Mr. MORRILL, of Vermont. Mr. President, let me say in the outset that the message from the President, accompanying the report of the commissioners, has my cordial approval. || If a partisan press has heretofore assailed his character, that, in the face of the report, will be no longer possible. The President wisely remits the question to the voice of the people, and stands, as at his inauguration, with no policy to enforce against their wishes. This I regard as an end of a vexed question; and I should not have trespassed upon the patience of the Senate only that I think it just and fair that some of the reasons for regarding the annexation of Santo Domingo with disfavor should be allowed to have utterance at the same time with the dissemination of a report which is likely to attract more or less the attention of the country.

Mr. President, differing as I do from the President as to his Santo Domingo policy, it is only just to say in the outset that I have ever freely accorded to him the credit of being actuated by the purest motives in whatever he has done to promote the swift accomplishment of annexation. In his methods he may have committed errors, but his intentions, I feel confident, will bear the scrutiny of the final Judge of all men. Let those who have done truer and braver work for their country, if any such there be, assail President Grant, but as for me I hold no title to give point to any sentence with the purpose of inflicting a stab upon his reputation. All parts of his late annual || message were able-most of it exceedingly satisfactory to the country-but there was no part of it more elaborate than that touching Santo Domingo. It is a subject deserving serious examination, and I wish an answer might be made in terms as terse and of equal clearness ||

as those employed in the message; but it is my purpose to touch upon only a few of the points there and elsewhere so strongly urged. În doing this, however, I shall be frank and earnest. Less than this would neither be truthful to the State I in part represent nor respectful to the Senate.

The report of the commissioners may speak well of the climate because, in five weeks, it never hurt them; favorably of the soil because it really produces bananas and pine-apples, never seen in Ohio, New York, or Massachusetts; slightingly of the iron, copper, and gold mines, as they had annihilated "distance," the only thing that "lends enchantment to the view," and the inhabitants may not have been aware that they were expected to produce anything valuable of this sort; despondingly of finding coal at Samana, where there is only a poor show of lignite; but the report will be well sprinkled with salt-Syracuse must look after its saltness-and yet it will be found neither more exhaustive nor reliable than a large number of works from the hands of impartial travelers who have heretofore visited the island and devoted far more time to the investigation of facts. Their report may be faithful as to what they saw, but it cannot supersede authorities of equal character and much larger opportunities, and will be chiefly valuable for vindicating, what needed no vindication, the personal integrity of the President and that of the gallant young officer charged with negotiating the defeated treaty.

ANNEXATION FINAL-DIVORCE FOREVER IMPOSSIBLE.

A treaty, or joint resolution, of annexation once made and adopted must be final and irrevocable. However sad and long the train of evils succeeding, there is absolutely no remedy. Divorce is impossible. After the Missouri

not any official, who can obtain nominal supremacy in the government of his people, count on the flag and the Treasury of the United States as an ally whenever he is ready to betray and sell his country? The American Republic should be the protector, the counselor, and guide of all her sister.republics, and not a ravenous beast of prey.

If our natural growth prior to our late war excited the envy and distrust of the aristocracy of England and France, because, as they said, || we were becoming too arrogant and aggressive, can we not be content therewith without seeking extraordinary accessions to our bulk, and such accessions, too, as will be far more likely to contribute to our downfall than to our up-building? The natural growth of a free country must be respected, be let alone, and will receive the universal admiration of freemen, but a forced or artificial growth is not only often circumvented, but nearly always a positive calamity.

ARE OUR PEOPLE NOW HOMOGENEOUS.

It is useless to disguise the fact that the people of a portion of our present territory have not become assimilated with the American people and American institutions, and the time when they will do so must be computed, not by years, but by generations.

