gence, the obligation of Great Britain to meet the losses seems to me to be most apparent. But, secondly, what doubt can there be that she is under that obliga tion because of the absence of proper diligence in the fulfillment of her neutral duties? What is proper diligence, is a mixed question of law and fact. That a neutral nation is bound to see that a belligerent with whom she is at peace suffers no injury, is a national axiom. That she is, therefore, bound to see that the other belligerent is not permitted to fit out in her ports vessels to cruise against it, is necessarily true. And what is dili gence in such a case is equally well settled. It is that all the officers of the government-the government being responsible for the acts of allshall use their powers to prevent a breach of neutral duties with reasonable skill, care, and promptitude. If they omit either, whether from negligence, ignorance, or corruption, the government is responsible for the consequences. Applying these principles to the present case, is it not manifest that there was a failure in the fulfillment of those duties for which this government is responsible? 1. It was notorious that the Alabama, originally known as No. 290, was being built under the direction of Captain Bullock, formerly an officer of the United States navy, but then in the service of the insurgents. There was not a man of any intelligence in Liverpool who was not aware of it, and the officers of the customs at that port must have known it. Possessing that knowledge notwithstanding, and seeing the vessel progressing to completion up to the moment when she left the port, they took no steps to arrest her. But even assuming that the government itself was not responsible for the misconduct of their subalterns, unless the facts were brought to their own knowledge, their responsibility is equally clear. This is obvious from a few facts which cannot be controverted. Before the Alabama was constructed, another vessel, called the Oreto, intended to prey upon the commerce of the United States, was fitted out at the same port. As early as the 18th February, 1862, the fact was brought to the notice of Lord Russell, in a dispatch from Mr. Adams, and his lordship's attention was afterwards invited to it more than once up to the period of her sailing. The fitting out of the Alabama and her piratical purpose were specially called to the attention of Lord Russell by a dispatch from Mr. Adams dated the 23d of June, 1862, and facts communicated to his lordship which rendered it certain that she was to cruise in hostility to the commerce of the United States. The vessel sailed on the 29th of July of the same year, and no attempt was made in the interval to arrest her. In the meantime, too, accumulated evidence was transmitted to his lordship establishing the fact, if possible, still more clearly that such was her destination; and yet nothing was done towards her seizure until an order for that purpose was issued by the government in London, but not received in Liverpool until she had gone. On the 22d of July, seven days before the vessel left Liverpool, the evidence was furnished his lordship upon which he issued the order of the 29th; and the only rea son which has been assigned for the delay in the issuing of that order was the one given to Mr. Adams by his lordship, and which was com municated to your department in Mr. Adams's dispatch No. 201, of the 1st August, 1862. That reason was this. I quote from the dispatch: "I read to his lordship the substances of your dispatches Nos. 281 and 299 respecting the use made of the island of Nassau by the rebels, and the fitting out of the gunboats Oreto and 290. His lordship first took up the case of 290, and remarked that a delay in determining upon it had most unexpectedly been caused by the sudden development of a malady of the Queen's advocate, Sir John D. Harding, totally incapacitating him for the transaction of business." That this reason is of any avail, upon the question of liability, who can believe? The obligation of the government was not contingent upon the sickness of her law or other officers, but absolute, and depended entirely upon the fact whether proper exertions were made to guard against the wrong. It is not my purpose in referring to Lord Russell's explanation to impute any intended wrong to his lordship. He acted, I have no doubt, in what he believed to be his official duty. But this is no answer to the wrong which resulted from it to the United States. The duty of Great Britain to observe a neutrality, as far as her responsibility to other nations is concerned, does not depend upon her municipal law or usage. These should be such as will insure the performance of that duty. The obligation is an international one, and is regulated by the law of nations alone. When that law enforces neutrality, each nation is bound to provide for its faithful observance. The malady, therefore, of the Queen's advocate constitutes no excuse whatever for the delay to act upon proofs conceded afterwards to be complete by the giving the order for the seizure of the Alabama. But again, the giving of that order, and the issuing of two others to stop her at Holyhead, Queenstown, and Nassau, is conclusive to show that, in the judgment of his lordship, she had violated the municipal laws of the kingdom, and by so doing had put it out of the power of the government to fulfill their obligations of neutrality to the United States. And yet the vessel was afterwards permitted to enter other colonial ports and coal, and obtain provisions, and thus continue her piratical enterprise. If the government was bound, as the orders just referred to concede, to seize the vessel if she entered either of the three ports named, why were they not bound to seize her when she entered any other of the ports of her Majesty? Could they be met by the objection that her commander then had a commission purporting to be from the insurgents? If such an objection as that would have been a protection, it would equally have been so at the designated ports, or in the port of Liverpool if she had returned there. An admitted violator of her Majesty's laws, and in a