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House of Commons to stand in the same predicament with every other body, whether individual or corporate, in the kingdom, from the Sovereign downwards-What would be the consequence? Not that the proceedings and other documents would cease to be published: but, that either the House would exercise greater care in selecting what was to be published; or, that it would print only for the use of its members, and leave strangers to publish, if they chose, for the rest of the world. The Committee conclude their Report by adverting to the likelihood which there is of the power being abused, from the 'impossibility of 'exercising on all occasions, amidst the pressure of multifarious 'business, that precautionary vigilance which might guard against the evil;' and they are forced to admit that much 'must depend upon the discretion and sense of justice of indivi'dual members'-six HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHT in number they might have added-and most of whom present all the petitions that are placed in their hands by any persons who conceive they have a grievance against any one, and wish it to be made public without expense and without hazard. Surely it is enough that these things should be circulated among the members of the House itself, without any restraint beyond that feeble one imposed by the chance of a calumnious petitioner being punished by the House.

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But it is said that diffusing the information contained in Reports, which may reflect on individuals, is highly useful to the public, and necessary for helping the House in its enquiries, and in performing its legislative functions. We admit it but we maintain that the same publication would take place were it wholly unprivileged. The House itself could publish those Reports, and all other papers of the like kind. It would find agents enough ready to take the risk. It would indeed be bound to make that risk as slight as possible, by exercising great vigilance in expunging all matter which it ought not to publish. It would also be bound to make good any loss sustained by its publisher in acting under its authority. This it could always do where civil proceedings alone were resorted to; and the punishment inflicted, were prosecutions instituted, would be barely nominal; because, the occasion of the publication, if it did not afford a complete defence, would be sufficient to mitigate the sentence upon a conviction. Indeed there would rarely be either action or prosecution. We are not here to conjecture. The facts are of every day occurrence which prove to be inevitable, all we have been stating as only likely, to happen. This will appear under the next head of the argument.

Suppose the House itself not to interfere at all,—which

would certainly be the better course, then the Reports and Papers being printed for the use of the members, all those which it was most necessary or useful to have circulated, would assuredly be published, by persons willing to take the risk. Some gross libels would probably never be published. But all that it was right and good to disseminate would be freely circulated. Does any one doubt this? Let him recollect that by far the greater part of Parliamentary Publication has hitherto been carried on in this way, and without any protection at all. There was nearly as much of it before the arrangements of 1836 as there has been since. Nay, even since those arrangements, and if the privilege claimed were granted in the utmost extent, by far the greater part of the circulation of Parliamentary papers must of necessity be carried on without deriving the least protection from it. That privilege extends not to any persons except those authorized by the House. Mr Hansard would be safe; but no one who bought of him, and sold again, would have any protection. Nor would any one buying from him and lending to another-nay, nor any member of the House itself, lending to a person not a member. The resolutions of the House are sufficiently stringent, but they have not as yet laid it down for Parliamentary law, that the House, by affixing its imprimatur on a libel, can make that innocent per se which the law holds to be noxious.

However, we have no occasion to maintain this position. Quite enough remains were it abandoned. Look at another department of Parliamentary publication-by far the most important of any the largest in amount-the most interesting in its nature the most essential to the whole operations, perhaps even the most necessary to the existence of the legislature. The reader perceives we allude to the DEBATES. Who will be so bold as to place the necessity of circulating any kind of document in any sort of comparison with that of making the daily proceedings universally known? By the proceedings, we mean not merely the Votes, but the Speeches. Now, this publication, so essential to the very existence of Parliament, is, and always has been, and, moreover, is likely always to be carried on without any sort of protection,-by individuals acting under no authority whatever of the House,-nay, according to the Law of Privilege, acting in defiance of the prohibitions of the House, and 'amenable to their just displeasure,'-individuals who are answerable, criminally and civilly, for every line they make. public; and who cannot, in any court of law, defend themselves by proving that they have only published a correct account of what was spoken in Parliament, if that which was spoken be slander

ous. From hence two inferences may be drawn; and either is decisive of the present question. The privilege claimed is not in the least degree necessary for enabling the public to have the fullest and freest access to all Parliamentary papers; and there is no real risk attending a publication of such papers, whether the Houses of Parliament choose to authorize them by their orders or not. If the first of these positions is deemed insufficient for the purpose of the argument, on account of the lesser interest taken in Documents than in Debates,-the second shows how easily persons may be found who will run the risk, should the Houses desire to circulate their papers. Such a thing as an action or prosecution for a libel in publishing a speech, is hardly known, unless when the speaker is likewise the publisher. Had Mr Hansard not published as the servant of the House, he would most probably have furnished no exception to the remark. But even persons employed by the Houses would run a risk quite insignificant.

Now, if these things are undeniably true, there is an end of the argument; for no one contends that privilege should be dealt out to any body of men without necessity,—or an expediency so high as not to be distinguished from necessity; and if it is clear that complete publicity would be given to whatever was fit for publication, without any privilege exempting the publishers from the operation of the laws, no one can seriously maintain the propriety of giving the agents of the House of Commons such an exemption.