To say

nothing of our lately acquired Siberia, com. monly called Alaska, it must be conceded that Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and that portion of Texas bordering upon Mexico are yet not only essentially un-American, but they have no overwhelming attachment to our form of government nor to the Anglo-Saxon race. Their first love was of a different complexion. If the strong arm of the United States should at any time become weak, it would receive no succor from these localities, (the conspicuous acquisitions of manifest destiny,) but their population would at any time, most likely, flock to the banner of any cocked-hat revolu tionist. Their civilization is at variance and not in harmony with our own. Having little commerce and almost wholly destitute of educational institutions, they are making no advances in the arts or sciences, literature or politics, and are neither better nor worse than they were years ago. It is certainly a matter to be regretted that any portion of our Union should seem to lag in the rear of the highest type of civilization, but it must be a sorry consolation to them or to us to add to the Union still darker patches in order to give to the places indicated the conspicuous advantages of a contrast.

It is also to be apprehended that the late masters of the emancipated race in the southern States will make few sacrifices for the enlightenment of that race or do anything which will elevate the colored people above depend

ence.

The unflinching policy of all the States

lately in rebellion would seem to be to subordinate the black man, intellectually as well as politically, and to give him no means of support except in accordance with compacts to which he is not an equal party. Under a system like this millions of freedmen may continue to have their ancient ignorance fostered and perpetuated and the prospect of making them intelligent citizens, enjoying the protection of of our Government-if they can be said to enjoy it—and giving in return a full equivalent therefor, will not very speedily be realized. result is that the master race, embittered by defeat in the recent conflict, studies political revenge for the future,. and the freedman is to be kept in such poverty and ignorance as to make him of little value to himself and of still less to his country.

The

These may be unwelcome truths, but if their verity is undeniable, prudent statesmanship requires that we should not be deluded by the vain idea that the consequences may be avoided by denial or by silence. The risks of the future ought not to be multiplied, though all the ragged and fugitive kingdoms of the world should seek annexation to us and show an eagerness to undertake their part of the risk. There are but few of even the brightest spots on earth which under any circumstances would be acceptable to us, and none that should be urged by any appliances of the Treasury or Navy. We desire to retain the prestige of teaching nations by our example how to govern themselves, rather than to imperil our own existence by attempting to govern the incapables, whether near or remote, upon fat soils or lean. cannot confer freedom upon any foreign people, much less upon a people who have not earned it, nor have the sense and energy to accept it. Freedom is the reward of merit, and not a subject of commerce or charity. At home we may make freemen of slaves or savages, but they will be so nominally only, requiring the protection of older freemen until they have been educated up to the point of appreciating their new privileges. Meanwhile they must be objects of solicitude, to some extent of weakness and of increased expenditure.

BAY OF SAMANA A COSTLY ELEPHANT.

We

One of the arguments in behalf of annexation is that we need the bay of Samana as a harbor for the protection of our commerce. Why do we need it? Certainly not for a coaling station unless we first carry coal there. Santo Domingo embraces the easternmost part of the island, far beyond St. Thomas, Cuba, and Jamaica, and almost entirely outside of the ordinary routes of commerce, with the Atlantic on one side and the Caribbean sea on the other. Even the steamships for Aspinwall pass west of Hayti, and of course far out of the way of Samana, which is six degrees

east of New York. The trade of Vera Cruz and the Gulf States passes between the Florida Keys and Cuba-being much the shortest distance-and, when returning north, of course all vessels seek to secure the considerable advantage of the Guif stream. The perils of foreign ownership of the West India islands have not hitherto crippled American shipping, and are not likely to embarrass it in the least hereafter. No trade passing to Louisiana, Texas, or Mexico would for a moment call at the bay of Samana, lying easterly and far out of the way, while the "Windward passage" also lies west even of Hayti and east of the|| most easterly part of Cuba. Only the "Mona passage" lies east of Santo Domingo, and the commerce taking this route is mainly that small amount which goes in the direction of Venezuela.

