stances have been brought to the attention of the English courts in actions for damages occasioned to railway passengers in this manner, and the question as to the circumstances under which the companies should be chargeable with such negligence has received much discussion;25 from which the conclusion to be drawn is that such companies must be extremely careful not to mislead their passengers into the belief that the halting of a train at a staiton is meant as an invitation to them to alight when it is not so intended; and that if the conduct of the servants engaged in its management is such as may reasonably produce that impresison, and the passenger so understands it, and in the attempt to leave the coach at a place where no facilities are provided for his doing so, and whilst in the exercise of due diligence in doing so, he is injured, the company will be liable. A fortiori is the company liable where the passenger is required to alight in a dangerous place. 26 has the right to rely upon the information given by a conductor or brakeman upon the train that it has reached the station to which he is destined, and if, relying upon such information, he leaves the train at that place, and it proves not to be the station he was informed it was, the company is liable for all the proximate damages which may ensue therefrom. Railroad Co. v. Jenkins, 15 Ky. L. R. 239. 25. Cockle v. The Railway, L. R. 7 C. P. 321; Whitaker v. The Railway, L. R. 5 C. P. 464; Foy v. The Railway, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 225; Lewis v. The Railway, L. R. 9 Q. B. 66; Weller v. The Railway, L. R. 9 C. P. 126; Gee v. The Railway, L. R. 8 Q. B. 161; Bridges v. The Railway, L. R. 6 Q. B. 377, L. R. 7 H. L. App. 213; Siner v. The Railway, L. R. 4 Exch. 117; Prager v. The Railway, L. R. 5 26. Griffith v. Missouri Pac. R'y Co., 98 Mo. 168; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. McCormick, 124 Penn. St. 427; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 13 Ky. L. R. 974 (passenger injured while crossing plank, by direction of conductor, from car to platform); Bethmann v. Railroad Co., 155 Mass. 352, 29 N. E. Rep. 587 (Train stopped in such a way that passengers had to step on truck to alight, and a passenger was injured). Whether or not it is negligence for the carrier to fail to provide a stool for passengers to get on or off its trains is a question of fact for the jury in the decision of which, a prior custom of the carrier to provide such stools may be an important factor. Railway Co. Railway carriers of passengers, however, are not liable for unforeseen accidents due to mistaken impressions of passengers. Thus a railroad company has been held not liable where, as required by statute, the train stopped before crossing another track, and a passenger, supposing that the train had arrived at the station, stepped off the car which was standing on a bridge and was drowned, nothing having been done or said by the trainmen to give passengers such an impression.27 Sec. 1123. (§ 616.) Same subject-Effect of calling name of station. But the mere calling out of the name of the station has not been considered as sufficient, under all circumstances, to justify the passenger in coming to such a conclusion, especially in the day-time, or at a station with the landing place of which he is familiar; and the question of negligence in every instance of the kind is one of fact for the jury.28 Certainly the mere calling out the name of the station does not of itself entitle the passenger to alight, if there are other circumstances from which he must reasonably infer that the carriage is not at the platform.29 But where, after the calling of the name of v. Sherrill, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 116, 72 S. W. Rep. 429; Railway Co. v. Bell, 25 Ky. L. R. 10, 74 S. W. Rep 700; Madden v. Railway Co., 35 S. Car. 381, 14 S. E. Rep. 713, 28 Am. St. Rep. 855. The alighting place at the rear end of the car, in the absence of notice to the passengers to the contrary, must be as safe as the forward end for it is well known that it is a general custom of passengers to use both ends. McDonald v. Railroad Co., 88 Iowa, 345, 55 N. W. Rep. 102. go to the jury on all the circumstances of the case, and an instruction asked by the carrier giving undue prominence to the mere calling of the name of the station and stopping of the train and ignoring other circumstances showing negligence is properly refused. Barry v. Railway Co., 172 Mass. 109, 51 N. E. Rep. 518. The announcement by the porter, "Jersey City, last stop, all out," followed by the opening of the vestibule door of the car, does not amount to an invitation to 27. Davis v. Railroad Co., 64 alight. It is merely an announceHun, 492, 19 N. Y. Supp. 516. 