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No. 64.]

Mr. Seward to Mr. Johnson.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, January 20, 1869. SIR: Your dispatch of the 9th of January, No. 96, was received. It relates to matters which, at the time of its date, were involved in the negotiations then pending for the settlement of the San Juan question and mutual claims. The necessity for a special reply has been superseded by subsequent events. On the 14th of January instant, a telegram was received from you which announced that the claims convention and the San Juan convention had been signed on that day at London. From materials which were remaining in our archives we were enabled to prepare a copy of each of those conventions. These copies, together with the naturalization protocol, were, on the 15th instant, submitted by the President to the Senate of the United States for their constitutional consideration.

It remains for me now only to convey to you the assurance of the President's high satisfaction with the manner in which you have conducted these important negotiations.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

REVERDY JOHNSON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Johnson to Mr. Seward.

No. 104.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, January 22, 1869.

SIR: Referring to my dispatch No. 32, of October 14, I have now the honor to inclose a few more acknowledgments of the "Tributes of the Nations to Abraham Lincoln," received, since the date of that dispatch, from various parts of the British dominions. I inclose a list, and am, with high regard,

Your obedient servant,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

REVERDY JOHNSON.

List of acknowledgments of the "Tributes of the Nations to Abraham Lincoln.”

Municipal council, Sanguhar.

Municipal council, Lancaster.

Municipal council, Glasgow.

Municipal council, Anstruther Easter.

Welch Baptist Association, Monmouthshire.

The Reformer, Dublin.

Georgetown, British Guiana.

Mr. Johnson to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 106.]

SIR:

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

London, January 30, 1869.

Nothing has occurred since I last wrote to you

of any public interest, except the decision of the Paris conference,

recently held in that city. The particulars of that decision have not as yet, I believe, been disclosed; but, from what I understand them to be, they seem to me to rest upon the same grounds upon which we have placed the Alabama claims. If I am not mistaken in this, (and I do not think I am,) neither of the governments represented at that conference, if selected as an arbitrator under our convention of the 14th instant, could fail to award in favor of the United States; and, indeed, as England was herself represented, and no doubt concurred with the conference, she may be considered as agreeing to the justice of our demand. I have the honor to remain, with high regard, your obedient servant, REVERDY JOHNSON.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Johnson to Mr. Seward.

No. 110.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, February 6, 1869.

SIR: The case of Augustine E. Costello came up on appeal before the Court of Queen's Bench in Dublin last week. The decision, which was against the prisoner, was delivered on Wednesday last, the 3d instant. Through the kindness of Mr. West I am enabled to forward herewith copies of the newspaper reports of these proceedings.

I remain, with high regard, your obedient servant,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington. D. C.

REVERDY JOHNSON.

[From the Dublin Irish Times, January 30, 1869.]

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH-YESTERDAY.

(Before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, and Mr. Justice George.)

COSTELLO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, AGAINST THE QUEEN.

This case came before the court for argument upon the writ of error granted to the plaintiff, who was convicted recently of treason-felony at the commission court, Green

street.

Mr. Heron, Queen's counsel, Mr. C. Molloy, and Mr. Crean, instructed by Mr. J. T. Scallan, appeared for the plaintiff in error. The attorney general, Mr. Murphy, Queen's counsel, and Mr. E. Barry, instructed by Mr. Anderson, for the Crown.

The prisoner, who was dressed in his prison costume, occupied the seat between two warders at one side of the court. He appeared to be in good health.

Mr. Heron said: I appear for the plaintiff in error, and before Mr. Molloy goes on with his argument I have an application to make about the course of procedure; that is, that the plaintiff insists on the right to reply.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well; but let Mr. Molloy go on now.

Mr. Molloy then proceeded with his argument on the writ of error. He said that the prisoner had been tried at the commission for the county of Dublin, which had commenced its sittings in October, 1867; that he had put in a plea of abatement, to which the Crown demurred, and on the argument on the demurrer the Crown obtained judgment. The learned counsel then read over the record, which set forth the indictment, and the different points to be contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the judgment shonld be reversed. It also stated that the jury on the first trial had disagreed and had been discharged, and that on the 13th November, 1867, the prisoner had been again brought before the court, and that on that day he put in a plea to further prosecution on the indictment. The Crown demurred to that; the demurrer was allowed, and the trial of Costello was proceeded with. Several jurors had been challenged, and the

