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most strongly against the carrier. In order to be effective, however, limitations as to time of use must be made known to the public in such a way and by such means as, in the special case, may be necessary and best adapted to serve the convenience and purpose of the passenger as well as of the carrier. As to what notice of limitations is required or is sufficient in order to reach and affect the public, the authorities are by no means agreed, the difference of opinion arising from the fact that some authorities regard such limitations as in the nature of regulations adopted by the carrier for the better management of its business, while others regard them as matters of contract between the passenger and carrier. The latter seems to be the better rule and, under it, a person who purchases a general ticket, and pays the usual price therefor, is entitled to one passage, unlimited as to time, upon any train which, under the proper and usual schedules of the road, stops at the point of the passenger's destination. If a ticket limited or conditional is sold to a passenger, it can only be done upon an express agreement with him, either oral or in writing, and either based upon a consideration, or with the alternative presented to the passenger of a full and unlimited ticket. The mere stamping or printing of a limitation or condition upon the face or back of a ticket, and the acceptance of such ticket by the passenger, without more, are not sufficient to bind him to such condition or limitation, in the absence of actual notice. to him of such condition or limitation and his assent thereto when he purchases his ticket. Nor will the posting of notices in the waiting rooms, ticket offices, and on the cars affect purchasers with notice in such cases. Passengers have but little time or opportunity to read such placards; and, it would impose quite a serious burden upon travel to hold that the pub

956, 23 So. Rep. 583; Malott v. Woods, 109 Ill. App. 512; Schubach 1. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163, 78 S. W. Rep. 1020, 65 L. R. A. 136, 101 Am. St. Rep. 452; Demilly v. Railroad Co. 91 Tex. 215, 42 S. W. Rep.

548; Maxson v. Railroad Co., 97 N. Y. Supp. 962.

3. Railway Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind. App. 135, 60 N. E. Rep. 169, 87 Am. St. Rep. 245.

lic must read all these notices thus posted before taking passage on a train upon which they are willing to and do pay full fare.1 This rule by no means prevents a carrier from selling special tickets for special trains with limitations and conditions, such as excursion, round-trip, commutation and mileage tickets, when the conditions and limitations are known to the purchaser and assented to by him orally or in writing, and he has paid for such ticket less than the usual fare. When tickets

4. Railroad Co. v. Turner, 100 Tenn. 213, 47 S. W. Rep. 223, 43 L. R. A. 140; Norman v. Railway Co., 65 S. Car. 517, 44 S. E. Rep. 83, 95 Am. St. Rep. 809; Dagnall r. Railway Co., 69 S. Car. 110, 48 S. E. Rep. 97; Railroad Co. r. Gaines, 99 Ky. 411, 36 S. W. Rep. 174, 59 Am. St. Rep. 465; Rail'road Co. v. Baldoni, 115 Ga. 1013, 42 S. E. Rep. 364; Boyd v. Spencer, 103 Ga. 828, 30 S. E. Rep. 841, 68 Am. St. Rep. 146.

Actual knowledge is sufficient. McGhee v. Drisdale, 111 Ala. 597, 20 So. Rep. 391.

"A passenger has a right to be conveyed in the cars of a railroad company without making any special contract for transportation. Upon payment of the usual fare, the company is bound to convey him, and is under all the obligations imposed by law on common carriers, so far as they relate to him as a passenger. It is competent to vary these obligations by a special agreement, on valuable consideration, between the passenger and the company. But if the passenger chooses to do so, he may stand on his legal rights, and elect to be carried to his destination without making any special contract. The mere purchase of a ticket does not constitute a con

tract. Before the ordinary liability of the railroad company can be varied, there must be a consent of the passenger, founded on valuable consideration. The ticket ordinarily is only a token, showing that the passenger has paid his fare. But where the ticket is sold at less than the usual rates, on the condition that it shall not be used after a limited time, if the passenger accepts and uses the ticket, he makes a contract with the company according to the terms stated, and the reduction in the fare is the consideration for his contract. It is true he pays his fare before he receives the ticket, but if he has been misled or misinformed, by the seller of the ticket, as to its terms, he has a right to return the ticket and receive back his money. The railroad company agrees to carry him at the reduced rate, upon the conditions stated on the face of his ticket; if he agrees to those terms, the contract is consummated; but he cannot take advantage of the reduction of the rate and reject the terms on which alone the reduction was made. Pennington v. Railroad Co., 62 Md. 95.

See also, Pennsylvania Co. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. St. 142.

are sold at reduced rates, the purchaser should, in consideration of such reduced fare or greater privileges, expect and look for some conditions, limitations, and terms different from those attaching to tickets generally, and be on his guard to become informed of them. But there is no such obligation on the ordinary passenger who pays the usual or full fare and asks for no reduced rates or special privileges; and he has a right to expect an unlimited ticket.

Some courts, however, regard limitations, as to the time of use of a ticket, as regulations of the carrier and not as matters of contract between the carrier and the passenger. If that view be correct, it necessarily follows that the passenger must take notice of such a regulation as he must do of all other reasonable rules and regulations of the carrier. Notice of a time limitation on the ticket would therefore be sufficient, and the mere posting of a notice that tickets are limited, without printing on the ticket or other notification, has been held to be sufficient to bring to the passenger knowledge of the limitation so as to make it binding on him. This view seems hardly tenable in the light of modern authorities.

