Sir E. Ryan interrupted the learned Counsel, by observing, that the cause did not appear to be entered on he board at all!

The Advocate-General.-Then, if it is not, my Lord, it ought to be.

Mr. Prinsep contended, that his examination did not Sir E. Ryan. That depends upon whether specific necessarily tend to anything more than a reduction of instructions were given to that effect, to the Officer of the debt and he apprehended that it was open to him the Court. But it seems to me that you have all you to reduce the verdict even to nominal damages, although want, by the very circumstance that the cause does not he might not be allowed to bar the claim altogether. happen to be entered upon the common law board, as His learned friends, however, had themselves gone into unnecessary matters, and they could not object to the your application is to put it off at all events; defendant following up the inquiry.

a

The Advocate-General said, that under the circum The Advocate-General said, he was quite at a loss to answered. The cause had been down on the board last stances of the case, his purpose was not thereby equally perceive how the plain it, by proving more than was teim; but had stood over to abide the result of a motion necessary, entitled his opponent to prove what was indd for an injunction; the defendants at law having filed misable! He would submit it to the Court, whether it bill to restrain the proceedings: the motion came on was competent for the defendant upon the sole plea of for hearing at the end of the term, but the defen lants no assets in hand, to impeach the doubt in the manner at law declined moving to make their order for an inattempted. junction absolute. The learned Counsel submittel, that, according to the prac ice in England, remanets ought to be set down without fresh instructions.

Sir Henry Seton was clearly of opinion, that u on these pleadings the defendant could not be let in to any such defence.

A question afterwards arose, whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest, there being a count for interest.

Sir Henry Seton said, that according to the general rule at home, the plaintiff would not be entitled to interest. There should, therefore, be a verdict for the principal sum; but he (the learned Judge) would communicate

with the learned Chief Justice and mention the point (Before Sir E. Ryan, Sir J. P. Grant, and Sir H. W, again to-morrow morning in Court,

Judgment of assets quando acciderint, for Rs. 36,406.
Hurk., March 23.

SATURDAY, MARCH 23.

Seton:)

WALSH AND OTHERS i SLATER AND OTHERS.

Mr. Johnson again mentioned this case, in which he had moved yesterday. The statute referred to in the or der of the M. R. was 2 and 3. Will. IV c. 33, enlarged

Sir H W. Seton sat alone this morning and took com- and extended by 3 and 4. Will IV c: 82.

mon motions.

Mr. Clarke, as amicus curiæ, mentioned a case which was somewhat similar, in which he had moved before Sir Henry Seton.

In Hurloll Tagore v. Seeboosoondery Dabee, widow, &c. heard yesterday, his Lordship this morning inti mated, that he had mentioned to the Chief Justice the to the Court was with respect to the apparent and ob Sir E Ryan said, that the difficulty which occurred point whether the plaintiff w was entitled to recover inter-vious anomaly of granting a commission to swear an est, and that the Chief Justice concurred in the opinion that the plantiff was not entitled.-Hurk., March 25.

MONDAY MARCH 25TH.

WALSH AND OTHERS U. SLATER AND OTHERS. Mr. Johnson moved in this cause, which is a cause, pending in the Rolls Court in Ireland, for a commission directed to Henry Studholme Brownrigg and others, officers of H. M. 9th Regiment of Infantry, to swear Major Lewis Saunders Bird, to the truth of his affidavit of the service on Ensign James Cumming, of the same Regiment, of an order to the Court of Chancery in Ireland, and also of a writ of subpœna to appear and answer in the said cause, and of a copy of the prayer of the bill of complaint.

Sir E. Ryan.—Under what authority do you move? I see that the order refers to a particular statue: so, perhaps, you had better mention it again, and look into the act referred to.

COCKERELL AND CO. v. SEAL AND ANOTHER.

The Advocate-General said, that he had to move in this cause, that the trial of the action (on the plea side) might be postponed on the ground of the absence of a material witness, and that, upon particular grounds this postponement might be without payment of costs.

affidavit in a matter not pending before the Court in any shape. How could they take judicial cognizance that the affidavit would not be a voluntary affidavit ? The matier, however, might be mentioned again, if necessary.

SREEMUTTY TARRAMOVEY DOSSEE, SREEMUTTY OŊŊNG
NOPOORNAH DOSSEE AND HURROCHUNDER HOLDER.
This was an action on the common law side, the
trial of which occupied the Court the whole day.

