money, though believed by both parties to be genuine, is not a good payment, the passenger who has paid his fare or bought. a ticket with counterfeit money, though innocently, must pay in genuine money when the fact is discovered, and if discovered before the journey is completed, he may be ejected if he refuses to make it good.15 Sec. 1027. Same subject-Effect of statutory requirement that conductor wear badge to show his authority to collect fares. Although a statute may require a conductor to show his authority to collect fares and tickets by wearing a badge, indicating his office, in a conspicuous place, wherever a passenger recognizes a conductor as such without a badge, the carrier will not be liable where the conductor ejects the passenger on his refusal to pay fare for other reasons.1 13. Tickets. 16 Sec. 1028. (§ 568.) The contract to carry-Tickets.-A great proportion of passenger travel is done without an express contract between the carrier and his passenger; and the number of those who travel as passengers upon street railways, omnibuses, hackney-coaches, ferry-boats and the like, which are used by great numbers of persons ily, as a convenient means of having themselves transported for short distances, and for the carriage upon which an express contract is rarely made, is much greater than of those who travel on long journeys, and whose carriage is generally undertaken by express contract. Passengers, however, who are carried under the contract which, as has been seen, is always implied in behalf of those who are being lawfully carried in public conveyances, have thrown around them the best protection which the law can afford, in the high degree of responsibility for care and diligence which it imposes upon the carrier. The right to this protection is generally, although not necessarily, evidenced by 15. Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Chastine, 54 Miss. 503. 16. Cox v. Railway Co., 109 Cal. 100, 41 Pac. Rep. 794. a ticket which may be either in the form of a mere check, showing the points between which the passenger is entitled to be carried, or in the form of a receipt and an express contract containing an acknowledgment of the receipt of the passenger's fare, and the obligation to carry him for the purposes and upon the terms specified. If the ticket is a mere check, the passenger is not obliged to read conditions on its back, nor is he bound by them without his express assent. But, if the ticket purports to be a contract ticket, of a kind and size that no one who could read could glance at it without seeing that it undertakes expressly to govern the conduct of the parties until the passenger arrives at his destination, the passenger will be expected to read it, and if he fails to do so, he will nevertheless be bound by its lawful stipulations. The fact that it is not signed by the passenger will be immaterial,17 although any restrictions or limitations upon the passenger's rights must be supported by some consideration in the shape of a reduced fare, or otherwise.18 But the mere fact, it is said, that the passenger pays a reduced fare for his ticket will be sufficient to put him on notice that the ticket may contain restrictions upon the carrier's liability, and, by accepting such a ticket, he will be bound by its lawful limitations. Sec. 1029. (§ 569.) Such tickets in universal use. Such tickets are of universal use in railroad travel; and the fact that railway carriers of passengers, from the numbers they carry, the great rapidity and regularity with which their trains must be run, the constant changes which are taking 17. Fonseca v. Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 553, 27 N. E. Rep. 665; Aiken . Railway Co., 118 Ga. 118, 44 S. E. Rep. 828, 98 Am. St. Rep. 107; Steers v. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 1; Wilton v. S. Nav. Co., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 453; Lindsey v. Steamship Co., 88 N. Y. Supp. 371; Boyd v. Spencer, 103 Ga. 828, 30 S. E. Rep. 841, 68 Am. St. Rep. 146; Norman v. Railway Co., 65 S. Car. 517, 44 S. E. Rep. 83, 95 See also post, § 1052. 18. Walker v. Price, 62 Kan. 327, 62 Pac. Rep. 1001, 84 Am. St. Rep. 392; Railroad Co. r. Turner, 100 Tenn. 214, 47 S. W. Rep. 223, 43 L. R. A. 140; Norman v. Railway Co., 65 S. Car. 517, 44 S. E. Rep. 83, 95 Am. St. Rep. 809. place in their passengers at every station, and the dispatch with which all the details of the business of such trains must be attended to whilst in motion, cannot be afforded the opportunity to collect his fare from each passenger while upon their trains, has made it necessary to allow to such companies, in the matter of making and enforcing regulations as to the purchase and exhibition of such tickets, when required, a power but little less than absolute. For a refusal to comply with all reasonable by-laws and regulations upon this subject, such carriers have the undoubted right to eject the passenger from their cars; and this right will depend only upon the question whether such regulations are reasonable, with reference to all the circumstances and requirements of the business for the interest of the carrier, and to the convenience and accommodation of the public. Sec. 1030. (§ 569a.) Duty to sell tickets to those applying for them. Where the purchase of tickets is required, as it may be, or where they are put on sale and any advantage arises from their possession, it is undoubtedly the duty of the company to furnish them without discrimination to all persons applying for them who are ready and willing to pay for them and who are entitled to be accepted as passengers. Thus it was held that while a railroad company is under no legal obligation to sell commutation tickets, yet having established commutation rates and offered such tickets to the public, it could not without just reason discriminate against a particular individual by refusing to sell them to him. Performance of the duty to sell was enforced