6

touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and of the same size, so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other, which is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see: Quære, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube? To which the proposer answers, Not:' for though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects hist touch; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so; or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye, as it does in the cube. I agree with this gentleman, and set this down, leaving with my reader to consider how much he may be beholden to experience and acquired notions, when he thinks he has least help from them; and the rather, as this gentleman adds, that having, on the occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one, that at first gave the answer to it, which he thinks true, till, by hearing his reasons, they were convinced.

But this is not usual in any of our ideas but those of sight, which is the most comprehensive of our senses, conveying to the mind the ideas of light and color, which are peculiar to that sense; and also those of space, figure, and motion, the varieties of which so change the appearance of light and color, that we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This is done so quickly, that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea formed by our judgment. Nor need we wonder at this, when we consider how very quick are the actions of the mind; for as thought takes up no space, so its actions seem to require no time. Habits, also, produce actions in us which often escape our observation. How frequently do we cover our eyes with our eyelids

without perceiving that we are in the dark! and therefore it is not strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, without taking notice of it.

Perception puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature: for however vegetables may have degrees of motion, and so some have obtained the name of sensitive plants, I suppose it is all bare mechanism, and no otherwise produced than the shortening of a rope by the affusion of water, which is done without sensation. Perception is in all sorts of animals, though the sensations of some are obscure and dull compared with the quickness of others. We may conclude that an oyster has not such quick senses as a man or several other animals: but there is some dull perception whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility.

Perception then being the first step and degree towards knowlege, and the inlet of all the materials of it, the fewer senses a man has, and the duller the impressions are that are made by them, and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them, the more remote is he from that knowlege that is to be found in some men.

CHAPTER X.

Of Retention.

The next faculty of the mind in its progress towards knowlege is retention, or the keeping the simple ideas which it receives from sensation or reflection. This is done, 1. by keeping the idea actually in view, which is called contemplation; 2. by reviving in our minds those ideas which have disappeared; this is memory, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas for the mind not being capable of having ideas in view at once, it was necessary to lay up many those which at another time it might have use of. But this laying up of ideas signifies merely a power which the mind has of reviving perceptions, with the

additional perception that it has had them before: and they are said to be in our memories, when there is only an ability to revive them.

Attention and repetition help to fix ideas in the memory; but those which make the deepest and most lasting impression are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain; the great business of the senses being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body.

Concerning the degrees of lasting wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may observe that some have been produced by an object affecting the senses once only; others that have offered themselves more than once have been little heeded; and some have been set with care and repeated impressions, when through some default the memory is weak. In these cases the ideas leave no more traces than shadows do flying over fields of corn. Thus many ideas, which were first produced in the minds of children, if not repeated in the course of their lives, are quite lost. This may be observed in those who have lost their sight when very young, so that no more notion of colors is left in their minds than in those of people born blind. Memory in some men is very tenacious; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of our ideas even in minds most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed, there at last remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as children of our youth, often die before us; and our minds represent those tombs to which we are approaching, where though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time. How much the constitu tion of our bodies is concerned in this I shall not here inquire; though it probably does influence the memory, since we oftentimes find the flames of a fever, in a few days, calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble.

Those ideas that are oftenest refreshed by a return

of the objects that produced them, fix themselves best in the memory: therefore, those which are of the original qualities of bodies, as, solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest;—those which constantly affect our bodies, as heat and cold;-those which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as existence, duration, and number, are seldom lost while the mind retains any ideas at all.

In memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive; for it sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea and when ideas lodged in the memory are revived, the mind takes notice of them as of ideas it had known before.

Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. Our other faculties are nearly useless without memory, wherein there may be two defects; 1. that it loses the idea quite, and produces perfect ignorance; 2. that it retrieves not the idea quick enough to serve the mind's occasions, and this in a great degree is stupidity. In having our ideas ready at hand on all occasions, consists that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.

There is another defect which belongs to the memory of man in general, compared with superior intelligences, who may have constantly in view the whole of their former actions. The omniscience of God may satisfy us of the possibility of this. It is reported of M. Pascal, that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This seems incredible to those who measure others by themselves; but it may lead our thoughts towards the perfections of superior spirits; for this M. Pascal was confined to having ideas in succession; whereas angels may have constantly set before them, as in a picture, all their knowlege at once, which we may suppose one of those ways in which the knowlege of separate spirits may exceed ours.

This faculty of retaining ideas other animals have

as well as man.' Birds learning tunes, and endeavoring to hit the notes right, put it past doubt that they retain ideas, and use them for patterns. For though sound may mechanically cause a certain motion in the brain, and the bird be mechanically driven away by certain noises because this may tend to its preservation, yet that can be no reason why the bird should imitate a sound which can be of no use to its preservation: nor can it be supposed that birds without sense and memory can approach nearer and nearer to a tune played yesterday, which if it be not in the memory is no where, and cannot be a pattern for them to imitate.

CHAPTER XI.

Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

Unless

Another faculty of the mind is that of discerning and distinguishing between its several ideas. the mind had a distinct perception of objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowlege. On this faculty of distinguishing depends the evidence of several propositions which have passed for innate truths.

So far as this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of, so far our notions are confused and our judgment is misled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in being able nicely to distinguish, where there is but the least difference, consists exactness of judgment and clearness of reason. And hence, perhaps, the reason of the observation, that men, who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories, have not always the greatest judgment; for wit lying chiefly in the assemblage of ideas, and putting these together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies in separating carefully ideas, wherein can be found a difference, thereby to avoid being misled, by simili