of dispute. The whole point unsettled between us is this: you agree to refer to arbitration the question of the Alabama and other kindred vessels, but are you willing to include, as a point of reference, whether you were right or wrong in recognizing the Confederate States when you did? That is the whole matter in dispute between us. After all the consideration I can give to the question, as at present advised, I cannot see what bearing the two things have the one upon the other. The practical bearing of the point is whether with respect to the events of 1862 we were right or wrong. I dare say some persons do not accede to that view of the case, and therefore I will endeavor to explain what is my view of the question. I suppose no human being would pretend that at no time during that prolonged struggle of four years had the confederates become entitled to the position of belligerents. Well, but if they were belligerents at some period and were not belligerents at the time we recognized them as such, what was the time when they became properly invested with that character? I will take a date that will bring the matter to issue. If ever they were belligerents I suppose it was after the military events of July, 1861. At that time they had an immense force, they had gained a temporary but an important numerical superiority, and their army was actually threatening Washington. Suppose we had recognized the confederates after the battle of Bull Run; could any human being have found fault with us? If so, how would this have affected the Alabama question? The Alabama escaped in April, 1862, and the battle of Bull Run was fought in July, 1861.

If I had chosen to adopt that line of argument I might have grounded it upon these facts. I grant, for argument's sake, that we were wrong in recognizing the confederates when we did so. I grant, for the sake of argument, that we were in a hurry; that we did it six months too soon. I grant that we ought to have recognized them in August; but, admitting this, how would the case respecting the Alabama have been affected if we had made that recognition six months instead of eleven months before the Alabama sailed? [Hear, hear.] It is upon that ground of irrelevancy that I rest the argument. But there is another objection to compliance with the demands of Mr. Seward as made in his dispatch, that this question of recognition should be referred to arbitration. The arbitration we proposed was perfectly simple in its character and not difficult to deal with. Given two belligerents, given a neutral power, the problem to solve is, "has that neutral power fulfilled effectually and faithfully the obligations imposed by international law?" Granting that international law is sometimes vague and uncertain; granting that new circumstances occur not met by precedents; still the question, as I have stated it, is one in the main governed by recognized international principles, and one upon which a friendly government would not be unable and probably not unwilling to give a decision. [Hear, hear.] But if you complicate the matter by bringing in a question of a totally different character; if you raise the question whether a certain political act was or was not suitable under the circumstances in which the government of the day was placed, how is the arbitrator to come to a decision? Were you to make this-for which you have no precedents-a matter of moral justice or of political consideration? No one will deny that this was a matter affecting us as an independent state, and that we were bound by the necessity of the case to use our own discretion. That doctrine of freedom in such matters has been urged, curiously enough, by no persons more strongly than by the government of the United States. I will cite only two cases. In 1849 the United States government proposed to recognize Hungary as an independent state, not merely as a belligerent, but to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary as an independent state. [Hear, hear.] The Austrian government complained, as was only natural, and a correspondence ensued. It was conducted on the American side by Mr. Webster, certainly not the least able or eminent of American statesmen, and Mr. Webster used this argument: That if they had done so, though the step would have been precipitate, and one from which no benefit resulted, it would, nevertheless, not have been an act against the law of nations, provided they took no part in the contest. I say that that goes immeasurably further than our conduct in this case. [Hear, hear.] Such is the doctrine distinctly put forth by a distinguished American statesman. I will take another case. In 1857 Texas was fighting for independence against the republic of Mexico. A question arose about the entrance into New York harbor of vessels bearing the Texan flag. The United States government defended the admission of such vessels, and in the course of the argument the foreign minister of the United States government contended that it had never been held necessary as a preliminary to the extension of the rights of hospitality to either party -meaning, of course, the admission of ships of war to the rights of belligerents-that the chances of the war should be balanced and the probability of eventual success determined. For this purpose it had been deemed sufficient that the party had declared its independence and was at the time armed for the purpose of defending it. Will any one declare that, at the time in question, the South had not declared its independence? In the face of the principles put forward by the United States government with respect to this absolute freedom of action in these matters, I confess I do not see how an independent state can contend that another independent state should be compelled to pay a fine, even if it had not exercised its discretion aright. Suppose we had not recog

