CHAPTER XXI. Of Power. The mind observing an alteration in the simple ideas of things without, and a constant change of its own ideas by the impression of outward objects, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what has been, that the like changes will still be made by like means; considers in one thing the possibility of being changed, and in another the possibility of making a change; and so comes by the idea of power. Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has a power to be melted. In which case the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas for we cannot observe an alteration in any thing but by conceiving a change of its sensible ideas. Power thus considered is two-fold, as able to make or to receive a change. The one may be called active, the other passive power. Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power as God is above passive power, and whether created spirit be not that alone which is capable of both, I shall not now inquire. But since active powers make part of our complex ideas of natural substances, I mention them as such, according to our common apprehension. Power includes in it some kind of relation, viz. to action and change; so our ideas of extension, duration, and number, contain in them a secret relation of the parts. Figure and motion have something relative in them more visibly; and sensible qualities are but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perceptions. Our idea therefore of power may have a place among our other simple ideas. We are furnished with the idea of passive power by most sensible things, the substances of which we see in a continual flux, and we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have we fewer instances of active power: for wherever there is change there must be power to make that change. But bodies do not afford us so clear an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds: for there are but two sorts of action, thinking and motion. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all. 2. Neither have we from body the idea of the beginning of motion; for when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard stick, it is not the action of the ball, but bare passion; and when it sets another ball in motion, it merely communicates the motion it had received, which gives us but an obscure idea of active power, reaching not to the production of action, but to the continuance of passion. idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflecting on what passes within ourselves, where we find by a thought of the mind that we can move our bodies. But bodies afford us no idea of the power to begin action, either by motion or thought. The We find in ourselves a power to begin, continue, or end several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies barely by a thought. This power we call the will: the exercise of the power is volition, or willing. The action or forbearance of action consequent to such command of the mind, is called voluntary; but whatever is done without such thought, is involuntary. The power of perception we call the understanding: it consists of, 1. perception of ideas in our minds; 2. the perception of the signification of signs; 3. the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas. All these belong to the understanding, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand. The ordinary way of speaking of these two powers, is to say that the understanding and the will are two faculties; a word proper enough, if it be not used so as to breed confusion, by being supposed to stand for some real beings performing those actions. For when we say, the will is the commanding faculty of the soul, that it is or is not free, that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c.; though these and the like expressions may be understood by some in a clear and distinct sense, yet this way of speaking has led many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents within us, and has been no small occasion of wrangling and uncertainty in questions relating to them. From the consideration of the power which every one finds in himself to begin, continue, or end several actions, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity. All actions reducing themselves to thinking or motion, so far as a man has power to think or not, to move or not, according to the preference of his mind, so far is a man free: wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow on the preference of the mind, there he is not free, though the action be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power to do or forbear any action, according as either is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent, there he is not at liberty. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, volition, and will, where there is no liberty. Thus, a tennis-ball in motion or at rest is not considered a free agent, because we cannot conceive it to have volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice versa. A man falling into the water by the breaking of a bridge has not liberty, though he has volition; for the cessation of that motion follows not on his volition. So a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power to forbear, acts by necessity or constraint. Again, suppose a man locked in a room with agreeable company, in which he prefers staying to going away; his stay is voluntary, but being locked in, he still to the same change. Nor have we fewer instances of active power: for wherever there is change there must be power to make that change. But bodies do not afford us so clear an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds: for there are but two sorts of action, thinking and motion. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all. 2. Neither have we from body the idea of the beginning of motion; for when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard stick, it is not the action of the ball, but bare passion; and when it sets another ball in motion, it merely communicates the motion it had received, which gives us but an obscure idea of active power, reaching not to the production of action, but to the continuance of passion. idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflecting on what passes within ourselves, where we find by a thought of the mind that we can move our bodies. But bodies afford us no idea of the power to begin action, either by motion or thought. The We find in ourselves a power to begin, continue, or end several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies barely by a thought. This power we call the will: the exercise of the power is volition, or willing. The action or forbearance of action consequent to such command of the mind, is called voluntary; but whatever is done without such thought, is involuntary. The power of perception we call the understanding: it consists of, 1. perception of ideas in our minds; 2. the perception of the signification of signs; 3. the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas. All these belong to the understanding, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand. The ordinary way of speaking of these two powers, is to say that the understanding and the will are two faculties; a word proper enough, if it be not used so as to breed confusion, by being supposed to stand for some real beings performing those actions. For when we say, the will is the commanding faculty of the soul, that it is or is not free, that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c.; though these and the like expressions may be understood by some in a clear and distinct sense, yet this way of speaking has led many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents within us, and has been no small occasion of wrangling and uncertainty in questions relating to them. From the consideration of the power which every one finds in himself to begin, continue, or end several actions, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity. All actions reducing themselves to thinking or motion, so far as a man has power to think or not, to move or not, according to the preference of his mind, so far is a man free: wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow on the preference of the mind, there he is not free, though the action be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power to do or forbear any action, according as either is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent, there he is not at liberty. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no vòlition, no will; but there may be thought, volition, and will, where there is no liberty. Thus, a tennis-ball in motion or at rest is not considered a free agent, because we cannot conceive it to have volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice versa. A man falling into the water by the breaking of a bridge has not liberty, though he has volition; for the cessation of that motion follows not on his volition. So a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power to forbear, acts by necessity or constraint. Again, suppose a man locked in a room with agreeable company, in which he prefers staying to going away; his stay is voluntary, but being locked in, he |