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power of motion as we discover in things without extension and motion, we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of spirit as with our notion of body for it is no more a contradiction that thinking should exist independent of solidity, than that solidity should exist independent of thinking for whensoever we would proceed beyond the ideas we have from sensation and reflection, we fall into darkness and perplexity. But whichever of these ideas be clearest, that of body or of spirit, it is evident that the ideas that make them up are from sensation and reflection; so of all our other ideas, even of God himself. For if we examine the ideas we have of God and separate spirits, we shall find, that they are made up of the simple ideas we receive from reflection; v. g. having got the ideas of existence and duration, of knowlege and power, of pleasure and happiness, and several other qualities, we enlarge these with the idea of infinite, and so make our complex idea of God.

The

If I find that I know some things, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many, which I can double again and again, and thus enlarge my idea of knowlege by extending its comprehension to all things, and can thus frame the idea of infinite knowlege. same also may be done of power and of duration; all which is done by enlarging the simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection. For it is infinity, joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowlege, &c. which makes our complex idea of God. For though in his essence God may be uncompounded, yet we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of existence, knowlege, power, &c. infinite and eternal, which are all distinct ideas, and some of them compounded of others. This is farther to be observed; that there is no idea we attribute to God, except infinity, which is not also part of our complex idea of other spirits; because being capable of no other ideas but those which we receive from the operation of our minds, we can

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attribute to spirit no other but what we receive from thence ; all the difference is in the extent of the attributes for that in our ideas of spirits, we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection, is evident from hence, that in our ideas of spirits, we cannot conceive of the manner in which they communicate their thoughts to each other. Having no experience of immediate communication, we can have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can communicate their thoughts.

Having thus seen what kind of ideas we have of substances, wherein they consist, and how we come by them, it is evident, 1. that our ideas of substances are only collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something in which they subsist, of which something we have no distinct idea: 2. that all the simple ideas which make up our complex ones are such as we have received from sensation or reflection, even those which seem most remote from all we have to do with; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and even of God himself: 3. that most of these simple ideas are powers, though we are apt to take them for qualities.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Of collective Ideas of Substances.

Besides the complex ideas of single substances, as of man, horse, gold, &c. the mind has complex collective ideas of substances, made up of many particular substances united into one idea, v. g. the idea of an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man.

These collective ideas the mind makes by uniting several simple or complex ideas into one, as it makes complex ideas of particular substances by an aggregate of simple ideas: and as by repeated ideas of unity it makes a score or a gross, by putting together

several particular substances, it makes a collective idea, as of a troop, an army, a fleet. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea; it being as easy to unite the idea of a number of men as to unite the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man. Amongst such collective ideas are to be reckoned most artificial things; and if we consider collective ideas aright, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing remote and independent things into one view, and signifying them by

one name.

CHAPTER XXV.

Of Relation.

Besides the ideas the mind has of things, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of any thing, can look beyond it to see how it stands in conformity to any other.

When the mind sets one thing by another, and carries its view from one to the other, this is 'relation' and respect;' and the denominations intimating that respect, and leading the thoughts beyond the subject denominated to something distinct from it, are called 'relatives,' and the things so brought together, ' related.' Thus when I consider Caius as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man; but when I give him the name of husband, I intimate some other person, and there are two things brought into consideration.

These relations, expressed by relative terms that have others answering them, as father and son, bigger and less, are obvious to every one: but where languages have failed to give correlative names, the relation is not so easily taken notice of. Concubine is a relative name; but in languages where this and like

words have not a correlative turn, people are not so apt to take them to be so. Hence, many names which include relations, have been called external denominations. But all names must either signify some idea which is in the thing to which the name is applied, and then it is positive; or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, and then it includes relation.

Another sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on as relative, or even as external denominations, which, under the appearance of something absolute, contain a tacit relation, as old, great, imperfect, &c.

This farther may be observed, that the ideas of relation may be the same in men who have different ideas of the things related; v. g. those who have far different ideas of man, may agree in the notion of father. The nature of relation consists in comparing two things, from which comparison one or both comes to be denominated; and if either be removed, the relation ceases: v. g. Caius, whom I consider to-day as father, ceases to be so to-morrow by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. By the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time; v. g. Caius, compared to several persons, may be said to be older, younger, weaker, stronger, &c.

Whatever can be considered as one thing is positive and so not only simple ideas, but modes also, are positive beings, though their parts are relative. A picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, is a positive idea. So of a family, a tune, &c. for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things.

Concerning relation these things may be considered 1. there is no one thing which is not capable of an almost infinite number of considerations

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in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words; v. g. one man may sustain the following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, son-in-law, friend, enemy, husband, subject, general, superior, inferior, &c. to an almost infinite number; being capable of as many relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things: 2. this farther may be considered concerning relation; that the ideas which relative words stand for are often more distinct than of those substances to which they belong. The notion we have of father or brother is clearer than that we have of man; for the knowlege of one simple idea is often sufficient to give the notion of relation; but to the knowlege of any being a collection of sundry ideas is necessary. The ideas then of relations are capable of being more distinct in our minds, than those of substances, because it is hard to know all the simple ideas which are in any substance, but for the most part easy to know the simple ideas that make up any relation. It is easy to frame the idea of brothers without having the perfect idea of man. It suffices for the precise idea of the relative term to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation : 3. though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared, yet they all terminate in the simple ideas of sensation or reflection, even in those relations that seem to be most remote from sense or reflection ; 4. relation being the considering of one thing with another, all words which lead the mind to other ideas than those which exist in the thing mentioned, are relative words; v. g. man, black, merry, thoughtful, &c. are absolute words; but father, brother, king, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which imply something exterior to the thing they denominate.

I shall now proceed to show how the ideas of relation are made up only of simple ideas, how remote so