The fact that the Tennessee, sent out on a national mission, with five hundred men and nine alert newspaper reporters on board, was as much lost to the world for the long period of thirty-three days as though she had been navigating in the open Polar sea, exhibits in the strongest light the absence of trade and ships in the route to Samana, and also its useless remoteness as a harbor for us or any other nation. The bay, too shallow for ships even of the second class, like the Tennessee, to approach within three miles of the shores to receive coal, and proverbially unhealthy, offers no protection whatever to American shipping interests. Whenever those interests may need protection, it will be only in time of war, and none but active cruisers, ships of war not afraid to venture forth out of harbors, would there be of any service. A navy cooped up in the bay || of Samana and defended by powerful shore batteries, might be out of the reach of an enemy, but it would be of no value to any exposed commerce. Vessels of war go forth to fight, not to seek shelter.

If we need a naval station in the West Indies, do we not need one much more in the Mediterranean? Really we need nothing|| of the sort anywhere. The Algerine and other pirates on the coast of Africa have seen something of the American Navy, and will not be likely to forget it. Commerce is as safe there as in Chesapeake bay. In the China seas or Japan there is far more reason for a naval station than here at home, where we have on our own shores any number of good and safe harbors, and which are more formidable to a foreign enemy than Samana could be made by an expenditure of millions. The acquisition of Samana bay was originally based upon a supposed necessity discovered by Secretary Seward, and which really temporarily existed during a time when all of our southern harbors were held by rebels; but no sane man can suppose such a condition of affairs is

to be again apprehended and provided for, and if it were to be apprehended, future traitors might be expected to obtain quicker and easier possession of Samana-like another Norfolk-than of Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah, or Charleston. Samana may be safely dismissed with the rebellion, and with it the countless millions of expenditure which a great oceanic naval station would involve.

But it is insisted that we want a naval station in the bay of Samana for the security of our commerce. The baselessness of this assumption will be further seen from the fact that we have, and can have, but the merest pittance of commerce which can ever display itself in that harbor. It all goes and must go further west or further east. To reach Samana, even the trade which now goes nearest must sail two hundred and forty miles out of the way to reach this out of the way station, and then sail back again two hundred and forty miles-making in all a voyage of four hundred and eighty miles-to no purpose; for when Samana is thus reached the only business is, and would be, to get away, as the bay is as empty as that part of the Lake Gennesaret, where Simon Peter and his partners, James and John, toiled all night taking nothing. Besides, if a harbor were needed, unless we were at war with Hayti, there are other harbors far more convenient near at hand-Gonaives, St. Marc, Port au Prince, and, if not at war with Great Britain, there is a fine harbor directly in the route of commerce, at Kingston, Jamaica. It is not likely we shall be at war with either of the countries named, certainly not with both, unless we should ourselves inspire the cause by an act of petty larceny, and be caught with Santo Domingo in our pockets. If we merely want harbors for peaceful commerce they are to be had for nothing, ever gratuitously open to our use.

Before we can possibly need a naval station at Samana we must build up commerce there, and then create a naval fleet to be placed there for its protection; a course not unlike that of the boy who buys a dear purse before he has anything to put in it. We have no commerce now in Santo Domingo; but it is assumed that if we only provide for its protection, though it would need no such protection if we had it, that it would spring forth as miraculously as the gushing water from the rock touched by the rod of Moses. Our greatest foreign commerce is with Liverpool, and yet that port is three thousand miles away from any naval station of the United States. It is quite apparent, if we are strong at home, that our flag alone will protect us anywhere abroad. Respect is inspired by the banner which represents power in reserve, rather than by a few guns floating in distant seas, and which could not float whenever a larger number of hostile

guns appeared. National plunderers, as well as private corsairs of the ocean, have disappeared before the march of modern civilization, and treaties of amity and commerce now guard the trade of the world.

Can it be pretended that we need Samana for the purpose of national defense, when we have nothing there, unless we first place it there, to defend? Who is to attack us? Who threatens in the background? Nobody! If Great Britain may rely upon the security that the "streak of silver sea" affords, we know that for the United States the broad Atlantic is a much more impassable bulwark. But in order to make Samana a defensive point we have first to go two thousand miles to fortify it, and then go there to be defended. We leave places of safety to find shelter where weaker nations are our equals, where many naval Powers are our superiors, and where the climate gives the black man very little quarter, and the white man none at all.

