Brooklyn, and those as to Brooklyn have no application to Buffalo, all of which cities are of the first class. Fourth- The law is distinctly a tax measure as distinguished from a police regulation for the restriction of the liquor traffic. As such it violates the constitutional prohibition against taking the property of the citizen without due process of law, in that neither the taxes assessed under it nor the punishment for violations are uniform throughout the State, nor even in the city of New York, and that it discriminates arbitrarily both in the amount of the tax and the extent of the punishments against the city of New York when compared with other cities of the first class. The first speaker was Mr. Untermeyer, of Guggenheimer, Untermeyer & Marshall, of New York city, who argued chiefly in regard to the first point. He was followed by the Attorney-General of the State, whose chief arguments were: The State may authorize, or refuse to authorize, the sale of liquors on such terms as it thinks proper, and the courts of the United States have nothing to do with the exercise of this police power. "No one has a natural right to retail spirituous liquors. The whole subject is within the police power of the Legislature, and persons engaging in the business must submit to such regulations, terms and burdens as the Legislature may have prescribed for the public good. The claim that the tax imposed is not uniform cannot be urged or argued against the constitutionality of the law. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.. "It reaches to every trade or occupation; to every object of industry, use or enjoyment; to every species of possession; and it imposes a burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may be followed by seizure and sale or confiscation of property. No attribute of sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point does the power of the government affect more constantly and intimately all the relations of life than through the exactions made under it." The fact that the tax imposes an unequal burden upon different persons or different localities could not be urged as against its legality or constitutionality. As to the two-thirds vote said to be necessary in the Legislature for the passage of such bills he argued: "The Constitution of this State, which took effect on January 1, 1895, in section 20 of article 3 provides as follows: 'The assent of twothirds of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes.' I "This provision is identical in language with section 9 of article 1 of the Constitution of 1846, and has been in force from January 1, 1847, to the present time. "In the case of the Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y., the court said, at page 662: 'At no time in the history of the State have we been without excise laws, nor has the authority of the Legislature to control, regulate and prohibit the sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors been questioned.' Continuing in this case, Wright, J., gives a résumé of excise legislation from the year 1801 down to the date of his writing, to-wit, September, 1886. "We are not aware that any of these laws have been passed by a two-thirds vote. The law in question, in section 11, provides for the assessment of excise taxes upon the business of trafficking in liquors, in accordance with four grades or classes therein specified. Section 13 prescribed to whom the tax shall be paid and the use to which the same shall be put. "The tax, varying as it does in the different cities of the State, does not affect the cities, but only the individuals resident in the respective cities who desire to deal in the liquor business. The power to impose the tax has never been delegated to any city in this State. It has, therefore, not been taken away by the act in question. The law, therefore, does not relate to the 'property, the government or the affairs. of cities." 999 Hon. Joseph H. Choate followed and his argument was partly as follows: "Its criminal features reach all those who traffic or have any transactions in liquor without paying any tax. It is because of the absolute inequality throughout the State of the penalties inflicted, contrary, as I believe, to the rules and administra tion of justice, that constitutes a very serious point for consideration here. You will note that a man who sells liquor here contrary to the provisions of this law is subject to a penalty of $1,600 for each offense. But a man who commits the same offense on the other side of Spuyten Duyvil is subjected to a penalty of not more than $200. And so it is graded throughout the State, according to the size of the city. "That the act is not uniform in its operation has clearly been shown. Thus, for instance, the act imposes upon the business of trafficking in liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold, upon the person carrying on such traffic in a city of 1,500,000 inhabitants or more, a tax of $800; in a city of a population from 500,000 to 1,500,000, a tax of $650; in a city of from 50,000 to 500,000, the sum of $500; in a city of from 10,000 to 50,000 a tax of $350; in a village of from 5,000 to 10,000, a tax of $300; in a village of from 1,200 to 5,000 a tax of $200; in every other place, the sum of $100. The district newly annexed to New York city in Westchester county is deemed a town for the purpose of the act, and one selling liquor to be drunk on the premises in that portion of the city of New York is required to pay a tax of $100 only. "Section 34 of the act provides: "Any corporation, association, copartnership or person trafficking in liquors, who shall neglect or refuse to make application for a liquor tax certificate, or give the bond, or pay the tax imposed as required by this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $2,000, provided such fine shall equal at least twice the amount of the tax for one year, imposed by this act, upon