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the purpose of showing the true character of that vessel. Those affidavits were referred to the honorable and learned member for Richmond, the then solicitor general, (Sir R. Palmer,) on the 28th, the six days' delay in dealing with the case having been occasioned by the unfortunate illness of the Queen's advocate, from which he never recovered. On the 29th the honorable and learned member for Richmond gave an opinion to the effect that the vessel in question, which was afterwards known as the Alabama, ought to be detained. A telegram was then sent to Liverpool for the purpose of giving effect to that opinion, but before the order could be obeyed the vessel escaped, under the pretense of taking a trial trip. She then sailed toward the Azores, where she was met by two other ships, from which she received her crew and armaments. She afterwards put into Jamaica, where she was recognized as a regular southern cruiser, and where she was hospitably received. Then began her devastations. She was intended for purposes of mere destruction, and she well performed her task. The seas were lighted up with her fires. She made no prizes, but burnt all the vessels she captured. In the course of one of the discussions which took place upon that subject in the house, an honorable member stated that he would rather have built that vessel than have made the speeches they had heard from the honorable member for Birmingham. [Hear, hear.] Now, observations of that kind had sunk deep into the hearts of the people of America, and had greatly complicated our relations with that country. He believed there were but few persons at present who would not say that those who had been connected with that vessel were among the greatest malefactors of the day. [Hear, hear.] He need hardly remind the house of the case of the two iron-clad rams which were subsequently being built in the yard of the Messrs. Laird. The government, going somewhat, perhaps, beyond their authority, had stopped the construction of these rams, and had afterwards purchased them on their own account. An attack was made upon the government by the present Lord Cairns for the course they had thus taken, but his motion was defeated by the narrow majority of five. There was also another vessel which was being built for the Confederate States at Glasgow, which the government detained until the close of the war. She was then returned to the owners, who sold her to the Chilian government, and in their service she became known as the Tornado, and was the cause of considerable difficulty between that country and Spain. There was also a vessel called the Alexandra, which were detained at Nassau, and there were two others, called the Georgia and Shenandoah. The two latter ships, one of which was fitted out in London and the other in Liverpool, pursued exactly the same course as the Alabama. These three cruisers, without having ever entered a southern port, had captured about 200 vessels. The loss they had caused to the United States was not, however, to be measured by the mere destruction of so many ships. The commerce carried on under the American flag had greatly declined in consequence of the increased rate of insurance which American ship-owners had to incur, and it appeared that while this carrying trade had fallen to one-third of what it had been before the war, the trade carried on under the English flag had more than doubled in amount. That was a reason why this country should deal generously with that question. It was right to mention that both the Georgia and Shenandoah had escaped from our shores without any information with respect to their destination having been communicated to her Majesty's government; and it also appeared that the American minister at Lisbon complained to his own government that if he had received earlier intelligence as to the true character of the Shenandoah he might have been able to arrest her progress. Those facts seemed to show that the American authorities had been somewhat negligent in the matter, and it was very possible that if they had made better use of their own cruisers they might have prevented some of the destruction which had taken place. But the whole of those transactions had produced the strongest irritation in America, and no one who had not traveled in that country could be aware of the extent of that feeling. The depredations committed by these vessels had caused constant irritation and aggravation, and had been used detrimentally by the Fenians and others who were anxious to create a feeling against this country and United States. Every right thinking person was therefore anxious, in the interest of peace, to bring, if possible, this unfortunate dispute to a conclusion. [Cheers.] He believed that the large preponderance of the higher opinion of America was favorably disposed toward this country; but, notwithstanding this, it would be well for both parties to have all sources of contention swept away. [Hear, hear.] On both sides there was but one desire, viz, to have the difficulty brought to a satisfactory solution. Having said so much upon one branch of this subject, he wished how to point out how diplomacy had dealt with the question. And, first of all, he would advert to the matter of the recognition of the belligerency. Mr. Adams arrived in this country on the very day the proclamation of neutrality was issued. His first task was to communicate with Earl Russell, and protest against the course adopted by the British government. He expressed great regret at the decision of her Majesty's ministry, and said that there could be no doubt that the effect of the proclamation would be disastrous. Earl Russell replied to this that in recognizing the south as belligerents no opinion whatever was expressed upon the merits of the American war. Mr. Adams answered that the proclamation of neutrality was a little more rapid than