Mr. Morton opened the pleadings, the plaint was in trover, and he defendants had pleaded, first the general issue, and secondly that the property was not the property of the plaintiff.

Mr. Clarke, for the plaintiff, stated, that this action was brought to recover jewels and certain other proper. ty to a very large amount. The plaintiff was married several years ago, at a very early age to one Bharutchunder Dutt, and u on that occasion her father present. ed her with several valuable jewels and ornaments as a marriage portion, and her husband and father-in-law also made her presents. Upon the death of her has band, she continued to reside with her mother-in-law, one of the defendants, until a quarrel took place be tween them about these very jewels, and she returned to her father's house. An action of trover was brought some time since in the Supreme Court, to recover the property in question, but the plaintiff being then under age, the action was laid in the name of her next friend as guardian :- in this, however, the plaintiff was nonsuited

not because there was any defect in the proof of ownership, but merely because no other demand was proved than a demand made by the brother, (not the father, who was alone the real guardian) and the Court thought that such a demand and refusal were not sufficient to support trover. The defendants claimed here as executor and executrix of the plaintiff's father-in-law. .. The first witness, Kistnomohun Bysack, the plaintiff's father, was then called for the plaintiff and examined at great length by Mr. Morton, this lengthy examination being required in order to prove each of the numerous articles in the plaint described and their respective va lue. In cross-examination, Mr. Leith extracted the fact, that this witness paid the costs of the present suit, and, upon this ground he submitted that his evidence was inadmissible.

Sir E. Ryan. It is a thousand pities you did not take the objection before: -it would have saved us two hours of unnecessary labour.

Mr. Leith declared that he had not been before aware of the fact which had transpired, and that his question was quite a random shot.

Other witnesses were then called. It was proved that the plaintiff quarrelled with her mother-in-law (one of the defendants) about the jewels, and left the house because they were not delivered up, the defendant saying in excuse, that "she did not know where they had been placed" A notice (joint in its terms) to deliver them up was also proved to have been served upon the other defendant, Hurrochunder Holdar, and a the trial this was produced by the joint attorney for the two defendants. General evidence of their value was given (about Rs 8,000) and most of the ornaments were specifically enumerated from recollection, by one of the witnesses, but he did not know the value of each. It was proved too that Oonoopoornah had admitted them to belong to the plaintiff, her daughter-in-law. It was not shewn in any way that they had ever been in the possession of the other defendant Hurrochunder.

Mr. Leith, for the defence, submitted in the first With place, that the plaintiff must be nonsuited. respect to Oonoopoornah, there was no proof of conversion, and with respect to Hurrochunder, there were no proof of possession. Now both were necessary in an action of trover.

subject to the conditions before-mentioned. The only question in the meantime was the question of amount, and the Court would assess this generally at Co.s Re 8,000; for there could be no hardship in doing so, the usual option being given to restore the specific propertu, and so reduce the verdict to nominal damages. Verdict for the Plaintiff, Co.'s Rs.8,000, with liberty to move &c.

MUDDENMOHUN MULLICK AND ANOTHER, v.

AND OTHERS.

GUEST

This cause, standing on the common law board, was struck out by consent.

Struck out.

MANUE V. OWEN.

Mr. Clarke said, that he had just moved in this suit, to confirm the Master's Report, and he was now instrucHe only ted to move to take the money out of Court. mentioned it, because the parties were anxious; but it appeared to himself clearly irregular and premature, because the order confirming the Report must first be obtained and indeed served, and it would regularly form part of the grounds.

The Court acquiesced.
Took nothing.

DOE V. PALIOLOGUS.

Sir E. Ryan wished to know whether any gentleman at the bar had a copy of Dowling and Ryland's Nisi Prius Reports, because these reports appeared to contain a decision closely analogous to the point argued in the above special case, and the Court were unable to meet with the book.

His Lordship also inquired whether the Court could be furnished with notes of the grounds of the judgment in Gale v. Robert McClintock.-Hurkaru, March 27,

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27.

(Before Sir H. W. Seton.)

DOE ON THE DEMISE OF HURLOLI. MITTER V. HILDER.

