reasoning embraces all kinds of relations, those of degree, time, place, fitness and unfitness, possession, and cause and effect, as well of agreement and disagreement, and of proportion. Relative feelings, sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another, continually unfold themselves, as the mind advances in an argument.

Although in reasoning there are elements besides feelings of relation, it is evident that it cannot advance independently of their aid. Facts may be accumulated, having close and decisive relations to the points to be proved, but they can never be so bound together as to result in any conclusion, without a perception or feeling of those relations. So that in some respects, the senses, consciousness, original suggestion, memory, testimony, &c, may be regarded as the handmaids, of relative suggestion; the former furnishing the facts, and the latter rendering them available.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

MEMORY.

200. Internal knowledge not limited in its origin to one
source or one power.

HOWEVER it may be regarded as a trite remark, that the memory has an intimate connection with the origin of knowledge, it probably is an indisputable one; although some may see reason for annexing the qualification, that it is less directly a source of ideas in itself, than in its various connections with other mental susceptibilities. We cannot form abstract notions, independently of the aid of the memory; we can neither exercise the power of reasoning nor of imagination without it; it may even be considered as implied in, or at least essential to the notion of personal identity. And how is it possible, therefore, not to regard it as, either directly or indirectly, one of the sources of internal knowledge?-The ways, in which knowledge is let into the mind, are more numerous, than would probably be supposed on a slight or cursory inspection; and it befits us, therefore, to be cautious of limiting its growth and expansion to one cause, to any fixed and exclusive mode of action, and to any single combination of circumstances. Such a limitation would seem to imply a disregard of the general experience on the subject, and a forgetfulness also, that the human soul is the result of divine workmanship, that its existence is beyond the direct cogr.izance of the senses, that it sustains a multitude of re

lations, is controlled by uncounted influences, and is susceptible of unlimited developement.

But

So far, therefore, from saying with Mr. Locke, that consciousness is the only source of internal knowledge, (if such be truly his doctrine, as it is generally understood to be,) we should not only add the sources of primitive and relative suggestion, but should increase the number with every inward susceptibility, and with every specific diversity of interior mental action, the memory, reasoning, imagination, &c. These are all sources of new ideas. in proceeding to consider them, it is proper to remark, that our attention will be more taken up with the faculties themselves and their action, than with their immediate results on the increase of knowledge. And accordingly, in next proceeding to investigate the memory, we wish to know what the memory is, its diversified character in different individuals, the causes of this diversity, the means of improving it. &c.

§. 291. Explanations in respect to the faculty of memory.

MEMORY is that power or susceptibility of the mind, from which arise those conceptions, which are modified by the relation of past time. It is not a simple, but complex state of the intellectual principle, implying (1) a conception of the object, (2) the relation of priority in its existence. That is, we not only have a conception of the object, but this conception is attended with the conviction, that it underwent the examination of our senses, or was perceived by us at some former period.

When we imagine, that we stand in the midst of a forest, or on the top of a mountain, but remain safe all the while at our own fireside, these pleasing ideas of woods, and of skies painted over us, and of plains under our feet, are mere conceptions. But when with these insulated conceptions, we connect the relation of time; and they gleam upon our souls, as the woods, plains,and mountains of our youthful days; then those intellectual states, which were And before mere conceptions, become REMEMBRANCES. the susceptibility, which the mind possesses of these latter complex states, is what usually goes under the name of the power or faculty of MEMORY.

§. 292. Of the differences in the strength of memory.

The susceptibility of remembrances is the common privilege of all, and generally speaking, it is possessed in nearly equal degrees. To each one there is given a sufficient readiness in this respect; his ability to remember is such as to answer all the ordinary purposes of life. But, although there is in general a nearly equal distribution of this power, we find a few instances of great weakness, and other instances of great strength of memory.

It is related of the Roman orator, Hortensius, by Seneca, that after sitting a whole day at a public sale, he gave an account from memory, in the evening, of all things sold, with the prices and the names of the purchasers, and that this account, when compared with what had been taken in writing by a notary, was found to be exact in every particular.

The following is an instance of strength of memory somewhat remarkable. An Englishman, at a certain time, came to Frederic the Great of Prussia, for the express purpose of giving him an exhibition of his power of recollection. Frederic sent for Voltaire, who read to his majesty a pretty long poem, which he had just finished. The Englishman was present, and was in such a position, that he could hear every word of the poem ; but was concealed from Voltaire's notice. After the reading of the poem was finished, Frederic observed to the author, that the production could not be an original one; as there was a foreign gentleman present, who could recite every word of it. Voltaire listened with amazement to the stranger, as he repeated, word for word, the poem, which he had been at so much pains in composing; and giving way to a momentary freak of passion, he tore the manuscript in pieces. A statement, being made to him of the circumstances, mitigated his anger, and he was very willing to do penance for the suddenness of his passion by copying down the work from a second repetition of it by the stranger, who was able to go through with it, as before.

A great number of instances of this description are found in the records of various individuals, but they must be

considered as exceptions to the general features of the human mind, the existence of which cannot be explained on any known principles. As no one can tell, why one oak on the mountains is tall and large, while its neighbour, on the same soil and of the same description of trees, remains stinted and dwarfish; so we find ourselves unable to give any philosophic explanation of such instances as have been mentioned.

But there are also weak memories, so much so as to be properly considered exceptions to the generally equal distribution of this mental susceptibility. Individuals can be found, from whose memory truths have passed away almost the moment after they have been acquired; and who, in the management of the common concerns of life, discover a forgetfulness extremely unfortunate and perplexing. Instances of this kind are indeed not so frequently found recorded as of an opposite description; because it is more pleasing and satisfactory to the literary annalist to record the excellencies, than the defects of the mind.

§. 293. Of the effects of disease on the memory.

Some writers have attempted to explain the phenomena of memory by supposed changes wrought in the cerebral substance; but without assenting to any such hypothesis, it is proper to remark, that it seems to be well established, that there is a connection of some kind between the mind and body. We rightly and fairly infer, that there is such a connection, because there are a multitude of facts, which can be explained on no other supposition ; but in what way, or to what extent it exists, it would be worse than futile to assert with the limited knowledge we at present possess.The general truth, however, that there is a connection of some sort between the mind and body, and consequently, a reciprocal influence, is confirmed, besides other sources of evidence, by some facts in respect to the memory.-I have read, (says Dr. Beattie,) of a person, who falling from the top of a house, forgot all his acquaintances, and even the faces of his own family; and of a learned author, who, on receiving a blow on the