the kind of traffic in liquors carried on, where carried on, and may also be imprisoned in the county jail or penitentiary for a term of not more than one year. 66 Section 31 defines certain sales as illegal sales. As to them it is provided in subdivision 2 of section 34 of the act that the punishment for such violation is that provided in the first clause of the section which has been just quoted. "It will thus be seen that persons engaged in the very same business are taxed at rates varying from $100 to $800, although their traffic comes within the same category. Not only is this the case where the business is carried on in different cities, but persons carrying on the same business in one and the same city are subject to the same variations in rates; those doing business in a specified part of New York city paying $100, while persons carrying on the identical business in the remaining portions are forced to pay a tax of $800. "That is an arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government not within the province of any Legislature whatever. All men are supposed to be equal before the law, and especially so before the criminal law. I should like to see any argument advanced for the same degrees of punishment for other offenses in different parts of the State. It is in violation of the fundamental rule that you cannot deprive a man of liberty or property without due process of law. If that power does not rest in the Legislature, then to punish different men in different parts of the State with different penalties for the same offense makes this act void. "This law depends for its enforcement upon the infliction of the penalty. This matter was touched upon in the case of Jaehne. The question whether the consolidation act was overruled in the punishment, for bribery was brought up. "Whether it should be passed by a two-thirds vote, depends upon the question whether those were public moneys, in a sense, of the State. Appropriating the money of the State, for the use of a village, town or city, and taking it away from the rest of the State, was so serious a matter that a mere majority of the Legislature was not enough to decide, and a two-thirds vote should be and is required. If it were constitutional in this act for this purpose, why, he asked, was not the same done with regard to the collateral inheritance tax and other taxes? lien does not belong to the State. Who proceeds to secure that lien? The city, the village, the town, the city, the county treasurer? Oh, no! The State proceeds. "If the Legislature can beat the devil around the bush in that way in respect to this constitutional provision they can do it in respect to any other law. They can do it with the collateral inheritance tax by the insertion of the same words. But it won't do. I submit that unless this same claim be made to apply so as to free all collections of taxes from the constitutional provision, then this act is defeated by that very claim. who evidently was very hard pressed to sign the bill-feel about the attempt to get over that?" Mr. Choate did not think that the Governor or those who advised him took into consideration the constitutional provisions bearing. upon the measure. Finally, he said, the whole law was unconstitutional, in his opinion. In conclusion, Mr. Meyer, counsel for the excise board of New York city, said: "I deem it proper to state to the court the attitude assumed upon this appeal by the board of excise, in view of the peculiar and somewhat embarrassing position in which it is placed. The confirmation by the courts of the "Where has the Attorney-General been all constitutionality of this law necessarily means this time? Is it true that he can get up here the abolition of the offices held by the commisand say soberly that the Legislature would not sioners of excise. The commissioners, while have passed this law without this provision? they reserve to themselves, as individuals, the Oh, no we all know too much for that ex-right to take such action or attitude, as individcept the Attorney-General. uals, which they each may deem proper, believe that as an official body it is their duty to follow the provisions of a legislative enactment until, if ever, that enactment is declared unconstitutional and no law. - "While it is true that in the cases just considered, the courts were called upon to consider express constitutional provisions requiring taxation to be uniform, yet it is insisted that although our Constitution does not in express terms provide for uniformity, it must, nevertheless, be considered as part of our fundamental law that a tax in order to be constitutional must be uniform; otherwise taxation will be but another name for confiscation. If this were not so the Legislature might levy all taxes required for the State government upon the city of New York, or the county of Erie, or it might impose a tax of five mills on the dollar on taxpayers of Albany county, or one mill on the dollar upon those of Kings county, or it might impose a franchise tax upon corporations operating in one portion of the State only, and none whatever upon those doing business elsewhere, or it might tax the property of unmarried men at a rate different from that imposed upon the property of married men.” "If a court of first instance will not declare an act unconstitutional, unless incontrovertibly and palpably so, they believe it to be in consonance with dignity and American institutions to obey a law, and not to assume the functions of the court, and, I, therefore, am directed, and I believe it to be my duty as an officer of this court, to present to the best of my ability, and with my fullest effort, such arguments and suggestions as look to sustaining the action of the board taken in denying the application of the relator, and thereby to sustaining the constitutionality of the enactment, leaving free the commissioners, as individuals, to each take such action as