The supreme power in our Constitution is composed of three branches, each, of course, irresponsible in the exercise of its functions. Two of those branches being not individuals, but bodies of men, their irresponsible character cannot be fully enjoyed without certain immunities being given to their individual members. Hence these have freedom from all civil process, and absolute liberty of speech within their several Houses of Assembly. To all criminal process they are liable like the rest of the community; and for every thing done by them without the walls of those Houses they are answerable, civilly as well as criminally, The necessity of the case is here the measure of the privilege; and all the privileges once claimed and allowed-e. g. protection to their servants of any kind,—being beyond the bounds which that necessity prescribes, have been long ago abandoned. So, the Sovereign is wholly irresponsible; but whoever acts, or speaks, or publishes by his command, is answerable to the law, and will in vain plead the orders he may have received as a justification of his conduct. That the Houses of Parlament should have powers of acting beyond their own walls, and by agents

whom their orders will protect from legal process, is to a certain extent necessary; and those powers exceed any possessed by the Crown. Thus, the King can neither order an arrest for a contempt-nor cause men's houses to be broken open and searched for papers-nor direct persons who have offended him to be summarily punished. Why is this? Manifestly because the Crown has no functions to perform like those of the Houses, which make it necessary that they should enjoy such extraordinary powers. The King is sufficiently protected and aided in his functions by the ordinary operation of the law. But that either House should be privileged to publish, by agents irresponsible to the law, whatever it chooses to publish, has been shown to be wholly unnecessary.

There are many reasons why such powers should not be committed to a body of men; even if it were ever possible to regard without the greatest alarm their being vested in an individual. A numerous assembly acts without any check or control from public opinion in each particular case. In the long run, it will be influenced by the sentiments prevailing among its fellow-citizens at large; but this imposes no effectual restraint in a moment of temporary excitement; and it is at such times that injustice and oppression are most likely to be worked. All judicial functions are worse exercised by large bodies than any other functions. No man of common sense would regard without the utmost dismay the trial of any valuable right, whether of person or property, before such a tribunal. He would infinitely prefer the decision of the worst constituted court, composed of a very few men singled out from among their fellow-citizens, permanently engaged in judicial duties, answerable as individuals to public opinion, and acting according to fixed rules previously laid down, not according to unsettled principles adopted on the spur of the occasion, or moulded by its exigencies.

The judges of this country, however, are placed under other checks, while they are strengthened by important immunities firmly to discharge their duties. They are independent both of the Crown and of the People; that is to say, they are absolutely and to all intents placed beyond the control of the executive government; and they cannot be affected by any sudden temporary revolution of the country. If indeed they make themselves hateful to their fellow-countrymen,-if they give just displeasure to the two Houses of Parliament, their conduct may lead to their removal. But, secure against the influence of any sudden impulses of popular feeling, and against all influence of the Court, their determinations are far more to be relied on, and afford to the suitor a much greater prospect of inflexible justice than can ever be held out by the deliberations of the best consti

tuted assembly, numerously composed; whether it represents others, or acts by personal or by hereditary right.

Many well-intentioned persons, of liberal opinions, have been led away by the feeling that it is safer to intrust the House of Commons with power, now than it was before its reformation; inasmuch as it now represents the people more fully. That it is still but an imperfect representation, must be admitted; but were the elective franchise greatly extended-nay, were the most universal suffrage to be the origin of that assembly, we should only the more dread its being armed with any unnecessary irresponsible powers. Such a body would be well adapted to conduct enquiries, and to perform all the functions of legislation; but it would be little likely to deliberate upon the rights of individuals with judicial calmness; and it would be still more prone than it now is to domineer over the minority of its fellowcitizens. It is of the essence of all justice to protect the weak against the strong; and whether oppression is threatened by the Crown and its marshalled forces, or by the unarrayed Multitude through its organs, he who opposes a firm resistance to attempted wrong is the true friend of real liberty.

If they act very inconsiderately who would arm the House of Commons, as now composed, with powers far more extensive and anomalous than those the assumption of which they so vehemently resisted in 1810, still more unreflecting appears to be the disposition shown by others to take part with the House upon this particular occasion; merely because the question concerns libel, and the House is claiming a power of unrestrained publication. Let it be remembered, that the claim of the House, though now urged upon the right of publishing, is grounded upon the frightful position, that whatever it may choose to assert as a privilege becomes so of right, and without the possibility of any other authority disputing its decree; and though ranged among libellers to-day, it may to-morrow be found punishing with all the rigour of its power any one who shall utter an opinion at all distasteful to the majority of its members. Its power to commit for contempt at present extends to the whole session; and there is nothing to hinder it from arrogating the still more formidable right exercised by the Lords, of fining and of imprisoning at their pleasure. Let the friends of liberal principles further bear in mind, that the majority of the present Parliament being favourable to their opinions, affords no security whatever against the recurrence of times when the enemies of liberty shall bear sway; and let them be cautious how they arm with the perilous authority in question, a body which may hereafter use it to destroy the very name of freedom.

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