where the later statute was intended to prescribe the only rules upon the subject, the subsequent is held to repeal the former statute. Ibid. 10. When a revising statute covers the whole subject-matter of antecedent statutes it virtually repeals the former enactments, without any express provision to that effect. Ibid. 11. Where some parts of the revised statute are omitted in the new law, they are not, in general, to be regarded as left in operation if it clearly appear to have been the intention of the legislature to cover the whole subject by the revision. Ibid. 12. The general rule is that a repeal of the repealing statute revives the original act. Ibid. 13. It could not be supposed that Congress would repeal the provision of the act of 1864, if they had supposed or intended that thereby the same provision in the act of 1862 would have been revived. Ibid. 14. It is the better opinion that by the repeal of the provision of § 5 of the act of 1864, the manufactures in question became dutiable under the preceding paragraph in the same section which provides that there shall be “levied and collected on bunting and all other manufactures of worsted," etc., not otherwise provided for, a duty of fifty per centum ad valorem. Ibid. 15. Although the act of March 2, 1861, does not enumerate shingles sawed, rived, or shaved, § 22 of the act provides that a duty of thirty per cent shall be collected on manufactures of wood, or of which wood is the chief component part, if imported from a foreign country, and not otherwise provided for, and the act of July 14, 1862, provides for five per cent ad valorem additional. Held, that shingles were within the said provisions of the revenue laws, and were not exempted by the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, whence the importations were made. Stockwell v. The United States, 284. 16. Debt is the proper form of action for the recovery of the penalties sued for in this case. Ibid. 17. All penalties and forfeitures incurred in consequence of the act under which this suit is brought, may be sued for and collected as prescribed by the act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage. 3 Stat. at Large, 732, § 5; 1 Stat. at Large, 695. Ibid. Ibid. 18. Recovery for the duties and double values may be had in the same case. 19. Import duties are levied by act of Congress, and when the goods are imported without paying or accounting for them, the liability is complete for the illegal importation. Ibid. ENLISTMENT. 1. If the recruit was under the age of eighteen years, his certificate under oath that he was of the age required for lawful enlistment, would not be conclusive as to the actual fact. Seavey et al. v. Seymour, 439. 2. The certificate of enlistment is not conclusive that the recruit was of age sufficient to enter into the contract. Ibid. See HABEAS CORPUS, 1-5. EVIDENCE, 19. JURISDICTION, 3-7. EQUITY. 1. The treasurer of the corporation, respondent, furnished to the assignee in insolvency of the complainant an incorrect and untrue statement of the account between them and the complainant, by which the assignee was induced to entertain a proposition to withdraw a suit of the complainant against the corporation, and which resulted in the execution of mutual releases between the assignee and the corporation in respect to all the interest of the complainant. The complainant never assented to the proposition or the settlement, but they were procured with his assignee, by the false statement of the accounts by the treasurer of the corporation. Held, that the complainant was entitled to a decree, according to the prayer of the bill, unless the corporation had other defences which could be sustained. James v. Atlantic Delaine Co. 614. 2. The settlement being prejudicial to the complainant, the assignor, he was entitled to the residue of his estate, if any, in the hands of the corporation, after his debts outstanding at the date of the assignment were paid. Ibid. 3. By the extinguishment of the debts the assignee became the trustee of the complainant, and the latter became clothed with all the rights and powers of cestui que trust, to the same extent as the creditors previously had whose claims he had extinguished. Ibid. 4. The complainant was the proper party to come into a Court of Equity and pursue the trust estate, it appearing that it had been improperly parted with by the trustee. Ibid. 5. When the objects of the trust are fulfilled, equity will compel a conveyance to the cestui que trust, he being the sole beneficiary. Ibid. 6. The complainant agreed with certain firms to construct and put in operation a factory. To obtain and secure a loan of money from these firms, he executed a mortgage, with power of sale for breach of condition, to the treasurer of the company, as trustee for the corporation, upon all his stock and interest in the company. He also executed to the same firm, as trustee of the lenders of the credit, separate mortgages of the same kind upon his homestead and farm, together with other property. Subsequently failing, he made an assignment of his property. By the terms of the assignment the liability to the company