In

nized the South at the time we did; suppose that fortune had turned in their favor and that they had succeeded in establishing their independence; would you say that they were entitled to call us to account for not recognizing them soon enough, and by such delay injuring their prospects? Putting it in that way, the question seems almost absurd; and yet it is not very easy to prove that if we were not responsible in one way we were not responsible in the other. [Hear, hear.] I cannot see how you can argue that damages are not equally due for a too tardy recognition as for a too hasty one. what position is a neutral power placed when war breaks out? It is a question of general international law; it is a question which will create a precedent, and we were bound to consider not merely what was convenient for the moment, but to regard the rights and duties of nations in general towards one another. [Hear, hear.] The ground I rest it upon in limiting the arbitration as I propose, was, first of all, that the question respecting the recognition of the South was irrelevant to the issue; secondly, that it was a question of statesmanship and policy, and not of mutual obligation, and therefore incapable of receiving legal solution; thirdly, that the United States, in parallel cases, had absolutely refused to admit any responsibility for adopting a similar course; and lastly, I believe no arbitrator would take any reference so vague. I do not propose now to argue the case of the recognition of the South on its merits, for this reasonbecause I quite agree with the honorable member who brought forward the motion, that in recognizing the confederacy as belligerents at the time we did we were simply declaring on May 13 that a certain state of things was a state of civil war, not on a hasty note, but on four official precedents laid before Congress by Mr. Seward nine, twelve, and sixteen days before the Queen's proclamation was issued. [Hear, hear.] On May 4, nine days before the issue of the proclamation of neutrality, Mr. Seward wrote that the insurgents had instituted a revolution with open, flagrant, deadly war, to compel the United States to assent to dismemberment, and the United States had accepted this civil war as inevitable. I should be sorry to say anything that would bear hardly upon so eminent and accomplished a statesman as Mr. Seward; but really, if it were a question which we could discuss face to face, I should venture to ask him how, with a grave face, he could ask me to call in some neutral and third party to determine whether a British government had a right to call that civil war which, on May 4, Mr. Seward himself called by that name. [Loud cheers.] I will notice in passing that the highest court of law in the United States declared that the state of things which existed was civil war; and I am glad to say that I have no doubt that there has been a change in the feeling here in a few years, and on the other side of the water a corresponding change has taken place. I saw a very remarkable article the other day, quoted from one of the leading journals of the United States-it was from the New York World of February 18-and it lays down, first, that no arbitrators likely to be chosen would say that the Queen's proclamation was a wrongful act; secondly, that it was incapable of being made the subject of arbitration; and, thirdly, that it had nothing to do with the Alabama claims. I think it remarkable that such a declaration should appear in the columns of one of the leading newspapers of a country which mor than any other is governed by public opinion. [Hear, hear.] I hope I have said enough to show that the proposed limitation is not arbitrary or capricious; still less is it a mere device to avoid bringing the matter to arbitration, but is founded on an intelligent and sound principle. If the negotiations had for a time been, I will not say broken off, but suspended, the honse must acknowledge that the rupture or the suspension did not come from our side. We have made an offer which has been declined, and it is for the complaining party to state their counter proposition. I have heard it said, “You ought to settle this matter at once, or you will be in danger of war with America." I am as anxious to settle the matter as any man in the house, [hear, hear,] but I do not fear that result. I have never concealed my opinion that the Americans, in case of reference, are not unlikely to make out their case to some extent. The money part of the question is one inappreciably small, more especially as we have claims on our side which, if only a portion of them hold water, will arrive at a considerable amount, and will form a not inconsiderable set-off to the claims against us; but in any case, if the matter be fairly investigated, and the decision went against us, we should not be disposed to grudge the payment. [Hear, hear.] If, therefore, the Alabama claims were for a moment kept out of sight, I think it ought to be understood that it is not by the act of our government that this has been done. I know that political feeling runs high in the United States, but I do not think any parties would be so insensible to the interests of their own country as to engage in a quarrel which might lead to a great and costly war for the sake of enforcing in one particular way a claim which it is in their power to settle, and not improbably in their favor, without having recourse to violence. [Hear, hear.] I cannot but think that in some way, indirectly if not directly-and I am not inclined to be very fastidious about the form [cheers]-the United States government may be induced to join in measures which may lead to an arrangement. If they decline, it only remains to be en whether any other solution of the dispute can be found. Mr. Seward, through Mr. Adams, has more than once thrown out hints respecting something in the nature of a commission to deal with all outstanding disputes between the two countries. I have,