matter which involved the duty of her government, she could afterwards by force of such a commission ride in safety in any of the ports of her Majesty, even in the port of Liverpool, from which she had escaped by fraud and collusion. This is a proposition too absurd to be seriously reasoned about. I have thus, at more length than you may deem necessary, considered the Alabama claims, the argument upon them having been exhausted in your dispatches to Mr. Adams, and his dispatches to her Majesty's government. But I have deemed it due to myself and to you that I should place upon record my own views relating to each of the subjects of the several treaties I have negotiated. I have done this with no view to my own justification, for this is to be found in your instructions, all of which I have followed, as I am glad to know, to the satisfaction of the President and yourself. I hear that in some quarters objections are made to the claims convention, for which I was not prepared. 1. It is said, I am told, that the claims to be submitted should not be all that have arisen subsequent to July, 1853. 2. That no provision is made for the submission of any losses which our government, as such, may have sustained by the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents, and the depredations upon our commerce by the Alabama and other vessels. In regard to the first, I do not see upon what ground of justice we should deny to our citizens the opportunity of having their claims upon this government adjusted by means of the commission, whatever may be the date of their origin, when they have not previously had that opportunity. I understand that there are many such claims, and some of them of great alleged hardship. And besides the justice due to this class of claimants, it is most desirable that all claims, without regard to their date, should be settled by means of the convention, as otherwise they may be the subject of controversy hereafter. As regards the second objection, I am at a loss to imagine what would be the measure of the damage which it supposes our government should be indemnified for. How is it to be ascertained? By what rule is it to be measured? A nation's honor can have no compensation in money, and the depredations of the Alabama were of property in which our nation had no direct pecuniary interest. If it be said that those depredations prevented the sending forth of other commercial enterprises, the answer is twofold: first, that if they had been sent forth the nation would have had no direct interest in them; and second, that it could not be known that any such would have been undertaken. Upon what ground, therefore, could the nation demand compensation in money on either account? And if it was received, is it to go into the treasury for the use of the government, or to be distributed amongst those who may have engaged in such enterprises, and how many of them are there, and how are they to be ascertained? France recognized the insurgents as belligerents, and this may have tended to prolong the war. This, too, it may be said, was a violation of her duty, and affected our honor. If we can claim indemnity for our nation for such a recognition by England. we can equally claim it of France. And who has suggested such a claim as that? But the final and conclusive answer to these objections is this: 1. That at no time during the war, whether whilst the Alabama and her sister ships were engaged in giving our marine to the flames, or since, no branch of the government proposed to hold her Majesty's gov ernment responsible, except to the value of the property destroyed, and that which would have resulted from the completion of the voyages in which they were engaged. The government never exacted anything on its own account. It acted only as the guardian and protector of its own citizens, and therefore only required that this government should pay their losses, or agree to submit the question of its liability to friendly arbitrament. To demand more now, and particularly to make a demand to which no limit can well be assigned, would be an entire departure from our previous course; and would, I am sure, not be listened to by this government or countenanced by other nations. We have obtained by the convention in question all that we have ever asked; and with perfect opportunity of knowing what the sentiment of this government and people is, I am satisfied that nothing more can be accomplished. And I am equally satisfied that if the convention goes into operation. every dollar due on what are known as the Alabama claims will be recovered. I cannot conclude this communication without bearing testimony to the frank and friendly manner in which I have been met by Lords Stan ley and Clarendon, and to the very sincere desire which they exhibited throughout our negotiations to settle every dispute between the two nations upon terms just and honorable to each. I have the honor to remain, with high regard, your obedient servant, REVERDY JOHNSON. Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Mr. Johnson to Mr. Seward. No. 119.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I find, by an editorial in the Times of yesterday, that there are objections to the claims convention, which are not noticed in my dispatch No. 112, of the 17th instant. To these I propose now briefly to address myself. 1. It is said that the time of the exchange of the ratifications allowed by the convention is too long. The purpose of that provision was not to delay such ratifications, but to insure their being made. Circumstances might possibly occur which would necessarily prevent such an exchange if a short period was only provided. And to guard against such a result, the period for the exchange is made longer than in fact would be found necessary. The time stipulated in the present conven tion, of twelve months for the purpose, is the same as that which was allowed in the claims convention between this country and our own of the 8th February, 1853. 