was actually called for by the occasion. With the exception of these two conversations which passed between Earl Russell and Mr. Adams, no protest or claim was made on behalf of the American government till within a very recent period. Such, however, had not been the case with respect to the confederate cruisers. No sooner was it ascertained that the Alabama was burning ships upon the ocean than Mr. Adams made a claim on our government for loss and damage done to the property of American citizens by vessels which had been allowed to escape from English ports. That was in November, 1862. In October, 1863, Mr. Adams received further information respecting other ships which had been burned by the Alabama; and in the course of the correspondence which followed he spoke for the first time of arbitration. On that subject he said the United States government were sincerely desirous of perserving peace and amity between the two nations, and that in case it was found impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion they would be perfectly willing to submit to any fair or convenient arbitration. Now, so far as he had been able to discover, Earl Russell upon that occasion took no notice of the question of arbitration. He simply denied the justness of the claims made by Mr. Adams. From that time the matter lay dormant for about two years, and in the mean time the other vessels to which he had alluded were burning and destroying. The complaints were, however, again renewed in the case of the Shenandoah, and then, for the first time, the question of the recognition of the belligerents of the south was brought forward, and we were charged with a breach of neutrality in permitting the cruisers to escape from our ports. On that occasion Mr. Adams said that the whole evil had practically its origin in this country recognizing the south as a belligerent power before they had a single vessel floating upon the ocean. In the course of the correspondence that followed, Earl Russell adverted to the claims between the Portuguese and the United States in 1824, which were similar to those between England and America, and pointed out that the American government had adopted the same line of defense upon that occasion as the English government adopted now. Alluding to the matter of arbitration, his lordship detailed his reasons for declining it, and said there should only be two questions for arbitration: first, whether the British government acted with good faith and honesty in the maintenance of neutrality; and secondly, whether the law officers of the Crown properly understood the foreign enlistment act when they declined to counsel the English government to detain the Alabama. Neither of these questions, his lordship held, could be referred to the arbitration of a foreign power, with due regard to the honor and character of the British nation, and he therefore declined to refer them. With this dispatch the correspondence closed for some time, although the refusal to submit to arbitration was commented upon in a dignified and prudent manner in the message of President Johnson in 1865. Papers relative to the dispute were laid before the country in the autumn of 1865. When Parliament met in 1866, Lord Derby stated that he fully approved of Earl Russell's correspondence and the arguments with which he had supported the cause of England, and in the lower house no objection was urged to the course adopted by the late government, except by one or two members, who expressed regret that the offer for arbitration had not been acceded to. He was one who had been in favor of that policy being pursued, and he framed a motion with the view of bringing it before the house, but upon consulting with other members, and finding that the resolution would not meet with general support, he abandoned his intention. The change of government which took place brought with it a sense of responsibility which was not previously apparent. The first symptom of the change was to be found in the correspendence between Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams, in which the latter gave an account of an interview which he had with the noble lord the head of the foreign office. Mr. Adams's account of what Lord Stanley said was, "His lordship, in welcoming me, remarked that he presumed his sentiments towards the United States were well known to me. He had always favored the cultivation of friendly relations with us, and regretted that these should have been at all endangered during the late struggle by inconsiderate speeches in Parliament." [Hear, hear.] He (Mr. Lefevre) could only regret that the noble lord had not used his great influence for the purpose of preventing some of these ill-considered speeches, or, at all events, in mitigating their effect. Some time after the noble lord came into office the negotiations respecting the Alabama and her sister vessels were again renewed, and upon this occasion, for the first time, the question of the recognition of the belligerency, which had formerly been treated as a subordinate matter or not mentioned at all, became the principal cause of complaint. The claim was put forward in this manner: "While yet the civil war was undeveloped, and the insurgents were without any organized military force or a treasury, and long before they pretended to have a flag, or to put either an armed ship or a merchant vessel upon the sea, her Majesty's government, acting precipitately, proclaimed the insurgents a belligerent power, and conceded to them the advantages and privileges of that character, and thus raised them, in regard to the prosecution of an unlawful armed insurrection, to an equality with the United States. This government has not denied that it was within the sovereign authority of Great Britain to assume this attitude, but on the other hand it insisted in the beginning, and has continually insisted, that the assumption of that attitude would be an injurious proceeding, for which Great Britain