through Mr. Adams, suggested that he should develop that idea. I think international questions are better settled one by one, but I am not disposed to reject any reasonable mode of bringing about a settlement, and if we can agree upon any mode of bringing about a solution, I do not think that either the government, or the house, or the country, would be disposed to quarrel on a mere matter of form. [Hear, hear.] I may say before I sit down that the reception of the new British minister at Washington has been not only friendly, but cordial, and I think I may say that the feeling towards England is increasingly friendly. [Hear, hear.] I have stated the facts of this case as briefly as I could, and I shall leave our action in this case not merely to the judgment of the house, of the public, and of the country, but to that of all fair and impartial persons on both sides of the Atlantic. [The noble lord sat down amid loud and general cheering.]

Mr. W. E. FORSTER thanked the noble lord for the anxiety he had shown to produce a better feeling between this country and America; but he believed that the difficulties which existed were not so great as had been imagined. The honorable member for Reading (Mr. Lefevre) made use of too strong an expression when he said that the negotiations had failed. If that had been so, he (Mr. W. E. Forster) should have deeply regretted it, as he wished to see the principle of arbitration carried out, and he thought that a precedent for it might have been established in the present case. He sympa thized with the noble lord in the difficulties he had been called upon to contend with in dealing with this question. The state of things was simply this, that Mr. Seward wished to bring on the question of premature recognition, and the noble lord said that he should not allow him to do so. He (Mr. Forster) did not for a moment sympathize with the American government in their claims against this country on account of what they called the premature recognition; but he must say that he did not think that the ground upon which they based their claim was precisely that stated by the noble lord. He did not think that the American government said anything so absurd as that there was no civil war existing at the time of our recognition, but what they said was that though there was war going on in America, there was no war raging at sea, and that it was not our business, as a neutral power, to take notice of what had happened upon land, and by proclaiming our neutrality hasten the time at which a naval war would be carried on. This was nowhere so well stated as in the first official dispatch relating to recognition which passed between the two governments. It was quite true that, though Mr. Adams, in his first intercourse with Earl Russell, protested against recognition, yet in his first official dispatch, in April, 1865, the ground upon which he put the matter was that it was wrong to acknowledge the South as a belligerent "before they had a single vessel of their own afloat." It was necessary this should be borne in mind, because he was quite sure that this country wished to understand the position taken by Mr. Seward. He thought that he could give, from his own personal, experience, some little ground for believing that the United States government were mistaken in the position that they assumed. At the time that the neutrality proclamation was issued by our government he personally was very much interested on behalf of the North. He felt that a war was beginning upon which would depend whether slavery should be extended all over the American continent or should receive its death-blow. [Hear, hear.] He was not ashamed to acknowledge that in that war he was a partisan of the North. Having that feeling, he heard that letters of marque had been sent by Mr. Davis to this country, and the question arose how British subjects could be prevented from having anything to do with these letters of marque.. He took legal advice, and was told, first, that vessels sailing under these letters of marque would be pirates, and he believed that 50 years ago they would have been so, and would have been so treated by England. He then referred to Wheaton, the great American authority upon international war, and he found that in his book the law was stated in most distinct terms. He said, "Until a revolution is consummated and while the civil war continues, any neutral government that wishes not to help either of the parties must treat the government de facto as a state entitled to the rights of war." Upon reading this, he felt that if he had come down to the house and said that these vessels should be treated as pirates, he should be at once met with the authority of Wheaton for saying that they were entitled to belligerent rights. Still, there was the question how vessels under letters of marque were to be prevented from leaving our shores; and he himself asked the government what steps would be taken to prevent the infringement of the law by British subjects. It was in answer to this question that Sir G. Lewis for the first time stated that a proclamation of neutrality would be at once issued, and that that would set forth the law, which, in general terms, was that no British subject should take part in such a war. This proclamation was not intended in the minds of many people to be considered as unfriendly towards the United States, but rather that it was the only way in which British subjects could be prevented from entering into the war. [Hear, hear.] But whilst he by no means sympathized with the convictions of Mr. Seward in reference to the proclamation, yet he could not but think that the noble lord had somewhat misunderstood Mr. Seward's position. In his closing dispatch on the 9th November, 1867, he said that "We are distinctly informed by Lord Stanley

