and lent the assistance they had promised to the Tycoon, but the majority had protested against what had been done at Kioto by ruse and by violence, and therefore the representatives are authorized to say that the present coalition bears not the character of a national manifestation. Therefore, not only has the nation, as far as such an expression may be used in Japan, not pronounced itself either for or against the Tycoon, but one could not even say that it had abstained itself, because the occasion to do so or to pronounce itself has been taken from it. What way remains, therefore, to the foreigners to discern on which side the nation is? None which would not be suspected of a preconceived notion or of private motives. If the foreigners were in Japan without rights or interests, simple lookers-on in the strife, and protected against all consequences which it may have, they might perhaps await what was called in ancient times the judgment of God, and recognize the right where the force was. But even in abstaining themselves from any interference in the strife of parties they cannot abstain themselves from having an opinion on the theoretical value of each of the parties, if it were only for the reason that they are accredited with one of them, and that they have to watch over interests which every party may compromise or serve. It is, therefore, on the field of positive facts and diplomatic stipulations rather than in discussions on the historical right, particularly in Japan, that they can discern the road to follow at this moment. Which, then, is the inference which can be drawn from these two trains of ideas? The facts teach us that Japan, taken all together, is so little prepared for the introduction of foreigners, that even under a friendly government, recent proofs of hostility, or rather of hatred, have produced themselves against foreigners. Considering the spirit reigning in the rabble of certain large towns and the situation itself of the towns of Osaka and Yedo, one would be led to suppose that the moment had not yet come to penetrate into them as into places perfectly secure. Nevertheless at the special demand of the foreigners have these towns either been opened or will be opened, and one can even prove that on the part of a certain number of European merchants the desire exists to see new ports opened in the dominious of some Daimios. But it is not the duty of the representatives to ask themselves if it be to-day in the interest of the foreigners, and in the interest or in the means of their respective governments, still to augment the number of the open towns; to hazard themselves into other territories; to have to do with many princes instead of with one; to multiply their naval stations and the consular posts; to offer, in one word, more opportunity for the ill-feeling to show itself, and more occasion for difficulties. Why should we give the Daimios credit for more loyalty, more sincere amity, a larger understanding or a more open one to progress, than the present Tycoon has shown? This prince was, so it is said, unable to protect sufficiently the foreigners in his dominions, and therefore cannot be recognized as the real sovereign of Japan. But who will be it more than he is? And what guarantee does exist that what he has not been able to do others will do and can do? Do we not know, on the contrary, that most of the insults and attacks of which the foreigners have been the victims, have had for authors the great and small adversaries of the Tycoon; that it were precisely the liberties and franchises of the Daimios which prevented the Tycoon from punishing acts he nevertheless had to pay for very dearly? Do we ignore that these attacks, some of them at least, may have been made less with the intention to murder a foreigner, than to create difficulties between the Tycoon and the foreigners? If to-day, in consequence of the present events, the adversaries of the government offer to us, and if we agree to establish ourselves in new towns and prov. inces, will we find there more security than in the possessions of the Tycoon? It would be at least singular to pretend that each of these Daimios would be in his possessions a better protector than the Tycoon in his possessions, and that the same princes by which the attacks and insults were directed against us will be for us, when we are with them, sincere and sufficient protectors. They would have selected at least quite novel means to attract us to them, and means, until now, little used in human affairs. Considered from this point of view, the question only offers apprehensions, or at least incertitudes, and it is rather probable that the foreigners which have come to Japan to transact commercial affairs peacefully would bitterly regret to have risked themselves outside the known dominions. To push still further the consequence of such a decision, if it was taken, no clear-sighted Japanese would hesitate to believe that it was precisely to divide still more their country and to search for an opportunity to take possession of some part of it, by the aid of inevitable difficulties, that the foreigners had so acted. Such would be in every probability, in the nearest future, the consequence of such a resolution. But it cannot be supposed that such be the intention of any of the powers represented in Japan, because such a way of acting, in itself little honorable, would be contrary to all declarations made till now, and would provoke immediately from the other powers just reclamations, or analogous proceedings. Japan would be submitted but to more than one power, which instead of acting together, as they have done till now, for the general benefit of the country, and the progress profitable to all, would only occupy themselves with watching and restraining each other. But as it is not possible, to repeat it once more, to suppose such designs to any one of the powers, it remains only to hold on provisionally to the existing treaties, save to draw from the events such advantages as the circumstances will allow, and as might be obtained together by the powers for the common benefit. So one is brought back to the daylight of the diplomatic dominion, and to the logic of the clear situation. The foreigners exist in Japan by virtue of international conventions, which have been more than once amply and sincerely confirmed by the government with which they had been concluded, and especially by the present Tycoon. The representatives of the powers have solemnly recognized the loyalty of this prince and the spirit which his government brought to the execution of these treaties. The Tycoon has neither renounced to govern nor to execute the treaties. Far from this, one could rather believe that he would be ready to extend them, and to put himself at the head of the foreign party. And then in the part of