incapacity in the initial or any connecting line made the journey impracticable within the limit.15 Sec. 1046. Same subject.-A time limitation as to the use of a ticket must be reasonable in view of all the facts and circumstances existing at the time the contract is entered into, and, if it be unreasonable, a passenger who avails himself of the first opportunity to complete his journey under the contract may do so, although the time stipulated therein has expired.16 But there is no principle of law which will authorize the passenger not to proceed under the original contract at all, but to seek to enforce a passage upon a subsequent and distinct journey commenced long after the time stipulated in the contract.17 15. Morningstar v. Railroad Co., 135 Ala. 251, 33 So. Rep. 156; Mitchell v. Railway Co., 77 Miss. 917, 27 So. Rep. 834; Myers v. Railway Co., 64 S. Car. 514, 42 S. E. Rep. 598; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 81 Miss. 208, 32 So. Rep. 309, 59 L. R. A. 742, 95 Am. St. Rep. 466. 16. Elliott v. Southern Pacific Co., 145 Cal. 441, 79 Pac. Rep. 420, 68 L. R. A. 393; Railway Co. v. Wright, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 463, 21 S. W. Rep. 399; Railway Co. v. Dennis, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 90, 23 S. W. Rep. 400; Railway Co. v. Wright, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 179, 30 S. W. Rep. 294. See also, Marx v. Railroad Co., 112 La. 1085, 36 So. Rep. 862. 17. Elliott v. Southern Pacific Co., supra. Where a ticket is "good for one seat," it means a seat on the same train upon which the holder has once taken passage, and not upon another train or upon different stages of the same journey. Dietrich v. The Railroad, 71 Penn. St. 432. But it has been held that "good for this trip only" relates to the time of using the ticket and not to its date, and that therefore the holder may retain the ticket and commence his journey on a subsequent day to its date, but that having once commenced it, it must be continuous, and if he stop over upon the route, he cannot afterwards proceed with the same ticket. Pier v. Finch, 24 Barb. 514. And where the ticket was "good for twenty days," it was said that although the holder might defer using it until the time was about to expire, yet if he commenced his trip as soon as he obtained the ticket, he must continue it to the end without stopping, and that if he stopped over for another train, he would forfeit his right to go further with the same ticket, although the twenty days had not elapsed. Hamilton v. The R. R., 51 N. Y. 100. The law was thus stated by Lott, Ch. C., but the other judges declined to express their opinions upon the point, it being unnec Sec. 1047. Same subject.-A carrier may waive the limitation as to time by accepting and receiving the owner of the ticket as a passenger after the time limited in the ticket has expired.18 But the fact that one of two tickets, not used within the time limited, was received as good does not constitute a waiver as to the other.19 Sec. 1048. (§ 577.) Rule different in case of coupon tickets. -A well-recognized distinction exists between the ordinary ticket of the carrier, which binds it to carry from point to point upon its own road, and tickets which entitle the holder not only to passage over the line of the company issuing them, but also over other connecting lines over which it is necessary for him to pass in order to reach his destination, and which are issued in what is called the coupon form and are denominated coupon tickets. When the carriage contemplated is confined to the line which issues the ticket, it is a contract solely with that line to carry the holder according to its terms, and when the transportation is once begun, both parties are held to a continuous performance until it is completed unless otherwise agreed.20 Sec. 1049. (§ 578.) Coupon ticket does not usually import contract of through carriage. But when the passenger has received from the carrier a number of such coupon tickets, one for his passage over the route of the first and others as passports over the lines of succeeding carriers, the rule applicable to common carriers of goods, by which a through bill of lading and the payment of through freight would make the first or contracting carrier responsible for their safe transportation throughout their whole route to destination, does not apply, essary to do so, there being error upon another point, upon which the judgment below was reversed. A statute giving longer life to the ticket than that expressed upon its face will not be given an extraterritorial effect. Carpenter v. Railway Co., 72 Me. 388; Bos ton, etc. R. Co. v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229. 