was made a charge upon the assets named in the assignment, with directions to the assignee to apply all the assigned estate, as he could, to the fulfilment of the contract of the assignor for the building and equipment of the mill. The assignee made an arrangement with the company to furnish the money to forward the contract of the assignor, and charge the same to the assets in his hands. Under this arrangement the factory was completed. The assignor continuing embarrassed, the trustee was directed to advertise the properties for sale. The assignee failing to raise the amount necessary to meet the assignor's liabilities, wrote to the treasurer of the company, demanding a statement of the condition of the company, so that he could represent the assignor's stock in its true light and sell it for its true value. The trustee stated that such an account could not be given, and the assignee then obtained an injunction restraining the proposed sale of the stocks until the further order of the court. Certain of the mortgagor's creditors tendered to the company the amount of the mortgage debt which the company refused to accept, and the court passed an order enjoining the sale unless the trustee would file a stipulation not to enforce the mortgage against property subject to the lien of the complainant in that suit. Two suits were pending to redeem the properties mortgaged, and the order restraining the sale of the stock was in force when the sale of the homestead took place. On that day the trustee sent to the assignee a paper described as a statement of the company's affairs. He afterwards on oath acknowledged that it was transcribed from a private memorandum kept by him, and it nowhere appeared on the company's books. Held: That, being furnished as a copy from the company's books, it must be assumed that the assignee received it as an official account and gave it full credence as furnished by the company's officers. Ibid, 622. 7. That the alleged statement was not only false, but furnished with intent to deceive and defraud by promoting a settlement prejudicial to the mortgagor and more favorable to the company than truth and justice would admit. Ibid. 8. That in such case the assignor is entitled to take the residue of the estate after his debts outstanding at the date of the assignment are paid. Ibid. 9. That by the extinguishment of the debts the assignee became the trustee of the assignor, and the latter clothed with all the rights of cestui que trust to the same extent as the creditors previously had been whose debts he had extinguished; and consequently the complainant could come into a Court of Equity and pursue the trust estate, it having been fraudulently or improperly parted with by the trustee, and that under the decretal order the complainant was entitled to redeem the mortgaged property just as her intestate might have done, if the settlement and release had never been executed. Ibid. 10. This case was twice referred to a master, but inasmuch as the exceptions which accompanied the respective reports made it necessary, if attempting to decide the case at this stage, for the court to adjudicate the whole controversy as if no reference had been made, the court again sent the whole case to the master with specific instructions for a statement of the accounts between the parties. Ibid. See JURISDICTION, 1; PLEADING, 1; PRACTICE, 1-6; SEPARATION, Agreement OF, 1-7; TRUST, 2; WILL, 1–4. EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 1-8. EQUIVALENTS. See PATENT, 7 – 11. EVIDENCE. 1. Mere opinions of physicians that ill-health, subsequent to an injury, was occasioned by it, must be received with caution, and weighed in view of all the circumstances surrounding the case. Nichols v. Inhabitants of Brunswick, 81. 2. The obvious purpose of the act of July 16, 1862, as to the competency of witnesses in the United States courts, was to bring the State and Federal courts into a more harmonious course of decision upon this subject. Robinson v. Mandell, 169. 3. The effect of the act of July 2, 1865, was to produce diversity between the rules of decision, in the State and Federal courts. Ibid. 4. By the act of March 3, 1865, it is provided, that neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other, under the circumstances described in the act, unless called by the opposite party, or required to testify by the court. Ibid. 5. The several acts of Congress, as to the competency of witnesses, indicate an intent upon the part of Congress to legislate that evidence of title to real estate and rules of decision in all controversies affecting rights of property shall be the same in the Federal and State courts of the same State and district. Ibid. 6. Where an executor or administrator is a party under the law of this State, the other party cannot be admitted to testify in his own favor, unless the contract was originally made with a party who was living, and competent to testify, and there fore the complainant in this case was not a competent witness to testify to any transaction with, or statement by, the testatrix. Ibid. 7. Equity acknowledges the rule that a representation made by one party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of the other party will in general be sufficient to entitle such other party, if induced to act upon such representation, to relief. Ibid. 8. Such representations must be proved by the party who alleges they were made. Ibid. 9. The objections were taken to the admissibility of a deposition : 1. That it did not appear that the magistrate had examined the deponent; 2. That it did not appear that the magistrate had reduced, or caused to be reduced, to writing the deponent's answers. 