man ought to print them: but then indeed, thefe exclufions ought not to be explicit, and not tend to the adopt