France and

War with Flushing and Ostend; another, on a larger scale, and her Allies, very different plan, was pointed at the Boulogne armament, which it was proposed to blow up by cata. Oct. 2, 1804. marans, an attempt no less unsuited to open and generous warfare than the torpedoes of the Americans. Fortune was more favourable to us in encounters with the enemy in the open Ocean, where, in the early part of 1804, a striking proof of the effects of intrepidity was given in the case of a fleet of merchantmen from China, which beat off, or at least deterred from action, a French squadron under Admiral Linois, consisting of a ship of 80 guns and three frigates.

Feb. 15.

Spain.

The war hitherto had been with France and Holland only; but a new power was now to be added to the list of our antagonists. Spain had been allowed by Bonaparte to avoid participating in the contest, on condition of paying a large annual contribution ; a condition, so contrary, as was alleged, to real neutrality, that, for some time past, our Government had kept a vigilant eye on the expected arrival of her treasure ships from America. A small squadron of four frigates, sent out to intercept these valuable supplies, met, on 5th October 1804, a Spanish squadron of a similar number proceeding towards Cadiz. The Spanish commodore refusing to surrender, an engagement ensued, attended with the capture of three of the Spanish frigates, and the explosion of the fourth with the loss of many lives. This decisive act, approved at home by the advocates of vigorous measures, was productive of the worst impressions in regard to our national honour both in Spain and her colonies, and Dec. 1804. led, soon after, to a declaration of war. Bonaparte was now provided with additional means of threatenExpedition ing our distant possessions. A squadron of five sail to the West of the line escaping from Rochefort, landed a body

Indies in 1805. May 6.

of nearly 4000 men on the Island of Dominica, and burned the chief town; the Island of St Kitt's escaped with paying a contribution and the loss of some merchantmen. But this was only a prelude to the arrival of a much more formidable fleet, which, to the number of eighteen sail of the line, French and Spanish, reached the West Indies in the end of May, and spread alarm throughout the Islands,-an alarm not dispelled till the arrival of a force inferior by one-third, but commanded by Lord Nelson. The hostile fleet soon after set out on its homeward voyage. Intelligence to that effect was opportunely received by Lord Barham, then at the head of the Admiralty, and a fleet, detached to cruise on their supposed track, had the good fortune to fall in with them on 22d July. An action took place; two sail of the line (Spanish) were captured; night closed the conflict, and though it might have been renewed on the succeeding days, an unfortunate indecision on the part of our admiral, Sir Robert Calder, allowed the enemy to escape. They repaired to Ferrol, whence they soon after sailed with augmented force, and reached Cadiz. To watch them there, or to engage them on their coming out, was an object of the highest moment, and it was to Lord Nelson that the important trust was committed. Joining our fleet off Cadiz, he avoided keeping in sight, and even dispensed with the aid of six sail of the line, which he sent to a distance along the coast; judging that the enemy, when

War with

France and her Allies.

apprised of their absence, would be induced to come out. Accordingly, the combined fleet left Cadiz on the 19th October to the number of 33 sail of the line (18 French and 15 Spanish), commanded by Admiral Villeneuve, and early on the 21st came in sight of the British fleet consisting of 27 sail of the line. The scene of conflict was off Cape Trafalgar, Battle of nearly half way between Cadiz and Gibraltar. The Trafalgar. enemy, convinced that their former defeats at sea had been owing to the want of concentration and mutual support, now formed a double line, so that any of our ships, attempting to penetrate, should be exposed to the fire of two or of three antagonists. Nelson, while yet distant, perceived their arrangement, and understood its object. It was new, but he was satisfied that no concentration in the open sea could prevent our vessels from coming to close action with their opponents, in which case the result could not long be doubtful. He made, consequently, no alteration in his previous plan, but directed his fleet to advance to the attack in two divisions, one of which, under Admiral Collingwood, intersected that part of the enemy's line, which gave it a nearly equal number of ships to encounter, while Nelson with the other division, acted on a similar plan Such was the only general manœuvre in this great action; by our superior seamanship, and our ships keeping near each other, we had, in some cases, a local superiority, but the general character of the fight was a conflict of ship to ship, and its decision, in our favour, was owing to that skill in working the guns, to that dexterity in an occasional change of position, and that confidence of success which characterizes a naval force in high discipline-advantages which we had displayed with such success against the Dutch at Camperdown, and the French at Aboukir, and in which we met with no equal opponents till we encountered the Americans. Our loss, amounting to 1600 men, was in part caused by the riflemen in the enemy's rigging,—an ungenerous mode of warfare, which may deprive an opposing force of officers, but can have little effect on the general issue of a conflict. The fighting began at noon, became general in less than half an hour, and lasted from two to three hours; in the case of a few ships it was longer, but all firing was over by half past four o'clock. Nineteen sail of the line struck; but unfortunately gales of wind, after the action, wrecked part of our prizes, and necessitated the destruction of others; four sail, however, were preserved, and four more, which had escaped, were met on their northward course, on 2d November, and captured off Cape Ortegal by a squadron under Sir Richard Strachan.

