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of French tyranny: but, that did not | distance; but, they are a reading and an hinder him from expecting them to be the observing and a calculating people; and,

enemy of impressing men from on board their ships; and, it should have been shown how this disposition proved them to be a willing instrument of French tyranny, or of any tyranny at all. It is useless to revile; it is useless to fly off to other matter. We impress men on board of American ships upon the high seas; we take out (no matter whether by mistake or otherwise) American seamen as well as English; we force them to fight on board our ships; we punish them if they disobey. And, when they, after years of complaints and remonstrances, take up arms in the way of resistance, we tell them that they show themselves the willing instruments and abettors of French tyranny.I wish sincerely that this passage had been omitted. There are other parts of the " DECLARATION" that I do not like; but this part appears to me likely to excite a great deal of ill-will; of lasting, of rooted, ill-will. I do not like the word "professed," as applied to the American principles of freedom. The meaning of that word, as here applied, cannot be equivocal, and assuredly would have been better left out, especially as we never see, in any of the American documents, any expressions of the kind applied to us and to our Government. But, to take another view of the matter, why should His Royal Highness expect the Americans to be disinclined towards France, because they profess principles of freedom? Why should he, on this account, expect that they would lean to our side in the war? Does the Declaration mean to say, that the Government of France is more tyrannical than was that monarchy, for the restoration of which a league was made in Europe in the years 1792 and 1793?-From its tone, the Declaration may be construed to mean, that our Government is more free than that of France, and that, therefore, we might have expected the Americans, who profess principles of freedom, to be on our side in a contest against "French ** tyranny." Hem! Mum! - Well, well! We will say nothing about the matter; but, it must be clear to every one, that the Americans may have their own opinion upon the subject; and, they may express it too, until we can get at them with an Ex-Officio. They may have their own opinion upon the matter; and their opinion may possibly differ from ours. They are, to be sure, at a great

I'll engage, that there is not a farmer in the back States who is not able to give a pretty good account of the blessings of "English liberty." - Besides, leaving this quite out of the question; supposing that the Americans should think us freemen and the French slaves, why should that circumstance prevent them from leaning to the side of France? What examples of the effect of such morality amongst nations have the Regent's ministers to produce? How often have we seen close alliances between free and despotic states against states either free or despotic? How often have we been on the side of despots against free States? England was once in offensive alliance with France against Holland; Holland and France against England; and, it ought never to be forgotten, that England, not many years ago, favoured the invasion of Holland and the subjugation of the States General by a Prussian army. Have we not formed alliances with Prussia, Austria, Russia, Spain, Naples, and all the petty princes of Germany against the Republic of France? Nay, have we refused, in that war, the co-operation of Turkey and Algiers? And, as for the old Papa of Rome, "the Whore of Babylon," as our teachers call him, his alliance has been accounted holy by us, and his person an object of our peculiar care and protection. Why, then, are we to expect, that America is to refrain from consulting her interests, if they be favoured by a leaning towards France? Why is she to be shut out from the liberty of forming connexions with a despotism, supposing a despotism now to exist in France? The truth is, that, in this respect, as in private life, it is interest alone that guides and that must guide; and, in my mind, it is not more reasonable to expect America to lean on our side on account of the nature of the Government of our enemy, than it would be to expect a Presbyterian to sell his sugar to a Churchman, because the only man that bade him a higher price was a Catholic. - Here I should stop; but, an article, upon the same subject, in the Morning Chronicle of the 13th instant, calls for observation. Upon the falsehoods and impudence of the Times and the Courier, that is to say, the principal prints on the side of the Wellesley party and that of the Ministers, I have remarked often enough. I was anxious to hear what the Whigs had to say, and here we have it. Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Brougham had pledged themselves to support the war, if America was not satisfied with the repeal of the Orders in Council; and here we have the grounds of that support. On this account the article is interesting, and, of course, worthy of an attentive perusal. "Notwithstanding the tedious length " of the papers on both sides, the question "between the Court of London and the "Government of the United States is sim"ply the right of impressment of seamen on " board trading ships-and this is in truth "the sole cause of the war.-If we were to "examine the value of this cause to the "two parties, it cannot be denied but that "to the Americans it is exceedingly slight, " and to the British highly material. The "Americans cannot regard it as an insull, "because it is a right which has been at all "limés asserted and acquiesced in by Sove"reign Stales respectively. Then viewed as an injury what is it? That they shall go to war to prevent British subjects who " have forfeited their allegiance, abandon"ed their country, and left their families " probably starving, from being impressed