plaintiff in error now submitted that all these challenges were good challenges, and ought to have been allowed. Mr. Molloy then proceeded to quote from Chief Justice Tindall and other eminent legal authorities on cases in error. He submitted that judg ment ought to have been given upon the plea of abatement for the prisoner and against the Crown. That plea contained three statements, the first of which was that the foreman of the grand jury had not complied with the provisions of the 1st and 2d Victoria; the second, the averment that the witnesses had not been sworn in open court; and the third statement, which was most important, was, that it did not appear on the record or otherwise that the bill of indictment had been legally found. Mr. Molloy also advanced the following points on which he relied on behalf of his client: That judgment ought to have been given upon the plea in abatement for the prisoner and against the Crown. That inasmuch as it does not appear by the record of the said indictment or otherwise, that the bill of indictment was found or returned a true bill by the grand jury, upon the evidence of any witness or witnesses who were sworn or affirmed, the prisoner should not have been put to answer said indictment, and that the same ought to have been quashed. That there is error in the mode in which the return and appearance of the jurors on the 5th of November, 1867, is stated and entered on the record. That judgment ought to have been given upon the plea pleaded by the prisoner on the 13th November, 1867, for the prisoner and against the Crown. That the plea pleaded on the 13th November, 1867, and the matters therein contained, were sufficient in law to bar and preclude the Crown from further prosecuting the indictment against the prisoner. That the award or precept given to the sheriff on the 13th November, 1867, to return another panel of jurors to try the issue before there was any defect or want of jurors of the panel returned on the 5th of November, pursuant to the award or order of the justices on said 5th November, and before said first panel had been exhausted, quashed, or disposed of, was not warranted by law. That the prisoner could not be legally tried by a jury selected from the second panel, returned on the 13th November, 1867, until the previous panel had been quashed, exhausted, or otherwise legally disposed of. Assuming the court to be of opinion that the award of the justices to the sheriff on the 15th of November was legal, and that the prisoner could be legally tried by a jury chosen from said second panel, that there is error in the mode in which the return and appearance of the jurors of the second panel is stated and entered on the record. That the challenge to William J. Nagle was a good challenge and ought to have been allowed. That the challenge to Archibald McComas was a good challenge, and ought to have been allowed. That the challenges respectively taken to Frederick Lewis, William Thomas McConkey, Francis Tellwright, and Samuel McComas, were each of them good challenges, and ought each to have been allowed. Mr. Molloy then commented generally upon the course which had been adopted towards Costello, and submitted that the second trial ought not to have been had against him. The attorney general then addressed the court in support of the second trial, and against the application of the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Heron, Queen's counsel, replied on behalf of the plaintiff in error.
The case was ordered to stand over until Wednesday, for judgment.

[From the Dublin Evening Post, February 3, 1869.]

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH-THIS DAY.

(Before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, and Mr. Justice George.)

THE CASE OF AUGUSTINE E. COSTELLO-JUDGMENT.

At the sitting of the court this morning, their lordships proceeded to deliver judg ment on the writ of error obtained on the conviction of the Fenian prisoner, Augustine E. Costello, at a late special commission in Green street. The arguments on the writ of error, which took place on Friday last, were fully reported in this journal, and judg ment was postponed until this morning. The prisoner was present in custody of the governor and one of the warders of the Mountjoy convict prison, and occupied a seat at the side bar.

The Crown was represented by Mr. Murphy, Queen's counsel, Mr. Heron, Queen's counsel, and Mr. Constantine Molloy, instructed by Mr. J. L. Scallan, appeared on behalf of the prisoner.

The lord chief justice delivered the unanimous judgment of the court. His lordship said the case came before them on a writ of error on the conviction of the prisoner at a special commission of the county of Dublin, in October, 1867. The first question raised for the prisoner was that he should not be called on to answer the indictment, because the witnesses were not sworn and returned to the grand jury by Mr. Alexander Ferrier, foreman, he not having affixed his signature to the back of the indictment.