1805.

But on the Continent of Europe the course of Continental public events was very different. The year had been Affairs in ushered in by a letter of Bonaparte to our Sovereign, containing pacific professions expressed in general terms. An answer was given, not by the King, but, according to diplomatic usage, by our Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Minister in the same station; expressing a similar wish for peace; but adding, that it was incumbent on us to consult our allies, particularly the Emperor of Russia. The French ridiculed the assertion of our being on

her Allies.

War with confidential terms with that court; but Russia France and had, in fact, begun to listen to the proposal of forming against France a coalition on an extensive scale. The basis of this compact was a treaty signed at St Petersburg in April. Russia, Austria, Sweden, Naples, all acceded to it, and hopes were entertained of the co-operation of Prussia. Bonaparte, apprized of this, affected to be absorbed in arrangements for immediately invading England, but secretly prepared to march his troops from Boulogne to the Rhine. After throwing on the Austrians the odium of aggression, by allowing them to attack Bavaria before he acted, he proceeded to execute a plan singularly adapted to the overweening confidence of his opponent, General Mack, who, by this time, had traversed Bavaria, and advanced to Ulm. By making forced marches, and by violating part of the neutral territory of Prussia, Bonaparte reached first the flank, and soon after the rear of the enemy, who clung, with blind pertinacity, to the position of Ulm. The result to the Austrians was a series of checks in the field, and, eventually, the surrender, by capitulation, of more than 30,000 men. The road to Vienna was thus opened to Bonaparte. He marched thither, crossed the Danube, proceeded northward, and at Austerlitz, on 2d December, displayed his military combinations in all their lustre, gaining, with forces not superior, a victory, which compelled Austria to immediate peace; and thus, by one blow, broke up the coalition.

Oct. 17.

Naval Actions in 1806.

March 13.

Sept. 25.

Negotiation at Paris.

Prussia.

Such was the alternation of fortune by sea and land, that the next year had hardly commenced, when fresh successes were obtained over the French navy. A division of the Brest squadron, after landing troops in the Spanish part of St Domingo, were overtaken by a superior force, and three sail of the line captured, and two burned. Admiral Linois, returning from India, was captured in the Marengo of 80 guns; and, at a subsequent date, of a squadron of frigates detached from Rochefort for the West Indies, four fell into our hands.

It was under these circumstances, that a negotiation for peace was for some months carried on at Paris. It began in consequence of an overture from Talleyrand, eagerly embraced by Mr Fox; and Lord Yarmouth, who happened to be under detention in France, was made the first medium of communica tion and conference. In its more advanced stage, the negotiation was entrusted to Lord Lauderdale; and, at one period (in September), the conciliatory tone of the French inspired a hope of peace ;-a hope soon disappointed, when it was found that the offers of Bonaparte were followed by the demand of Sicily; and that, while professing an ardent wish for peace, he was extending his usurpations in Germany, and secretly preparing to subvert the power of Prussia.

The humiliation of Austria left Bonaparte at liberty to direct his manoeuvres, both diplomatic and military, against her northern rival. Affecting great indignation at the friendly disposition shown by Prussia the preceding autumn towards the coalition, he demanded the cession of a portion of her territory in the south-west, and, in return, transferred to her

France and her Allies.