Mr. Leith moved, under the 1st Ejectment Rule, to Mr. Clarke, contra, submitted, with respect to the enter an appearance for and confess the plaint in former defendant, that the quarrel concerning the property sufficiently proved the demand, and besides the name of the casual ejector. The rule requires that, she must be taken to be affected by the notice an affidavit of the due service of a copy of the plaint served upon her co-defendant, and now produced in the and notice, and that the lands lie in Calcutta, or in the witness box by the joint attorney for the defendants. actual occupation of one who is subject to the jurisdic. With respect to the other defendant, the possession of tion of the Court, setting forth the cause of jurisdiction. one executor was the possession of another, and Hurro-Now in the present case, part of the premises were not chunder must be presumed, therefore, to have had pos session of the property.

in Calcutta, and the actual occupant, who was a mere monthly tenant, was not personally subject to the jurisdiction, but the landlord, who was of course the Sir E. Ryan said, that the Court had doubts whether actual owner of the lands, was within the jurisdiction; the quarrel was not sufficient proof of demand and re- and as the ejectment was to try title, it was apprehendfusal, although his own opinion was that the plaintiff ed that an affidavit, that the landlord or tenant of the ought to be nonsuited. Upon the other points, they were una freehold (the real defendant) was subject to the juris nimous against the plaintiff. There would be no nonsuit, diction, sufficiently complied with the rule, and that the therefore, but the defendant Oonoopoornah would have Court might hold plea of the lands. There was also a liberty to move, and with respect to the defendaut Hurro-clause in the mortgage deed (which was the title of the lessor of the plaintiff) making the mortgagors spechunder Holdar, there must be a verdict for him, as this was an action of tort, and the act of one executor cially subject to the jurisdiction in respect of the prodid not bind the other. This party therefore might nowperty mortgaged, and there was a joint family dwellingbe made a witness for the defence. house belonging to the mortgagors, in Calcutta, in which one member of the joint family resided. It was Mr. Leith then commented upon the evidence, contending that there was no definite evidence of value submitted, that upon one or other of these grounds, the premises out of Calcutta were within the jurisdiction. but called no witnesses. Mr. Cochrane mentioned, that this was a case in which he had just moved to let in the tenant in possessiou to take defence for a two-anna share.

Sir E. Ryan said, that there must be a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant, Oonapoornah Dossee,

Mr. Leith said, that his present application only extended to the remaining fourteen-anna share.

Mr. Cochrane begged to apprise his learned friend, that he should have a motion ready for him in the matter

to-morrow.

Mr. Leith said that he should be only too happy, and he hoped his learned friend would send the fee!

Sir H. W. Seton intimated, that he wished to consider the matter, before he gave his opinion upon the point raised by the motion made by the learned Counsel,

Mr. Leith requested permission to wait upon his Lordship in Chambers, as this was the last day for setting down causes in the common law board for trial at the ensuing Sittings.

recover alone even upon a contract made during the exis tence of the partnership. This doctrine, therefore, would even authorize the recovery in the case before the Court, the retirement of Hogg from the firm. With respect to the for the (abandoned) items which accrued due previous to argument urged that the defendant may be thus precluded from availing himself of a debt due from the firm, as a set-off, it is observable, that Lord Tenterden laid down in the case just cited, that if such a set-off or counter-demand existed, it would have been necessary to include the other partner as a plaintiff in the action. Another argument urged here, was that the suppression of the fact that there had been an alteration in the firm, while the former name continued to be used, amounted to a breach of professional confidence, as between attorney and client; but the cases of Grojan v Wade, 2 Starkie, and Kell v. Nainby, 10 Barnewall and Cresswell, shew that there is no difference in this respect between the case of attorney and client, and the case of any other party, dealing with an ostensible partnership. The Court is of opinion, that the case is not affected by the question in whose name the warrants were given; because the real question is with whom was the contract made; and Arden v. Tucker, 4 B. and Adol, is strongly in point. It is only necessary to observe upon the case of Guidon v. Robson, 2 CampNote. It seems from this, that an express clause of bell's Reports 302,which was strongly relied upon for subjection to the jurisdiction of the Court, cannot, under the defendant as an authority for the position that any circumstances, make lands, (not otherwise within an ostensible partner must be joined, that the action it) subject to the jurisdiction. It seems too, that the upon a bill of exchange, and the name of the ostensible holder of lands out of Calcutta, although personally firm appearing on the face of the bill, there was a subject to the jurisdiction, may always defeat an action variance between the instrument declared upon and to try the title, by simply letting them to a monthly the instrument proved at the trial. tenant or perhaps a tenant at will.-Qu?-Hurkaru, March 28.