that the limited reference of the Alabama claims is founded upon the condition that the United States shall waive before the arbitrator the position they have maintained, that the granting of belligerent rights was not justified on any ground of necessity or moral right. This condition being inadmissible, the proposed limited reference is declined." He did not understand Mr. Seward's position to be that the question whether what had been done was according to the law of nations should be referred; but to complain that before entering upon the arbitration he was to be compelled to waive his conviction, repeatedly expressed, that the proclamation was premature and contrary to international law. He could not but think that it was too much for the noble lord to expect that Mr. Seward should give up his opinion on that matter, and record his having done so. If he had said, "I refer the question whether there is any money due in reference to the Alabama ships, and whether we broke the law by granting belligerent rights," it would have been open to us to say, "We will not refer that;" but what the noble lord said was, "We will not refer unless you acknowledge yourself to be wrong in reference to the ground that you have been constantly taking."

Lord STANLEY. No; only that the right should not be questioned before the arbi

trator.

Mr. FORSTER believed that Mr. Seward thought that if he entered upon the arbitration he must acknowledge that the assumption that he had made that the proclamation was not called for was a wrong one, and that the noble lord should not have enforced any such conditions. He did not know why we should have refused arbitration upon Mr. Seward's terms, for we had the strongest possible case, and all the noble lord's arguments might have been brought before the arbitrator instead of as reasons why the arbitration should not be assented to. If the arbitration were meant in the spirit of the treaty of Paris-that of an attempt to decide a question between two nations by means of the decision of a third party rather than by war or a threat of war-then the fact that we were confident as to what our right was was no ground for not arbitrating, and consequently if Mr. Seward desired to refer this question, he (Mr. Forster) did not see why his wish should not have been admitted. But Mr. Seward did not ask for this, and it was right that his last dispatch bore a different meaning from his first one. He said first that the whole subject must be referred, and that this included the question of recognition; but after the noble lord's letter Mr. Seward took different ground, or so defined his first statement that it bore a different interpretation. He said that he must be at liberty to contend before the arbitrator that the act of the British government was not right; that this must be among the matters complained of. He thought that what Mr. Seward meant was that he should have the right to use the fact of recognition as an argument in favor of the claims made; and he (Mr. Forster) could not see why he should not be allowed to do so. He thought that Mr. Seward's argument would be a very bad one; and if the noble lord's representative at the arbitration should say that the argument was not relevant it would not be used. He believed that the representative of the United States at the arbitration would have felt that the argument was so bad that we should never have heard of it again. It was very much to be regretted that Mr. Seward had taken the position that he was called on by the noble lord to eat his own words, but after all he hoped that what had happened was only a hitch in the settlement, for he could not but believe that some means of settlement would be found. Everybody in England, and the large body of influential persons in the United States, also desired that the matter should be settled. He believed that there was no party in the United States that did not desire this except the Fenians. If it should turn out that he was right in the supposition that the American government only wanted to make use before the arbitrator of certain arguments, he hoped that the noble lord would not object to their doing so. They should further consider whether arbitration was the only means of settling the matter. [Hear, hear.] There had been tremendous injury inflicted upon American shipping, and there was great reason to believe that if the law remained as it now was, then in future wars great injury would also be inflicted upon English shipping. What naturally came forward under these circumstances was the wish that international law should be so arranged that the inhabitants of both countries should be prevented from carrying on private war. And if America should say, in answer to that proposition, "You must first make recompense for what has passed," why should not that matter be considered? He did not think that it would be inconsistent with our interest if the two governments agreed that the international or the municipal law of both countries should be so altered as to prevent the escape from the ports of either of pirate ships for the future. Such an alteration would do great good. [Hear, hear.] There was another possible means of settling the matter. There were several questions in dispute between the two governments, and he could not but think that, with the willingness of both governments to settle disputes, if some statesmen high in position in this country were sent out by the noble lord, the whole of these questions could be settled. He repeated that there was no party in England that did not wish for a settlement, and he believed that there was no such party in America except those irreconcilable enemies of ours whose only hope lay in such questions remaining unsettled; and if we could get rid of these questions we should strike a greater blow at Fenianism than by anything else which we could do. [Hear.]

