SUMMARY OF POLITICS. NORTHERN WAR. PEACE. The successes of the Russians have, at last, produced the effect of inducing the King of Prussia openly to join them by a treaty of alliance, and, at the same moment, to declare war against France. Thus are these two powers once more pitted against Buonaparte, who, on his side, appears to be making dreadful preparations for recovering the influence he has lost, and for chastising these his late allies. In taking a view of the state of the war on the continent, we will not notice the particulars of that mass of falsehoods which is contained in the divers proclamations and state-papers that have appeared within these four or five months. According to these, each party is in the right; each has been ill used; each has ground of complaint against its adversary. There is, indeed, hardly a word of truth in the whole of their stories, and they are all unworthy of any particular attention. But, on the conduct of the several powers we may remark; and may be able, perhaps, to form something like a correct opinion as to what will be the result of the next campaign. The origin of this Northern war was, the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to fulfil the Treaty of Tilsil, in which he stipulated to adopt the Continental system; that is to say, to shut English commerce out of all the ports under his command. No matter what was the cause of this refusal: the refusal was certainly the cause of the war. The terrible measure of burning Moscow, and the severities of the Russian winter, turned the tide of that war against Napoleon; and, it is not to be at all wondered at, that Prussia has swum with that tide. In fact, the King of Prussia is a mere shuttle-cock between the two Emperors. He is, and he must be, on the side of him who has possession of his dominions. The Duke of Bassano gives a pretty good description and history of the conduct of Prussia from the out-set of the French Revolution to the present day; and, really, when one does consider what that conduct has been, one cannot help smiling to hear the Morning Chronicle say, that the proclamation of his Prussian Majesty to his people will be read by every Englishman with sentiments of delight. What should induce any Englishman to feel delight at any thing which such a King can say to a people? What has he to tell them, except that, having lately been a province of France, his states are now become a province of Russia; and that they, his subjects, who, a few months ago, were fighting for France and the Continental System, are now to fight against France and the Continental System? - -That the means of Napoleon have been very much crippled there can be no doubt, and it may be impossible for him so far to recruit his means, as to be able to re-enter Russia in the course of a single campaign; but, on the other hand, we see that he has been making enormous exertions to this end, and there is no doubt that he will return to the combat with an immense army. We have, during the last twenty years, seen enough to convince us, that the French are a people not to give up easily any object of their ambition. Napoleon is ambitious enough; but he is not more ambitious than other Frenchmen. The enthusiasm of the Revolution; that is to say, the enthusiasm of liberty, against which our Government so long warred in vain, does certainly no longer exist; but, still it is the same people, increased in population, enriched by new sources of industry, and accustomed to conquer. When I consider this, I think that this is the moment to offer Napoléon reasonable terms of peace, lest, by any accident, he should recover his lost ground in the North, in which case, we may be quite sure, that the States of Prussia would pass for ever from the House of Brandenburgh. The same principle, however, which produced this war of twenty years, appears still to animate our Government; namely, a fear of France; a fear, that if she be left undestroyed; or, at least, uncrippled, we cannot be safe. It was this fear that was the avowed ground, upou which Mr. Burke called for the war in 1792, and justified its continuance afterwards. In vain did the Republican government disavow conquest; in vain did it beseech England to look upon France as a friend in the cause of freedom; in vain did it declare that it would make any commercial sacrifice rather than break with England. Nothing would do. France was becoming free, and was evidently about to possess all the vigour of a free state; and this was an object of dread. The example, too, of real freedom, was something formidable in the minds of some | lishments? These are the arguments persons. That example, however, was, unfortunately, soon rendered of no avail. But, still there remained the power, the increased power, of France, in the hands of new men; and that power still remains. While war continues we feel but half the consequences of this power. Peace would shew it to us in all its alarming effects. All the world would flock to France, which is now become the repository of all those things, to have a sight of which people formerly had to travel thousands of miles. France, owing to various causes, is now comparatively lightly taxed; and, in a state of peace, she would scarcely