would immediately come under a full responsibility to justify it, or to render redress and indemnity." The noble lord, the foreign secretary, in writing to Sir F. Bruce on the 30th of November, 1866, said, "On the other hand, they are fully alive to the inconvenience which arises from the existence of unsettled claims of this character between' two powerful and friendly governments. They would be glad to settle this question if they could do so consistently with justice and national self-respect; and with this view they will not be disinclined to adopt the principle of arbitration, provided that a fitting arbitrator can be found, and if an agreement can be come to as to the points to which an arbitration shall apply." The United States government, however, wished to refer the whole controversy as it stood in the correspondence which had taken place between the two countries, with such further evidence as could be procured, without imposing restrictions on the umpire. The noble lord, in reply, said, With regard to to the ground of complaint, on which most stress is laid in Mr. Seward's dispatch, viz., the alleged premature recognition of the Confederate States as a belligerent power, it is clear that no reference to arbitration is possible. The act complained of, while it bears very remotely on the claims in question, is one of which every state must be held to be the sole judge of its duty. There is, so far as I am aware, no precedent for any government consenting to submit to the judgment of a foreign power or to an international commission the question whether its policy has or has not been suitable to the circumstances in which it was placed." The answer which Mr. Seward made to this dispatch appeared to have been a letter written by him to Mr. Adams, which letter was read by the latter to Lord Stanley, but was not left with his lordship. That letter was consequently not included in the published correspondence. It had, however, been given at length in the American papers, the substance of it being that the President hoped the explanations which had been given would remove all difficulties, and allow both parties to bring the dispute to a satisfactory conclusion. Lord Stanley, on the 16th December, replied that her Majesty's government could not depart from their decision of refusing to refer the question of the recognition of the belligerency to arbitration, and Mr. Seward declined to accept arbitration upon such terms. Any one would admit from the last of these letters that a very considerable change was observable in the course of this correspondence in the position of Mr. Seward. At the commencement of this correspondence he put the whole claim on the recognition of belligerency, aud at the close he, in fact, assented to the terms proposed by the noble lord. There were three stages in the correspondence-the first in which the whole question was put on recognition of belligerency, all other questions being considered as incidental and unimportant; the second, in which Mr. Seward offered to refer the whole correspondence as it then stood to an arbitrator; and the third, that in which he accepted the proposition put by the noble lord-namely, whether we were morally responsible for the damages occasioned by the Alabama, and stated that that was sufficiently comprehensive for his purpose. The difference in these last stages was very great; and he (Mr. Lefevre) could not but regret that the noble lord had not left the matter there, but had thought it his duty to make special exception of the question of the recognition which induced Mr. Seward to withdraw from further negotiation in the matter. It was one thing to refer the question itself to an arbitrator, and another to make a special exception from the arbitration of another subject, and which might be introduced as an incidental topic bearing upon the question at issue. If the special exception were not made it would be open to the other side to introduce the subject as an argument, but it would be equally open to us to object to its introduction as irrelevant. In view of the nature of the whole question between the two countries he could not but regard it as a mistake on the part of the noble lord to expect a total withdrawal by Mr. Seward and the American people from what he (Mr. Lefevre) considered a bad and a false position. The noble lord might have been satisfied by the concession already made in the course of the correspondence, and it was a mistake to break in upon Mr. Seward with a special exception, which he must have known would lead to the failure of the whole negotiation. Looking at the whole tone of the correspondence, he could not but think that it was the intention of the noble lord to bring the question to a common ground, in which it was possible that arbitration might be admitted on both sides, and at the last moment he was frightened at the position at which he had arrived, and then made the special exception. The noble lord had put the question for arbitration-whether we were morally responsible for the damages caused by the Alabama. What was the meaning of the word morally? It needed some explanation. Was the arbitrator to go beyond the ordinary strict rules and usages of international law, and into the more vague regions of morality? If so, on what ground were we specially to except a branch of the subject which the Americans thought bore upon the morality of the question? If the morality of the whole question was to come under consideration, he was not sure that it might not be for our advantage that the inquiry should be extended. But he did not wish to express any opinion on the main question. He had ventured, within the last two or three years, to differ from the opinion of some learned authorities as to what our international obligations were, and he should be silent on that occasion. He should not enter upon that ques