by mandamus.19 19. Atwater v. Railroad Co., 48 N. J. L. 55. But see Spafford v. Railroad Co., 128 Mass. 326. A railroad company which sells mileage tickets must sell them impartially to all the public who apply for them. Larrison v. Railway Co., 1 Interstate Com. Rep. 147; In re Passenger Tariffs, 2 id. 649. A discrimination in rates in favor of a special class of passengers, e. g., commercial travelers, on the ground that they are supposed to create freight traffic for the road, is not justifiable (Larrison v. Railway Co., 1 Interstate Com. Rep. 147); nor on the ground that thereby the carrier's present or future business Sec. 1031. Effect of exchange of tickets on stipulations therein. At any time before entering upon the journey, a passenger may exchange one ticket with its limitations for another containing different stipulations, and the old stipulations with the cancellation of the old ticket furnish the consideration for the substitution of the new ticket.20 Sec. 1032. (§ 570.) Carrier may require passengers to purchase tickets and exhibit them before entering trains. It is undoubtedly competent for a railroad company, as a means of protection against imposition and to facilitate the transaction of its business, to require passengers to procure tickets before entering the car,21 and where this requirement is duly made known and reasonable opportunities are afforded for complying with it,22 it may be enforced either by expulsion from the train regardless of a tender of the fare in money,23 or, as will will be thereby stimulated; or the settlement of the country promoted; or that those in whose favor the discrimination is made are persons of small means intending to settle in the northwest (Smith v. Railroad Co., 1 Interstate Com. Rep. 208); but there is nothing illegal in making a rate for emigrants as a class, and refusing to give the same rate to others to whom different accommodations are furnished. Savery v. Railroad Co., 2 Interstate Com. Rep. 338. 20. O'Regan v. Steamship Co.. 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. Rep. 1070, 39 Am. St. Rep. 484. 21. Cleveland, etc. R. Co. 1. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Rai!road Co. v. Louthan, 80 Ill. App. 579; Mills v. Railway Co., 94 Tex. 242, 59 S. W. Rep. 874, 55 L. R. A. 497, reversing (Tex. Civ. App.) 57 S. W. Rep. 291. 22. See following section. 23. Reese . Railroad Co., 131 Penn, St. 422. See also, Lane t. Railroad Co., 5 Lea, 124; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelson, 59 Ill. 110; Jones v. Railway Co., 17 Mo. App. 158; Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 77 Ind. 507; Falkner r. Railway Co., 55 Ind. 369; Toledo, etc. R'y Co. v. Wright, 68 Ind. 586; Lake Shore R'y Co. v. Greenwood, 79 Penn. St. 373; Poole r. Railroad Co., 16 Ore. 261; Reese r. Penn. Co., 131 Penn. St. 422; Swan r. Railroad Co., 132 Mass. 116; Hoffbauer v. Railroad Co., 52 Iowa, 342; McCook v. Northup, 65 Ark. 225, 45 S. W. Rep. 547; Railroad Co. v. Kilpatrick, 67 Ark. 47, 54 S. W. Rep. 971, citing Hutch, on Carr. In the first edition of this work the learned author expressed the following opinion in the text of this section: "If, however, in disregard or ignorance of such regu be seen in the following section, by requiring the payment of a larger fare upon the train than that for which the ticket might have been procured.24 So it is held to be a reasonable regulation to require passengers to exhibit their tickets to a gate-keeper and have them punched before entering the train, and the con.pany may enforce such a regulation or prevent its violation by the use of such reasonable force as is necessary to that end,25 although lation (that passengers shall procure tickets as a condition of the right to enter the cars), one who desired to be carried, without any fraudulent intent to impose upon the carrier, should obtain entrance into a car, he could not be treated as a trespasser, and would be entitled to the rights of a passenger; and, not being there with any dishonest or unlawful purpose, if ready and willing to pay the price of his carriage when demanded, he could not be ejected for his previous noncompliance with the regulation, but might demand his carriage to his intended destination upon an offer to pay according to the carrier's rates. How ever reasonable such a condition might be as a regulation for the convenience of the carrier, a failure to comply with it before the inception of the journey could not be considered as a reasonable ground for ejecting the passenger after it had commenced." This language is approved in Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea, 438. The statement of the present text seems, however, to be sustained by the authorities. Most of the cases were cases where freight trains were in question, but in the Reese Case the rule is said to apply as well to passenger trains. 24. See the following section: 25. Dickerman v. Union Depot Co., 44 Minn. 433. Said Gilfillan, C. J.: "No claim is made, and none could well be made, against the reasonableness of the rules of the defendant requiring persons passing through the gates for the purpose of taking trains to exhibit their tickets to the gatekeeper and have them punched by him, and providing that no passenger shall be allowed to pass out of any gate after the train indicated by his ticket has started, or to board any train while in motion. Such or similar rules would seem absolutely necessary to preserve to the defendant control of its grounds, and to enable it to receive and discharge passengers with order, and to the safety, comfort and convenience of the passengers. All persons having notice of such rules, and a reasonable opportunity to comply with them, are bound to observe them in order to have a right to pass through the gates or to take a train at defendant's depot; and the defendant has a right to enforce such rules, and to prevent their violation, and to use such force as may be reason |