Hanover, in the hope of kindling the flame of dis- War with cord between her and England. The Prussians accordingly entered Hanover; the local government making no resistance, and our Cabinet taking no retaliatory measure, except the detention of vessels bearing the Prussian flag; a measure adopted not in the spirit of hostility, but to satisfy popular clamour in England. The discussions between France and Prussia continued during the summer of 1806, and, from the blind confidence of one party, and the art of the other, assumed at last a serious aspect. The battle of Jena (see the article FRANCE, towards the close) deprived Prussia of her army, her capital, her fortresses; and her court was fugitive in the north of Poland, ere there had been time to send, or even to concert the sending of succours from England. The Grenville ministry, less eager than their predecessors to embark in Continental war, confined themselves to sending a general officer (Lord Hutchinson) to the Russian head-quarters, and to the grant of a limited subsidy. For some time, the difficulties of the country, and the firm resistance of the Russians, particularly at Eylau, encouraged the hope of arresting the progress of Bonaparte; but this hope was disappointed by the battle of Friedland, and still more by June 14, the approximation of the court of Russia to that of 1807. France.

The treaty of Tilsit excited alarm, less from its July 1. specific provisions, than from the probable consequences of the co-operation of the contracting powers. Among these, some persons reckoned, or pretended Expedition to reckon, the equipping against us of the Danish to Copennavy, a force of sixteen sail of the line, not manned or hagen, Aug 1807. ready for sea, but capable of being fitted out without a great sacrifice. The ministry of 1807 founded their claim to public favour on a system of vigour, on a course altogether opposite to the cautious calculations of their predecessors. No sooner were they apprized of the treaty of Tilsit, than, without waiting for its effect on the Danish government, they deter mined on the as yet unexampled measure, of taking forcible possession of a neutral fleet. A powerful armament of 20,000 troops, and twenty-seven sail of the line, prepared ostensibly against Flushing and Antwerp, was directed to proceed to the Sound, there to await the result of a negotiation at Copenhagen. This negotiation was entrusted to a special envoy, who represented the danger to Denmark from France and Russia, and demanded the delivery of the Danish fleet to England, under a solemn stipu. lation of its being restored on the termination of our war with France. The Danes, justly offended at this proposal, and aware that their agreeing to it would expose them to the loss of the continental part of their territory, refused; our envoy returned on board our fleet; our army was landed, and Copenhagen invested August 16. by sea and land, while a part of our fleet cut off all communication between the Continent and the island on which it stands. After a fortnight passed in preparations, a heavy fire was opened on the city, and Sept. 2. continued during two days with great effect. A capi- Sept. 8. tulation now took place; the citadel, dock-yards, and batteries were put into our hands, and no time was lost in fitting the Danish men of war for sea. All stores,

War with timber, and other articles of naval equipment, belong ing to government, were taken out of the arsenals, embarked and conveyed to England.

France and ber Allies.

Buenos Ayres.

June 27, 1806.

July 5.

Battle of Maida.

The expedition to Copenhagen excited much discussion and difference of opinion in England, * par. ticularly when it was avowed that ministers had no evidence of an intention in Russia to coerce Den. mark, and still less of a disposition in Denmark to give way to such coercion. The only tenable ground was, to acknowledge at once that the Danes had given no provocation; that their conduct had been strictly neutral; but that they would evidently have been unable to defend themselves, had Russia and France united against them. Still it was extremely questionable, whether we, to ward off a contingent annoyance, should commit a present aggression. The success of our attempt, considering our naval superiority, the insulated position of Copenhagen, and its unprepared state, admitted of little or no doubt. But this was not all. There remained farther and more important considerations;-the odium that would be thus excited against us in the Danish nation, and that closer approximation of Russia to France, which could hardly fail to follow so open an affront to a power professing to take a lead in the political ar rangements of the Baltic.

The Cape of Good Hope surrendered to an armament from England in January 1806. After this, Sir Home Popham, who commanded the naval part of the expedition, ventured to make, without the sanction, or even knowledge of government, an attempt on Buenos Ayres. Our troops, though under 2000 in number, effected a landing, and occupied the town. Intelligence to this effect having reached England, the popular notion, that Buenos Ayres would prove a great market for our manufactures, induced government to take measures for completing the new conquest. And, though the inhabitants soon rose, and drove out the feeble detachment under Sir Home Popham, an armament, which arrived in January 1807, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, attacked the fortified town of Monte Video, and carried it in an assault, conducted with great skill and gallantry. But a very different fate awaited our next enterprise, an assault on Buenos Ayres, planned by General Whitelocke, an officer wholly unfit for such a service. Our troops, 8000 in number, were successful in some parts; but failing in others, the result was a negotiation, and a convention that we should withdraw altogether from the country, on condition of our prisoners being restored.