tion. There were two classes of objection raised, but he should confine himself to the point he advocated-first, that the question of the recognition of belligerency was so certain that it was not only not right to allow it to form the subject of arbitration, but that it ought to be specially excepted from arbitration; and, secondly, that the dignity of this country would not permit that question to be raised. No one could be more certain than he was as to the strength of our position with regard to the question of belligerency. He believed that war actually did exist at the time of our proclamation of neutrality, and if we wanted proof of the soundness of our position we might refer to Mr. Seward's dispatches, and to decisions of American law courts upon numerous cases of vessels captured on the seas or breaking the blockade as property of the citizens of the Confederate States, in which cases the Supreme Court held that the procla mation of blockade was in the nature of a proclamation of war, and that, in fact, the northern States were exercising belligerent rights. But, however certain we might be upon the point, there were people on the other side of the Atlantic who were equally certain that we were wrong in issuing the proclamation, and that that error had a bearing in some way or other upon the more important question at issue. After all, the main object of the arbitration was to remove serious grounds of dispute which had existed between the two countries, and it would be unfortunate if, by the special exception of this one branch of the subject, there should remain any cause of irritation after the main question had been decided. Then as to the question of dignity. The American government did not desire that the proclamation of neutrality should be actually a question of arbitration, but only that it should be a topic for discussion, and he could not understand how the dignity of this country could be compromised more by this question than by the more important question being brought before the arbitrator. He did not advance these views with any exaggerated feeling of alarm, either for the present or the future. He did not believe that war would result from these claims, though no doubt they might remain a source of irritation which might render it difficult to settle other matters of difference which might arise between the two countries. There were persons who said that Mr. Seward had raised this difficulty merely for the purpose of deferring the settlement, and that the Americans would be only too glad to find us at war, in order that they might seize our vessels. He did not altogether share in that opinion. It was quite true that in a moment of irritation the lower house of Congress had passed a bill to bring their foreign enlistment act into accord with the legal interpretation which our lawyers had put upon ours; but the better sense of the country came to the rescue, and pointed out that in many respects our foreign enlistment act was better than theirs, and altogether more strict and more adverse to such enterprises. He had no doubt that in the event of our finding ourselves at war the American government would do their best to preserve their neutrality; but, at the same time, a government could do nothing except supported by public opinion, and so long as these claims were left in an unsettled state there would, if this country were engaged in war, be many persons in America who would be ready to enter upon enterprises which they now professed to condemn. It was the duty of this country to remove all causes of irritation, to take one great step in advance towards carrying out the policy of arbitration recommended at Paris; and, above all, it was our duty to act in a spirit of friendliness and conciliation towards a country like America, with the people of which we had so many ties of religion, of blood, and of history. He concluded by submitting the motion of which he had given notice.

Lord STANLEY. It is only bare justice to the honorable member who has brought this whole subject before us in so clear and comprehensive a manner to say that he has stated nothing which is calculated to increase any feeling of international irritation that may still remain, or to aggravate those diplomatic complications which have arisen. [Hear, hear.] I cordially agree in one expression used by the honorable gentleman-I mean in the tribute which he has paid to the high character and accomplishments of the existing United States minister in this country, whose services, unfortunately, we are so soon to lose. [Cheers.] No man has ever had a more difficult part to play than Mr. Adams, and no man, as far as I am enabled to judge, could have played it with greater judgment, temper, and discretion. [Cheers.] It is not my duty or my wish to' follow the honorable gentleman into his criticism upon the policy of Lord Russell and his colleagues. Lord Russell had great difficulties to deal with, and he has many friends and representatives in this house who will be prepared to vindicate any steps taken by him. My business is with the present aspect of the controversy, rather than with past policy. There was only one remark in the speech of the honorable member which I regret, and that is where for a moment he introduced the character of partisanship into his speech. He spoke of it as an extraordinary thing that a conservative government should have consented to refer this question to arbitration, and seemed to think that on our part change of opinion had followed change of position. Upon that point I must say, though I do not want to revive personal controversy, that I think it would be difficult to point out in the speeches of either my right honorable friend, the first lord of the treasury, or of myself, one word which could prejudge the issue to be raised before the arbitrator. I do not put myself forward as having been in this contest a partisan