he may hereafter deem proper." After a close struggle the chamber of deputies, on March 26, 1896, accepted the principle of the income tax. Prime Minister Bourgeois raised a question of confidence against an amendment offered by M. Guillemet, and the amendment was rejected by a vote of 288 to 272. Mr. Choate argued that the bill should have been submitted to the mayors of cities, as it was a proposed law relating to the property, government and affairs of cities. "The city of New York," he said, "had a revenue from excise, and it was uniform throughout its length M. Doumer, minister of finance, then deand breadth. The Legislature strikes out that manded a vote on M. Dron's resolution of confeature of its government and takes away its fidence, and on the principle of the income revenue and interferes with its government. | tax. The confidence paragraph was adopted How does His Excellency, the Governor by a vote of 297 to 249. Finally an amend him. In 1850 the discovery of gold in these regions led to a renewal of the frontier questions; and an understanding was come to between the parties to abstain from encroachment upon the debatable area ment offered by M. Pourquery de Boisserin, which was similar to that of M. Dron, but leaving the settlement of the most strongly opposed details of the income tax bill to the budget, committee was carried, the vote stand-pending a full survey and settlement. Subsequent ing 286 to 270, the government accepting the amendment. It is to be hoped that the fate of the law in France will be the same as in our own country if the features and provisions of the law are as objectionable as the one which our Supreme Court declared unconstitutional. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN IMBROGLIO. Trong stad Venezuela has now entered upon an HE long standing frontier dispute between Great acute stage, owing to the intervention, upon the ground of the Monroe doctrine, of the United States in a somewhat bellicose spirit, as indicated in the presidential message and by the appointment of a Boundary Commission an intervention which threatens to raise complications between the two great English-speaking states, and with which the other powers of Europe having relations with the south central American Republics, are not unconcerned. With the details of the quarrel between Great Britain and Venezuela we shall not here concern ourselves; for, an examination into its merits would open up a vast field of inquiry depending upon historical research among the buried records of the archives of Spain and Holland. A general outline of the dispute is, however, necessary for the understanding of the issue between Great Britain and the United States which is but a sequel to the Anglo-Venezuelan controversy. Originally Venezuela and British Guiana were colonies of Spain and Holland respectively. The boundary line between these possessions while they remained so, was never definitely marked; but the Dutch appear to have extended their sphere of influence some distance up the Orinoco where they established some "forts." In 1796 Great Britain acquired the Dutch territories by right of conquest, and proceeded to lay down a rough frontier line from Point Barima along the alleged western boundary claimed by the Dutch, and continued for many years to exercise territorial jurisdiction within their area. In 1814, the Dutch by a formal treaty to which Spain was a party, ceded to Great Britain their possessions west of the Corentyn River. Upon the foundation of the Venezuelan Republic in 1830 disputes arose with Great Britain as to their respective boundaries, and ten years later a conventional line running through the basins of the Cuijum and Guruari was drawn by Schomburgk and called after to this, different lines were suggested by either party but not accepted, and in 1887 Venezuela ceased diplomatic relations with Great Britain. The dispute however went on simmering, and in 1890 and 1893 two other lines were proposed to, but not adopted by, Venezuela. At length, an outrage committed at Uruan on the British frontier police, last year, resulting in a demand of reparation from Venezuela, re-opened the controversy, and led to intervention by the United States. The claim originally advanced by Venezuela embraces the Captaincy-General as existing in 1810, and extending to the Amazon on the south and the Atlantic on the east, but she has ultimately abandoned the territory beyond the Essequibo. Great Britain, on the other hand, asserts a right to the area between the Essequibo and the Orinoco, and appears willing to submit to arbitration the regions beyond the Schomburgk line, but absolutely refuses to recognize her claim to the territory within that line as in any way open to dispute. It must be admitted that the claims of both parties are somewhat indefinite and have not always been consistent. But the actual principle of International Law applicable to the case is not difficult. Great Britain, on the one hand, is entitled by right of inheritance to all the territory which belonged to the Dutch at the time of the cession of the colony by the latter, while Venezuela, on the other, is entitled to the area owned at that time by Spain. the area, by metes and boundaries, which belonged to the original holders really was, is the point in question. The solution of this question, which is purely one of fact, seems well adapted for settlement by arbitration. But what However, this matter may be ultimately settled, the interference of the United States at this stage has given a new aspect to the controversy, and brings for the first time into direct issue with Great Britain the famous Monroe doctrine. The question we propose to discuss is whether the United States have any locus standi in the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute. It is clear that the action of Great Britain is not in violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, as