If the more modern rule be correct, and a time limitation is a matter of contract and not of mere regulation by the carrier, a distinction should be noted between tickets which are mere tokens or checks not purporting to be contracts between the carrier and the purchaser, but which only indicate the route over which the passenger is to be carried, and contract tickets. In the first class of tickets, the purchaser is not presumed to look for limitations.

5. See cases cited in preceding note, and also Elliott v. Southern Pacific Co., 145 Cal. 441, 79 Pac. Rep. 420, 68 L. R. A. 393; Railway Co. r. Ricks, 109 Ga. 339, 34 S. E. Rep. 570; Grogan v. Railway Co., 39 W. Va. 415, 19 S. E. Rep. 563, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Railway Co. v. Howard, 111 Ga. 842, 36 S. E. Rep. 213; Churchill v. Railroad

In contract tickets which no

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person who could read could glance at without seeing that they purport to govern the relation of carrier and passenger in detail, the ordinary purchaser is presumed to look for such limitations. But even in the latter case, the limitations must be supported by an adequate consideration in the shape of a reduced rate, or otherwise.8

Sec. 1044. Same subject.-The chief use of a passenger ticket is to identify the holder as a person who has paid his fare or has otherwise complied with conditions entitling him to carriage, and this use of it is ordinarily made when the holder offers himself to be carried; hence, where nothing is expressed to the contrary, a stipulation purporting to limit the use of a ticket to a specified time is construed as fixing that time as the latest for commencing and not for completing the journey.9

It has also been held that when a railway passenger ticket contains a clause, "Continuous passage within one day of date of sale," and a certain date is stamped upon it, such date is presumptively the date of its sale, and if presented at a subsequent date, its holder is not entitled to have it accepted as valid. But if sold on another date than that stamped upon it, it is good from the date of sale and not from the date inserted in the ticket.10

8. Where the passenger purchases a ticket for transportation from one point to another over the road of a common carrier, and pays full or regular ordinary fare, the ticket is not intended as a contract itself, but as а mere token or evidence of a contract which the law creates and which lies behind the ticket. In such case the law makes the contract and regulates the reciprocal rights and duties of both carrier and passenger, and the ticket is a mere token that such contract

exists, and, under it, the passen-
ger is entitled to be carried to
and from the points named with-
out regard to time limitations
printed upon it. Boling v. Rail-
road Co.,
Mo.
88 S. W.
Rep. 35. See also, Walker C.
Price, 62 Kan. 327, 62 Pac. Rep.
1001, 84 Am. St. Rep. 392, citing
Hutch. on Carr.

9. Morningstar v. Railroad Co., 135 Ala. 251, 33 So. Rep. 156.

10. Ellsworth v. Railway Co., 95 Iowa, 98, 63 N. W. 584, 29 L. R. A. 173.

Sec. 1045. Same subject.-So when a ticket is issued by a carrier not good for passage after a certain date, if the holder of the ticket commences his journey before midnight of the last day, he is entitled to complete the passage on the ticket although it cannot be so completed before the expiration of the time fixed in the contract, and the fact that a change of trains is necessary cannot affect the right of the passenger to complete the passage on the ticket. Thus, a ticket sold on the 6th of the month, to be used within two days from its date, may be used at any time before midnight on the 8th.12 When the day upon which the ticket expires is Sunday, upon which no trains are run, it will be good for use on Monday.13 Where, however, the time has expired before the passenger has had an opportunity to use his ticket, though through the negligence of the carrier, the passenger is not entitled to ride upon it, but should pursue his remedy against the carrier for the breach of the contract;14 but this is subject to the qualification that if the passenger started in time to make his passage within the time limited, he should not suffer if any casualty or

11. Railway Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind. App. 135, 60 N. E. Rep. 169, 87 Am. St. Rep. 245; Railroad Co. V. Stephen, 13 Ky. L. R. 687; Railroad Co. v. Powell, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 212, 35 S. W. Rep. 841; Rutherford v. Railway Co., 28 Tex. Civ. App. 625, 67 S. W. Rep. 161.

Good if passage begun before midnight of last day. Evans v. Railway Co., 11 Mo. App. 463. Sufficient if trip begun before expiration. Auerbach v. Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281; Lundy v. Railroad Co., 66 Cal. 191.

Ohio St. 276, citing Shelton v.
Railroad Co., 29 Ohio St. 214;
Townsend v. Railroad Co., 56 N.
Y. 295; Frederick v. Railroad Co.,
37 Mich. 342; Lake Shore, etc.
R'y Co. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277;
Railway Co. v. Watson, 110 Ga.
681, 36 S. E. Rep. 209.

If the time has expired through the negligence of the carrier's agent in not punching the right date upon the ticket, and that fact is brought to the attention of the head office by the conductor who is instructed to honor the ticket, and the conductor of the

12. Georgia R. Co. v. Bigelow, next division refuses to honor the 68 Ga. 219.

13. Little Rock, etc. R'y Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529.

14. Pennsylvania Co. v. Hine, 41

ticket and expels the passenger from the train, the railroad will be liable. Johnson v. Railway Co., 46 Fed. 347.

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