Counsel for Plaintiff in Error. 252 U.S. journey would burden interstate commerce as to cost and in the practical operation of the traffic. The provision for a separate compartment for the use of only intrastate colored passengers would lead to confusion and discrimination. The same interstate transportation would be subject to conflicting regulation in the two States in which it is conducted. It seems to me that the statute in question as applied to the traffic here involved is an unreasonable regulation and burdensome to interstate commerce, and, therefore, beyond the power of the State. I think the judgment should be reversed. MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER and MR. JUSTICE PITNEY concur in this dissent. CINCINNATI, COVINGTON & ERLANGER RAILWAY COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY. No. 253. Argued March 18, 19, 1920-Decided April 19, 1920. Decided on the authority of South Covington & Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, unte, 399. 181 Kentucky, 449, affirmed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Alfred C. Cassatt, with whom Mr. J. C. W. Beckham, Mr. Richard P. Ernst and Mr. Frank W. Cottle were on the briefs, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Stephens L. Blakely, with whom Mr. Chas. I. Dawson, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, was on the brief, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. This case was argued with No. 252, South Covington & Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, ante, 399. It was disposed of by the Court of Appeals with that case in one opinion. The company was indicted as the other company was for a violation of the Separate Coach Law of the State and found guilty. The facts are in essence the same as in the other case, though the indictment is more elaborate. The defenses and contentions are the same. We have stated them, and upon what they are based, and the character and relation of the companies, in our opinion in the other case. The company is an interurban road and the Separate Coach Law is applicable to it. It was incorporated under the general laws of the State and authority conferred upon it to construct and operate an electric railway from the City of Covington to the town of Erlanger, and to such further point beyond Erlanger as might be determined. It was constructed from Covington to a point just beyond the suburban town called Fort Mitchell, a town of a few hundred inhabitants. The South Covington and Cincinnati Street Railway Company furnished the means to build the road and at the time covered by the indictment was operating the road as part of its railway system as described in the other case. The intimate relations of the roads as stated by the Court of Appeals, we have set forth in the other case, and it is only necessary to add that the indictment in the present case charges that the company in this case was DAY, VAN DEVANTER and PITNEY, JJ., dissenting. 252 U. S. the lessor of the other company and thereby "permitted and brought about the acquisition of its rights and privileges knowing that" the other company, "would not operate and run separate coaches for its white and colored passengers." And, it is charged that the other company operating the lease violated the law and that the defendant company knowing of the intended method of operation, also violated the law. These facts and other facts the Court of Appeals decided made the company an offender against the statute, and decided further that the statute was not an interference with interstate commerce. The conviction of the company was sustained. Our reviewing power, we think, is limited to the last point, that is, the effect of the law as an interference with interstate commerce, and that we disposed of in the other case. The distinction counsel make between street railways and other railways, and between urban and interurban roads, we are not concerned with. MR. JUSTICE DAY, dissenting. Judgment affirmed. This case is controlled by the disposition made of No. 252. While it is true that the Erlanger Company was incorporated under the laws of the State of Kentucky, the proof shows that its road was built and operated by the South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway Company as part of the latter's system. This is not a proceeding to test the right to operate the road. The conviction is justified because the local company permitted the principal company to operate without separate coaches or compartments for its colored passengers. The traffic conducted is of an interstate nature, and the same reasons which impel a dissent in No. 252 require a like dissent in the present case. In my opinion the single traffic over both railroads being 408. Counsel for Petitioner and Plaintiff in Error. interstate, the regulation embodied in the statute and for which the conviction was had, as to both roads, is an unreasonable and burdensome interference with interstate commerce. MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER and MR. JUSTICE PITNEY concur in this dissent. KENNEY, ADMINISTRATOR OF KENNEY, v. SUPREME LODGE OF THE WORLD, LOYAL ORDER OF MOOSE. CERTIORARI AND ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. Nos. 269, 303. Argued March 23, 1920.-Decided April 19, 1923. A statute denying jurisdiction to the courts of Illinois in actions for damages occasioned by death occurring in another State in consequence of wrongful conduct was construed by the Supreme Court of the State as applying equally to an action on a sister-state judgment founded on such a cause of action. Held, that, so applied, it contravened the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. P. 414. The law of Alabama, which gives a right of action in that State for death by wrongful act, cannot, by its declaration that such actions may not be maintained elsewhere, affect the right to enforce by action in another State a judgment recovered on such a cause of action in Alabama. P. 415. A judgment of a state supreme court giving a meaning and effect to a statute of the State which brings it in conflict with the Federal Constitution is reviewable by writ of error. P. 416. 285 Illinois, 188, reversed; writ of certiorari dismissed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. G. R. Harsh for petitioner and plaintiff in error. Argument for Respondent and Defendant in Error. 252 U. S. Mr. E. J. Henning, with whom Mr. Ralph C. Putnam was on the briefs, for respondent and defendant in error: The matter sought to be reviewed in this court can only be considered upon writ of certiorari, and not by writ of error. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co. v. Gilbert, 245 U. S. 162; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18; Ireland v. Woods, 246 U. S. 327; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477. The writ of certiorari should be dismissed because the application was not timely submitted under the rules of this court and the statutes of the United States. A state court is free to determine its own jurisdiction, without reference to the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373. Where an action is brought upon a judgment of a sister State, the court may always examine the nature of the cause of action upon which the judgment is founded for the purpose of determining if it would have jurisdiction of the real subject-matter of the action, and, if it appears that the court would not have jurisdiction of the original action, it will not have jurisdiction of an action on the judgment. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265. In the Pelican Case, the binding force of the judgment was not questioned; it was given full faith and credit as a judgment, but the court said, "we have no jurisdiction of an action of that nature." Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, follows the rule laid down in the Pelican Case and the Anglo-American Provision Co. Case. It clearly distinguishes between an attack upon the judgment or an inquiry into the merits of the judgment and the determining of a question of jurisdiction. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, establishes no contrary doctrine, as is clearly shown by the discussion in the Anglo-American Provision Co. Case, That the Illinois statute is jurisdictional is held by |