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on board their merchant vessels that is "to say; they claim the right to afford an " asylum and employ the refuse of the Bri"tish navy-men without principle, for it " is only the profligate that are likely to become the objects of their protection. In "this view, then, the point is of little consequence to the Americans, but it is " interesting to the British to assert the power inherent in every State to reclaim "its subjects; and the time may come "when the principle would be equally im"portant to America herself. But, say "the American Ministers, it is not so "much the right itself, as the violent and "insulting mode of exercising it that we "complain of; for we have upon reflection "agreed in the principle of international "law, that free bottoms do not make free "goods, and therefore we have no objec" tion to the search of our merchant ships " for contraband of war; but in that case, " whenever warlike stores, &c. are found " on board an American vessel, she is de"tained and carried into a port, for adju"dication by a competent Court. Whe"ther the adjudication be always impartial " or not is another affair, but in this re"spect nations are on an equal footing, and "these Admiralty Courts, well or ill-con"ducted, are recognized by all maritime "nations. But with respect to the impressment of seamen, the act is violent

"because summary, and because it is sub"ject to no revisal-to no adjudication" and because the individual seized has no

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means of redress. By this sort of rea"soning there is a tacit admission on the " part of America, that it is not to the act "itself which they object so much as "to the manner of the act; and accord"ingly we see various suggestions made by "Americans, for entering into an amicable "discussion on the means of getting over "the outrageous way in which the right is " exercised, and of giving security to both "nations against the abuse in question. "On the other side, Lord Castlereagh de"clares the readiness of the British Go"vernment to receive and discuss any pro" position on this subject coming from the "American Government; though he would " not enter into a negociation, a prelimi"nary to which should be the concession " of this right, and so far we think he was " clearly right. But is it not monstrous "that two people of common origin, and of " almost inseparable interests, should re"main at war on a point upon which there " is so little difference between them? "Surely without any sacrifice of etiquette " on either side, the expedients might be "canvassed, by which this nighty cause of "war 'might be removed. Let each party " promulgate their thoughts on the subject, " and if there be an honest disposition to " peace, it must follow. The argument " on both sides is short, and may be put " in a few words. The agreement ought "to be so drawn as to make it most dan"gerous to the Captain of an American "ship to employ a British seaman on board; " and, on the other side, to make it equally " dangerous for a British Captain to seize " and carry off an American seaman, under " pretext of his being a British subject. "Or, in other words, it ought to be made "their interest to abstain from those two "causes of national offence. Various modes " have been suggested for this purpose."The most effectual undoubtedly would "be to ordain by a treaty, that the sub"jects of each power, if found on board "the merchants' vessels of the other,

should be considered in the nature of con"traband of war, inasmuch as their na"tural Sovereign was thereby deprived of "their service in war, and that that "should be a cause to detain the vessel for " adjudication. By this the American "Captain or his owners would most seri"ously suffer by having British seamen on " board; and, on the other hand, the Bri

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"tish Captain would equally suffer, if he
"had all the risk and loss to incur of an
" improper detention. Against this, how-
"ever, the arguments are strong. The
"American Captain may have been impo-
"sed upon by the similarity of language,
" &c.; and when brought into one of our
"ports, where there is a competent Court
"to adjudge the point, a real American
"seaman might find it impossible to ad-
" duce proofs of his nativity. Besides, in
both events, the penalty would be inor-
"dinate. Another suggestion has been
"made, that the British naval officer im-
" pressing a seaman on board an American
“ vessel, and vice versa, should be bound
"to make a certificate in duplicate (or
"what the French call a proces verbal), to
"the fact, one copy of which he should
"deliver to the American Captain, and
"transmit the other to the Admiralty to
" be filed; and that the seaman seized
" should have his action for damages in the
"Courts of Law, the certificate to be pro-
"duced by the Admiralty as proof of the
"trespass, if the person can prove himself
"to be a native of the country that he
" pretended to be. We confess we think Botley, 14th January, 1813.

America are of no value? And, when we
know, when no man will deny, when
official records of the fact exist, that
hundreds of native Americans have been
impressed and sent to serve on board our
ships of war: when this is notorious; when
it neither will nor can be denied, what is
of value to America if this cause be not of
value?-As to the proposition for making
English seamen "contraband of war," it
is so impudent, it is so shameful, it is even
so horrid, that I will do no more than just
name it, that it may not escape the reader's
indignation. Indeed, there needs no more
than the reading of this one article to con-
vince the Americans, that all the factions
in England are, in effect, of one mind upon
the subject of this war; and, I am afraid,
that this conviction will produce conse-
quences, which we shall have sorely to
lanent, though I shall, for my own part,
always have the satisfaction to reflect, that
every thing which it was in my power to
do, has been done, to prevent those conse-
quences.