3. That it did not appear that the magistrate had reduced, or caused to be reduced, to writing the answers of deponent in his presence. The return stated that, 1. "An examination on oath of the deponent was had before me." 2. Cross and direct interrogatories accompanied the commission, and the magistrate's return was, "the following are the answers," to the direct and cross interrogatories, and also that “the signatures of the deponent affixed to this deposition are in his handwriting, and made in my presence." Held, that as the magistrate was to permit no person other than a clerk to be present at the examination except himself and the deponent, and as it did not appear that a clerk was appointed, the presumption was that no one was present but the deponent and the magistrate, and, if not, then either the magistrate or the deponent must be presumed to have written the answers, and, if by either, the first and second objections failed. 3. The fact that the signatures affixed were those of the deponent and made in the presence of the magistrate is an answer to the third objection. Stockwell v. The United States, 284. 10. Parol evidence as to the usage of trade is admissible relating to a written contract in two classes of cases: Where the evidence is offered to prove that the words used in the contract are employed in a peculiar sense in the particular trade to which the contract relates; where the purpose of the evidence is to annex incidents to the contract in matters upon which the contract is silent. Hearn v. New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 318. 11. In the latter case, however, the peculiar meaning which it is proposed to attach to the words must not either expressly or by implication vary the terms of the written instrument. Ibid. 12. Such evidence is admissible to define what would otherwise be indefinite and obscure, and always with a view to give expression to the presumed intention of the parties. Ibid. 13. Under the policy in this case, parol evidence to the effect that it is the usage for vessels bound from Liverpool and back, to discharge at one port and then to proceed to a second port for a return cargo, was not admissible to avoid the effect of a deviation. Ibid. 14. If admitted, it would extend the voyage and increase the risk beyond what the language employed warrants the court in believing the parties had in contemplation. Ibid. 15. Depositions offered to show that on a voyage of this kind the vessel might, under a usage, go to a second port in Cuba to load, were admitted de bene esse. Hearn v. Equitable Safety Insurance Co., 328. 16. It does not establish a usage that vessels have the right to so go to a second port in Cuba and load, under a policy in the terms of this one, to show that Cuba charters from Liverpool and back contain an express stipulation that the charterers shall have the option of a second port of loading. Ibid. 17. Matter of contract and usage or evidence of usage are quite different. lbid. 19. Upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus before the District Court, there 21. The evidence to prove the agreement ought to be clear and satisfactory, as the rule is one of exceptional character in the law of evidence. Ibid. 22. Where the evidence to prove the agreement, was that of only one of the parties, the other having deceased, and was uncorroborated by any word or act of the other, proof of friendly relations existing between the parties is not sufficient where the evidence is otherwise subject to doubt. Ibid. 23. Where witnesses are not excluded on account of interest in the event of the suit, 24. Something is due in such a case as this, to the denials of the answer to the effect 26. It is the settled rule in the Federal Courts that oral evidence is admissible to 27. Where a contract was alleged to be shown by letters, it was held that all objection to their admissibility on the ground that they were not stamped the act of Congress then requiring contracts in writing to be stamped - was waived by the annexing of the letters, without reservation, to the agreed statement of facts under which the case was submitted. Snow et al. v. Miles, 608. See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 4, 6, 7. CONFESSIONS, 1-3, 5, 7. EXPERTS. See EVIDENCE. FACTS, AGREED STATEMENT OF. Objections to the form of an action are usually considered as waived by the submission of a case to the decision of the court upon an agreed statement of facts, unless such objections are expressly reserved for the consideration of the tribunal to which the submission is made. Snow et al. v. Miles, 608. |