Having alluded to the case cited by the counsel for the Crown-that of Mr. Steele in the memorable State trials-in which a similar circumstance occurred, his lordship said the essential thing to be done under the statute was to swear each witness whose name was on the back of the indictment, it being within the power of the foreman or any of the grand jury to administer the oath. It was not the indorsement that gave the authority to administer the oath; it was the act of Parliament. His lordship having quoted different authorities, said in the case before them it was nowhere alleged that the witnesses whose names were on the back of the indictment were not, as a matter of fact, sworn; the only allegation was, that the entry on the bill of the administration of the oath was omitted by the foreman of the grand jury. However, the essential thing was done-namely, the swearing of the witnesses-although the foreman of the grand jury had forgotten to initial the bill of indictment. Therefore, after a full and careful investigation, all the members of the court were of opinion that the arguments on the part of the prisoner had failed, and that there was nothing to support the ground of error on this point. The question mainly relied on for the prisoner was with reference to the affirmation of a juryman named James Kennan, who, though not belonging to any of the religious sects entitled to affirm, refused to take the usual oath, and served on the jury as if he had been duly sworn. His lordship read the circumstances attending the swearing of the jury on the first trial of the prisoner, as set forth in the writ of error, which have been already published, and also the affidavit of Mr. Scallan, the solicitor for the prisoner. The affidavit, he thought, disclosed that irregularity in swearing the jury was observed by the prisoner's counsel, but that they did not correct the error until it became embarrassing to the counsel for the Crown. The point raised in this part of the case was that the judges had no power to discharge the jury. The question raised in the prisoner's behalf was important, and worthy of consideration-namely, what is the extent of the judicial discretion of judges; but the practical question was, what, in such a case as appeared on the record, was to be done? Was the discharge of a jury, under the circumstances here stated, equivalent to a verdict of "not guilty?" Did it prevent the issuing of a fresh jury, even assuming the judges to have erred when the question of Mr. Kennan's affirmation was brought before them? It was necessary, in such cases as the present, to look with the utmost care and anxiety to questions touching the administration of the law, because he agreed with the prisoner's counsel that every protection should not only be granted to the prisoner, but zealously preserved to him. His lordship then cited a variety of cases, dating as far back as the reign of Henry the Seventh, in which judges had discharged juries for different causes, and also quoted legal authorities to show that it lay within the discretion and power of a judge to discharge jurors for illness, intoxication, or other causes. In the present case the officer of the court was ignorant of the mode of administering the affirmation to the juror. Was that circumstance sufficient to defeat the ends of justice? He thought he was warranted in the opinion that it was within the power of the court so to discharge the jury on the first trial. After some further observations his lordship said that, touching the argument that a wrong juror had got on the jury, the court were of opinion on the authorities that no case had been made—a remark which applied generally to the point raised as to the power of a judge to discharge a juror. The latter was a question much discussed, but they took the case of the Queen against Monsell to rule the present case, and no member of the court would wish it to be understood that the judge had not power to exercise his fullest discretion in discharging any member or even members of a jury. On the whole they were of opinion that no case had been made, and if there was any hardship of which the prisoner had to complain it was the duty of his counsel to bring the matter under the notice of the government of the country, and they might act on such information or memorial according to their wisdom and discretion. Having given to the case the most attentive consideration, in accordance with the requirements of justice and the ability of the arguments of counsel, the court were of opinion that judgment must be given for the Crown.

Mr. Justice Fitzgerald and Mr. Justice George concurred in the judgment of the lord chief justice.

The prisoner was then removed in custody, and was loudly cheered by a large crowd of persons assembled outside the court.

Mr. Johnson to Mr. Seward.

No. 111.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

London, February 15, 1869.

SIR: As soon as I was informed that her Majesty would pro y hold a court during the coming season, I addressed to Lord Cla endon an

official note communicating to him the resolution of Congress of the 27th March, 1867, and inquiring whether the members of this legation would be authorized to appear in any other than a uniform and official costume. That if not so permitted it would not be in their power, because contrary to their duty, to be present and show their respect and that of our government for her Majesty.

On the 10th instant I received an answer from his lordship, a copy of which is enclosed.

As her Majesty has consented to my request, I have advised his lordship that the arrangement she has sanctioned is satisfactory. It will of course be observed by myself and the members of the legation.

I am gratified to be able to give you this information, as it shows her Majesty's desire to comply with the wishes of our government and indicates the friendly feeling which she entertains for it.

A copy of my letter to Lord Clarendon of the 27th of January and of the one of to-day are inclosed.

Hoping that what I have done in the matter will meet the approval of yourself and President,

I remain, with high regard, your obedient servant,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

REVERDY JOHNSON.

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Johnson to Lord Clarendon.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, January 27, 1867.

MY LORD: I beg leave to call your lordship's attention to a resolution of the Congress of the United States of the 27th March, 1867, prohibiting persons in the diplomatic service of my government "from wearing any uniform or official costume not previously authorized."

As no authority has been given to the members of this légation excepting them from this positive prohibition it is our duty to comply with it. Your lordship will oblige me, therefore, by letting me know if we can appear in plain citizens' dress at the court ceremonials which her Majesty may hereafter have?

I sincerely hope that this privilege may be allowed us, and am sure that it would be regarded by my government with gratification. As I see that her Majesty is to hold a court on the 2d of March your lordship will please favor me with as early an answer as you conveniently can.

Inclosed you have a copy of the resolution referred to.

I pray your lordship to accept the assurance of the highest consideration with which I have the honor to remain, my lord, your lordship's most obedient servant,

The Right Honorable EARL OF CLARENDON, &c., &c., &c.

REVERDY JOHNSON.

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SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 27th ultimo inclosing copy of a resolution of the Congress of the United States o the 27th of March, 1867, prohibiting persons in the diplomatic service of the United States from wearing any uniform or official costume not previously authorized.

You add that no authority has been given to the members of your legation excepting them from that positive prohibition, and you therefore request to be informed whether you and the gentlemen of your legation can appear in plain citizens' dress at the court ceremonials which her Majesty may hold.

Having laid your note before the Queen, I have received her Majesty's commands to acquaint you that her Majesty will receive yourself and members of your legation in evening dress without cocked hats and swords-breeches being worn on full dress occa

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