" that this ought to satisfy both Govern"ments, for this would make officers cau"tious in exercising the right which at the "same time cannot be safely surrendered." This is poor, paltry trash. But, it contains one assertion, which I declare to be false. It is here asserted, that "the right of im" pressment of seamen on board of trading "ships, is a right which has, at all times " been asserted, and acquiesced in by sove" reign states respectively." -I give this an unqualified denial. I say, that it is a right, which no nation has before as serted, and that no nation ever acquiesced in.Let the Morning Chronicle name the nation that has ever done either: let him cite the instance of such a practice as we insist upon; let him name the writer, every English writer, on public law, who has made even an attempt to maintain such a doctrine; nay, let him name the writer, who has laid down any principle, or maxim, from which such a right can possibly be deduced. And, if he can do none of these, what assurance, what a desperate devotion to faction, must it be to enable a man to make such an assertion! The assertion of the "value of the cause" being slight to America, in comparison to what it is to us, has no better foundation. The value! what is of value, what is of any value at all, if the liberty and lives of the people of

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Wм. СОВВЕТТ.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES. -- Declaration of the
Regent of England against them.

The earnest endeavours of the Prince Re

gent to preserve the relations of peace and amity with the United States of America having unfortunately failed, His Royal Highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, deems it proper publicly to declare the causes and origin of the war, in which the Government of the United States has compelled him to engage. - No desire of conquest, or other ordinary motive of aggression has been, or can be, with any colour of reason, in this case, imputed to Great Britain: that her commercial interests were on the side of peace, if war could have been avoided, without the sacrifice of her maritime rights, or without an injurious submission to France, is a truth which the American Government will not deny. His Royal Highness does not, however, mean to rest on the favourable presumption to which he is entitled. He is prepared, by an exposition of the circumstances which have led to the present war, to shew that Great Britain has throughout acted towards the United States of America with a spirit of amity, forbearance, and conciliation; and to demonstrate the inadmissible nature of those pretensions, which have at length unhappily involved the two countries in war. It is well known to the world, that it has been the invariable object of the Ruler of France, to destroy the power and independence of the British Empire, as the chief obstacle to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs. He first contemplated the possibility of assembling such a naval force in the Channel as, combined with a numerous flotilla, should enable him to disembark in England an

circumstances of unparalleled provocation, His Majesty had abstained from any measure, which the ordinary rules of the law of nations did not fully warrant. Never was the maritime superiority of a Belligerent over his enemy more complete and decided. Never was the opposite Belligerent so formidably dangerous in his power, and in his policy to the liberties of all other nations. France had already trampled so openly and systematically on the most sacred rights of neutral powers, as might well have justified the placing her out of the pale of civilized nations. Yet in this ex

army sufficient, in his conception, to sub-treme case Great Britain had so used her

jugate this country; and through the conquest of Great Britain he hoped to realize his project of universal empire. By the adoption of an enlarged and provident system of internal defence, and by the valour of His Majesty's fleets and armies, this design was entirely frustrated; and the naval force of France, after the most signal defeats, was compelled to retire from the ocean.--An attempt was then made to effectuate the same purpose by other means; a system was brought forward, by which the Ruler of France hoped to annihilate the commerce of Great Britain, to shake her public credit, and to destroy her revenue; to render useless her maritime superiority, and so to avail himself of his continental ascendency, as to constitute himself, in a great measure, the arbiter of the ocean, notwithstanding the destruction of his fleets. -With this view, by the Decree of Berlin, followed by that of Milan, he declared the British territories to be in a state of blockade; and that all commerce, or even correspondence with Great Britain was prohibited. He decreed that every vessel and cargo which had entered, or was found proceeding to a British port, or which, under any circumstances, had been visited by a British ship of war, should be lawful prize: he declared all British goods and produce wherever found, and however acquired, whether coming from the Mother Country, or from her colonies, subject to confiscation: he further declared to be denationalized the flag of all neutral ships that should be found offending against these his decrees: and he gave to this project of universal tyranny the name of the Continental System. -For these attempts to ruin the commerce of Great Britain, by means subversive of the clearest rights of neutral nations, France endeavoured in vain to rest her justification upon the previous conduct of His Majesty's Government. - Under

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naval ascendency, that her enemy could
find no just cause of complaint: and in or-
der to give to these lawless decrees the ap-
pearance of retaliation, the Ruler of France
was obliged to advance principles of mari-
time law unsanctioned by any other authori-
ty than his own arbitrary will.
pretexts for these decrees were, first, that
Great Britain had exercised the rights of
war against private persons, their ships and
goods, as if the only object of legitimate
hostility on the ocean were the public pro-
perty of a State, or as if the edicts, and
the Courts of France itself had not at all
times enforced this right with peculiar ri-
gour. Secondly, that the British orders of
blockade, instead of being confined to for-
tified towns, had, as France asserted, been
unlawfully extended to commercial towns
and ports, and to the mouths of rivers;
and thirdly, that they had been applied to
places, and to coasts, which neither were,
nor could be actually blockaded. The last
of these charges is not founded on fact,
whilst the others, even by the admission of
the American Government, are utterly
groundless in point of law.