-

But, in another part of the world, and against an enemy in general far more formidable, our arms had been attended with success. Naples had been engaged in the coalition of 1805, with a view to assail the French on the side of Lombardy; but an AngloRussian army, landed for that purpose, had been prevented from marching northward by the disastrous intelligence from Germany. They were subsequent ly re-embarked, the British withdrawing to Sicily, and Palermo becoming once more the refuge of the

VOL. IV. PART II.

her Allies.

Neapolitan court. That court, eager to excite in- War with surrection against the French in Calabria, prevailed France and on General Sir John Stuart, in the beginning of July 1806, to lead thither a detachment of our troops. They landed, and soon after received intelligence, that at Maida, distant only ten miles from our encampment, was a French corps, already nearly equal to our own, and hourly expecting reinforcements. Our troops marched to attack them on the morning of 4th July, and at nine o'clock drew near to their position, which had a river in front. General Reynier, who commanded the French, having received his reinforcements the preceding evening, and seeing that our small army was unprovided with cavalry, made his men march out of their camp, and advance to charge us on the plain. Our force, including a regiment landed that morning, was nearly 6000; that of the enemy above 7000. The French, who knew our troops only by report, marched towards them with confidence, and hardly expected them to stand the charge. Our line formed, faced the enemy, and advanced. The firing commenced at the distance of about 100 yards; but it had not long continued, when the extreme of each line, as if by mutual consent, suspended it, and advanced towards the other with fixed bayonets. The advancing division on each side was composed of choice troops. On our side, of light companies; on that of the French, of grenadiers. They crossed bayonets, and were about to begin a conflict hand to hand, when the firm aspect of our men daunted their opponents. The French gave way, and were pursued with great slaughter. The rest of the enemy's left now drew back, but at first in good order; for they stopped occasionally, fired, and retreated only as our troops drew near; at last they fell into great confusion. Their right flank being in like manner repelled in an attack on our left, the field of battle remained entirely in our possession. The French loss in killed and wounded was nearly 2000; ours only between 300 and 400. This brilliant exploit produced the evacuation of part of Calabria by the French, but had no other result; our small force returning soon after to Sicily.

Constantin

ople.

Our next operation in the Mediterranean was an Threatened unsuccessful menace of the Turkish capital. That attack on court refusing to enter into our plans of hostility to France, our ambassador withdrew, and re-entered the Straits of the Dardanelles, with a squadron of seven sail of the line, exclusive of frigates and bombs. They suffered considerably in passing the narrow part of the straits, between the ancient Ses-tos and Abydos, now called the castles of Romania and Natolia. Anchoring at a distance of eight miles from Constantinople, our Admiral, Sir J. Duckworth, threatened to burn the Seraglio and the city, but in vain. The Turks continued adverse to our demands, and employed the interval assiduously in strengthening the formidable batteries of the Dardanelles. It soon became indispensable to withdraw, and to repass the straits; but this was not accomplished without a loss of 25 men in killed and wounded, the cannon at the castles being of

3 Y

her Allies.

March 1807.

War with great size, and discharging granite balls. A descent France and made soon after in Egypt was equally unfortunate. A detachment of troops landing at Alexandria, occupied that town, but suffered a severe loss at Rosetta, and eventually withdrew, on the Turks consenting to give up the prisoners they had taken. Peace was soon after concluded with the Turks, and our operations in the Levant confined to the capture of the Ionian Islands from the French. Zante, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Cerigo, were taken by a small expedition in 1809, and Santa Maura the succeeding year.

Sicily.

On the side of Sicily, our commanders, though pressed by the court of Palermo, refused to make descents on Calabria, which could lead to nothing but partial insurrections, followed, on the return of a superior force, by the death of the most zealous of our partisans. We took, however, in June 1809, the small islands of Ischia and Procida, near the coast of Naples; and, in the autumn of 1810, repelled an attempt of Murat to invade Sicily. A September body of nearly 4000 Italians, who had landed on this occasion, were driven back with loss-a failure which, joined to our decided naval superiority, put an end to all attempts of the kind.

1810.

Sweden.

The hostility of Russia consequent on her connection with France, produced a menaced invasion of Sweden, now our only ally in the north. To aid in May 1808. repelling it, Sir John Moore was sent to Gottenburgh with a body of 10,000 men. This force did not land; but the general, repairing to Stockholm, entered into communications with the king, and had the mortification of finding that prince wholly incapable of rational conduct, and bent on projects which would necessarily involve the sacrifice of the British troops. On this he lost no time in returning to Gottenburgh, and soon after brought back the armament to England, to be employed on a more promising service.