18. Pennington v. Railroad Co., 69 Ill. App. 628. 19. Hanlon v. Railroad Co., 109 Iowa, 136, 80 N. W. Rep. 223. 20. Railroad Co. v. Klyman, 108 Tenn. 304, 67 S. W. Rep. 472, 56 and such tickets are held not to import a contract on the part of the first carrier, from whom they are received, to be responsible for the carriage of the passenger beyond its own line. In such cases the first carrier is considered rather in the light of an agent for the succeeding carriers than as undertaking for their faithful discharge of their duty, and the coupons as in the nature of separate tickets on behalf of the successive carriers, and binding upon them in the same manner as if issued by themselves.21 And the same rule of construction is applied L. R. A. 769, 91 Am. St. Rep. 755, 1039, 34 Am. St. Rep. 787, 16 L. citing Hutch. on Carr. R. A. 471. 21. Young v. Railroad Co., 115 Penn. St. 112; Auerbach v. Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281; Kerrigan v. Railroad Co., 81 Cal. 248; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell, 112 Ill. 295; Hartan v. Railroad Co., 114 Mass. 44; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Scharzenberger, 45 Penn. St. 208; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Roach, 35 Kans. 740; Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647; Railroad Co. v. Foster, 134 Ala. 244, 32 So. Rep. 773, 92 Am. St. Rep. 25, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga. 657, 23 S. E. Rep. 836, 51 Am. St. Rep. 152, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Railroad Co. v. Mulford, 162 Ill. 522, 44 N. E. Rep. 861, 35 L. R. A. 599, reversing 59 Ill. App. 479; St. Clair v. Railroad Co., 77 Miss. 789, 28 So. Rep. 957; Koenke v. Railroad Co., 57 N. Y. Supp. 325, 39 App. Div. 457; Railroad Co. v. Loftis, 72 Ohio St. 288, 74 N. E. Rep. 179, 182, 106 Am. St. Rep. 597; Nichols v. Railroad Co., 23 Ore. 123, 31 Pac. Rep. 296, 18 L. R. A. 55, 37 Am. St. Rep. 664, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Moore v. Railway Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 561, 45 S. W. Rep. 609; Railway Co. v. Looney, 85 Tex. 158, 19 S. W. The fact that a passenger knows what a coupon ticket is, and intends to purchase a ticket taking him over the defendant's line and another connecting line, warrants the inference of notice to him of a statement at the head of the ticket that the company selling the ticket acts as "agent" and that it does not intend to become responsible beyond its own line. Talcott v. Railroad Co., 159 N. Y. 461, 54 N. E. Rep. 1, reversing in part, affirming in part, 35 N. Y. Supp. 574, 89 Hun, 492; s. c. 66 Hun, 456, 21 N. Y. Supp. 318. In Dresser v. Railway Co., 116 Fed. 281, 53 C. C. A. 559, plaintiff, desiring transportation to Dawson City from Chicago, paid the defendant railroad company $362 and received in return a coupon ticket for transportation to Seattle and an order on a steamship company for transportation from Seattle to Dawson. The order stated its value at $300. It was held that there was no through contract to transport plaintif from Chicago to Dawson City, and defendant could not be held liable for a delay occurring after plaintiff left Seattle. when the question is as to responsibility for the loss of the passenger's baggage, the carriage of which is regarded as a mere incident of the carriage of the passenger.22 And consequently it has been held that, in the absence of an express contract for through transportation, or circumstances from which it will be implied, the holder of such coupon tickets is not bound to pursue his journey without intermission when it has been once begun, as in the case of a passenger whose trip is confined to the route of a single carrier, but may, at the end of each of its stages represented by such tickets, temporarily discontinue his passage without losing his right to resume it within a reasonable time.23 This rule has also been extended 22. Knight v. The Railroad, 56 Me. 234; Hartan v. The Railroad, 114 Mass. 44; Kessler v. The Railroad, 7 Lans. 62; Hood v. The Railroad, 22 Conn. 1; Elmore . The Railroad, 23 id. 457; Ellsworth v. Tartt, 26 Ala. 733; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421; Nashville, etc. R. R. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk, 852. But see, contra, Hutchins v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 181 N. Y. 186, 73 N. E. 972, 106 Am. St. Rep. 537, affirming 86 N. Y. Supp. 1138, 92 App. Div. 612. (Strong dissenting opinion citing this section.) 23. Brooke v. The Railway, 15 Mich. 332; Little Rock, etc. R'y Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529; Nichols v. Railroad Co., 23 Ore. 123, 31 Pacific Rep. 296, 18 L. R. A. 55, 37 Am. St. Rep. 664. In Auerbach v. Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281, it appeared that plaintiff at St. Louis, had purchased a coupon ticket over several lines to New York. It was "good for one continuous passage," and was to be used on or before September 26. Leaving St. Louis on the day of its purchase, plaintiff went over one line to Cincinnati, where he stayed one day; thence he went over another line to Cleveland, where he stayed a few hours; thence upon another coupon he went to Buffalo, where he arrived on the 24th and stayed one day, having then left one coupon which entitled him to a ride over defendant's road from Buffalo to New York. Being desirous of stopping at Rochester, he purchased a separate ticket to that place and went there on the 25th. On the afternoon of the 26th he entered defendant's train at Rochester for passage to New York, and tendered his ticket, which was duly accepted, and he rode upon it until the afternoon of the 27th, when a new conductor refused to honor it because it had run out, demanding the payment of fare and ejecting plaintiff. The court held the ejection wrongful; that plaintiff had a right to begin his journey on defendant's road at any point between Buffalo and New York, and that, having begun to use it before the ex to cases where passengers hold tickets having separate coupons for different divisions of the same line.24 Sec. 1050. ($ 579.) Same subject-But contract for through carriage may be so made.-There is, however, nothing in the employment of such tickets inconsistent with the idea of a contract for through transportation by the first carrier which will make him the responsible party to the passenger for all injuries or losses throughout the entire journey. It may therefore be shown that there was such a contract, notwithstanding the acceptance of such tickets, and that the tickets were delivered in pursuance of the contract; and whether or not there was such a contract must, in every case of the kind, depend upon the facts.25 In Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 26 the evidence piration of the time, he could lawfully complete his journey upon it. 24. Spencer v. Lovejoy Co., 96 Ga. 657, 23 S. E. Rep. 836, 51 Am. St. Rep. 152. 25. Cherry v. Railroad Co., 61 Mo. App. 303; s. c. 52 Mo. App. 499; Talcott v. Railroad Co., 159 N. Y. 461, 54 N. E. Rep. 1, reversing in part and affirming in part 35 N. Y. Supp. 574, 89 Hun, 492; s. c. 66 Hun, 456, 21 N. Y. Supp. 318. A railroad may, by its advertisements, treat the entire journey over its own and connecting lines as an entire trip for which it alone would be responsible, and in such case it would be liable in damages for an accident happening on the connecting carrier's lines, due to an overcrowded condition of the cars. Railroad Co. v. Dumser, 161 Ill. 190, 43 N. E. Rep. 698, affirming 60 Ill. App. 93. A railroad company selling a ticket over its own and a con necting line, which connecting line is merely the means of reaching the real terminus of its road, and to which its train is transferred, must be held responsible for any negligence during the transfer, whether by the acts or omissions of its own immediate servants or those of the connecting line by which it causes its trains to be so transferred. Railrcad Co. v. Gates, 162 Ill. 98, 44 N. E. Rep. 1118, affirming 61 Ill. App. 211. Where there is evidence tending to show the operation of the road, on which the injury occurred, by the defendant at the time of the accident, defendant cannot evade liability by showing that its charter did not authorize it to operate such road, and that the ticket held by the passenger provided that the defendant assumed no responsibility beyond its own line. Railroad Co. r. Rambo, 59 Fed. 75, 8 C. C. A. 6, 16 U. S. App. 277. 26. 17 N. Y. 306. |