of the northern cause. I have always thought that it was not our duty to throw ourselves in a partisan spirit into the internal disputes of foreign countries. I hold that we are bound to give both sides fair play-to apply, as far as possible, the same rule of international law to both; that we are bound to do that, and, having done that, we are bound to do nothing more. I suppose it is unnecessary for any person occupying the position I hold to make professions of his desire to settle the controversy if possible. England can have nothing to gain by keeping it open, and has a great deal to gain by closing it. [Hear, hear.] We have vast commercial relations with the United States; we have a long line of conterminous frontier; we come across one another, so to speak, in every quarter of the globe; we have on both sides an enormous load of debt, which probably neither desires to see increased; [hear, hear, and a laugh;] and it is equally the interest of both sides that we should remain on good terms. I need not say, therefore, that we wish to arrange the matter if we can, and I do not think that in the present state of the case any difficulty arises from the popular feeling in this country. So far from that, undoubtedly the change from the predominant sentiment in the years between 1860 and 1864 was so strong that, if I might venture to say so, I think I have detected a tendency on our part to be almost too ready to accuse ourselves of faults which we have not committed, and take for granted that every point which is doubtful ought to be decided against us. [Hear, hear.] I do not deny that as the world goes, that is an error on the right side. Indiscriminate resistance to unreasonable demands is mere folly and mischief, but indiscriminate concession to all demands, merely because they are strongly urged, whether they will bear the test of argument or not, is a course equally likely to lead to mischief. What we have to do is to try to find out what are the strict rights of the case, to state the case temperately and fairly, endeavor to do justice as far as we are concerned, and, having done that, to appeal frankly and confidently to the existence of a corresponding spirit in those with whom we have to deal. I think there never was a case in which it was more desirable to define accurately what are the points to be settled than that with which we are now dealing; because upon the other side of the water, and perhaps upon this also, the question has been complicated by all sorts of grievances, to the nature of which the honorable gentleman slightly referred-grievances which I will not call unreal, which I do not say are unfounded, but which still are grievances of so vague and general a character that we shall find it very difficult to define them. I do not complain of that; it is most natural; and I do not doubt that if we were in the position of the North Americans we should feel very much as they do. Men who have emerged from a civil war in which they have incurred £500,000,000 and sacrificed 1,000,000 of lives will not be for some time to come in a position to appreciate with perfect coolness the conduct of those who were in the position of critics and lookers-on in the quarrel. [Hear, hear.] I am not now saying whether in my judgment our course was one in every respect of strict neutrality. That is the very question which we are endeavoring to ascertain by arbitration. [Hear, hear.] But if our neutrality had been the most rigid and absolute, it is possible to conceive that it would have fallen short of the expectations that existed among a large portion of the people of the north. [Hear, hear.] What they expected from us at the beginning of the contest was not neutrality, pure and simple, but neutrality so far as all material assistance was concerned, coupled, however, with a strong moral sympathy and support. [Hear, hear.] And when such a feeling exists and is disappointed, as it certainly was in this case, we cannot expect that the disappointment so produced should not find a vent in some quarter or other. I mention this because it is the key to a good deal of the exaggerated tone of writing and speaking which was observable on the other side in the earlier stages of the controversy; and from that point of view I do not at all regret the time that has passed. On both sides we can discuss the matter much more calmly in 1868 than we could in 1864. The passion of the moment has passed away, and only the facts and the arguments remain; and happily, as the case now stands, the controversy, though still pending, is reduced comparatively within the narrowest possible limits. Upon those doubtful questions of fact and law-questions upon which it was not likely, if possible, that the two governments could come to an agreement-we are of one mind so far as this, that we know we cannot agree, and therefore we are prepared to abide by the decision of a third and presumably impartial power. The principle of arbitration, so far as we are concerned, is accepted. They say that it is accepted on both sides, except upon a point of detail. That is a very important step gained. [Hear, hear.] I am not finding fault that this step was not gained before, because I recognize most fully that in a case of this kind time makes many things easy which were not so at first. [Hear.] We have conceded almost everything that was asked for when this dispute began. I think I am right in saying that if it had been possible to grant a hmited arbitration, such as is now proposed, when it was first asked for, the question of the alleged premature recognition would never have made its appearance. It was incidentally mentioned, but that was all; but by a peculiar process, which I do not propose altogether to explain, that grievance, whatever its value may be, seems to be gaining importance in the minds of American statesmen and of the American people just in proportion as onthisside of the water has grown up a feeling to remove all causes

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