Portugal The influence possessed by Bonaparte over Spain and Spain. had long inspired him with the hope of overawing Portugal, and of obliging that country to dissolve her alliance with England. To this hope the humiliation of Germany, and his new alliance with Russia, gave double strength; and, in the latter part of 1807, the most peremptory demands were made on the court of Lisbon. To part of these, implying the exclusion of British merchantmen from the harbours of Portugal, compliance was promised; but the demand of confiscating English property, or detaining the English resident in Portugal, was met with a decided refusal. A French army now marched towards Lisbon, and threatened openly to overthrow the house of Braganza; but the latter, after some momentary indications of indecision, took the determination of abandoning their European dominions, and proceeding to Brazil. This spirited, and by many unexpected measure, was carried into effect in the end of November, and Lisbon was forthwith occupied by French troops. A few months after the transactions at Bayonne occurred, and the general

her Allies.

declaration of hostility by the Spaniards to Bona- War with parte. Our cabinet now determined to postpone all France and other projects to that of a vigorous effort on Spain and Portugal. With that view, an armament of 1807. 10,000 men collected at Cork, and said to be intended for Spanish America, sailed in July to the Peninsula, and offered its co-operation to the Spaniards in Galicia. They, however, thought it best that we should confine our aid to Spain to arms and money, directing our military force against the French army in Portugal. Accordingly, our troops, after passing an interval at Oporto, were landed to the southward, in Mondego Bay, where, after receiving the co-operation of a farther division of British, and of a few Portuguese, they proceeded on their southward march to Lisbon. The first actions took place with French detachments August 15. at the small town of Obidos, and at Roleia. Neither were of importance: the French, inferior in number, retreated; but their commander at Lisbon was Junot, an officer trained in the school of revolutionary enterprise, and disposed, like most of his brethren at that time, to make light of British land forces. He determined forthwith on offensive operations, advanced from Lisbon, and, reaching the British army on 21st August, attacked it in its position at the small town of Vimiera. The force on either side * was about Battle of Vi14,000 men. The French marched to the onset in miera. columns, with their wonted confidence, but they had to encounter an enemy equally firm as Germans or Russians, and far superior in arms, equipment, and activity. A part of the opposing lines advanced to the charge, and not only crossed bayonets, but, what very rarely happens, maintained that desperate conflict for several minutes, when the French gave way. Equal success attended our efforts in other parts of the line, and the loss of the enemy was 3000 men, and 13 pieces of cannon. The object now ought to have been to follow up our success, before the French should recover themselves, and fortify the almost impenetrable mountains on the road to Lisbon. In vain did Sir A. Wellesley + urge this, first on Sir H. Burrard, who had now taken the command, and next day on Sir H. Dalrymple, who arrived and replaced him. Reinforcements were daily expected; and, till their arrival, neither of these officers could be persuaded to incur hazards for the attainment of an advantage which, from their unacquaintance with localities, they were not competent to appreciate. A precious interval was thus lost. The French occupied the passes, opened their negotiation in a tone of confidence, and obtained, by the treaty called the Convention of Cintra, a free re- Convention turn to France on board of British shipping. The of Cintra. ministry, though disappointed, determined to defend this Convention; judging it indispensable, partly from the communications of Sir II. Dalrymple, more from its bearing the unqualified signature of Sir A. Wellesley, who was, even then, their confidential military adviser. The public, however, called for inquiry;

Sir John Moore's Campaign.

Dec. 4.

Dec. 20.

The public disappointment at the Convention of Cintra was soon counterbalanced by gratifying intelligence from the Baltic. Bonaparte, whose plan was to subjugate all Europe, by making one nation instrumental in overawing another, had sent the Spanish regiments in his service into Denmark; but he could not prevent their receiving intelligence of the rising spirit of their countrymen, and the vicinity of a British fleet happily facilitated their evasion. Ten thousand Spaniards were thus brought off, and carried, with their arms, stores, and artillery, to join the standard of their country.