The plea that we want the harbor of Samana for any purpose is only a link in the evidence that Hayti, not Santo Domingo, is really coveted and sought, for the harbors of Hayti only could furnish any real accommodation, being far better and less remote. The air in the bay is stagnant, and not even freshened by the trade winds, as the bay is so land-locked that they do not penetrate beyond its mouth. On shore the land front has been gobbled up by the perpetual leases obtained by such diligent seekers of thrift as Fabens, O'Sullivan, and Cazneau.

We are asked to buy the site, next to improve and fortify it, and then to occupy it with a naval fleet, with the vain idea that we might thus fire the languid brains and torpid muscles of the Dominicans to make sugar, grow coffee, and hack down the mahogany trees in such incredible quantities as to glut the world with their exports. We are asked to launch one expenditure which drags after it numerous others of greater and constantly increasing magnitude, and all for the desperate purpose of establishing a permanent commerce and American institutions where nothing has been permanent but failures and revolutions, or for the even more desperate purpose of finding security for our Republic by making fast to a tropical island, whose foundations have been often shaken by earthquakes, and which is scarred all over with the political as well as atmospherical hurricanes of previous centuries.

The frank-spoken sailor, Commander Selfridge, in one of his letters to the Secretary of the Navy, July 14, 1869, starts most unpleasant suggestions. He writes:

"If it is the desire of the Government to possess a port in the island of Hayti either by purchase or lease, I know of no port in the West Indies in convenience of approach, facility of defense, salubrity of position, or of strategic situation, that the port of Nicola Mole, on the northwestern extremity of

Hayti, possesses.

for negotiation.

Now is the most propitious time

Salnave must have money, and a gift of a wornout monitor or two would hasten matters.

"While my short stay in the island will not permit me to speak with authority, it is my individual opinion that if the United States should annex Hayti on the representation of a party it would be found an elephant both costly in money and lives." I have no doubt that nine tenths of our officers, both military and naval, if called upon, would testify that, even with an expenditure of millions, the bay of Samana would be a source of weakness to the United States.

It should also be noted when we have got our naval vessels into the torrid zone-and all of Santo Domingo is within that zone-that by the regulations of the Navy our men cease from labor and are permitted to hire natives. to attend to the ship, a privilege not likely to remain a dead letter among "old salts." Let me quote from the regulations of the United States Navy for 1870 to officers commanding vessels:

222. In cruising in the torrid zone he may engage the natives to attend the ship and carry provisions and water, if it should be advisable to do so in order to preserve the health of the crew."

Would it not be more advisable to preserve the health of the crew, and our own moral and political health as well, by letting Santo Domingo severely alone? If the Navy must be permitted to employ natives to do even ordinary work on shipboard, who will our agriculturists, miners, and mechanics, who may be seduced to go there, find it advisable to employ to do the extraordinary work of supporting "ten millions of people in luxury," which the President has intimated can be done?

LAND ENough alrEADY.

Although I have never had any filibustering ideas as to the manifest destiny or miraculous growth of our country, I yet have an abiding faith in the prospective character and greatness of the people of America, however territorially bounded. It is true that territorial expansions have some undefinable fascinations for the Anglo-Saxon race, and they are not to be wholly proscribed as wicked, for they arc sometimes innocent; but the merest tyro cannot blink out of sight the fact that gross bulk, or geographical extent, is not the only nor the most vital element which figures in the estimate of a great and enlightened nation. The intelligence and the virtue, the industry and the courage, the intellect and the stamina of the people, not the sum total of their property in dirt, form the grander part of the basis upon which rest the claims of all nations to rank among their contemporaries or in the history that survives their end.

If the question now were barely the acquisition of more land, unincumbered by population-although we have land enough and to spare, homesteads even to give away-it would have an aspect somewhat less objectionable.