Parton v. Prang. or proprietor of a picture should be in writing to render the sale valid, still it is contended by the complainant that neither the sale in this case to the vendor of the respondent, nor the purchase of the same by the respondent from the vendee of the complainant, even though the sale and delivery of the picture in each case was absolute and unconditional or both combined, had the effect to transfer to the respondent the right to reproduce or chromo the picture, that in selling and delivering the picture, and subsequently suffering his vendee to sell and deliver the same to the respondent, he only parted with the result of his labor as property, that he did not part with the right to reproduce or chromo-lithograph the picture, that the right to multiply copies of the picture was vested in him as the author and proprietor of the same, and that he still retains that right notwithstanding the sale and delivery by himself and the subsequent purchase by the respondent. Undoubtedly, the author of a book or of an unpublished manuscript, or of any work of art, has at common law and independently of any statute, a property in his work until he publishes it or it is published by his consent or allowance, and that property unquestionably exists in pictures as well as in any other work of art. He has the undisputed right to his manuscript, he may withhold or he may communicate it, and communicating, he may limit the number of persons to whom it shall be imparted, and impose such restrictions as he pleases upon the use of it. He may annex conditions and proceed to enforce them, and for their breach he may claim compensation. Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815-961; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 2396; Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden. 329. Numerous other decided cases also affirm the same proposition, that the author of an unpublished manuscript has the exclusive right of property therein, and that he may determine for himself whether the manuscript shall be made public at all, that he may in all cases forbid its publication by another before it has been published by him or by his consent or allowance, that a painter also has at common law the same right before publication to prevent any person from copying it, and that the purchaser and owner of the picture holding the title from the painter Parton v. Prang. or his assigns, has the same right before publication, to prevent another from multiplying copies of it or reproducing the picture, but the authorities all agree that after publication, that right is lost. Turner v. Robinson, 10 Jr. Ch. 121. Same case on appeal. 10 Jr. Ch. 510. Fisher v. Fold, 1 Jones Exch. 12; Wheaton v. Peters 8 Pet. 591; Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. L. Reg. 33; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 McLean, 37. An author, said Hoar, J., in Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 549, has at common law a property in his unpublished works, which he may assign, and in the enjoyment of which, equity will protect his assignee as well as himself. This property continues until by publication a right to its use has been conferred upon or dedicated to the public. Independently of legislation, the sole proprietorship of a manuscript is in the author and his assigns until he publishes it, but an unqualified publication, such as is made by printing and offering copies for sale, dedicates the contents to the public unless the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending the same is secured to the author or proprietor by copyright. But there may be a limited publication by communication of the contents by reading, representation, or restricted private circulation which will not abridge the right of the author any further than necessarily results from the nature and extent of such limited use as he has make or allowed others to make of the manuscript or painting, or, as Lord Brougham said in Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 961, he may withhold or he may communicate it, and communicating, he may prescribe limitation and impose such restrictions as he please as to the extent of its use, which fully justifies the conclusion in Keene v. Kimball, that when a literary proprietor has made a publication in any mode not restricted by any condition, other persons acquire unlimited rights of republishing in any mode in which his publication may enable them to exercise such a right. Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 550. Assignments of a manuscript are required to be in writing by the copyright act, but enough has been remarked to show that a picture under that act might be transferred by an oral contract, and it is well settled law that Parton v. Prang. even copyright is an incident to the ownership of a manuscript, and that it passes at common law with the transfer of a work of art. Turner v. Robinson, 10 Jr. Ch. 121. Power v. Walker, 3 M. & S. 9. Hence the remark of the court in Turner v. Robinson, that it was a strange proposition that the transfer of property should destroy and extinguish that which principally constitutes the value of the thing transferred, meaning not that the right to publish did not pass by the sale, but that the exclusive right of publication which attached to the manuscript was not lost by the transfer. Such a transfer of the manuscript or picture is not a publication of the same unless it was so intended by the parties, but if the sale was an absolute and unconditional one, and the article was absolutely and unconditionally delivered to the purchaser, the whole property in the manuscript or picture passes to the purchaser, including the right of publication, unless the same is protected by copyright, in which case the rule is different. Baker v. Taylor, 2 Blatch. 