2. The time allowed for rendering the awards and their payment. When it is remembered what the character of the most of these claims is, the novelty of the questions which for the most part they involve, and the probability that these will be submitted to the arbitration of "some sovereign or head of a friendly state," who will be at a great distance from Washington, the place of meeting of the commissioners, and that if he decides the question of liability the claims are to be returned to the commissioners to ascertain the amount due upon each, I do not see how it can be maintained that the two years is a longer time than is necessary and should be allowed for the completion of the whole work. This provision does not require the commissioners or the arbitrator to delay their or his decision for two years. They may, and no doubt will, discharge their duties within a much shorter period. It is designed to guard against a failure of the adjustment consequent upon a shorter period, and to render unnecessary what has been found necessary in all previous cases, to prolong the time by an additional convention, which either government might refuse to enter into, and that would defeat the claims not acted upon. 3. The time allowed for the payment of the awards. This, it is objected, is too protracted. The time stipulated for this purpose in the convention of February, 1853, was twelve months from the date of each award. The time in the present convention is eighteen months from the date of each decision. This government would have been willing to fix the period at twelve months, but, looking to the condition of our treasury, and acting under instructions from the department, I thought it advisable to put it at eighteen months. But either government will have a right to pay at an earlier time if the claimants shall wish it. 4. That the claims of British subjects on the United States are submitted. This objection seems to me to be not only unreasonable, but grossly unjust. It goes upon the ground, as I uuderstand, that this government have been knowingly false to their duty, and have been gov erned by disreputable influence as concerns the causes which have given rise to the claims of our citizens. To suppose that a government alive to its own honor, as this government have ever been, would consent to negotiate upon the hypothesis that they had forfeited it, is as absurd as it would be insulting. How would our government answer the same objection if urged by Great Britain against our right to have submitted the claims of our citizens under such a convention? They would consider it a degrading imputation, to be met at all hazards with a stern rebuke. But independent of these considerations, the object being to settle at the earliest period all the causes of difference between the two nations, (a settlement called for by the obvious interests of both,) it would seem to be manifest that they should all, as far as claims are concerned, be included within the convention. In no other way could the object be accomplished. I remain, with high regard, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. REVERDY JOHNSON. [From the London Times, February 19, 1869.-Editorial.] The news we publish elsewhere this morning will show that the caution observed with reference to the Alabama claims in her Majesty's speech was not excessive. We were not led to expect an immediate settlement of the question, but only encouraged to hope that a durable friendship between Great Britain and America might be the result of the negotiations carried on by three successive governments. The cordial reception of this sentiment in both houses of Parliament fairly represents the feeling prevalent throughout this country, but we hear with less surprise than regret that the committee of foreign relations of the United States Senate yesterday rejected the convention almost unanimously. In spite of Mr. Reverdy Johnson's repeated assurances, we have never allowed ourselves to count too confidently on the assent of the Senate to any treaty signed by President Johnson on the eve of his retirement. That body is intrusted by the Constitution with no merely nominal responsibility in such cases. The President can only make treaties "by and with the advice of the Senate," and it is further required that at least two-thirds of the senators present should concur. After all that had passed, the republican majority might well grudge Mr. Johnson the honor of any diplomatic triumph which could be reserved for his successor. It appears, however, that a strong party in the United States opposed the ratification on independent grounds. While some writers and politicians exulted over the concessions extorted from Great Britain, others complain that Mr. Seward had sacrificed the interests of his own country. A petition embodying this view was presented by Mr. Sumner to the Senate in open session on January 30. It was signed by Mr. George B. Upton, a large ship-owner of Boston, and alleged two chief reasons why the convention should not be confirmed. The first of these objections is founded on the excessive time allowed for making the award and carrying it into effect. It was provided by the 7th article that ratifications should be exchanged within 12 months from the 14th of January, 1869, being the date of the convention. By the 3d article it was agreed that every claim should be presented within six months (or nine months at latest) of the first meeting of the commissioners, which was to be held "at the earliest possible period" after their appointment. A final decision was to be given on every claim within two years from the first meeting, but a further period of 18 months was fixed by the 4th article for the payment of any sums of money found to be due. We are disposed to agree with Mr. Upton that under these provisions redress would have been too long delayed. Two years may not be too much for the consideration of claims and counterclaims dating back to 1853, but if the convention were to be ratified at all, it ought surely to have been ratified within much less than a year, and if damages were to be paid, they might be paid within much less than a year and a half. Mr. Upton's second objection, however, was of a very different nature, and one much more likely to have influenced the committee of the Senate. He protests against Brit |