a writer in the "Fortnightly Review" of December last, erroneously appears to assume. The terms of Article I that "neither will ever erect or maintain any fortification commanding the Nicaraguan canal or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Central America" clearly import firstly, a permanent occupation, etc., and not a temporary one (as was indeed admitted by the Washington cabinet with respect to the British occupation of Corinto lost year, to enforce the payment of the indemnity due from Nicaragua), and secondly a permanent occupation, fortification or exercise of dominion over any part of Central America which does not belong to either party. In the present case Great Britain does not profess to acquire territory admittedly belonging to Venezuela, but seeks to enjoy possession of what it deems to be its own. Hence the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty confers no right upon the United States to interfere. This, indeed, is tacitly acknowledged; for the official ground put forward for intervention by the American Foreign Office is, solely, the exigencies of the Monroe doctrine. Let us examine this doctrine and consider its bearing upon the Anglo-Venezuelan question. It was propounded by President Monroe in his seventh annual message to Congress on the 2nd December, 1823 (Vide "Annual Register," 1823, tit. Public Documents, pp. 184, 193, 194), and consists of the fol. lowing principles: (1) That the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power: (2) Non-interference in matters exclusively European; (3) That an extension of the European Political system of allied powers to any part of the American hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States; that, therefore, with respect to governments which had acquired independence, any interposition to oppress them or control in any other way their destiny by any European powers would be an unfriendly act; (4) noninterference with the existing colonies of European States; (5) neutrality between a revolted colony and its European mother State. Although the doctrine has never been adopted by the Legislature of the United States and was even rejected by the house of Representatives in 1825, and treated, in 1848, during the discussions on the subject of Yucatan, as being mere declarations, yet on the whole the cabinet, at least, have never failed to wedge it in, whenever an opportunity for doing so has presented itself. Thus in 1843 President Polk opposed the transfer of Yucatan upon the ground of the doctrine. It was asserted again in 1862 and 1865 during the Franco-Mexican war. Upon the same ground the United States contended in 1882, that the Panama canal, if constructed, should be under exclusive American control and in 1889, when the French government offered financial and official assistance to the Canal Company, the senate resolved that the connection of any European government with the construction or control of any ship-canal across South or Central America would be regarded with disapproval by the United States. In 1894 it was again applied to the Nicaraguan canal. Last year an attempt was made to bring the Anglo-Nicaraguan indemnity dispute within the purview of the doctrine; and finally Secretary Olney has determined to extend it further to a boundary dispute. There are grave objections to the doctrine which cannot be over-looked by the European powers whatever may be its value in American eyes. In the first place it is admitted even by American jurists and senators that it is not International law, but merely a principle of American policy. It cannot therefore be binding upon States that have not given their acquiescence to it expressly or tacitly; and Great Britain has not only not accorded its sanction to it but opposed it in connection with the claims put forward by the United States, under its cover, to exclusive control of the Panama and Nicaraguan canals in 1882 and 1894, and again last year in connection with the Nicaraguan difficulty. Mr. Olney appears to have appreciated the true character of the Monroe rule in this respect, for he repeatedly speaks of it in his despatch as "a Doctrine of American public law” and refrains from putting it on the ground of International law. He seeks to clothe it, however, with the binding nature of a principle of International law upon the ground that it is "well founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent." But the mere fact that a rule peculiar to a country may be suited to the exigencies of its situation, and may therefore be "well founded" in principle cannot convert that rule into one of International law. The treatment of slave trade as piracy by some nations was "well founded in principle; "but it was never considered by them that their view was, in consequence, International law, so as to be binding upon the whole world and the fact that it is "abundantly sanctioned by precedent," if it refers to assertions of the doctrine at various times, is of no avail, unless it can be shown against a State that it has expressly or silently recognized it. President Cleveland does indeed attempt to prove, by a syllogism, that it is a part of International law; he says, in effect that, all just claims of States are recognized by that law; that the Monroe claim is just; that therefore the Monroe doctrine is part of the International Code. In the first place all just claims of States are recognized by International law only with a proviso that its exercise does not injuriously affect the rights of other States, which it does here; and the second proposition begs the question. There are other objections also to the Monroe doctrine. The immediate object of its enunciation was the prevention of the execution of the design of the Holy alliance to assist Spain in the forcible reduction of her revolted colonies. It was said that the American continents having achieved their liberty and established popu |