28. Hooks v. Railway Co., 73 Miss. 145, 18 So. Rep. 925, citing Hutch. on Carr. The question of negligence must ment that the train has reached, or the station, the train soon thereafter comes to a full stop, the passenger may reasonably conclude that the train has stopped at the station, and may endeavor to alight, unless the circum 38 N. J. L. 133; Railroad Co. v. Holmes, 97 Ala. 332, 12 So. Rep. 286; Railroad Co. r. Means, 48 Ill. App. 396; Railroad Co. v. Depp, 17 Ky. L. R. 1049, 33 S. W. Rep. 417; Fletcher r. Railroad Co., 187 Mass. 463, 73 N. E. Rep. 552, 105 Am. St. Rep. 414; Victor v. Railroad Co., 164 Pa. St. 195, 30 Atl. Rep. 381; Townsend v. Railway Co., 106 Tenn. 162, 61 S. W. Rep. 56; Payne v. Railway Co., 106 Tenn. 167, 61 S. W. Rep. 86; Railroad Co. r. Anderson, 72 Md. 519, 20 Atl. Rep. 2; England v. Railroad Co., 153 Mass. 490, 27 N. E. Rep. 1. In Mitchell v. Railway Co., 51 Mich. 236, the plaintiff, a woman, was a passenger on defendant's train, and was to change cars to take another road at Lansing. The latter road was crossed by defendant's road at a distance from the depot of each, and the two depots were quite far apart. On account of the distance, the conductor of defendant's road offered to carry her to the junction. The statute of the state required all railroad trains before crossing another line to be brought to a full stop at not less than two hundred or more than eight hundred feet from the crossing. Just before arriving at the junction, and when the train was some three hundred or four hundred feet from it, the name of the junction station was called out by the proper person, and the cars came to a full stop as required by law before reaching crossings. Plaintiff at once left her seat and hurried to leave the car, no officer of the train noticing her. She went down the steps, where there was no platform or other convenience for landing, and, just as she stepped off, the cars started to go on to the depot and she fell and broke her ankle. When the train reached the station, the conductor came to help her off, and, not finding her, ran his train back until she was discovered. The accident happened early in the morning, during daylight. In an action for damages it was held that she was not entitled to recover. "The only cause of the mischief," said the court, per Campbell, J., "leaving defendant's carefulness or negligence out of view, was her mistaken supposition that the cars had stopped for the station, and that she should therefore get out. There was nothing at the spot to indicate a landing place, and there was, at the proper place, a short distance further, on, a building and platform appropriate and used for that purpose. The stoppage of the cars was required by statute, as well as by usage, as a precaution against collisions. The calling of the station was not shown to have been out of the usual course, and from the distance mentioned we can hardly conceive it should have been delayed. No one representing the company, whether conductor or brakeman, is shown to have known or suspected that plaintiff had put herself in peril or left her place. Nothing is shown which put them in fault for not knowing this. We stances are such as to make it manifest that the proper and usual stopping place has not been reached.30 Sec. 1124. Same subject-Where announcement is made by stranger. The passenger, on hearing the name of his station cannot discover anything in the record to indicate that there was any act or any omission not incident to the constant usage of the road, or indicating fault. The starting of the train after such a stoppage is an incident plainly contemplated by law. The com pany cannot be expected to treat its passengers as children, or to put them under restraint. Passengers must take the responsibility of informing themselves concerning the every-day incidents of railway traveling, and the company could not do business on any other basis." In Smith v. Railway Co., 88 Ala. 538, Clopton, J., says: "Calling out the name of the station is customary and proper, so that passengers may be informed that the train is approaching the station of their destination and prepare to get off when it arrives at the platform. The mere announcement of the name of the station is not an invitation to alight; but, when followed by a full stoppage of the train soon thereafter, is, ordinarily, notification that it has arrived at the usual place of landing passengers. Whether the stoppage of the train, after such announcement, and before it arrives at the platform, is negligence, depends upon the attendant circumstances. The rule is aptly expressed in Bridges v. Railway Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 377, by Willes, J.: 'It is an announcement by the railway offi cers that the train is approaching or has arrived at the platform, and that the passengers may get out when the train stops at the platform, or under circumstances induced and caused by the company in which the man may reasonably suppose he is getting out at the place where the company intended him to alight. To that extent, calling out is an invitation.'" 