[Mr. Leith afterwards attended at the Chambers of the learned Judge, when his Lordship pronounced his opinion, that with respect to the land out of Calcutta, the jurisdiction was not sufficiently shewn. The cause was therefore set down for trial only with respect to the premises in Calcutta, the rest being struck out of the ejectment plaint.] Refused.

THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1839.

(Before Sir E. Ryan, Sir J. P. Grant and Sir H. W. Seton.)

THOMAS SANDES V. AGA KURBOLIE MAHOMMED.

In conclusion, we are happy that the strict law fully corresponds with the justice of the case; for nothing has transpired and we have heard nothing urged, which could afford a justification for the ground of defence attempted to be established,

Rule for a nonsuit discharged.

SREEMUTTY COMULMONEY DOSSER V. SREEMUTTY SEE BOO-
SOONDERY DOSSEE-

Sir E. Ryan pronounced judgment in this case. This Sir E. Ryan. This was an application to make abwas an action brought to recover the amount due for certain bills of costs; the warrants of Attorney were, solute an order nisi that the petition of appeal be alsome in the name of Sandes alone, others in the name of lowed, and the appeal was against an order on the Hogg and Sandes, and others in the name of Hogg. Equity side of the Court, refusing a motion for a new alone. A verdict was found for the plaintiff, with liberty trial of an issue at law in which a verdict was found This Court have decided and to move to enter a nonsuit; and a rule nisi was granted. for the defendant. There was no plea except the general issue; but there recorded a minute to the same effect, (see a late numis no doubt that nonjoinder may be taken advantage of ber of the Hurkaru containing it) that no appeal against under the general issue, upon the plain principle that a a verdict shall be allowed; and we still adhere to contract with A., is not a contract with A. and B. that determination, but we are not disposed to extend jointly, and the evidence, therefore, is obviously admis. the decision to the present case, nor are we inclined sible under non assumpsit or the simple denial of the to acquiesce fully in all the reasons which the Court the grounds of their opinion; for contract in fact. Now the general rule no doubt is, that there assigned as all the members of a firm must be joined as co-plaintiffs; some of those reasons, if recognized, would govern the That decision itself, however, but the plaintiff here only sought to recover items which case now before us, had accrued due after the dissolution in fact of the part- we still uphold; and it is observable, that it does not nership, and the question is whether a mere ostensible overrule any express decision of the Court for the partner must be joined in the action. We are of opinion opinion expressed in Woomeschunder Paul Chowdry v. that he need not be joined, and that evidence is admis- Sreemutty Woojulmoney Dossee, was merely an obiter sible, that, although a party is nominally a partner, he dictum, the order being, in fact, upon other grounds, is not in fact actually interested. This rule is established discharged. The power of appeal, is given as a priby Teed v. Elworthy, 14 East, 210, and Parsons v., vilege, and is to be construed liberally. It is curithe statutes to trace the right of appeal, from Crosley, 5 Espinasse. There is also a case in 1 Carring-ous ton and Payne's Reports, Davenport v. Rackstrow, which to the Charter of Justice. I has sometimes been was not cited at the bar and also Evans v. Silverlock, thought that it is to the former, that we are rather to Peake's N. P. C. 31. A case cited in Collyer on Part- look, in determining the powers and jurisdiction of nership, p. 393, goes even further, and it is not neces- this Court; but my own opinion has always been, that sary to go this length in upholding the verdict for the the Charter more properly affords the criterion. Now plaintiff. This is the case of Atkinson v. Laing (1 D. and the 18th section of the statute contains words ("judgR, Nisi Prius Rep. 16) where Lord Tenterden decided, ment or determination of the said Court") of a much that a partner carrying on business on his own account, more exclusive and limited character than the expresbut in the names of himself and his former partner, might sions in clause XXXII, of the Charter (“judgment

or decree, or decretal or other order or rule of the Court"); and the words used in our Charter, are similar to those used in the Charters of Madras and Bombay. In the case of Santacana versus Ardevol, 1 Knapp 262, the appeal (from Gibraltar) was against a verdict, and although the Court disallowed it upon general principles, no objection was taken to the right to appeal, though the Reporter suggests, in a note, that an application ought to have been made for a new trial; and that the appeal ought to have been from the order of refusal (which is precisely the contrivance resorted to in the present case!) The words of the Gibraltar Charter (See 2 Knapp 67) are much more limited than in our's; and this is a strong illustration, therefore, of the liberality with which the Courts construe the right of appeal. This Court has actually allowed the appeal in cages very similar to the present. In Rajah Ranlochun v. Bulram Ghose, Notes MSS. of Hyde J., and Smoult's Rules p. 63, a petition of appeal was allowed against an order discharging a rule nisi for confirming an award; and the case of Surroopchunder Ady v. Rogonauth, also in Smoult's Rules, is precisely in point, being an appeal granted from an order refusing to set asidea nonsuit in issue at law directed from the Equity side of the Court. We are of opinion, therefore, that this petition of appeal must be allowed.