Japan which will obey the authority of the Tycoon, the foreigners would be certain, without it being necessary to make new stipulations, to find complete security. Are we assured of the same advantages with the adversaries of the Tycoon? It results evidently from what precedes, that it would be hazardous to have faith in the first declarations which they certainly will not fail to make to us. En resumé, therefore, and for the moment the right and the duty of the powers appear to be exclusively to provide, if necessary by force, for the security of the foreigners, and for the maintenance of the treaties, without changing anything in the diplomatic situation, until the events have by themselves and without any intervention, either open or secret, disengaged the representatives from the obligations they would observe in every other country, and from which they cannot depart here without causing serious damages to the honor and perhaps to the interest of the country which every one of them represent. KOBE, February 6, 1868. LEON ROCHES. HIOGO, February 6, 1868. Since the abandonment of the cattle at Osaka by the Tycoon, and the reception from his ministers of the communication dated 30th January, 1868, the undersigned have no knowledge of the existence of a general government in Japan. The government of the Tycoon, which appeared able to give some guarantees for the faithful execution of the treaties, and to which for this reason the undersigned have always given their moral support, has broken down in the course of a few days, and the open ports of Osaka and Hiogo have been abandoned by the troops and officials of the heretofore so-called government, while the apparently victorious party has not yet thought fit to communicate with the foreign representatives. The undersigned, therefore, think it their duty to lay down in a few words the principles by which their future action will be guided. They wish to preserve a perfect and faithful neutrality between the contending parties, concentrating all their efforts upon the protection of the lives and interests of their countrymen. They will neither treat with any single prince or coalition, nor support the former Tycoon against his enemies, but will only enter into communication with the Mikado or such de facto governments as hold any of the open ports. They agree between themselves not to accept any communication from any of the contending parties not addressed to all the foreign representatives, or to negotiate separately with them, but to act conjointly for the best of the general and common interests they represent. The bases on which they will enter into communication with such party as may offer sufficient guarantees to them for the execution of its engagements are 1st. The full and unreserved recognition of all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded between their respective governments, or their representatives, and the government of the Tycoon up to this day. zd. A reliable guarantee for the execution of the stipulations contained in such treaties, &c., and for the safety of the lives and property of their countrymen, as well as for the re-establishment and protection of their commercial interests. 3d. Full and ample satisfaction for the outrage committed on the 4th of February, 1868, by Japanese troops at Kobé, and a guarantee that no similar outrage shall hereafter be committed. NOTE. This memorandum was not signed, but the general principles and conditions were assented to by the representatives, and have in a great measure governed our subsequent action. FEBRUARY 18. M. Roches to Mr. Van Valkenburgh. [Translation.] (KOBÉ,) HIOGO, February 9, 1868. MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: I have the honor to inform you that I leave to the Baron Brin, attaché of the legation of France in Japan, the duty of representing France after my departure, in the quality of chargé d'affaires ad interim. I communicate to you at the same time the conditions under which this mandate is confided to the Baron Brin. I am happy, in parting, to hope that the Baron Brin will find with you the help and cordial sympathy which I ask from you for him, and which has rendered to me personally so precious the relations I have had the pleasure to maintain with you. Receive, sir, and dear colleague, the assurances of my high consideration. LEON ROCHES. General VAN VALKENBURGH, Minister of the United States of America in Japan. [Translation.] Copy of instructions to Baron Brin, attaché of the legation of France in Japan, at Hiogo. HIOGO, February 9, 1868. SIR: I have the honor to inform you that in consequence of the gravity of the circumstances, and the particular nature of events we have witnessed, I believe that I ought not to leave to any one the duty of giving the necessary information to my government. I go, to this effect, to Yokohama, and leave to you, in the quality of chargé d'affaires ad interim, the care of representing France in Japan. The line of conduct you will have to follow, until you will have received other instructions, confines itself to the protection of the naval and national interests of France, and to agree to the decisions which will be taken conjointly, by the representatives of foreign powers, in order to maintain in fact and in appearance the mutual understanding of such representatives, which has already produced and will produce such happy results. I am convinced that you will find with my colleagues the most complete and cordial help to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission I confide to you. I transmit to every one of my colleagues a copy of the present instructions, which, if necessary, will serve to accredit you near the government which will be recognized de facto, in that part of Japan where the interests of our countrymen are already engaged. Receive, sir, the assurance of my very distinguished consideration, LEON ROCHES, The Minister of France in Japan. Mr. Van Valkenburgh to M. Roches. No. 27.