Meantime the command of our troops in Portugal was vested in Sir John Moore, and arrangements were made for moving them forward into Spain. From the badness of the roads, it was necessary to advance in two divisions, one marching due east, and another north-east, while a farther force, arrived from England at Corunna, was instructed to hold a south-east course. Each of the lateral divisions received, in their progress, orders to adapt the direction of their march to existing circumstances; but the result was, that both converged towards the central division, led on by Sir John Moore in person.

In their march, our officers had an ample opportunity of witnessing the fallacious and exaggerated impressions entertained in England with regard to the ardour of the Spaniards. They saw a country They saw a country wretchedly cultivated and thinly peopled; a nation hostilely disposed, indeed, to the French, but unaccustomed to exertion, and incapable of combination; instead of recruits, supplies of provisions, or offers of voluntary service, all was inactivity and stagnation; and, amidst the general poverty, our Commissariat had great difficulty in obtaining provisions. Another great source of perplexity was the want of information. The natives, whether in the civil or military service, were too ignorant and credulous to be capable of detecting exaggeration, or of distinguishing truth from falsehood; and our officers were obliged to judge for themselves under the most contradicto

ry rumours.

Sir John Moore reached Salamanca on 13th of November, aware that the Spaniards had been defeated at Burgos, and soon after apprised that a French corps was advancing to Valladolid, within 60 miles of his front. In this situation, he received from Madrid the most urgent solicitations to send thither his army, in whole or in part. He knew the ardour of his country for the cause of Spain, and directed his movements in the plan of complying, as far as should be at all advisable, with the representations pressed on him; but, day after day, the intelligence became more discouraging. At last, the fall of Madrid, ascertained by an intercepted letter of General Berthier, removed every doubt, and left him no other plan but that of uniting his three divisions, and determining on a retreat; but, as his army was now augmented to 25,000 men, he determined to strike, if possible, a blow against the detached

her Allies.

French army under Soult, stationed at some distance War with to the north-east. With this view, our troops ad- France and vanced from the small town of Sahagun towards the enemy, and a partial action, which took place between the opposite vanguards, was to our advantage; but intelligence arriving that Bonaparte was directing a superior force on our rear, it became indispensable to make a prompt and uninterrupted retreat. Bonaparte, pressing forward with his vanguard, reached our rear at Benavente, saw, for the first time, British soldiers, and witnessed a cavalry Dec. 29. action, in which several squadrons of his guard were very roughly handled, and their commanding officer, Lefevre Desnouettes, made prisoner. Meanwhile, Soult, marching by a different road, hoped to cross our line of retreat at Astorga; and the Spaniards having abandoned the position which covered the access to that town, it required both prompt and skilful exertion to enable our army to occupy it before the enemy. Here, pressed as we were, it became necessary to destroy a great part of our camp equipage. Our army was a-head of the enemy, but had before it a long and difficult march over the mountains of Galicia. The weather was severe, provisions scanty, the inhabitants cold and unfriendly: so many privations and disappointments relaxed the discipline of our soldiers, who called loudly to be led to action, as the close of their distress. Retreat, however, was unavoidable; and, in this state of suffering and insubordination, the army performed a march of more than 200 miles, our general keeping in the rear to check the French, who followed with their usual audacity. At Lugo, about 60 miles from Corunna, circumstances seemed to justify our awaiting the enemy, and fighting a general battle. Our soldiers repaired with alacrity to their ranks, but Soult did not accept the challenge, and our retreat was continued. It closed on the 12th January, having been attended with the capture of many men, from disorder, and the sacrifice of many horses, from want of forage, but without losing a standard, or sustaining a single check in action. On the 13th, 14th, and 15th, the sick and artillery were embarked on board our men of war; the troops remained on shore, to await the enemy, and to cover the reproach of retreat by some shining exploit. This led to the battle of Corunna : Jan. 16. on that day our position was good on the left, but very much otherwise on the right; thither, accordingly, the French pointed their strongest column, and thither Sir John Moore repaired in person. He directed the necessary movements first to obstruct, and afterwards to charge, the advancing enemy. These orders were gallantly executed, and the attack of the French repelled; but our lamented general received a wound from a cannon ball, which soon after proved mortal. Subsequent attacks, first on our centre, and next on our left, were equally foiled; and, in the evening, we occupied an advanced position along our whole line. Enough having now been done for the honour of our arms, the embarkation was continued on the 17th, and completed on the 18th, after which the whole set sail for England.

of 1809.

Our failure in this campaign was far from dis- Campaign couraging our government from new efforts. Austria was preparing to attack the allies of Bonaparte