Against these Decrees, His Majesty protested and appealed; he called upon the United States to assert their own rights, and to vindicate their independence, thus menaced and attacked; and as France had declared, that she would confiscate every vessel which should touch in Great Britain, or be visited by British ships of war, His Majesty having previously issued the Order of January 1807, as an act of mitigated retaliation, was at length compelled, by the persevering violence of the enemy, and the continued acquiescence of neutral powers, to revisit, upon France, in a more effectual inanner, the measure of her own injustice; by declaring, in an Order in Council, bearing date the 11th of November 1807, that no neutral vessel should proceed to France, or to any of the countries from which, in obedience to the dictates of France, British commerce was excluded, without first touching at a port in Great Britain, or her dependencies. At the same time His Majesty intimated his readiness to repeal the Orders in Council, whenever France should rescind her Decrees, and return to the accustomed principles of maritime warfare; and at a subsequent period, as a proof of His Majesty's sincere desire to accommodate, as far as possible, his defensive measures to the convenience of neutral powers, the operation of the Orders in Council was, by an order issued in April 1809, limited to a blockade of France, and of the countries subjected to her immediate dominion. Systems of violence, oppression, and tyranny, can never be suppressed, or even checked, if the power against which such injustice is exercised, be debarred from the right of full and adequate retaliation: or, if the measures of the retaliating power, are to be considered as matters of just offence to neutral nations, whilst the measures of original aggression and violence, are to be tolerated with indifference, sub. mission, or complacency. The Government of the United States did not fail to remonstrate against the Orders in Council of Great Britain. Although they knew that these Orders would be revoked, if the Decrees of France, which had occasioned them, were repealed, they resolved at the same moment to resist the conduct of both Belligerents, instead of requiring France, in the first instance, to rescind her Decrees, Applying most unjustly the same measure of resentment to the aggressor, and to the party aggrieved, they adopted measures of commercial resistance against both a system of resistance which, however varied in the successive acts of embargo, non-intercourse, or non-importation, was evidently unequal in its operation, and principally levelled against the superior commerce, and maritime power of Great Britain. The same partiality towards France was observable, in their negociations, as in their measures of alleged resistance. Application was made to both Belligerents for a revocation of their respective edicts; but the terms in which they were made were widely different. Of France was required a revocation only of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, although many other edicts, grossly violating the neutral commerce of the United States, had been promulgated by that Power. No

security was demanded, that the Berlin and Milan Decrees, even if revoked, should not under some other form be reestablished; and a direct engagement was offered, that upon such revocation, the American Government would take part in the war against Great Britain, if Great Britain did not immediately rescind her Orders.-Whereas no corresponding engagement was offered to Great Britain, of whom it was required, not only that the Orders in Council should be repealed, but that no others of a similar nature should be issued, and that the blockade of May, 1806, should be also abandoned. This blockade, established and enforced according to accustomed practice, had not been objected to by the United States at the time it was issued. Its provisions were on the contrary represented by the American Minister resident in London at the time, to have been so framed, as to afford, in his judgment, a proof of the friendly disposition of the British Cabinet towards the United States. Great Britain was thus called upon to abandon one of her most important maritime rights, by acknowledging the Order of blockade in question, to be one of the edicts which violated the commerce of the United States, although it had never been so considered in the previous negocia tions; and although the President of the United States had recently consented to abrogate the Non-Intercourse Act, on the sole condition of the Orders in Council being revoked; thereby distinctly admitting these orders to be the only edicts which fell within the contemplation of the law, under which he acted. A proposition so hostile to Great Britain could not but be proportionably encouraging to the pretensions of the enemy; as by thus alleging that the blockade of May 1806, was illegal, the American Government virtually justified, so far as depended on them, the French Decrees. After this proposition had been made, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, if not in concert with that Government, at least in conformity with its views, in a dispatch, dated the 5th of August, 1810, and addressed to the American Minister resident at Paris, stated that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, and that their operation would cease from the Ist day of November following, provided His Majesty would revoke his Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade; or that the United States would cause their rights to be respected; meaning thereby,

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