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN JAPAN, MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, in which you inform me that you leave Baron Brin as chargé d'affaires ad interim, as well as a copy of the instructions you have been pleased to give him. While I deeply regret by your departure the sundering of the pleasant official and personal relations which have existed between us while in Japan, I assure you that nothing shall be wanting upon my part to make those relations equally friendly and cordial with the Baron. I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant, His Excellency M. LEON ROCHES, R. B. VAN VALKENBURGH, Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., &c., &c. No. 12.] Mr. Van Valkenburgh to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I have the honor to inform you that on the 14th instant I received from Higashi Kuze Saki No Shosho, the envoy of the Mikado, a communication, stating that in consequence of the revolt of Tokigawa Yoshinobu, (the Tycoon,) a prince of the blood of the second rank had been appointed commander-in chief of the army of execution, and also asking that strict neutrality be observed on the part of citizens of the United States. Similar letters were addressed to each of the foreign representatives at the same time. I inclose a copy, marked No. 1. We immediately held a conference and had the matter under discussion from day to day until the 18th instant, when, after careful examination, we agreed upon the terms of a notice to be issued by us respectively, and bearing date on that day. I inclose, marked No. 2, a printed copy of the one issued, and No. 3, copies of those issued by my colleagues, the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Prussia. I also enclose (No. 4) copy of my letter transmitting these notices to the United States consul at Kanagawa, similar letters having been forwarded by me to the vice-consul at Nagasaki and the consular agents at Hiogo and Osaka. I shall also, by the first opportunity, send copies of the notice to the acting consul general at Shanghai, and also to Hakodadi. It is now more than sixteen days since we have heard from Yokohama direct, the opportunities for communication being very few. At that time the Stonewall had not arrived. Whether she has since arrived and been delivered to the Tycoon it is impossible for me to say. I have not been informed of the nature of the instructions given to her commander, and do not know the expected time of arrival. The question of her delivery, under this complication of affairs, has given me great trouble. I am informed by the representative of Great Britain that there are several men-of-war which have been built in England for some of the Daimios, now acting with the Mikado, on their way out for delivery, and one or two of them are almost daily expected. The situation of affairs is such that the delivery of these vessels at this juncture might prolong this unhappy contest to an interminable length, and have the effect to ruin all foreign trade and commerce in this country. The Tycoon is still strong east of the Hakim Mountains, having Yedo for his capital, and nearly one-half of Japan is said to favor his position and may fight under his banner. He has the Kaio Maro, a beautiful frigate of about 2,500 tons measurement, and carrying twenty-six guns, built expressly for him in Holland, the Fusiyama, built in the United States, and several steam and sailing vessels and gunboats of smaller size. Some of the Daimios, now in alliance with the Mikado, have each several steamers and gunboats, each party being possessed of quite a squadron. I am of the opinion that there is but one vessel in all the squadrons now in these waters that can successfully compete with the Stonewall if she were properly managed, and that vessel is the English iron-clad Ocean. Such, also, is the opinion of all the naval officers with whom I have consulted upon the subject, or heard express an opinion. The Tycoon, with the Stonewall in his possession, would at once command the seas; could blockade successfully Osaka, Hiogo, and Nagasaki, all now in possession of the Mikado, cutting off all communication, and thus prevent the carrying on of any business, and endanger the lives and property of our countrymen. After mature deliberation and frequent consultation with all my colleagues, who agree with me upon this question, I have written a letter to Mr. Portman, secretary of our legation, who is now at Yokohama, and instructed him, in case the Stonewall should not have been delivered to the Tycoon before the reception of my letter, to prevent such delivery if possible, and to detain her at Yokohama, or send her to Hong Kong for détention until I shall have returned, when I will probably cause her further detention until I have received instructions through you, sir, in regard to her. I believe it to be the only course I can pursue under the circumstances, having due regard for the honor and the interests of our government I inclose (No. 5) copy of my letter to Mr. Portman upon this subject. I have asked Mr. Portman to communicate to the department such infor mation as he may obtain at Yedo and Yokohama during my absence from those places. Trusting that my action in this matter will be approved by the Presi dent and yourself, and that I shall soon be favored with in structions, I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, R. B. VAN VALKENBURGH. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. [Translation.] FEBRUARY 14, 1868. SIR: In consequence of the revolt of Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Munragi No Miyra, a prince of the blood and of the second rank, has been appointed commander-in chief of the army of execution. The government of the United States being neutral, it is not to be supposed that assistance of any kind will be given to Tokugawa Yoshinobu, either by transporting his troops or those of Daimios acting under his orders, or by importing arms or vessels of war, or by lending the service of American officers or soldiers. I have the honor to propose to you that you should notify citizens of the United States to this effect, and that your government should take measures in order to the preservation of strict neutrality. I have the honor to be, HIGASHI KUZA SAKI NO SHOSHO. American Minister. His Excellency R. B. VAN VALKENBURGH, Notice. Having been officially informed that war exists in Japan between his Majesty the Mikado and the Tycoon, and being desirous of taking measures to secure the observ ance of a strict neutrality on the part of citizens of the United States of America, I give notice to such citizens that active participation in this war, by entering into service, the sale or charter of vessels of war or transport ships for the transportation of troops, the transportation of troops, military persons, military dispatches, arins, ammuni tion, or articles contraband of war, to or for either of the contending parties, and similar acts, constitute, according to international law, a breach of neutrality, and may therefore be treated as hostile acts. Persons in such military service would subject themselves to the rules of war, while ships and other means of conveyance engaged in a breach of neutrality would render themselves liable to capture and confiscation, which rule may extend to cargo belonging to neutrals. Such breaches would also involve the citizen and vess 1 in the danger of forfeiting claim to the protection of their government, as well as the rights and privileges granted by the treaty between the United States and Japan. R. B. VAN VALKENBURGH, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN JAPAN, |