30. Columbus, etc. R'y Co. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 408; International, etc. R. Co. v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 274; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. McCormick, 124 Penn. St. 427; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Edelstein (Penn.), 16 Atl. Rep. 847; Memphis, etc. R'y Co. v. Stringfellow, 44 Ark. 322; Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; International, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, (Tex. Sup.) 14 S. W. Rep. 642; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 92 Ala. 237, 9 S. Rep. 223; Smith v. Railway Co., 88 Ala. 538, 7 So. Rep. 119, 16 Am. St. Rep. 63, 7 L. R. A. 323; Davis v. Railway Co., Ark. 86 S. W. Rep. 995; Railway Co. v. Sain, (Tex. Civ. App.) 24 S. W. Rep. 958; Railway Co. v. Dotson, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 73, 38 S. W. Rep. 642; Railway Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ark. 122, 26 S. W. Rep. 593; Railroad Co. v. Worthington, 30 Ind. App. 633, 65 N. E. Rep. 557, 66 N. E. Rep. 478, 96 Am. St. Rep. 355; Englehaupt v. Railroad Co., 209 Pa. 182, 58 Atl. Rep. 154. In Kentucky, a statute requires announced, cannot ordinarily be presumed to know that it is not made by the authority of the carrier. If, therefore, the name of the station is announced by a stranger, such announcement, if made in the presence or hearing of a servant of the the name of the station to be announced within a reasonable time before it is reached, and it has been held that, if, for any reason after the announcement has been made, the train is compelled to stop before arriving at the station, it is the duty of the carrier to warn the passengers to that effect so they may act accordingly. Coe v. Railroad Co., 25 Ky. L. R. 1679, 78 S. W. Rep. 439. In McNulta v. Ensch, 134 Ill. 46, 24 N. E. Rep. 631, the defendant McNulta was receiver of a railroad upon which Ensch was a passenger. He and a number of others were passengers bound for a small station known as Starne's, at which the train upon which he was riding was not scheduled to stop and to which no tickets were sold for that train. He and the other passengers, however, paid fare to that point and were not told that the train would not stop there. About five hundred feet beyond Starne's was a railway crossing, and trains were required by law to stop within eight hundred feet of it before crossing. In complying with this provision, trains sometimes stopped at the platform at Starne's, sometimes beyond it, and sometimes before reaching it. Just before reaching Starne's station on this occasion, the name of the station was called in the usual manner, the train stopped at the platform, and plaintiff started to get off. Just as he was in the act of alighting, however, the train suddenly started and ran fifty or sixty yards further, where it stopped long enough for passengers to alight. Plaintiff was quite seriously injured, and it was held that he was entitled to recover. "The stop at the platform," said the court, "as to the plaintiff, under the peculiar facts of this case, might be properly regarded by him as the stoppage of the train at the point where it was intended to let off the passengers. Having, by the acts and conduct of his servants, justified the plaintiff in attempting to get off the train, the duty of the defendant then attached to stop his train a sufficient length of time to enable the plaintiff to reach the platform in safety. His duty to the plaintiff, whom he had induced to believe that the train had reached the point at which he was to depart therefrom, was in respect of the place where the train first halted, and not in respect of the place where it finally stopped." In Wood v. Railway Co., 49 Mich. 370, a passenger desired to stop at a small station. Just before it was reached, the name was called in the usual manner. As the train slacked up, the passenger went out on the platform and asked the conductor if the train would stop there for water and was told that it would; the passenger then stepped on the lower step while |