feel the weight of taxation. This circumstance alone would draw thousands and thousands of rich people to her fine climate. The emigration from this country would, in all probability, be very great. By changing countries an Englishman would, indeed, cease to hear speeches and songs about liberty; but, he would, at the same time, lose the pretty little printed papers that are handed to him every now and then, with nice blank spaces for him to write down how much he receives, how much he earns, how many children he has to keep, how many horses, mules, wheels, dogs, footmen, and so forth, he employs, and whether his head be, or be not, powdered. He would, in short, lose the liberty of having a case, at his own expense, drawn up for the Judges, without a Jury, to determine, whether his goods shall, or shall not, be seized, if he refuse to pay the sum, which Commissioners, appointed by the Government, demand from him. Here, in my opinion, we may look for one of the chief causes of the continuation of this war. The cause is a persuasion, in the mind of our Government, that, if France he left as she now is, there would be no safety for England in a state of peace; that the former would, in a few years, grow over her; and, that to begin a new war, at the end of four or five years of peace, would be attended with difficulties not to be overcome. Besides this, peace would do nothing for us, unless we could lay down our fleet and our army; and how could we do either, France being in possession of all her present power and her present means? The time which we must employ in disbanding and dismantling, she would be able to employ in recruiting and building. A peace with the establishments of war would answer us no purpose at all; and yet, if France retain her present power, how are we to dispense with these estab against peace so long as France remains what she now is; and, hence it is concluded, that we ought to persevere in the war, until the power of France be so reduced as to make peace a measure of safety; for, if we never succeed in reducing the power of France, we shall be no worse off than we should be in making a peace with her now, seeing that such a peace must end in our subjugation. Supposing all this to be true, and some part of it is true, what have those to answer for who began the war, and who, by refusing repeatedly to make peace, have, at last, reduced us to such a dilemma? They went to war on the pretence of preventing the French from partaking with the Dutch in the navigation of the river Scheldt; and what has been the result? - However, the grand question is, what is to be done now? Ought we to offer to negotiate, or not, at this moment? Or, ought we to run the risk of another campaign, and to take other chances of reducing the power of France before we negotiate? I think we ought to negotiate if we can; that we ought to see what we are able to do by negotiation, since we have been able to do nothing by war.-I would, for my part, give up all our conquests, I would leave Sicily, Spain, and Portugal to defend themselves; for, after all, leave them we must; I would disband nine-tenths of the army; I would keep up, in good order, a moderate fleet; I would give up the pretended right of impressing people on board the ships of America; I would put arms into the hands of the people of Great Britain and Ireland; I would reform the Parliament; I would reduce the taxes; and then I would set France at defiance. Those who are not prepared to do this; those who are not prepared for doing all these things, must be content with a continuation of the war; for, without reform, and a reduction of taxes at home, it appears to me clear as day-light, that it would be impossible for this country to maintain itself in peace against the overgrowing power of France. France must be reduced by war, or we must make such reforms as to enable us to exist in peace. One of these two must take place, or this nation must fall under the power of France. This is my opinion, and I should be glad to hear any one seriously maintain the contrary. I should be glad to hear what those have to say, who cry out for peace, and who are silent upon the subject of reform at home. I have seen petitions for I am persuaded, at last, come, if the independence of this kingdom is to be preserved. There are people weak enough to believe, that, if the Whigs were in power, we might hope for peace. But, did any man ever hear the Whigs talk of a reform in parliament? Yes, formerly they did; but the moment they were in possession of power they ceased to talk upon such subjects. They are now full as inuch the ene, mies of reform as are any of their oppo nents; so that their talk about peace is 2. mere trick practised against the Ministers, who are much more consistent in talking neither about peace nor reform. They see clearly, that without reform, that is to say, without a great change in the system of ruling this country and managing its resources, including always a reform in the, Commons' House of Parliament, this country cannot exist in peace, if France retains her present power and possessions; and, therefore, as they are bent against reform, they are also bent on war, until the power of France be reduced. They, very