But a question arises of some importance, for the diseretion of the Counsel for the appellant, upon which I shall offer a few suggestions, and it may be advisable to consider whether the appeal, although the right is admitted, is likely to be practically beneficial. In the case of Santacana v. Ardevol, 1 Knapp 269, it was held generally that no appeal will lie from the judg. ment of the Court below on the sole ground that the testimony of witnesses had been improperly discredited; and although this decision has since been qualified, the same principle is favoured. The cases of Canepa

v. Larios, 2 Knapp, 276, and Ulruck Sing v. Beny Persaud, hold that there must be some clear and dis. tinct point upon the merits, that the case must be so unsatisfactory as to require further explanation, or so improbable as to be palpably and manifestly unworthy of credit, before the Court will, upon a question of evidence, recommend a reversal of the decision, and that in all other cases, the Court will adopt the far safer course of adhering to the determination of the Court below. These suggestions are now thrown out merely upon the question of the expediency of the appellant availing herself in this stage, and under such circumstances, of her admitted right, and this is of course solely for the consideration of Counsel.

The Advocate-General said, that he had been brought in to oppose the application in the first instance irregu larly upon notice. He hoped the Court would give the

costs of this.

Mr. Clarke begged to mention, that the practice had always been to move upon notice, and not to move for an order nisi in the first instance. He did not mean to say that this was not wrong, but he had certainly acted according to precedent and had been misled.

Sir E. Ryan said, that under the circumstances, each party should pay their own costs of that applica

tion.

Order absolute that the petition of appeal be allowed.

WALSH AND OTHERS. V. SLATER AND OTHERS. Sir E. Ryan said, that the Court remained of opinion, that they could not grant the commission applied for in this case. They would be very happy to aid, if possible, in carrying into effect the Order of the Master of the Rolls but they would not do what they had no power and authority to do.

Motion for a commission refused.-Hurk., March 29.

INSOLVENT COURT.

MARCH 16, 1839.

(Before Sir H. W. Selon.)

IN THE MATTER OF SARGEANT J. THOMPSON.

The applicant having sworn to the correctness of his schedule, and there being no opposition, he was discharged.

IN THE MATTER OP GEORGE DAVID BROWN,

This applicant having failed to serve notices on 18 of his creditors, put in an affidavit, setting forth, that he and Mr. Perry, the messenger of the Court, had for two days exerted themselves to find out the abode of these creditors, but failing in their efforts, the notices could not be served. The applicant was further op posed by Mr. R. F. Smith, one of his creditors. The Judge informed Mr. Strettell, the applicant's Attorney, that the affidavit's sworn to by Mr. Brown and Mr. Perry, were too general, and he required the applicant to state specially why so many notices were not served. The further hearing of this case was postponed until the 20th April next.

IN THE MATTER OF JAMES JACOBS.

IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD PARMER.

Mr. Strettell, the Insolvent's Attorney, applied to postpone the case until the next Court day, as the adver tisements directed by the Court on the former settings of the Court, had not yet been inserted. Application granted.

IN THE MATTER OF M. SCHLATTER.

Mr. Sandes applied to postpone this case, to enable his client to file a supplimentary schedule, in conse quence of his having received account sales from Europe by the last Overland Mail. Application granted.

IN THE MATTER OF SHAIKH ABDULLAH,

In this case, an application for an attachment was made by Mr. Sandes, and granted.

IN THE MATTER OF JAS. CULLEN.

Holroyd, Esq., to be discharged from the Assigneeship Mr. Boyle made an application on behalf of Thomas to the estate of James Cullen, Esq. The application, owing to some irregularity, was refused, and the Judge informed Mr. Boyle, that if he were to renew the

This case was postponed for a fortnight, to enable the application in an amended form during the next Court Examiner to file his report.

day, the application would be granted.”

