they were apprised, or with proper care could have known of circumstances which indicated that someone would be injured unless the disorderly passenger or stranger were ejected or controlled. Thus in one case where the facts were that in a fight upon a car between some drunken men, the conductor did not exert himself to suppress it as he should have done, and the plaintiff, a passenger who was not concerned in it, lost an eye, a verdict against the company was sustained; and it was said by the appellate court, "we cannot perceive the force of the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, wherein he endeavors to raise a distinction between accidents arising from negligence in the equipment or management of the train and those arising from the misconduct of passengers upon it. If the employees of the road had no control or power over passengers, this argument would be sound. But they have 6. In United Railways, etc., Co. a crowded train, and after a fight v. State, 93 Md. 619, 49 Atl. 923, 86 Am. St. Rep. 453, the plaintiff's intestate was riding as a pas senger on the defendant's cars, and while so riding was assaulted by a drunken and disorderly person. Without any provocation the drunken person struck plaintiff's intestate a blow which later resulted in his death. It appeared that before the blow was struck, the drunken passenger had assaulted another passenger in the same car, and he had been ejected by the servants of the company for such act. He, however, got on the car again when it started, and, the servants of the company making no attempt to put him off, so remained. In a suit for wrongfully causing the death of plaintiff's intestate, the company was held guilty of negligence. So in Railroad Co. v. McEwan, 21 Ky. L. R. 487, 51 S. W. Rep. 619, where drunken negroes were on had occurred and a race collision seemed imminent, the conductor merely put them out of the car and upon the platform, where they were free to renew the conflict when opportunity offered, and a passenger consequently was shot by one of them, the company was held liable. For similar cases and results see Lucy v. Railway Co., 64 Minn. 7, 31 L. R. A. 551, 65 N. W. Rep. 944 (use of profane language towards a lady after conductor failed to interfere on complaint); Railroad Co. v. Jefferson, 89 Ala. 554, 16 S. E. Rep. 69, 32 Am. St. Rep. 87, 17 L. R. A. 571 (abuse of negro passenger by drunken men); Railway v. Flake, 114 Tenn. 671, 88 S. W. Rep. 326 (boy shot by drunken passengers who had been shooting off dynamite sticks); Railroad Co. v. son (Tex. Civ. App.), 82 S. W. Rep. 1065 (negro compelled to Hender such power, and they are just as responsible for its proper exercise as they are for the proper running of the train. Sec. 985. (§ 551.) Same subject-Duty of carrier to guard against careless use of firearms. The carrier is also bound to exercise the utmost vigilance in guarding against the negligent and careless use of firearms, and in a number of cases the carrier has been held liable for injuries to passengers, resulting from their use, which might reasonably have been anticipated or naturally expected to have occurred in view of all the circumstances and of the number and character of the persons on the carrier's vehicle. This rule was first applied in Flint v. The Transportation Company. In that case a number of disorderly soldiers were upon the boat, as the plaintiff went upon it after he had engaged his passage, through a crowd of whom he had to pass. As he did so, a musket in the hands of one of them was accidentally discharged, the ball from which struck the plaintiff and wounded him severely. It was not shown that the officers of the boat made any effort to quiet or remove these disorderly persons, or to warn the passengers of dance, by drunken passengers, at point of revolver); Railway Co. r. Sherbert (Tex. Civ. App.), 42 S. W. Rep. 639 (use of indecent language before ladies after a vain complaint to the conductor). In Blain v. Railway Co., 5 Ont. L. R. 334, 2 Canadian Ry. Cases, 85, affirmed in Railway Co. v. Blain, 34 S. C. R. 74, 3 Canadian Ry. Cases, 143, a passenger was assaulted several times by a drunken man. The conductor was informed of the assaults, but refused to do anything, and a judgment on the verdict of the jury was affirmed in favor of the plaintiff. Evidence of the improper relations between the plaintiff and the wife of his assailant, alleged as provocation for the assaults, was held to have been properly rejected, for if the plaintiff was conducting himself properly on the train, he was entitled to the same measure of protection as any other passenger. 7. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. v. Pillow, 76 Penn. St. 510. 8. Northern Commercial Co. r. Nestor, C. C. A. 133 Fed. 383; Wright v. Railroad Co., 4 Colo. App. 102, 35 Pac. Rep. 196; Railroad Co. v. McEwan, 21 Ky. L. R. 487, 51 S. W. Rep. 619; Railway v. Flake, 114 Tenn. 671, 88 S. W. Rep. 326; West Memphis Packet Co. r. White, 99 Tenn. 256, 41 S. W. Rep. 583, 38 L. R. A. 427. See also, Railway Co. v. Long, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 664, 36 S. W. Rep. 485. 9. 6 Blatch. 