82; Ryan v. Goodwin, 3 Sum. 518; Wood v. Zimmer, Holt N. P. 60; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 14. Personal property is transferable by sale and delivery, and there is no distinction in that respect, independent of statute, between literary property and property of any other description. Owners of personal property have the right to sell and transfer the same as inseparable incidents of the property, and the author or proprietor of a manuscript or picture possesses that right as fully and to the same extent as the owner of any other personal property; the same being incident to the ownership. Sales may be absolute or conditional, and they may be with or without qualifications, limitations, and restrictions, and the rules of law applicable in such cases to other personal property must be applied in determining the real character of a sale of literary property. Proper attention to these considerations will furnish the true explanation of many, if not all the cases referred to by the complainant, which are supposed to support the second proposition for which ho contends. Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Hall & Twells. 1; Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden. 329; Bishop v. Griffin, 16 Sum. 196; Steven v. Cady, 14 How. Parton v. Prang. 528; Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 447; Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall & Twells. 28. Beyond doubt, the right of first publication is vested in the author; but he may sell and assign the entire property to another, and if he does so his assignee takes the entire property, and it is a great mistake to suppose that any act of Congress, at the date of the sales of the picture in this case, required that such an assignment should be in writing; and the pleadings show that the sale and delivery in each case were absolute and unconditional, and without any qualification, limitation, or restriction, showing that the entire property was transferred from the complainant and became vested in the respondent. Sims v. Marryatt, 17 Ad. & Ell. 281; Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607. Confirmation of that view, if any be needed beyond what appears in the express allegations of the answer to that effect, is also found in the further allegation that the respondent called upon the complainant immediately after the sale and delivery to him, and informed the complainant that he intended to publish the picture as a chromo, and that the complainant made no objection to the proposed publication, showing that the complainant as well as the respondent understood that the entire property of the picture was vested in the respondent. It is insisted by the respondent that the acts and declarations of the complainant on that occasion, as more fully set forth in the answer, estop the complainant from making any such claim as that set up in the bill; but it is unnecessary to decide that question, as the court is of the opinion that those acts and declarations amount to a practical affirmance of the contract of sale and delivery of the entire property of the picture, as understood and claimed by the respondent. Freeman et al. v. Cooke, 6 D. & L. 187; Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatch. 100; Bigelow on Estoppel, 475. Neither a conditional sale nor any unfairness is shown, and as neither exists in the case, it must be held that the complainant parted with the entire property in the picture. Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 142; Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 737; Mayall v. Higbey, 1 H. & C. 147; Jones v. Thorne, 1 N. Y. Obs. 408; Dalglish v. Jarvie, 2 McN. & G. 231; Martin v. Wright, Sherman v. Bingham et al. 6 Sim. 297; Read v. Conquest, 9 C. B. N. S. 755. Unfairness is not pretended in this case, and inasmuch as the sale and delivery were in their terms absolute and unconditional and without any reservation, restriction, or qualification of any kind, the court is of the opinion that complainant is not entitled to relief. SUMNER U. SHERMAN, in Error, v. OSMER A. BINGHAM et al. Under the act of March 2d, 1867, an assignee in bankruptcy of a person declared a bankrupt in one district, may maintain an action to recover moneys paid the defendants residents of another district, in violation of the Bankrupt Act, in the District Court of such district, and such District Court in the district where such defendants reside, has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. The whole tenor of the present Bankrupt Act shows that Congress intended to provide for the complete administration of the bankrupt system in the Federal Courts and through the instrumentality of Federal officers. BY § 1 of the Bankrupt Act, the several district courts of the United States are constituted courts of bankruptcy, and the provision is, that they shall have original jurisdiction in their respective districts in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, and that they might hear and adjudicate upon the same, according to the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. On the 21st of March, 1871, the plaintiff, as assignee in bankruptcy of the estate of the bankrupts named in the record, brought an action of assumpsit against the defendants to recover back certain moneys, which he alleges were paid to them by the bankrupts, in violation of the Bankrupt Act. Both the bankrupts were resident in the County of Providence, and State of Rhode Island, and were doing business in that County under the name and style of Reynolds and Bartlett, and the record showed that the petition in bankruptcy was filed in the District Court for that district, and that all the proceedings took place in the court where the petition was filed. Service was made, and the defendants appeared and pleaded as follows: "That the proceedings wherein the plaintiff alleges that he became, and is assignee, as aforesaid, were all instituted in |