IN THE MATTER OF JAS. MACLEAN.

their releasing Mr. Trower from custody, and he, Mr. An application was made on behalf of the Estate Pearson, with the consent of Mr. Longueville Clarke, of the late Lieutenant J. Maclean, to have the deceased's the Counsel for the creditors, moved the Court to portion of the dividend, accruing to the estate from the order the release of Mr. Trower, pending his adjudica. estate of J. Palmer, paid over to the deceased's Execution, and previous to the declaration of his insolvency. tor, Mr. D. Maclean. Application granted.

DIVIDENDS:

Mr. Pearson admitted that this application was unprece. dented, and he could not adduce any analogous cases, but this case was in some measure based on the prin

A dividend of Co.'s Rs 4 per 100 sicca rupees,ciples of the 6th and the 23d Sections of the Act of was declared by the Assignee of the Court to be pay. able in the estate of John Palmer, deceased. This being the sixth dividend declared n this estate.

A first and final dividend was declared of Co.'s Rs 2 per 100 Sa. Re, in the estate of Shaick Jurroop.

IN THE MATTER OF C. A. CAVOREE.

Mr. Strettell, the insolvent's Attorney, informed the Court, that in this case the Insolvent had paid the sum of Co.'s Rs 5,000 into the hands of his Assignee, and bad requested him to pay his Attorney the expenses of a suit which the Insolvent had maintained in the Supreme Court. This request Mr. Alexander, the Assignee, it appears, had refused, and demurred paying without an order of the Court. On the last Court day, an application had been made by Mr. Strettel for such an order, but the Court had declined to interfere in the matter. Subsequently, however, the Assignee had consented to pay the costs of this suit, with the exception of certain charges amounting to 200 rupees, which he objected to pay without a further explanation regarding them, which Mr. Strettell could not afford without referring to certain papers, and consequently required time. Application granted.

IN THE MATTER OF C. TROWER,

A motion was made by the Advocate-General, on behalf of Charles Trower, Esq., now a prisoner in the Jail of Calcutta, applying for the benefit of the Insolvent Act. Mr. Pearson stated, that Mr. Trower had been arrested on the 15th of February, at the suit of Choonee Laul Jahoree, and after he had been 15 days in Jail, he applied for the benefit of the Act. An adjudication was granted, but in the interim, detainers had been lodged against the applicant, by Govind Banoorjee, Raja Buddenanth Roy, and Fyzoo Khansamah, and the hearing of the applicant's case has been fixed for the 20th April next.

Mr. Pearson here informed the Court, that Mr. Trower, after his arrest, with much difficulty obtained leave for two months from the 18th February, and a probability is, that if Mr. Trower, at the expiration of his leave, does not resume his official duties, be will eventually loose his appointment of Civil Auditor, and as the hearing of his case does not come on unti! after the expiration of his leave, should he not be able to resume his duties, and thus lose his appointment, the salary of which is 3,380 rupees a month, his creditors would thereby suffer the loss of the deductions which the Court would, on the declaration of his insolvency, order from his salary. Mr. Pearson, in addition to the above facts, stated, that Mr. Trower, during the period of his incarceration, is subject to a reduction of 1,300 Rs. per month from his pay. This likewise is a heavy drawback on the credit side of his estate, which, if he were enabled, by a discharge from custody through an order of this Court, to assume his duties, would cease and the estate be benefitted thereby. This discharge Mr. Pearson was perfectly aware his creditors would instantly grant; but in so doing they would legally be debarred from any dividend made by the insolvent's estate, as the discharge would be a virtual absolvement of his debt to them. This consideration alone had prevented

Parliament, thus assimilating to cases wherein insolvents, on delivering assets to the amount of half of their debts, were entitled to their discharge from custody and pend. ing their adjudication and eventual discharge. Mr. Pearson admitted, that in this case Mr. Trower could not put his assignee in possession of effects to the amount of half his debts, but as the case was granted on principles of equity and for the benefit of the estate, and with the consent of the creditors, he prayed the Court to grant the application.

Mr. Longueville Clarke, on the part of the detaining creditors, supported this application, and quoted the cases of Shaik Mohebullah and W. F. Hair, but the Court did not consider them to be analogous to this; nor did it consider the case of Jones, quoted by Mr. Leith, to assimilate to the present case.

The Judge, in passing his order on the application, admitted it to have been based on principles of equity and beneficial to the estate; but he regretted, that under the existing regulations, he could not comply with the prayer of this application. In ordering its refusal, he added, that as the case was one of such importance, he would consult the Chief Justice on it, and should his opinion differ from his (Sir W. H. Seton's) he would inform Mr. Pearson of it, and grant the application.— Hurkaru March 18.