158; 34 Conn. 554. the danger. The trial court, in charging the jury, laid down the above rule which was held correct on appeal. So in the case of The New Orleans, etc. Railroad v. Burke,10 the facts were that the passenger was taunted and abused by a disorderly crowd of men upon the train, and was finally shot and wounded by one of them, and the conductor, so far from having used all the efforts in his power to quell the disturbance, showed timidity, shrank from his duty, and retreated from the scene of the difficulty while it was in progress. An action for the injury was brought against the company, and the jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, it was sustained in the appellate court, Chalmers, J., after a learned discussion of the question of the degree of the responsibility of the carrier in such cases, stating the law to be that "the undoubted power which is vested in railroad officials to preserve peace and good order on their trains, and, if necessary for this purpose, to eject therefrom turbulent and disorderly persons, carries with it the absolute duty to exercise the power when called upon so to do in a proper case by the other passengers; that a failure to discharge this duty stands, to some extent, upon the same footing as the omission to perform any other official duty, and, upon the maxim respondeat superior, renders the corporation liable." But in such instances the duty of the carrier is fulfilled when he has exercised the force at his command to prevent injury, and if an injury follows when the carrier has so performed his duty, he is not guilty of any wrong and consequently cannot be held liable.11 Sec. 986. Same subject-Carrier's duty to protect passengers from injuries by strikers.-A railway company is not guilty of negligence in attempting to operate its cars during a strike of its employes, unless the conditions are such that it 10. 53 Miss. 200. But in a later road Co., 67 Miss. 376, 7 S. Rep. case the court dissent from this 320. salutary doctrine and announce their intention to review it when occasion offers. Royston v. Rail 11. Fall v. Steam Packet Co., 90 Md. 248, 44 Atl. Rep. 1007, 47 L. R. A. 120; Railway Co. v. Boyle, knows, or ought reasonably to anticipate, that it cannot do so and at the same time guard from violence, by the exercise of the utmost care on its part, those who accept its implied invitation to become passengers. Nor will it be guilty of negligence if it fails to avail itself of extraordinary precautions or means of protection not commonly employed, such as pulling down the blinds of the car or stretching heavy canvas over the windows outside the car in order to better protect those within from objects thrown by a mob, for it is chargeable with only ordinary care and prudence to guard against the lawless acts of third persons not under its direct control.12 On the other hand, a railroad company cannot invite trouble by needlessly receiving into its train with other passengers men whom it has good reason to believe will expose the occupants of the car to injuries on account of enmity between them and strikers. In Chicago, etc. Railroad Co. v. Pillsbury,13 the railroad company stopped its train at a station where a strike was in progress and received into one of its cars with the other passengers a number of men who had been imported to take the place of strikers in a large manufacturing establishment. Against these men the strikers manifested the greatest indignation and were prevented from doing them violence only by the presence of armed guards. After receiving them on board, the train ran on a short distance further, when it stopped before crossing another road. Immediately upon its stopping it was boarded by a mob of the strikers, who began an assault with clubs, stones and pistols upon the imported operatives in the car, and in the melee that ensued the plaintiff, who was a passenger upon the train, was seriously injured. For this injury the company was held liable, on the ground that by stopping its train and receiving into its. cars these men whose presence it had good reason to believe would provoke attack, it had negligently and wrongfully exposed its other passengers to injury. 115 Ga. 836, 42 S. E. Rep. 242, 59 L. R. A. 104. 12. Fewings v. Mendenhall, 88 Minn. 336, 93 N. W. Rep. 127, 97 Am. St. Rep. 519, 60 L. R. A. 601. 13. 123 III. 9. Sec. 987. Same subject-Duty of carrier to protect passenger from arrest.-The carrier is not required to resist an officer of the law who has apparent authority to arrest a passenger, nor is he under any duty to inquire into the legality of the arrest, or to see that the officer uses only such force as is necessary to make the arrest. If he has notice that the arrest is wrongful, it would be his duty to make inquiry into the matter, and, if justified, to interfere. But where the arrest is by officers of the law and is apparently regular, and there is nothing to put the carrier on notice that the arrest is illegal, the carrier will not be bound to interfere with the officers and prevent the arrest. Having a right to presume that the arrest is legal, his obeying the command of the officers is no breach of duty to the passenger.14 Sec. 988. Same subject-Duty of carrier to protect its passengers against acts of violence by passengers who have been ejected or who have alighted.-The duty of the carrier to protect its passengers is not limited to conduct exhibited in the interior of its vehicles, but applies as well to assaults by passengers who have been ejected or who have alighted from them. And if injury to passengers is threatened from outside of the train of a railroad company, it should be averted precisely the same as if impending on any of the company's platforms or in any of its apartments. It would be a lame rule, it is said, which required nothing more than that a vicious. person should be put off the train and then left raging up and down its length, throwing missiles through its windows.15 But it will be necessary, in order to charge the railroad company with liability, that its servants knew, or under the cir cumstances should have known that injury to passengers in its vehicles from such a cause was threatened or impending.16 14. Railroad Co. v. Ponder, 117 Ga. 63, 43 S. E. Rep. 430, 97 Am. St. Rep. 152, 60 L. R. A. 713; Owens v. Railroad Co., 126 N. C 139, 35 S. E. Rep. 259, 78 Am. St. Rep. 642. 15. Spangler v. Railway Co., 68 Kan, 46, 74 Pac. Rep. 607, 63 L. R. A. 634, 104 Am. St. Rep. 391. 16. Brown v. Railway Co., 139 Fed. 972, C. C. A. |