Sir G. BOWYER observed that the honorable gentleman had assumed that the Alabama case involved the question of carrying on private war by the subjects of one country against those of another. It seemed, however, to him that there was no connection between the two things. His object in rising was to call attention to the doctrine of international law in reference to contraband of war, as it bore upon the Alabama case. Some persons thought that the doctrine as to contraband of war involved what was called "conflicting rights," because private persons were allowed to deal in contraband of war, and belligerents had a right to seize it. You might, however, as well talk to a jurist of "conflicting rights" as to a mathematician of a triangle of which one angle was greater than another. The principle of international law in reference to contraband of war was clear. It was this, that no government should be held responsible for the ordinary trade of its subjects, when carried on with belligerents. If this were not so, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain neutrality. If a government were made responsible for contraband of war sold to a belligerent, then the sale of a stand of arms, or a barrel of gunpowder, might compromise the neutrality of a country, and it would be necessary for a government to exercise a direct surveillance over the whole trade of its subjects; and this would be a state of things which it would be almost impossible to carry out. Vattel, in book 3, chapter 7, said: "If a nation trades in arms, timber, ships, or muniments of war, I cannot complain if it furnishes these things to my enemy, provided it does not refuse to sell these articles to me at a reasonable price. It exercises its traffic without any intention to injure me, and by continuing that traffic as if I were not at war it gives me no just cause of coinplaint." Let them apply these clear principles of international law to the case of the Alabama. The southern States being at war, sent to eminent ship-builders at Liverpool to build them ships according to specifications. No doubt these specifications indicated that these ships were to be used for a warlike purpose; but this was a case contemplated by Vattel. It was not for the ship-builders to consider whether the ships were intended for commerce or for war; but the remedy of the United States government was to capture them, and condemn them as contraband of war. It was only by her impartial conduct that England expected to keep her neutrality. There was not a tittle of sound legal argument to support the assumption that the foreign enlistment act made any alteration in the position of England in reference to international law. No country could be bound at the dictation of another country to enforce its own municipal laws; and the difference between a municipal law and a treaty was this, that if the foreign enlistment act had formed a treaty the American government might have enforced its provisions. But with regard to municipal law it was right of every sovereign state to consider with reference to its own interest, and not in any particular instance, whether it would enforce any of its municipal laws. The foreign enlistment act was one of those laws which could not be enforced at the instance of the government, but it could be done at any time in any of our courts by a British subject or a foreigner. The power of the principal custom-house officers to detain a vessel did not in any manner impair the effects of the law as he had laid it down, because what they did in that respect was purely ministerial, and in obedience to a warrant issued by a competent authority. The government of the day ought to have said to the American government: "We do not wish to take unlimited responsibility in this matter; you lay your information before a magistrate and it shall be put in force by the executive." But the government of the day made a great error when they telegraphed to Liverpool to stop the ship, because by so doing they gave the appearance of being themselves responsible. Although he considered it was a mistake their interfering, he was far from thinking that it really altered the merits of the case. It was an act of supererogation on their part, and it was now sought to make, this government responsible for the slip or failure that had occurred in doing what the law did not peremptorily require of them. It was an unfortunate circumstance, the escape of the Alabama. It was an accident, and the government stood harmless with regard to it. He was unable to see what fair or reasonable grounds of complaint the United States government had in the matter, and he had laid his argument before the house because that part of the question had not been sufficiently ventilated. He agreed with the honorable member for Reading that a quiet and temperate discussion of the matter might tend to the solution of the difficulty. The feeling of that house, and the people of the country, was friendly towards the United States, [hear, hear,] and he thought the honorable member was wrong in supposing that the conservative party was not friendly towards the north. [Hear, hear.] The recognition of the south as belligerents by the north was a matter more for the consideration of the government than of the House of Commons. It was, in fact, a question of policy, which depended on a great number of circumstances and facts which were better known to the government than they could be to the house, and he thought the house would act unwisely in expressing an opinion on either side. If, however, the question of recognition of the south was sent to arbitration, he thought it would be decided in favor of this country. He could not give his entire assent to all the arguments that had been used upon the question by either side. What had been said with regard to a blockade was a mistake, because there was such a thing as unilateral