likely, have doubts as to the result of the war; they have their fears, perhaps, that the power of France will finally be increased by the war, instead of being reduced by it; but, even in that case, they are consistent; for, it is no matter that ruin come in that way, if they be convinced that ruin would also come in the other way. The Ministers, therefore, are consistent; and those only are inconsistent, who call for peace and are silent upon the subject of Parliamentary Reform. - Now is the moment to offer peace. Napoleon is so situated as to make him lend an ear to such an offer; but, unless you can prevail upon him to give up two-thirds of his power, which is not very likely, it is useless to make peace, if you be not, at the same time, prepared to make a reform at home. - I should be very glad, if I could prevail upon the manufac turers, and upon all those who suffer from the war, to see the matter in this light.They feel the evils of war; the masters are ruined and the journeymen are starved by the war. That is enough: they look no further: they ask for peace. But, they do not reflect on the causes of peace being refused; they do not ask themselves how peace is to be got; they do not take time to inquire into the consequences of peace as things now stand with regard to the relative power of the two countries. If they did, they would soon discover, that peace is not to be had without a parliamentary reform, or without a reduction of the power peace; but I have never noticed them as being worthy of great attention; because I know that no real peace can be made unless it be accompanied with reform; because know, that, until England be made a different place to live in from what it now is, there can be no real peace with France, possessed of all her present power. Those, therefore, who oppose reform, are perfectly consistent in being opposed to peace with France at this time; and, as both the great political factions are opposed to reform, they ought both to be opposed to peace. The Morning Chronicle, which, in general, speaks the sentiments of the Whigs, is often reproving the Ministers for not entering into negotiations for peace. But, will Mr. Perry undertake to shew any one benefit with which peace, without the previous reduction of the power of France, would be attended? A peace would, at once, open all the ports and harbours of France; it would bring out the French ships; it would, in a short time, create a French navy. It would give Napoleon the time and the means to make himself formidable by sea. We must, therefore, keep up our navy to nearly its present amount of force. The army we must also keep up; for he need not disband a single battalion. What saving, therefore, would peace bring us? If it produced no saving of expense, it would, of course, not reduce the taxes; and, if it did not reduce the taxes, who, with such a prospect before him, would remain in England if he could quit it? Who that had ten thousand pounds | would remain here to pay, in one way or another, one-half of the interest of it to the Government, and that, too, without the most distant prospect of alleviation? The nation, under such circumstances, must dwindle into a state of feebleness that would naturally prepare the way for utter subjugation. To reduce the taxes without reducing the army; indeed without disbanding the army, it is nonsense to talk of; to disband the army without putting arms into the hands of the people would be to invite invasion; and, to put arms into the hands of the people, without giving them a share in the concern by the means of a Parliamentary Reform, would be madness.No: as Major Cartwright has long ago contended, and long ago proved, the only sure defence is in an armed people, represented in parliament by persons chosen by that population. His scheme is, that the duty of arms-bearing and the right of voting should go hand in hand: and to this we must, I of France by war; and, of course, instead two furious passions of ambition and re venge: and, whatever they are capable of, In the last Number, p. 562, l. 6, LETTERS OF LORD MOIRA AND MR. WHIT- of calling out for peace, they would call out ALE 227 THREEP (Continued from page 576.) no hesitation in saying, that, to the best of my recollection, it contains the substance of what I said in my place. Some verbal inaccuracies are quite immaterial. I am bound to fulfil your Lordship's hope, by making your Letter to me public. In endeavouring to obtain the explanation of passages so generally misunderstood, I knew not how to proceed effectually, but by motion in the House of Commons; and the motion having been calculated to obtain your Lordship's attendance in the House of Commons, if successful, your Lordship would have had the opportunity of giving the explanations, in the very place where they were asked for; and I never had any doubt of their honourable and satisfactory nature. But the discussions in the House of Commons having now been dropped (as I sincerely hope never again to be revived), I will send your Letter, and my answer, directly to the Public Journals. It will give me pleasure to acknowledge, by the same means, much personal civility received at various times from your Lordship; and particularly in the