The War Department is charged with the responsibility of organizing, training, and maintaining the Army at all times in accordance with conditions defined by Congress, and with certain nonmilitary activities. 2. History Prior to the Revolutionary War governmental policies in America were determined by the mother country. Hence, although every community had to be ever ready to defend itself against local attack by Indians, and each colony developed a militia which at times was employed on campaigns for considerable periods, nevertheless the problem of national organization for common defense did not arise. The British army was their bulwark against a common foe. The military establishment was organized and administered by edict of the king. Friction with England forced the colonies to unite and organize for common protection. The problem of common defense suddenly became paramount. Yet there was no common assembly to consider it and no plans nor means for securing concerted action. In 1774 the First Continental Congress, consisting of representatives from colonial assemblies, met in Philadelphia, drew up a declaration of rights and grievances to be sent to the king, and adjourned until the following year. No steps looking toward military action were taken in the hope that armed conflict might be avoided. When the Second Continental Congress convened the following year all hopes for conciliation were gone. The battle of Lexington had been fought three weeks before. The immediate and pressing problem now was how to raise, equip, and maintain an army for the common defense. There were many difficulties to be overcome. The delegates had no authority to act for the colonies which they represented; each delegate was jealous of the power of the others; there was no executive head to Congress; there was no organization for setting up and carrying on a central government; and there was a deep-seated aversion on the part of the people toward standing armies, an aversion dating back to the struggle of the common people of England against the Stuart kings of the seventeenth century, when armies had been used to abuse the people, not to defend them. The English Puritans and the cavaliers of the colonies had always been stubborn in protesting that no army should be quartered upon them, except by the consent of their own Legislatures. Notwithstanding these and many other difficulties, Congress was compelled to assume the functions of a civil government and to organize to carry on the war for defense. It appointed committees for war, but it refused to give them any power; it constantly changed the membership of the committees; and it jealously rendered their work ineffectual by passing frequent "resolves" which covered all the business of war. Cader such conditions Washington found it almost impossible to keep an army in the feld When he was made Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, it numbered about 17.000 men, the enlistment of every one of whom would expire before the end of the rear. Most men preferred enlisting in the milina, where the term was short and the fiscipline vas lax joning the regular Cotinental regiments. Though he impressed upon the soldiers the senous consequences of leaving the Amy before the new reps tould be trained they left him by hundreds the day the period of enlistment ended Bounties were fered to encourage enlistments and the amount of money offered was gradually increased. The time me vien men wic enlisted for short penods mder this system vere recerming more pay than the cfcers who were training them. Serious moble with the icers loved Desertions from the Amy were frequent Washington repented reminded Congress of his contion that the campaigns failed because Ile dependence muld be placed in the militia because there was no definite minary policy, and because of the failure to furnish necessary supplies. In a letter to Congress be sui: “The Esadvantages amending the immed enlistment of trees are too apparent to those who are evenmesses of them. but to gentlemen at a distance, whose attention is engrossed by a thresand imperant objects, the case may be otherwise. To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them mder proper Eiscipline and subordination, not only requires time, but it is a work of great culty: and in this Army, where there is so little stinction between the Foers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect then the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran scibers is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen. At another time he wrote: "Connecticut wants no Massachusetts men in her o ́s, Massachusetts thinks there is no necessity for a Rhode Islander to be introduced into hers, and New Hampshire says it is very hard that her valuable and experienced officers, who are willing to serve, should be discarded, because her own regiments under the establishment cannot provide for them." Congress failed to heed Washington's advice. It did increase the bounties offered, but the paper money issued was practically worthless, and wholesale desertions followed. The soldiers were half starved and insuficiently clothed. Mutinies were numerous. In the midst of these troubles and successive defeats, Congress persisted in making plans to reduce the size of the Army, but the war did not end. Finally the period of enlistment was extended to "three years" or "during the war" at the discretion of the soldier, and Washington was given complete charge. These experiences, together with the defeat of General Gates at Camden, brought forth the following expression from Washington in a letter to the President of Congress: "This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as for of fense, and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. * The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. It is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence." * * * At the conclusion of the war Congress decided to dispense with a standing army. It ordered the discharge of the Continental troops, with the exception of about 80 soldiers, who were kept to guard public stores. Constant Indian troubles and civic disorders, however, compelled an increase in this number to make up a force of several hundred men. In the meantime the war organization had undergone successive changes in the Continental Congress. When the committees for war failed, boards of war had been appointed; yet Congress itself continued to direct all military affairs, until these boards became as powerless and ineffective as the committees which preceded them. At the conclusion of the war, after a long dispute, Congress resolved to create a Department of War whose chairman should be called the Secretary of War.1 Under the leadership of Gen. Henry Knox, the second Secretary of War, the department became well organized. The new Department of War established under the Constitution of the United States was organized on a similar basis and the former Secretary retained. At its beginning, the Department of War included the functions which are now divided among the Departments of War, the Navy, and the Interior.3 Although the Revolutionary War was over, the problem of adequate protection of the new nation was one of the gravest that presented themselves. In his first annual address to Congress, President Washington said: "Among the many interesting objects that will engage your attention, that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." In formulating a military policy under the new government, the prejudice of the people against a standing army again came to the surface. Even with the lessons of the past war fresh in their minds, the majority of the people believed that a large army would provoke war. A maxim arose: "A standing army is dangerous to liberty." There was no distinction in the public mind between the army proposed by Washington and the armies of the past, which had been the mercenaries of despots. Congress attempted to solve the problem by passing two statutes. * * The first act, passed in 1790, laid the foundation for the volunteer system. It empowered the President to employ for a short term, "not exceeding six months, * a corps not exceeding two thousand noncommissioned officers, privates, and musicians, with a suitable number of commissioned officers." The second act, passed in 1792,5 had for its purpose "more effectually to pro 1 Act Aug. 7, 1789 (1 Stat. 49). 2 Act April 30, 1798 (1 Stat. 553). 3 Act March 3, 1849 (9 Stat. 395). 4 Act April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 119). Act May 8, 1792 (1 Stat. 271). |