manner in which I was requested, and the urbanity with which I was received, to peruse the documents to which your Lordship has referred in the early part of the present year. In the discussions which afterwards arose, I did not use the knowledge I had so acquired of any one of them, until after it had appeared in print. I regret, that in the course of these discussions ons I have given momentary pain to their Lordships, or cause of dissatisfaction to any persons, of whose friendship and esteem I was pleased in thinking I possessed a share. The loss, if lost, is entirely my own-it is painful to me. But justice has been the object of my pursuit-that pursuit has been conscientiously conducted by me, and must therefore, of necessity, have been free from all selfish considerations. With the addition of these explanations from your Lordship, so honourable to the Princess of Wales, and so just to yourself, the public will be satisfied, that justice has been completely obtained. I have the honour to be, my dear Lord, your Lordship's obliged attempting to take her to the United States, and obedient servant, SAMUEL WHITBREAD. To the Right Honourable the Eart of Moira, K. G. &c. &c. AMERICAN STATES. and not considering it prudent to trust her into a port of Brazil, particularly St. Salvador, as you will perceive by the enclosed letters 1, 2, and 3, I had no alternative but burning her, which I did on the 31st ult. after receiving all the prisoners and their baggage, which was very tedious work, only having one boat left (out of eight), Commodore Bainbridge to the Secretary of and not one boat left on board the Java. the Navy. St. Salvador, Jan. 3. Sir, I have the honour to inform you, that on the 29th ult. at two p. m. in South lat. 13. 06. and West long. 38. about ten leagues distance from the coast of Brazil, I fell in with and captured His Britannic Majesty's frigate Java, of 49 guns, and upwards of 400 men, commanded by Capt. Lambert, a very distinguished officer. The action lasted one hour and 55 minutes, in which time the enemy was completely dismasted, not having a spar of any kind standing. The loss on board the Constitution was nine killed and 25 wounded. The enemy had 60 killed and 101 wounded certainly (among the latter Capt. Lambert mortally); but by the enclosed letter written on board the ship (by one of the officers of the Java), and accidentally found, it is evident that the enemy's wounded must have been much greater than as above stated, and who must have died of their wounds previously to their being removed. The letter states 60 killed and 170 wounded. For further details of the action, I beg to refer to the extracts from my journal. The Java had, in addition to her own crew, upwards of 100 supernumerary officers and seamen, to join the British ships of war in the East Indies; also Lieut.-General Hislop, appointed to the command of Bombay, Major Wilke, and Captain Wood, of his Staff, and Captain Marshall, Master and Commander of the British navy, going to the East Indies to take the command of a sloop of war there. Should I attempt to do justice, by representation, to the brave and good conduct of all my officers and crew during the action, I should fail in the attempt; therefore, suffice it to say, that the whole of their conduct was such as to merit my highest encomiums. I beg leave to recommend the officers particularly to the notice of Government, as also the unfortunate seamen who were wounded, and the families of those brave men who fell in the action. The great distance from our own coast, and the perfect wreck we made the enemy's frigate, forbade every idea of On blowing up the frigate, I proceed. ed to this place, where I have landed all the prisoners to return to England, and there remain until regularly exchanged, and not serve in their professional capacities in any place or in any manner whatever against the United States of America, until the exchange shall be regularly effected.I have the honour to be, &c. W. BAINBRIDGE, of the United States. I lay before Congress copies of a Proclamation of the British Lieutenant Governor of the island of Bermuda, which has appeared under circumstances leaving no doubt of its authenticity. It recites a British Order in Council of the 26th of October last, providing for the supply of the British West Indies, and other colonial possessions, by a trade under special licenses, and is accompanied by circular instructions to the Colonial Governors, which confines licensed importations from the ports of the United States to the ports of the Eastern States exclusively. The Government of Great Britain had already introduced into her commerce during a war, a system which at once violated the rights of other nations, and, resting on a mass of forgery and perjury unknown to other times, was making an unfortunate progress in undermining those principles of morality and religion which are the best foundation of national happiness. The policy now proclaimed to the world introduces into her mode of warfare a system equally distinguished by the deformity of its features and the depravity of its charac ter; having for its object to dissolve the ties of allegiance, and the sentiments of loyalty in the adversary nation, and to seduce |